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Chapter 1 Introduction  
 
The transition from coal to oil between 1945 and 1975 was the main driver of both an 
unprecedented expansion of the Port of Rotterdam and the fundamental 
transformation of its German hinterland. The oil industry was the key element of 
Rotterdam’s post-war rise to becoming the world’s largest port, as oil became the 
dominant cargo flow through its docks.1 However, the extent to which this affected 
the port’s relations with the German hinterland – historically Rotterdam’s primary 
hinterland – is little understood. Indeed, the historiography of the port and its 
relationships with the German hinterland has generally focused on the pre-1940 
period, when Rotterdam and the Ruhr area were strongly connected through the 
Rhine shipping of bulk goods such as coal, iron ore, pitwood and grains.2  
After 1945, the stream of scholarly work on port-hinterland relations dried up. 
The transition from coal to oil and the subsequent rise of the Port of Rotterdam and 
the industrial decline of the Ruhr area have been accepted as having reduced 
Rotterdam’s reliance on its German hinterland. The oil and petrochemical cluster that 
emerged in the port after 1945 is generally understood to have made it less dependent 
on German transit flows.3 However, this interpretation is contested. The German 
geographer Renate Laspeyres, for instance, highlighted that Rotterdam remained 
hugely important for iron ore imports into the Ruhr area, causing a locational shift to 
the Rhine of the region’s steel industry.4 Moreover, Europoort, the port’s largest post-
war expansion, was constructed in the late-1950s and early 1960s when a massive rise 
in oil refinery capacity in the West German Rhine-Ruhr area required a port that 
could handle large tankers and host a pipeline to supply the new refineries with crude 
oil.5 Furthermore, the oil port itself was highly international. For instance, the 
capacity of its refineries was the largest in Western Europe, and the port exported 
over 50 per cent of its production.6 Accordingly, there is little doubt that the 
                                               
1 For instance: F. de Goey, Ruimte voor industrie. Rotterdam en de vestiging van industrie in de haven 
1945-1975 (Rotterdam 1990) 21-25. Between 1946 and 1973, the share of crude oil and oil products 
in the total cargo flow through the Port of Rotterdam increased from 27 to 70 per cent.  
2 H.A.M. Klemann and F. Wielenga, ‘Die Niederlande und Deutschland, oder verschwindet die 
nationale Ökonomie?’, in: H.A.M. Klemann and F. Wielenga (eds.), Deutschland und die Niederlande, 
Wirtschaftsbeziehungen im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (Münster 2009) 11-13; R. Laspeyres, Rotterdam und 
das Ruhrgebiet (Marburg 1969) 195.  
3 F. de Goey, and H. van Driel, ‘Rotterdam und das Hinterland (1920-1995)’, in: H.A.M. Klemann 
and F. Wielenga (eds.), Deutschland und die Niederlande, Wirtschaftsbeziehungen im 19. und 20. 
Jahrhundert (Münster 2009) passim. 
4 Laspeyres, Rotterdam, 126-127, 151. 
5 De Goey, Ruimte voor industrie, 81. 
6 See Appendix B: Data Table 0-6. The refinery capacity in Western Europe by region, 1950-75 (in 
million tons); Royal Dutch Shell’s Rotterdam-Pernis refinery, for instance, exported on average 70 per 
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transition from coal to oil fundamentally changed the Port of Rotterdam and, in turn, 
profoundly affected its relationship with its German hinterland. The extent of this has 
not, however, yet been fully appreciated.7  
The purpose of this study is to revisit the post-war history of the Rotterdam oil 
port from a transnational perspective, i.e. from the viewpoint of its relations to the 
German hinterland. In particular, the research questions how and why the transition 
from coal to oil affected the relationship between the port and the German hinterland 
between 1945 and 1975. Sections one and two of this chapter briefly outline the post-
war histories of the port and the Rhine-Ruhr area, particularly in the context of the 
transition from coal to oil. Thereafter, following a discussion of the historiography in 
section three, section four will consider theoretical issues. Then, the research 
questions will be formulated in section five, before the chapter ends with a discussion 
of the methodology in section six.  
 
1.1 The rise of oil and the decline of coal, 1945-1975 
Between 1890 and 1940, the relationship between Rotterdam and the Ruhr area was 
cast in coal.8 Coal was the basis for the economic and industrial development of the 
Ruhr region, and it was this area’s growing need to transport raw materials, foodstuffs 
and finished products that fuelled Rotterdam’s ascendance as a major port in Western 
Europe between 1870 and 1940. After 1890, the Rhine became the cheapest transport 
artery for bulk goods to and from the Ruhr area, making Rotterdam its most 
important seaport.9 The River Rhine, and in particular the Lower Rhine, was 
therefore crucial to the rise of the Port of Rotterdam in the age of coal. As part of the 
Lower Rhine region, the Ruhr area is bordered to the north and south by the rivers 
Lippe and Ruhr, respectively (Figure 1-1). Rotterdam’s inland counterpart was the 
Port of Duisburg, which, being located at the intersection of the Rhine and Ruhr, 
developed into Germany’s largest inland port around 1900.10 The Rhine basin also 
                                                                                                                                       
cent of its production between 1957 and 1963 (Shell Historical Archive, inventaris 976, doos 114, 
Statistical data on Shell Nederland Raffinaderij NV). 
7 M. Boon, H.A.M. Klemann and B. Wubs, ‘Outport and Hinterland. Rotterdam Business and Ruhr 
Industry, 1870-2010’, in: R. Gorski, A. Rosengren and B. Söderqvist (eds.), Parallel Worlds of the 
Seafarer. The 10th North Sea History Conference (Gothenburg 2012) 201-207. 
8 H.A.M. Klemann and J. Schenk, ‘Competition in the Rhine delta: waterways, railways and ports, 
1870–1913’, The Economic History Review 66 (2013) 826-847; E.-M. Roelevink and J. Schenk, 
‘Challenging times - The renewal of a transnational business relationship: The Rhenish Westphalian 
Coal Syndicate and the Coal Trade Association, 1918 to 1925’, Zeitschrift für 
Unternehmensgeschichte/Journal of Business History 57 (2002) 154-180.  
9 Klemann and Schenk, ‘Competition in the Rhine delta’, 833-844. 
10 A. Kunz, Statistik der Binnenschiffahrt in Deutschland 1835-1989 (1999 [2005]) GESIS Köln, 
Deutschland ZA8157 Datenfile Version 1.0.0, Güterumschlag in Binnenhäfen, own calculations. 
http://www.gesis.org/histat/de/project/details/3849408141F966CF9317FC792820CD95, accessed 11 
July 2014. 
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harbours other metropolitan agglomerations, such as the Rhine-Ruhr area, the Rhine-
Main area around Frankfurt and the Rhine-Neckar area around Mannheim and 
Ludwigshafen (Figure 1-1).11 
 
Figure 1-1. The Rhine and its most important tributaries 
 
Source: Map created by the author. Waterways GIS data: European Environment Agency, 
COoRdinate INformation on the Environment (Corine) 2006, GIS data on watercourses, 
http://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/data/clc-2006-vector-data-version-2, accessed 3 May 2012. 
Metropolitan regions (Rhine-Ruhr, Rhine-Main and Rhine-Neckar): Bundesamt für Bauwesen und 
Raumordnung (BBR) and Initiativkreis Europäische Metropolregionen in Deutschland (IKM), 
Regionales Monitoring 2008. Daten und Karten zu den Europäischen Metropolregionen in Deutschland 
(Bonn 2008) 7. http://www.deutsche-metropolregionen.org/fileadmin/ikm/IKM-
Veroeffentlichungen/IKM-Monitoring2008_lite.pdf, accessed 11 July 2014. For a detailed 
composition of the metropolitan regions, see Appendix E: The composition of the German 
metropolitan regions. 
                                               
11 See also Appendix E: The composition of the German metropolitan regions. These regions are a 
fairly new phenomenon. The term Rhine-Ruhr metropolitan region, for instance, emerged in the 
1990s in governmental and urban planning circles in North Rhine-Westphalia. The region stretches 
from Bonn in the south to Mönchengladbach in the west and Hamm in the north. However, what has 
since become known as the Metropolregion Rhine-Ruhr has few historical roots. It consists of at least 
four economic areas with highly diverse historical experiences, with the Ruhr area being the most well 
known. The use of the term Rhine-Ruhr to denote a historical region therefore seems to be 
anachronistic, but is currently the most accurate label available to denote the area relevant to this study. 
The same is true for the other metropolitan regions that will figure prominently in this book. (Source: 
H.H. Blotevogel, ‘The Rhine-Ruhr metropolitan region’, European Planning Studies 6 (1998) 395-410, 
here: 395-396, 401) 
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The coal and steel trade to and from the Ruhr area dominated Rotterdam’s hinterland 
traffic.12 In general, until World War II, coal was Europe’s most important energy 
source. In 1937, the average share of coal in the primary energy consumption of 
Western Europe was 86 per cent. The share was even higher in countries with 
abundant domestic coal supplies; Germany, for instance, used coal for 97 per cent of 
its energy consumption.13 However, after 1945, there was a shift in the energy balance 
of Western Europe.  
The dominance of oil in the expansion of the Port of Rotterdam was 
testament to the process that fundamentally changed the energy economy in Western 
Europe after the end of World War II. An energy transition is generally defined as a 
“gradual shift from a specific pattern of energy provision to a new state of an energy 
system.”14 Oil consumption in Western Europe increased more than tenfold between 
1950 and 1970, rising from 57 million tons to 670 million tons per annum, which 
implies an average annual growth rate of 13 per cent.15 Oil became a cheap alternative 
to coal for industrial underfiring, domestic heating, electricity generation, 
transportation and chemistry. At the same time, the development of the 
petrochemical industry, which was based on the valorisation of the by-products of oil 
refining, gave rise to an entire range of new industrial and consumer goods. Oil’s 
share of the total energy consumption of Western Europe increased from 15 per cent 
in 1952 to 55 per cent in 1972. The share of coal declined from 80 to 24 per cent in 
the same period.16 Concurrent with the transition to oil was the rise of natural gas 
consumption in Western Europe, especially after the discovery of large gas reserves in 
the Netherlands and the North Sea in the late 1950s and 1960s.17  
In response to the increasing demand for oil, refinery capacity in Western 
Europe increased from 41 million tons per annum in 1950 to 703 million tons in 
1970.18 Prior to World War II, Germany depended heavily on coal. Indeed, from 
1933, the Nazis had pursued a policy aimed at autarky, in which German coal played 
a key role, especially for the production of gasoline, aviation fuel, lubricants and 
synthetic rubber. This policy further increased Germany’s pre-war dependence on 
coal.19 During the late 1940s, Europe as a whole, but Germany in particular, suffered 
                                               
12 Klemann and Schenk, ‘Competition in the Rhine delta’, 834. 
13 Odell, Oil and world power, 120-121. 
14 V. Smil, Energy Transitions: History, Requirements, Prospects (Santa Barbara 2010) vii.  
15 Odell, Oil and world power, 120-121. The countries included are: West Germany, Italy, France, 
Great Britain, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg.  
16 Odell, Oil and world power, 120-121. 
17 J. Schenk, Groninger gasveld vijftig jaar. Kloppend hart van de Nederlandse gasvoorziening (Amsterdam 
2009) 78-79.  
18  W. Molle and E. Wever, 'Oil refineries and petrochemical industries in Europe', GeoJournal 9 
(1984) 421-430, here: 422. 
19  R. Stokes, ‘The Oil Industry in Nazi Germany, 1936-1945’, The Business History Review 59 (1985) 
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a major shortage of energy.20 This was the result of the slow recovery of coal 
production after the war and the import restricting effects of currency inconvertibility 
and the limited availability of foreign currency, both in Germany specifically and in 
Western Europe in general.  
Due to Germany’s post-war economic problems and its pre-war dependence 
on coal, the adoption of oil as a source of energy and raw material for the chemical 
industry was relatively slow compared to other Western European countries. In 1950, 
only 8 per cent of Germany’s energy needs were supplied by oil.21 Even in the 
chemical industry, only 15 per cent of the production of organic chemicals was based 
on oil, although by then American, British and Dutch oil and chemical companies 
were already heavily involved in petrochemicals.22 However, the energy policies of the 
Allied occupation authorities aimed to break with Germany’s historic dependence on 
coal, partly as a way to constrain the country’s capacity to become autarkic again, and 
partly to save foreign currency. With the inception of the Bizonal Refinery Plan in 
1947 and its subsequent integration into the Marshall Plan in 1949, the Allies sought 
to increase Germany’s dependence on foreign oil.23  
The transition from coal to oil had many causes, an important one of which 
was a difference in production costs and prices.24 The post-war energy crisis, although 
initially caused by a shortage of coal, led to an effort to recapitalise and rationalise the 
coal industry. By 1958, the production of German coal was back at pre-war levels. 
However, policies to diversify energy sources – through importing US coal or fuel oil 
– dampened the demand for German coal and led to faltering coal sales and growing 
stocks. In fact, since that time, the coal sector in every major coal producing country 
in Europe suffered, with production gradually being scaled down and ultimately 
ending. Coal could certainly not compete with oil without subsidies or the imposition 
of taxes and tariffs on oil products. As a consequence, in coal producing countries, 
such measures were commonplace from the 1950s up to the 1970s.25 Between 1950 
and 1960, the production costs of coal rose significantly, because the West German 
economic miracle created full employment and no job was less attractive than coal 
mining. As the sector was very reliant on labour, rising employment costs during the 
                                                                                                                                       
256. In fact, Nazi Germany never managed to become fully autarkic. 
20 D. Painter, ‘Oil and the Marshall Plan’, The Business History Review 58 (1984) 3, 359-383, here: 361. 
21  P. Waller and H. Swain, 'Changing Patterns of Oil Transportation and Refining in West Germany', 
Economic Geography 43 (1967) 143-156, here: 143. 
22  R. Stokes, Opting for Oil. The political economy of technological change in the West German chemical 
industry, 1945-1961 (Cambridge 1994) 3. 
23 R. Stokes, ‘German Energy in the U.S. Post-War Economic Order, 1945-1951’, Journal of European 
Economic History 17 (1988) 621-639. 
24 M. Chick, Electricity and energy policy in Britain, France and the United States since 1945 (Cheltenham 
2007) 7-8. 
25  Odell, Oil and world power, 122-124. 
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economic boom led to rising coal prices.26 Simultaneously, the cost of producing, 
transporting and processing oil fell.27 Consequently, from the late 1950s onwards, the 
West German government took several steps to improve the fate of the coal industry, 
culminating in the 1969 merger of all active coal mines in the Ruhr area into a single 
private company, Ruhrkohle AG.28 This could not however save the Ruhr coal industry 
from decline and fundamental reorganisation, and of the 140 mine shafts active in 
1955, only 35 were still open in 1972.29  
The oil industry in Western Europe, and in West Germany in particular, 
experienced a period of unprecedented growth as both markets and the operations of 
foreign and domestic oil companies expanded. The oil industry established several 
large-scale refineries in the major industrial regions and urban agglomerations, most 
prominently in the Rhine-Ruhr area. This conurbation formed the basis for 
Germany’s largest concentration of petrochemical activity.30 The energy transition 
thus had far-reaching consequences for the Rhine-Ruhr region. This gave rise to 
changing transport demands, as refineries required continuous inflows of crude oil 
and product exchanges led to petrochemical cluster formation through the growing 
physical integration of plants.  
The transition from coal to oil is easily mistaken as a path of natural 
development stemming from the increasing divergence between the production costs 
of coal and those of oil, particularly oil from the Middle East. In fact, the transition 
was beset with crises, introducing Western European countries to a number of risks 
with respect to their energy supply in the oil era. Indeed, several crises in the Middle 
East and the ever present fear of the Soviet Union upsetting the regional balance of 
power, demonstrated time and again that production, supply and the price levels of oil 
were extremely sensitive to political upheaval, leaving the national energy interests of 
Western European countries exposed.31  
Notwithstanding the clear risks of relying on imported oil, alternatives were 
not seriously pursued – save for gas and nuclear energy – until after the first oil crisis 
of 1973.32 The promise of nuclear energy did, however, hang over the energy markets 
throughout the period. Indeed, US President Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace speech in 
1953 had fostered interest in the civil application of nuclear technology, while the 
                                               
26 C. Nonn, Die Ruhrbergbaukrise. Entindustrialisering und Politik, 1958-1969 (Göttingen 2001) 37-39. 
27  W. Molle and E. Wever, Oil refineries and petrochemical industries in Western Europe: buoyant past, 
uncertain future (Aldershot 1984) 26-27 
28  Karlsch and Stokes, Faktor Öl, 310-311; 376. 
29 W. Abelshauser et al, Das Ruhrgebiet im Industriezeitalter. Geschichte und Entwicklung (Düsseldorf 
1990) 51.  
30 F. Broich, ‘Die Petrochemie des Rhein-Ruhr-Gebietes’, Jahrbuch für Bergbau, Energie, Mineralöl und 
Chemie 61 (1968) 13-55, here: 13-40. 
31 Chick, Electricity and energy policy, 13-14; M.A. Adelman, ‘Security of Eastern Hemisphere Fuel 
Supply’, working paper dept. of economics MIT, 6 December 1967, 1-2.  
32 Yergin, The Prize, 544.  
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1956 Suez Crisis demonstrated that reliance on imported oil was risky. EURATOM, 
the European organisation in which the member countries of the European Coal and 
Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Economic Community (EEC) 
collaborated on nuclear energy from 1957 onwards, attested to the intense interest in 
nuclear energy. Indeed, nuclear energy was seen as the panacea for Western Europe’s 
foreign energy dependency.33 Oil companies watched advances in nuclear energy 
closely. Royal Dutch/Shell, for instance, considered it as a means of diversifying, but 
concluded during the 1960s that serious applications of the technology were unlikely 
before the 1980s, and even then nuclear energy was not expected to compete with oil 
directly.34 The company’s attitude to nuclear energy changed when rising oil prices 
prompted energy conservation in the 1970s, leading to lower than expected growth 
rates for the entire energy industry, including liquid fuels.35 In fact, energy prices were 
the key element holding up nuclear energy development. After the initial acceleration 
of development in the wake of the 1956 Suez Crisis, consistently declining prices for 
oil and a growing coal glut reduced the cost of energy, making the promise of nuclear 
energy and its enormous development costs less and less attractive during the 1960s.36 
Lower energy prices were key to European industrial competitiveness, and countries 
in Europe were not prepared to sacrifice that advantage for energy independence.  
 
1.2 Scaling up: the Rotterdam oil port 
The oil industry is a prime example of a sector characterised by technologically-
induced economies of scale in production, refining and transportation.37 Although 
John D. Rockefeller’s Standard Oil Trust was the first to understand the benefits of 
exploiting economies of scale in the 19th century, it was not until after World War II 
that the European oil industry experienced a similar expansion, and even then it was 
largely based on Anglo-American technology, capital and managerial capabilities. 
Moreover, the oil industry is a prime example of how technology can deliver 
economies of scope.38 The search for the valorisation of by-products from oil refining 
                                               
33 G.P.J. Verbong and J.A.C. Lagaaij, ‘De belofte van kernenergie’, in: J.W. Schot et al (eds.), Techniek 
in Nederland in de Twintigste Eeuw. II Delfstoffen, Energie en Chemie (Zutphen 2000) 239-255, here: 
239-240; E.B. Kapstein, The Insecure Alliance. Energy Crises and Western Politics Since 1944 (New York 
1990) 125-129. 
34 Jonker and Howarth, Stuwmotor, 375-376.  
35 Ibid., 379.  
36 Kapstein, Insecure Alliance, 128. 
37 A.D. Chandler, Scale and Scope. The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism (Cambridge MA 1990, first 
paperback edition 1994) 92. Economies of scale are efficiency gains deriving from a larger scale of 
production or transportation.  
38 Ibid., 103-104. Economies of scope are efficiency gains in production deriving from product 
diversification. Chandler notes that the chemical industry was actually much more attuned to creating 
economies of scope than the oil industry. Oil companies were traditionally aimed at expanding scale 
and struggled to develop the research and development capabilities needed to foster economies of scope. 
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that started around World War I created the basis for the increase of extensive 
research and development capabilities in and among oil companies. This fostered the 
creation and growth of the petrochemical industry, in particular after World War II. 
The technological innovations and applications in the oil industry drove down unit 
costs dramatically. Consequently, as exploration techniques improved, supply 
expanded.39 Advances in shipbuilding in turn created additional economies of scale in 
transportation, as did the construction of pipelines in Europe from the late 1950s 
onwards. As a result, crude oil prices remained low and stable, and were even 
declining in real terms between the mid-1950s and the late 1960s.40  
The economies of scale and scope in the oil and petrochemical industry 
translated into a scale shift for the Port of Rotterdam. The transition led to new large-
scale flows of oil into Western Europe, and also greatly expanded the Western 
European oil industry. Indeed, between 1945 and the early 1970s, oil consumption 
grew exponentially in most Western European countries. This caused a shift in the 
location of oil refining, first from producer countries to port locations in consumer 
countries, and from the late 1950s also to inland locations close to markets.41  
To supply the expanding refineries in Western Europe, growing amounts of 
crude oil were shipped from producer countries – mainly in the Middle East – to 
consumer countries in Western Europe. As the economic value of crude oil contained 
much less added value than refined oil products, incentives for utilising potential 
economies of scale in transport were created. The upwards trend in tanker size that 
started in the 1950s was a reflection of this.42 Indeed, oil tankers rapidly increased in 
size, from just 25,000 tons in the late 1940s to 500,000 tons in the early 1970s.  
Figure 1-2 shows the growth in the number of tankers by size class, clearly 
demonstrating that each size class grew rapidly after its introduction, testifying to the 
high growth ratio of global crude oil consumption. 
  
                                                                                                                                       
It was only at the outset of World War II that R&D yielded a growing gamut of chemical products 
derived from oil.  
39 R. Karlsch and R. Stokes, Faktor Öl: die Mineralölwirtschaft in Deutschland, 1859-1974 (München 
2003) 314-317; M.A. Adelman, The World Petroleum Market (Baltimore 1972) 196-224; W. Levy, 
Lage und Entwicklungstendenzen des Welto ̈lmarktes in ihrer Auswirkung auf die Energiepolitik Westeuropas, 
insbesondere der Bundesrepublik (Köln 1961) 13-14. 
40 BP statistical review of World energy, ‘Crude prices since 1861’, June 2011, 
http://www.bp.com/statisticalreview, accessed 31 January 2013. 
41 Molle and Wever, ‘Oil Refineries and Petrochemical Industries in Europe’, 424-425; Waller and 
Swain, ‘Changing Pattern of Oil Transportation’, 146-148. 
42 M. Hubbard, The Economics of Transporting Oil to and within Europe (London 1967) 2-3 
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Figure 1-2. The composition of the world tanker fleet by size class, 1957-
1969 
 
Source: J. Brennecke, Tanker. Vom Petroleumklipper zum Supertanker (Herford 1975) 317 (table 24). 
Own calculations. 
 
The closure of the Suez Canal in 1956, and between 1967 and 1975, also greatly 
affected the size of crude oil tankers.43 The 1956 crisis was triggered by the 
nationalisation of the Suez Canal by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser in July 
1956 in response to pressure from Western powers to end the country’s flirtations 
with the Soviet Union. France, Britain and Israel responded by invading Egypt and 
seizing the canal. The nationalisation and ensuing standoff blocked the canal for 
commercial shipping. This was an issue because the Middle East had become 
Europe’s main oil supplier after World War II. Indeed, in 1955, 89 per cent of 
Europe’s crude oil requirements were supplied from Middle Eastern oil fields, which 
amounted to around 98 million tons. Almost two thirds, or 61 million tons, reached 
Europe via the Suez Canal.44 Along with the Trans Arabian pipeline connecting Saudi 
Arabian oil fields with Lebanon’s Mediterranean Port of Sidon, which transported 
around 38 per cent of Middle Eastern crude oil to Europe, the Suez Canal had 
become “the critical link in the post-war structure of the international oil industry.”45 
Although some crude oil tankers had already exceeded the capacity of the canal before 
the eruption of the Suez Crisis, the standoff did cause both oil companies and 
governments to realise that the world’s tanker fleet needed to scale up to create more 
                                               
43 E. Corlett, The Ship. The Revolution in Merchant Shipping, 1950-1980 (London 1981) 24-30.  
44 H. Lubell, Middle East oil crises and Western Europe's energy supplies (Baltimore 1963) 11. 
45 D. Yergin, The Prize. The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power (New York 1992) 480. 
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flexibility in the transportation of crude oil across the globe.46 The rationale was that 
only larger tankers could provide an efficient alternative to the Suez Canal, which was 
to go around the Cape of Good Hope. Accordingly, the Suez Crisis fed into the 
process of increasing scale in crude oil transportation.47 
The rising scale of overseas oil transportation was part of what has been called 
the third transport revolution (after sailing in the 16th century and steam in the 19th 
century). This refers to a sharp fall in maritime transport costs since the 1950s and the 
effects of this on world trade.48 The upwards trend in the size of tankers required ports 
to continuously adapt in order to provide adequate deep-sea access, as was the case for 
the Port of Rotterdam. The respective post-war port expansions, Europoort (1957) 
and Maasvlakte (1968), and the continued dredging of the sea access channel and the 
docks, were directly aimed at accommodating the increasing scale in maritime 
transport (Figure 1-3). 
 
Figure 1-3. The areas of post-1945 expansion in the Port of Rotterdam, 
1945-1975  
 
Note: The dates signify the period of construction.  
Source: Created by the author.  
 
The scale shift in transportation not only affected maritime transport; the increasing 
volume of crude oil shipped towards inland refineries also fostered the introduction of 
pipelines. During the 1950s and 1960s, crude oil pipelines were constructed from 
various landing ports in Western Europe to feed the refineries in, among other 
countries, West Germany, France and Switzerland. The five major international 
crude oil pipelines (Figure 1-4) consisted of the Nord-West Oelleitung from 
Wilhelmshaven to the Ruhr area (1958), the Rotterdam-Rhine pipeline from 
Rotterdam to the Ruhr area (1960), the Southern European pipeline from Marseille 
                                               
46 S. Howarth and J. Jonker, Powering the Hydrocarbon Revolution. The History of Royal Dutch Shell, 
volume 2 (Oxford 2007) 282. 
47 Yergin, The Prize, 496-497; OEEC, Europe’s need for oil. Implications and lessons of the Suez crisis 
(Paris, 1958) 44-45.  
48 N.-G. Lundrgren, ‘Bulk trade and maritime transport costs. The evolution of global markets’, 
Resources Policy 22 (1996) 5-32, here: 8.  
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to northeast France, southern Germany and Switzerland (1963), the Central 
European pipeline from Genoa to Switzerland and southern Germany (1965), and 
the Trans-Alpine pipeline from Trieste to southern Germany (1967). Moreover, since 
1968, an oil product pipeline had connected Rotterdam to the German hinterland as 
part of the Rotterdam-Rhine pipeline.49 
 
Figure 1-4. Map of the major Western European crude oil pipelines 
around 1980 
 
Source: Adapted from W. Molle and E. Wever, Oil refineries and petrochemical industries in Western 
Europe: buoyant past, uncertain future (Aldershot 1984) 53. 
 
The post-war oil boom fell on fertile ground in the Port of Rotterdam. After World 
War I and the economic depression of the 1930s, Rotterdam City Council attempted 
to make the port less sensitive to external shocks by pushing for its industrialisation. 
These efforts led to the creation of a powerful agent, the Municipal Port Authority, 
which was responsible for port management and development. The Port Authority 
proved to be instrumental in both developing a series of port expansions that 
successfully adapted it to the increasing scale of maritime transportation, particularly 
in the oil industry, and creating the conditions for industrial settlement and 
development, at least up to the early 1970s.50 The port expansions particularly 
                                               
49 H.J.M. Koene et al (eds.), ‘58’98: Veertig jaar veilig en verantwoord transport (Den Haag 1998) 33. 
50 De Goey, Ruimte voor industrie, 10.  
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contributed to the growth of an oil and petrochemical cluster in the port, 
transforming it into Europe’s largest oil port.  
 Larger tankers and the introduction of pipelines upended existing port-
hinterland relations. Pipelines are, by far, the cheapest overland mode of transport for 
concentrated oil flows; only maritime oil tankers can be cheaper. As a consequence, 
the supply chain of Middle Eastern crude oil to Western Europe depended in part on 
the relative costs per ton-mile of pipelines and tankers.51 As long as tankers remained 
small, pipelines represented the largest relative transport cost reduction in the supply 
chain, but this depended on the utilisation of economies of scale in tanker 
transportation. The relative costs of pipelines and tankers had a major impact on the 
organisation of the supply chain of Middle Eastern crude oil to Western European 
refineries. As long as pipelines were cheaper, short sea routes between the Middle 
East and Western Europe and long pipelines across the European continent were 
favoured. However, when tankers became cheaper, long sea routes no longer mattered 
and could even become an advantage in combination with comparatively short 
pipelines. This trade-off between the relative advantages of pipelines and tankers was 
a decisive factor in reshaping port-hinterland relations in the age of oil. Nevertheless, 
it is a factor that has thus far not received enough recognition in the historiography of 
the period. 
Between the late 1940s and the first oil crisis of 1973, the Port of Rotterdam 
quadrupled in size  (in terms of its gross surface area) as it expanded westwards into 
the sea to accommodate increasingly larger oil tankers. At the same time, the port 
attracted some of Europe’s largest oil and petrochemical plants.52 Consequently, the 
share of mineral oil in the total commodity flow through the docks rose from 25 per 
cent in 1950 to 70 per cent in 1972.53 The number of refineries in the port also rose 
from two to five between 1950 and 1975, while primary refining capacity increased 
from 2.7 to 85.8 million tons per annum, which was the largest concentration in 
Western Europe (Figure 1-5). With the growing number of refineries, the scale of 
refinery operations expanded considerably from an average capacity of 1.4 million tons 
in 1950 to 17.2 million tons in 1975.54  
 
                                               
51 G. Manners, ‘The Pipeline Revolution’, Geography 47 (1962) 154-163, here: 157-159. 
52 De Goey, Ruimte voor industrie, 77, 123, 180, 240. 
53 Database Rotterdam-Antwerp: a century and a half of port competition 1880-2000, 
http://www.persistent-identifier.nl/?identifier=urn:nbn:nl:ui:13-n6w-g4s, 10 September 2009. Own 
calculations.  
54 Molle and Wever, Oil Refineries, 164-169. Own calculations.  
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Figure 1-5. The refinery capacity in Western Europe by region, 1975 
 
W. Molle and E. Wever, Oil refineries and petrochemical industries in Western Europe: buoyant past, 
uncertain future (Aldershot 1984) 164-168. 
 
Royal Dutch was an important first mover in the Port of Rotterdam. Although the 
petroleum trade had started to establish itself in the port in the early 1860s, the 
gasoline refinery established by Royal Dutch in 1902 was the beginning of the 
modern oil industry in the port.55 Royal Dutch (N.V. Koninklijke Nederlandse 
Petroleum Maatschappij in full) had taken a bold step with this refinery. The company 
started out as a freestanding company in the Dutch East Indies in 1890. Generous oil 
finds and the powerful leadership of its managing director Henri Deterding enabled it 
to expand into a multinational oil company by the turn of the century, culminating in 
a merger with Shell Transport & Trading in 1907 (for more information on the 
structure of the Shell group, see Appendix A: The organisational structure of the 
Royal Dutch Shell group).56 Although petroleum was the most traded oil product at 
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1907 merger, the company continued as a bi-national company with headquarters in both London and 
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the time, Deterding conceived that an expanding market for gasoline was developing 
in Europe. Using Russian oil tankers that would have otherwise returned empty, 
Deterding transported crude gasoline to Europe and managed to break Jersey 
Standard’s monopoly in the continent’s largest markets of France and Germany.57 
Through its subsidiary Rhenania, Royal Dutch also operated gasoline refineries in 
Germany, which started with a plant in Reisholz near Düsseldorf in 1902.58 From an 
early stage, the gasoline refineries in Rotterdam and Reisholz were part of a 
developing functionally related value chain that began with the distillation of Borneo 
crude oil in the Dutch East Indies. This crude gasoline, which was otherwise burnt as 
a useless by-product, was shipped to Rotterdam where it was further refined to 
produce various grades of commercial and industrial gasoline, some of which were 
then transported onwards to Reisholz for further treatment to produce gasoline and 
feedstock for the German explosives and dye industries.59   
Royal Dutch’s Rotterdam plant was gradually expanded over the first three 
decades of the 20th century. In 1936, the plant was moved to a bigger plot in the port 
and expanded into a full refinery with the most modern installations available at the 
time.60 This Rotterdam refinery became the company’s largest in Europe, with the 
purpose of providing a regional manufacturing base that could supply a wide range of 
intermediate and final oil products for the many different national markets in Europe. 
As a consequence, Rotterdam became home to Royal Dutch Shell’s regional balancing 
refinery61 which, up to the 1970s, was the largest in Europe and, for some time, the 
most efficient refinery of the Shell group.62  
The careful ventures in petrochemicals that had already started before World 
War I were quickly expanded after World War II. As the Rotterdam refinery was 
                                                                                                                                       
40 per cent. The company name, Royal Dutch/Shell, reflected its bi-national identity until the 
company fully merged into a single company under the name Royal Dutch Shell plc in 2005. 
Throughout the book references to Royal Dutch/Shell will either use the full name or widely used 
reductions: Royal Dutch, the Shell group or simply the Group, all of which refer to the company as a 
whole or the company’s headquarter level. Where applicable, subsidiaries of the Group will be 
specifically named and subsequently reffered to by that name.   
57 J. Jonker and J. Luiten van Zanden, Van nieuwkomer tot marktleider, 1890-1939. Geschiedenis van 
Koninklijke Shell, deel 1 (Amsterdam 2007) 79. 
58 Ibid. 
59 E. Homburg, J. Small and P. Vincken, ‘Van carbo- naar petrochemie, 1910-1940’, in: J.W. Schot, 
H.W. Lintsen, A. Rip and A. de la Bruhèze (eds.), Techniek in Nederland in de twintigste eeuw, deel 2. 
Delfstoffen, Energie en Chemie (Zutphen, 2000) 335-336. 
60 Jonker and Luiten van Zanden, Van nieuwkomer, 447.  
61 A balancing refinery performs the function of balancing the position of an oil company in a number 
of markets. As such, it is designed to process multiple different types of crude oil and intermediate oil 
products for the purpose of absorbing surpluses from one market and filling shortages in another. In 
consumer markets, oil companies typically operate a number of smaller, relatively simple refineries 
dedicated to serving the local market, and a regional balancing refinery to absorb temporary imbalances 
in the various local markets. 
62 S. Howarth and J. Jonker, Powering the Hydrocarbon Revolution, 1939-1973. History of Royal Dutch 
Shell, part 2 (Oxford 2007) 263; Molle and Wever, Oil Refineries, 164-169, own calculations.  
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flexible and could produce and process a large number of intermediates, it was a 
suitable location to add production facilities for chemical products like PVC 
(polyvinylchloride, a plastic) and detergents using petrochemical starting materials 
delivered by the refinery. The Dutch chemical industry, which had hitherto been 
small-scale and isolated, was strongly supported by the Dutch government in the first 
two decades after the war, making it the fastest growing industry.63 Existing plants 
such as the Royal Dutch refinery in Rotterdam formed the core of chemical 
complexes that gradually developed into some of the largest in Europe. Scarce land in 
the Rotterdam port and a huge increase in the scale of production of basic 
petrochemicals in the late 1960s led to the development of new complexes in 
Terneuzen and Moerdijk. As both production and demand for basic industrial 
chemicals and products led to the expansion of large complexes in the Rhine delta 
(Rotterdam, Terneuzen, Moerdijk and Antwerp), these were connected to exchange 
feedstock, intermediates and industrial gases. The Rhine delta complex was in turn 
connected to other complexes in the Belgian Campine and the Walloon area, the 
Dutch province of Limburg, and the German Rhine-Ruhr, Rhine-Main and Rhine-
Neckar areas.64 Over the course of the 1960s and early 1970s, the Dutch chemical 
industry developed into Europe’s largest producer of basic petrochemicals, which was 
a position that was strongly related to the refinery cluster in the Port of Rotterdam.65 
Buoyed by the oil and petrochemical industry, the Port of Rotterdam became 
the largest in the world in 1962.66 In the European context, it developed into the 
single largest oil port, handling 30 per cent of Western Europe’s total oil flow in 1973, 
while its refineries exported around three quarters of their production.67 Dominating 
the port’s industrial establishments were American companies seeking to gain access 
to the Common Market, which was created with the Treaty of Rome in 1957.68 In 
general, the Netherlands attracted a rapidly growing amount of direct American 
investment between the late 1940s and the 1970s, most of which was invested in the 
western part of the country.69 During the 1960s, the majority of inwards foreign direct 
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investment originated from the United States, and in 1970 the Netherlands was 
ranked sixth among the Western European recipients of this direct US investment.70 
A substantial share of these investments flowed to the Port of Rotterdam. 
As the largest oil port in Western Europe, the Port of Rotterdam became the 
regional oil price benchmark. During the 1950s and early 1960s, multinational oil 
companies (jointly dubbed the Seven Sisters because of their firm grasp on the 
industry71) dominated the oil cluster in the Rotterdam port by way of long-term 
supply contracts with oil producing countries and fully integrated transportation, 
processing, distribution and marketing operations. However, their dominance waned 
during the 1960s as oil producing countries, organised in the Organisation of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries, expanded their share in the production of oil and 
looked for ways to increase the price of oil by wresting price setting from the hands of 
the Seven Sisters.72 Moreover, increasing amounts of crude oil became available 
outside the control of OPEC. This led to national oil companies asserting themselves, 
independent refinery capacity being expanded, and consumption and production 
becoming increasingly hard to match because of structural changes in demand. As a 
result, oil flows outside the integrated channels of the oil majors started to grow and 
increasingly found their way to Rotterdam.73 Independent tank storage operators and 
independent oil traders profited from this development and, from the mid-1960s 
onwards, Rotterdam became Western Europe’s most important open oil market; it 
was certainly no longer just a transhipment or production location for the oil majors. 
The open market, in contrast to the long-term supply contracts between oil producing 
countries and the majors, had always existed on the margins of the oil industry. 
Moreover, until the 1960s, it was mainly based on US Gulf prices. By the mid-1960s, 
Europoort had developed into Europe’s most important location of physical oil flows, 
and Rotterdam’s spot and term prices for oil products began to determine price levels 
in West Germany, Switzerland, Sweden, Denmark, Belgium and the Netherlands. 
West Germany was by far the largest market, primarily because it was Western 
Europe’s largest economy, but also because independent traders commanded a higher 
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share of the market in Germany than was the case in most other Western European 
countries.74 The Rotterdam oil market was therefore important for West Germany 
and vice versa. In terms of investment, volumes, and long-term developments, the oil 
majors were, and remained, the most important actors in both the Port of Rotterdam 
and the global oil market during this period. 
For the Rotterdam oil port, the extended period of growth from the late 1940s 
up to the late 1960s was suddenly upended with the onslaught of the first oil crisis of 
1973. The general economic environment had been worsening since the breakdown of 
the Bretton Woods system in 1971.75 Adding to volatile currency markets, the 
Arabian oil boycotts of 1973 and 1974 that followed Western support for Israel in the 
Yom Kippur War sent oil prices spiralling upwards. These prices had actually been on 
the rise since the late 1960s, as OPEC countries attempted to increase their take from 
crude oil production by pressuring oil companies into accepting higher prices.76 The 
rising prices demonstrated that power was shifting from oil consuming countries (the 
West) to OPEC countries, in particular the Arab oil-producing nations. The oil 
embargo of 1973-4 illustrated this shift, shocking the Western world into realising 
that the reliance on oil imports exposed its economies and societies to considerable 
risk. The embargo itself was directed at the US and the Netherlands. The former was 
singled out as an arms supplier to the Israelis, while the Dutch were officially targeted 
for their support for this, although it has been argued that the Netherlands was a 
target because the Port of Rotterdam was such a central hub in the Western European 
oil supply.77  
The embargo itself was ineffective. The real sting was the increase in oil prices 
for Arabian crude oil that followed the initial embargo and production restraints.78 
Encouraged by the support of the Shah of Iran, the price for Arabian crude oil settled 
at an unprecedented 11.65 US dollars in December 1973, which was up from 1.80 US 
dollars in 1970.79 These increased prices and OPEC’s lower production volumes 
negatively affected world trade in general and energy intensive industries in particular. 
As the Port of Rotterdam relied heavily on both, the decrease in trade and production 
that followed the first oil crisis led to a reduction in the revenues of the Port 
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Authority.80 “Rotterdam, city in doubt” was the conclusion of a report written under 
the auspices of the Rotterdam Chamber of Commerce in 1974. Indeed, the city 
council and the Municipal Port Authority had lost their influence on the future of the 
Port of Rotterdam.81 Combined with growing local concerns over nature preservation 
and pollution, the first oil crisis brought an abrupt end to the unprecedented period of 
growth that lasted from the late 1940s to the early 1970s.82  
 
1.3 Historiography: Rotterdam and the Rhine-Ruhr hinterland, 1945-75 
The narrative of the post-war rise of the oil industry and the decline of the coal sector 
is generally well documented, as are the respective experiences of the Port of 
Rotterdam and the Ruhr area. However, historical publications on port-hinterland 
relations in the post-war era are few and far between. Moreover, there is little 
consensus in the existing literature as to the impact of energy transition on port-
hinterland relations. Hugo van Driel and Ferry de Goey have argued that the 
industrialisation and expansion of the Rotterdam port after 1945 reduced its reliance 
on the German hinterland.83 In his dissertation, De Goey also concludes that the 
Rotterdam Municipal Port Authority pursued a policy of industrialisation with the 
express goal of reducing the port’s dependence on the German hinterland. De Goey 
argues that the Port Authority succeeded in this goal through a policy of rapid port 
expansion and the careful selection of industrial settlements.84 According to De Goey, 
the Rotterdam port thus expanded enormously between 1945 and 1975, stimulated by 
wider processes such as European economic integration, the post-war economic boom, 
the associated expansion of industrial production and the inflow of American 
industries seeking to access the Common Market from the late 1950s onwards.85 
Others have argued that the transport relations between Rotterdam and the 
Ruhr area fostered enduring economic interrelations between the port and the 
hinterland. Most prominently, Martijn Lak and Jeroen Euwe argue that the 
importance of Rhine shipping for both the Port of Rotterdam and the Ruhr area 
caused the political relationships between the Netherlands and Germany to seek ways 
to accommodate the Rhine-based interdependence between the areas after World 
War I and World War II. As a natural river, the Rhine is geographically fixed. 
However, after an institutional process of Prussian power politics that spanned the 
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better part of the 19th century, the Rhine became subject to international law in the 
form of the 1868 Treaty of Mannheim, which enshrined the freedom of trade and 
transport on the Rhine. It also became governed by a supranational organisation, the 
Central Commission for Navigation on the Rhine (CCNR).86 The canalisation of the 
Rhine under the auspices of the CCNR opened up opportunities for scale increases in 
Rhine shipping in the last few decades of the 19th century, after which the Rhine 
became the principal trade artery for the Ruhr area and Rotterdam became its primary 
seaport.87  
As a consequence, the Rhine provided a geographically and institutionally 
embedded link between the port and its hinterland, which seems to have been 
reinforced time and again. The work by Lak and Euwe reveals that after the two 
world wars, the Rhine did indeed function as an economic motivator to accommodate 
political differences in Dutch-German relations.88 According to Lak, the expanding 
scale of the transport demand in the hinterland associated with the take-off of the 
West German economic miracle from the mid-1950s onwards seems to have guided a 
political accommodation and, thereby, the restoration of relations between the Port of 
Rotterdam and the Rhine-Ruhr hinterland.  
While conceding that the transition from coal to oil affected relations between 
the Port of Rotterdam and the Ruhr area, Laspeyres accentuates the enduring 
importance of this relationship. Declining coal exports from the Ruhr region and an 
increase in iron ore transport from Rotterdam to West Germany caused the upstream 
traffic on the Rhine to double between 1936 and 1962, while downstream traffic fell 
over the same period by 8 per cent, mainly due to dwindling Ruhr coal exports to 
Rotterdam. Exports of coal to member states of the European Coal and Steel 
Community remained stable over the period, but exports outside Europe dwindled as 
US coal forced its Ruhr counterparts out of most overseas markets, which particularly 
affected Ruhr coal flows via Rotterdam.89 In 1937, 14 million tons of coal were 
exported via the Port of Rotterdam to overseas markets, and to Sweden in particular. 
However, between 1945 and 1975, coal exports via Rotterdam averaged only 3 million 
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tons per annum.90  
Simultaneously, the iron ore shipped upstream grew unabatedly from 2.2 
million tons in 1950 to 35 million tons in 1974.91 The consequence of the imbalance 
between up- and downstream cargo flows was a decline in the utilisation of transport 
capacity in dry bulk Rhine shipping, as a rising share of the fleet travelled downstream 
empty after delivering cargo upstream.92 The negative impact of empty return journeys 
on unit transport costs for iron ore were mitigated by both exploiting economies of 
scale in transhipment in Rotterdam and inland shipping on the Rhine. Europoort 
accommodated the largest ore carriers of the day, allowing larger volumes to be 
transported to Rotterdam from more distant origins, particularly West Africa. A 
consortium of German steel enterprises invested in the Rotterdam ore transhipment 
facility and founded the Dutch limited company Ore Transhipment 
(Ertsoverslagbedrijf Europoort NV), which expanded the transhipment capacity for 
iron ore enormously in the Port of Rotterdam from 1970 onwards. Push barge 
combinations allowed for scale increases in onwards transportation over the Rhine.93 
Together, the growth in scale in the entire iron ore supply chain gave Rotterdam a 
considerable competitive edge over other North Sea ports vying for iron ore flows to 
the Ruhr. It also led to the relocation of blast furnaces in the Ruhr to the Western 
Ruhr area in order to profit from ore deliveries over the Rhine.94 Indeed, ore 
shipments to the Ruhr became increasingly centred on the Western Ruhr area, 
attracting 52 per cent of these shipments in 1950 versus 71 per cent in 1966. As a 
result, Rotterdam expanded its share of ore transport to the Ruhr from 59 per cent in 
1950 to 83 per cent of the total volume of imported ore in 1966.95 Laspeyres thus 
concludes that, although Rhine shipping flows between Rotterdam and the Ruhr 
became unbalanced, Rotterdam became increasingly important for the Ruhr iron and 
steel industry.  
In short, the limited literature in existence on the relations between the Port of 
Rotterdam and the Rhine-Ruhr area between 1945 and 1975 is inconclusive beyond 
the obvious observation that the transition from coal to oil and the post-war economic 
boom affected the port-hinterland relationship. An important explanation of this 
inconclusiveness stems from a bias in the historiography towards national or 
nationally embedded local and regional history writing. The majority of the literature 
focuses on the Port of Rotterdam with little or no comparative or transnational 
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perspective. Authors discuss the history of the city and its port (Van de Laar 2000), 
the role of the Municipal Port Authority (Brolsma 2007, De Goey 1990) and port 
industrialisation (De Goey 1990, Wever 1974 and Winkelsmans 1973).96 Prominent 
in the research by Winkelmans, De Goey and Wever is a discussion of locally 
embedded advantages and the local climate for investment that was involved in 
establishing a petrochemical cluster at the port. Taken together, the work of these 
authors provides an image of an industrial port that profited from the post-war oil 
boom because of geographical advantages, the clustering tendencies of the oil and 
petrochemical industries, and able management of the Municipal Port Authority. 
However, only a limited number of publications, emanating from the project 
Rotterdam-Antwerp: A century and a half of port competition, employ a comparative 
perspective.97  
There is extensive literature when it comes to the post-war development of the 
Rhine-Ruhr area, although the historical analysis of the impact on the region of the 
transition from coal to oil is divided between three separate bodies of work. Regional 
histories on the Ruhr area tend to focus on the decline of the coal and steel industry 
during the second half of the 20th century, but largely ignore the rise of the oil and 
petrochemical sector in the region.98 This is covered by several publications on the 
German oil industry, although these largely lack the regional perspective.99 There is a 
more detailed analysis of the transition of the West German economy in Ray Stokes’s 
study of the transition of the West German chemical industry from coal-based to oil-
based (petrochemical) production.100 Stokes draws on both political economy and 
business history to provide context and case studies concerning this process. The 
German chemical industry, Stokes argues, could adapt to petrochemical production 
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through a gradual and deliberate evaluation of its own interests and options, fostering 
a transition that was much more careful than could be expected from the distinct cost 
advantages of oil over coal from the early 1950s onwards. Two of the largest chemical 
companies, BASF and Bayer, entered into partnerships and joint ventures with oil 
multinationals as a means of making inroads into petrochemistry. As the transition of 
the chemical industry was so gradual, many of the old plants remained and were 
slowly transformed, with new facilities being built around the existing infrastructure. 
As a consequence, they created a downstream market for the by-products of the oil 
industry, thereby becoming pull locations for oil companies. The wider implication of 
the successful transition of the chemical industry was the impact of German research 
traditions, with capabilities generally being retained that greatly enhanced the growth 
potential of the West German economy and helped to foster its post-war economic 
boom.101  
Stokes’s analysis forms an important link between the existing historiography 
and the present study. One key issue not fully appreciated in either the Dutch or 
German literature is the implication of the transition of the Rhine-Ruhr industries on 
the demand for transportation in the area. Stokes points out that by successfully 
switching to petrochemical production, the vast chemical complexes in the Rhine 
basin required oil-based feedstock, which needed to be imported. Certainly, the 
growth of the oil and petrochemical industry in the Rhine-Ruhr area created an entire 
supply chain infrastructure to serve the growing demand for oil in the region. The 
rather obvious need to transport oil to the Rhine-Ruhr area, and the implications of 
this new demand for the Port of Rotterdam, is a glaring lacuna in the historiography. 
In fact, when the demand for crude oil in the Rhine-Ruhr area started growing in the 
late 1950s, the capacity of Rhine shipping was soon found to be inadequate when it 
came to meeting demand. The construction of a crude oil pipeline thus became 
essential, which triggered competition between various European ports for the supply 
of crude oil to the burgeoning oil and petrochemical industry in the Rhine basin, most 
notably in the Rhine-Ruhr area. Although this episode has received some attention in 
the literature, its impact and significance for the development of the Port of 
Rotterdam, the Rhine-Ruhr area and their interrelations have not been appreciated.102 
Yet the episode brings the fundamental issue at stake in this study to the fore: how 
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and why was the port-hinterland relationship affected by the rise of a new mode of 
transport, namely pipelines? Was the Port of Rotterdam the clear favourite to host a 
pipeline to the Rhine-Ruhr area from the outset? To what extent were other ports in 
the region in a position to compete with Rotterdam? In short, what were the factors 
that threatened the position of Rotterdam vis-à-vis its German hinterland, and which 
elements strengthened its position? Whereas Laspeyres analysed port-hinterland 
relations with regard to coal and iron ore, those between Rotterdam’s oil port and the 
Rhine-Ruhr hinterland require further examination. 
 
1.4 Theoretical considerations 
Whether the transition from coal to oil has weakened or strengthened the ties 
between Rotterdam and the Rhine-Ruhr area hinges on the  extent to which the 
growth of the Rotterdam oil port can be related to developments in the Rhine-Ruhr 
hinterland and vice versa. In general, port-hinterland relations changed in the post-
war era as the truck, the plane and the pipeline substantially altered both global supply 
chains and local and regional logistics. The current study focuses in particular on 
pipelines and how their introduction in Western Europe in the 1950s altered port-
hinterland relations in the Rhine region. In order to understand the development of 
the European oil pipeline infrastructure, a transnational perspective is required. The 
existing literature on the industrial development of the Port of Rotterdam has 
hitherto focused mainly on the question of local conditions for industrialisation and 
growth. This is unsurprising, because this literature is generally based on theories of 
location, which stress locally embedded push and pull factors. Given its great 
propensity for economies of scale and scope, the oil and petrochemical sector is a 
prime example of an agglomeration industry. As a consequence, the development of 
Rotterdam’s oil port has been interpreted as a self-sustaining agglomeration process.103 
Nonetheless, the clustering of economic activity is generally an economic 
phenomenon. Indeed, ever since Alfred Marshall demonstrated in the 1890s that the 
clustering of economic activity yields external economies of scale, and thus provides 
economic benefits, theories of location have attempted to both grasp the uneven 
geographical distribution of economic activity and understand why agglomeration 
takes place in some areas and not in others. Most recently, new economic geography 
has brought several concepts of location theory together. The discipline proposes that 
internal and external economies of scale, transportation costs, and market potential 
create links that pull economic activities (firms), which in turn drive clustering or 
agglomeration.104 Market potential refers to the size of the market that can be served 
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by a plant’s location. Transport costs matter because cheap transportation widens the 
potential market and allows for the more efficient supply of raw materials.  
Earlier scholars of economic geography have noted that economies of scale in 
transportation (reducing unit transport costs) seem to reinforce processes of 
agglomeration, making ports and their hinterland connections important nodes and 
links in a system of interregional trade.105 Ports with well-developed infrastructures are 
therefore supposed to benefit from increases in scale and the associated agglomeration 
process. This tendency was noted, for instance, by the American geographer Allen 
Pred in the 1960s, and has been replicated by theoretical models in the new economic 
geography framework.106 For the oil industry, economies of scale in transportation 
were part and parcel of the oil boom after 1945. As a location, it seems evident that 
the Port of Rotterdam profited from scale increases and agglomeration in the oil 
industry. Location theory suggests that this would also entail the reinforcement of the 
relations with the hinterland. The conclusions of Lak and Euwe that Rhine-based 
interrelations between Rotterdam and the Rhine-Ruhr area were reinforced time and 
again seem to suggest that the city was in an excellent position to become the 
principal oil port of the Rhine-Ruhr hinterland, and possibly even other regions in 
West Germany.  
The questions thus arise as to precisely what constitutes a hinterland and how 
an analysis of the effects of energy transition on the port-hinterland relationship can 
best be designed. Pred refers to the hinterland as being “discontinuous and 
overlapping” and stresses that a port is almost always competing for a hinterland with 
other ports. Borrowing from the American economist and location theorist Walter 
Isard, Pred argues that the boundary of the hinterland is struck at the point where 
commodity flows from the port drop to a minimum.107 This definition of hinterland is 
reflected by the existing literature on this concept. There is broad recognition that the 
hinterland in general is the area from which “a port draws the majority of its 
business.”108 Different ideas have been proposed to define the hinterland, for instance 
the distinction between captive and contested, primary and secondary, or export-
oriented and import-oriented hinterlands.109 A captive hinterland is the area where a 
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port boasts lower hinterland transport costs than any other port. A contested 
hinterland, meanwhile, is where several ports compete to meet transport demand. In 
extremis, each product and mode of transportation has, to some degree, its own 
hinterland.110 Although relevant, the static aspects of the port-hinterland literature, i.e. 
defining the boundaries of a port’s hinterland, are not so interesting. More relevant 
are the dynamic aspects of the port-hinterland relationship: what drives change? How 
is change transmitted through the port-hinterland relationship? What are the 
consequences of change for the port’s hinterland? Echoing Allen Pred’s argument, 
Theo Notteboom postulates that hinterlands are dynamic and unstable due to political, 
economic and technological change.111  
Notteboom implies that an analysis of the port-hinterland relationship 
through time should look beyond cargo flows and grasp the wider economic, political 
and technological processes affecting the economic geography of both port and 
hinterland. According to Pred, the port-hinterland relationship depends on four 
factors: the relative location of the port vis-à-vis the hinterland; the types of industry 
in the physically accessible hinterland; the quality of the port’s transport access to the 
hinterland expressed in transport costs; the capacity of the hinterland transport 
connections; and the physical attributes of the port itself.112 These factors have 
frequently been mentioned in the older hinterland literature, for instance the work by 
Weigend (1956), Morgan (1952) and Sargent (1938).113 A port’s development is 
therefore contingent on the interaction between its hinterland and its own physical 
and economic attributes. Moreover, the extent to which a port can benefit from a 
greater demand for transport in the hinterland depends on its capacity to adapt.  
Pred’s theoretical proposition accentuates three important areas that determine 
the continuity of port-hinterland relations. The first of these is the hinterland itself. 
The economic development of the hinterland determines whether there is demand for 
transportation at all. In this regard, the Port of Rotterdam had little or no direct 
influence, because the development of the Rhine-Ruhr area depended on wider 
economic and technological processes in the German political and administrative 
system.  
The second area is the infrastructure connecting the port to the hinterland. 
The degree to which Rotterdam could benefit from a growing demand for transport 
in the hinterland depended on the extent to which the transport infrastructure actually 
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connected the port to the hinterland and the quality of the infrastructure in terms of 
capacity and cost. In this regard, the port had a more direct influence on creating and 
improving hinterland access, but the fact that the primary hinterland was located in a 
foreign country created substantial risk. The recurring discussions on the 
interpretation of the Treaty of Mannheim after World War II, and the current 
ongoing failure to fully connect the German extension of the Dutch rail link to 
Germany (the Betuwe route), illustrate the point.114  
The third area that Pred identifies is the port itself. Here, geographical, 
financial and institutional conditions determine the extent to which a port can adapt 
to a rising demand for transport in the hinterland. Naturally, the port has the most 
direct influence in this regard, albeit depending on the agility with which it negotiates 
local, regional and national constraints on port expansion. The strength or weakness 
of port-hinterland relations thus depends, according to Pred, on the interaction 
between these areas. In the case of the Port of Rotterdam, because the main 
hinterland is located in a different country, the greatest risk to the continuity of port-
hinterland relations is posed by the port’s limited influence on the development of 
infrastructure connections to the hinterland.  
Echoing Allen Pred’s argument, Notteboom and Rodrigue make a distinction 
between the macro-economic, physical and logistical factors affecting the port-
hinterland relationship.115 Each factor constitutes a layer of the hinterland. On the 
macro-economic level, economic, political and technological processes determine the 
economic conditions and development of the hinterland, thereby determining the 
demand for transportation there.116 Changes to any attribute of the macro-economic 
layer can shift trade patterns or production locations, thereby greatly affecting the 
demand for transport in the hinterland.  
 The physical hinterland constitutes the supply of transportation, which 
comprises the capacity and efficiency of the transport networks that connect a port to 
its hinterland. Changes in the macro-economic hinterland require adaptations to be 
made to the physical infrastructure, as changing demand can lead to either capacity 
surpluses or shortages. The physical hinterland comprises both the port infrastructure 
(sea access, docks, quays, transhipment, storage and land) and the hinterland 
infrastructure.  
Notteboom and Rodrigue identify a third layer, the logistical hinterland, in 
which actual transport flows occur. How these flows are organised depends on the 
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type of demand for transportation in the hinterland, the capacity and quality of the 
infrastructure, and the actors deciding on actual shipments. The three layers are 
therefore interrelated, just as Pred observed earlier.117 Changes in the macro-economic 
layer trickle down to the physical layer, causing alterations to the transport 
infrastructure, which in turn affects actual cargo flows. Notteboom and Rodrigue 
stress that port-hinterland relations are comprised of a number of relationships 
between various actors in the supply chain, ranging from cargo owners, ship owners, 
shippers, terminal operators and distributors, as well as political actors and 
government agencies (such as port authorities).118 These actors have various objectives 
and respond differently to problems given their respective goals and options. Recent 
work on the role of hinterland connections in port competition stresses that the power 
of ports to influence the organisation of supply chains depends on the degree of 
concentration of power among the other actors shaping the supply chain.119 The more 
the power to shape international supply chains is concentrated, the more ports need to 
coordinate policy at a national and international level. This implies that a port and the 
port authority managing it must gain a position in international supply chains in order 
to further its growth potential. Becoming an important international player, or 
aligning itself to one, is now seen as one of the most important strategic problems for 
port authorities.120  
A second vital issue concerns the extent to which port-hinterland relations 
suffer from the fact that a border separates the port from its main hinterland. 
Although Rhine shipping repeatedly recovered from major disruptions to cross-border 
transport, it did so with considerable difficulty because, each time, the interests of the 
Rhine-Ruhr industries (cheap transportation) were weighed against other German 
interests, such as limiting foreign currency expenses, or the interests of the German 
transport sector and German ports (fostered by, among others, special rail tariffs for 
German North Sea ports, the Seehafenausnahmetarife). This has been a recurring 
theme from the 19th century onwards.121 However, as long as Germany was dependent 
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on the geographically fixed and institutionally guarded position of the Rhine, port-
hinterland relations between Rotterdam and the Rhine-Ruhr area were more or less 
safeguarded. During a period of growth, Rotterdam thus stood to gain from its Rhine 
connection to the hinterland. However, the question arises as to what extent 
Rotterdam was able to benefit from an increasing demand for transport in the 
hinterland if a new transport infrastructure (pipelines) was required. The answer 
depends on the interaction of the areas or layers identified by Pred and Notteboom 
and Rodrigue: together they determine the strength of port-hinterland relations.  
The Port of Rotterdam relies on transnational integration, but until the 1990s 
national transport and infrastructure policies were rarely coordinated among the 
member states of the European Economic Community.122 Beyond the transnational 
governance of the Rhine, there was no effective coordination of cross-border 
infrastructure and transport policy-making; national policy was dominant in such 
issues. The role of governments could therefore be regarded as a dividing force 
inhibiting the creation of cross-border infrastructure and transport. The creation of 
the Common Market, however, provided opportunities for business and an incentive 
for firms to perform cross-border direct investment and operations. The role of firms 
could therefore be regarded as integrative, which is similar to the role ascribed by 
Strikwerda to the rise of multinational companies in pre-1914 Europe, when rising 
cross-border direct investment fostered a high degree of economic integration in a 
highly nationalistic political environment.123  Even though the mind-set of European 
governments was completely opposed to the nationalist sentiments that prevailed on 
the eve of World War I, the long road to a serious attempt at European coordination 
of cross-border infrastructure and transport policy illustrates how resistant the 
national perspective on European development remained throughout at least the 
second half of the 20th century.  
 To conclude these theoretical considerations, Pred and Notteboom and 
Rodrigue highlight two key theoretical and methodological issues that have 
implications for this study. Firstly, the port-hinterland relationship consists of three 
distinct, but interrelated, areas or layers: the demand for transportation in the 
hinterland (the economic composition of the hinterland), the supply of transport (the 
development of infrastructure), and the organisation of actual transport flows. 
Secondly, it is important to take into account the relevant actors that together shape 
the port-hinterland relationship, i.e. governments on all levels and their agencies and 
firms. The study is therefore designed to bring out the conditional development of 
both port and hinterland by considering the interrelatedness of policy choices and 
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their outcomes across the border. To do this, the research makes use of the concept of 
hinterland as a unifying spatial category linking Rotterdam with different parts of the 
Rhine region. Rather than just a statistical expression, hinterland in this study consists 
of three layers, which aim to integrate the various actors, institutions and processes 
that together shape it. A technological regime shift such as the transition from coal to 
oil cannot be interpreted just by observing changes in transport statistics. In fact, 
transport flows are merely the expression of much wider economic and political 
processes that guide and filter the impact of technological change on societies and 
therefore on port-hinterland relations.  
 
1.5 Research questions and methodology 
In this study, the central research question concerns how and why the transition from 
coal to oil affected the relationship between the Port of Rotterdam and the German 
hinterland between 1945 and 1975. Reflecting the theoretical considerations, the 
answer to this question depends on the responses to three further questions. Firstly, 
how and why did the transition from coal to oil affect the Rhine-Ruhr area’s demand 
for transport? Secondly, to what extent was Rotterdam’s port successful in adapting 
port and hinterland infrastructure to the energy transition in the hinterland, what 
were the constraints on this adaptation and how were these overcome? Thirdly, how 
did the transition of the hinterland and the adaptation of the transport infrastructure 
affect the composition of the hinterland of the Rotterdam oil port? Each sub-question 
addresses an aspect of the port-hinterland relationship identified in the theoretical 
section: the economic development of the Rhine-Ruhr area, the development of port 
and hinterland infrastructure, and the organisation of the actual cargo flows between 
port and hinterland.  
For several decades, historians have been debating the need for a transnational 
approach to escape the national historical perspective that still dominates much of 
Europe’s historiography, and also seems to have dominated the historiography of the 
Lower Rhine region. The debate has led to various calls by historians for the adoption 
of transnational methodology.124 In recent reflections on the subject, Patricia Clavin 
has defined transnational history as a perspective that “enables history to break free 
from the nationally determined timescales that dominate the historiographical 
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landscape.”125 Expanding on this, Clavin states that transnational history “[…] is 
motivated by the desire to highlight the importance of connections and transfers 
across boundaries at the sub- or supra-state level, […] and the character and 
exploitation of boundaries.”126  
Clavin identifies several challenges for the transnational historian. 
Transnational history deals with existing, bounded chronologies and should strive to 
reshape these into timeframes reflecting transnational rather than national, regional or 
local histories. Moreover, transnational history challenges historians to look for 
connections and relations between global and regional organisations and actors, and 
to compare these in order to derive renewed meaning and significance from historical 
events. This also provides leeway when it comes to the concept of networks (e.g. 
business, political and scientific) in understanding transnational history.  
The present study takes stock of the transnational turn in history and aims to 
apply its methodological implications. This is incorporated in the research design in 
two ways. Firstly, the study aims to connect the histories of the Port of Rotterdam 
and the Rhine-Ruhr area by looking at infrastructural connections and transport flows. 
Secondly, the research examines actors and how their interrelations help to explain 
how and why transnational connections were developed.  The study focuses on two 
sets of actors, specifically governments and firms. These are the main agents shaping 
the transition from coal to oil. Firms transmit technological innovations by 
recognising and acting upon opportunities, while governments attempt to set 
parameters within which technological change evolves and markets operate. As a 
consequence, it is important to incorporate both actors in an analysis of the port-
hinterland relationship.  
The analysis requires two methods. The first consists of an historical case 
study approach based on archival material aimed at reconstructing the causal process 
of the impact of the transition on port-hinterland relations. The second method is 
comprised of a quantitative analysis of transport data with a view to achieving a well-
defined and comparative measure of the port-hinterland relationship. Case study 
methodology (and the historical method in general) is designed to deal “with 
operational links needing to be traced over time, rather than mere frequencies or 
incidence.”127  It is therefore well-suited to unravelling the causal chains of an event or 
historical process and understanding the how and why of this through a detailed 
analysis of the sequences of the event.128 This study aims to use case studies to be able: 
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to establish a chain of evidence that allows the economic development of the 
hinterland to be linked with the development of the infrastructure; and to, ultimately, 
assess the implications thereof for the organisation of cargo flows.  
Company cases are an excellent source, because they allow for insights into 
location and investment decisions on where to produce, how to develop transport 
infrastructure and capacity, and how to organise transport flows. However, for a 
proper understanding of the actions of single companies, company cases need to be 
embedded in the historical context in which they operate and the relevant government 
actors that shaped their environment. The drawback of relying on government sources 
is that information and data remain contained within the national framework. On the 
other hand, multinational companies employ a transnational perspective, and their 
investments and cross-border activities are expressly designed to overcome (or exploit) 
the constraints of national borders on flows of goods, knowledge and capital. Writing 
and researching transitional, regional history can therefore benefit from combining a 
macro-economic historical perspective with a business historical viewpoint and 
method.  
Methodological issues with case study approaches often focus on external 
validity or analytical generalisability.129 The small number of observations in the case 
study approach is often seen as limiting the value of the case study methodology for 
theory testing or determining a causal effect.130 Such a view is dominated by the 
postulates of quantitative methodology and is, according to recent additions to 
qualitative methodology, too restrictive a view of the merits of case studies when it 
comes to yielding valuable causal inferences.131 Quantitative methodology stresses that 
the strength of causal inferences from qualitative sources can only be derived from so-
called data-set observations, i.e. adding observations to a standardised set of variables 
(increasing the N). However, qualitative research can yield robust causal inferences by 
adding so-called causal-process observations. A causal-process observation is a piece 
of information that adds insight and additional detail to the causal process in a 
particular case, thereby strengthening the validity of the causal inference based on 
limited and incomplete data.132 While not increasing generalisability in the sense of 
quantitative methodology, the detailed historical reconstruction of one or a limited 
number of cases can therefore yield valid proof of causal relations, with implications 
beyond the case itself. 
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Chapter 2 Post-war reconstruction and the rise of oil, 1945-1951 
2.1 Introduction 
The energy transition of the 1950s and 1960s brought about a technological regime 
shift that led Western European economies to switch from coal to oil as their main 
source of energy. This changed the economic composition of the Rhine-Ruhr area 
dramatically. The coal industry, which was the source of its industrialisation and the 
main employer in the region, experienced a prolonged decline. At the same time, the 
oil sector established large-scale refineries in the area and developed a petrochemical 
cluster jointly with Germany’s chemical industry. The energy transition thus had far-
reaching consequences for the Rhine-Ruhr region, giving rise to changing transport 
demands as refineries required continuous inflows of crude oil and product exchanges 
led to the formation of a petrochemical cluster through the increased physical 
integration of plants.  
On a global scale, the construction and expansion of refineries in the Rhine-
Ruhr area was part of a two-stage shift in the pattern of oil refining and distribution 
between the 1930s and 1960s. The rising share of oil in energy consumption in the 
1950s entailed a shift from the pre-war pattern of refining crude oil at source to one 
of refining near markets. In the first stage, refineries were constructed in the major 
ports of consumer countries, while in the second, from the late 1950s onwards, 
refinery capacity tended to shift inland, as demand for mineral oil products increased 
in inland markets.133 The Rhine-Ruhr refineries of the late 1950s were of this latter 
type. With the expansion of oil refineries in the region, opportunities arose to use by-
products from refining for the chemical industry. Traditionally based on coal, the 
German chemical industry had fathered the world’s preeminent chemical companies. 
However, from 1945 onwards, Germany’s defeat, the Allied occupation and the rise 
of oil-based chemistry (petrochemicals) forced the German chemical industry to 
switch from coal to oil.134 As a consequence, the Rhine-Ruhr area became the largest 
concentration of the oil and petrochemical industry in West Germany from the early 
1960s onwards.135  
 The energy transition and the ensuing transformation of the Rhine-Ruhr area 
had several causes, the first of which was rooted in the post-war occupation of 
Germany. This chapter questions how the Allied occupation of Germany dealt with 
the energy crises of the late 1940s, and how and why this affected Rhine-Ruhr 
industries, in particular the regional oil, chemical and coal sectors. The way in which 
the Allied occupation authorities attempted to solve the problem of German 
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reconstruction contains the reasons for the first steps towards the energy transition 
that evolved in the 1950s and early 1960s. The end of World War II and the 
subsequent occupation of Germany was a radical break with the previous period with 
regard to the organisation of the energy supply to the German economy.  
The first section of this chapter discusses the European context of post-war 
reconstruction and the Allied (US) approach to the post-war energy situation in 
Western Europe. Structural changes in world oil supplies combined with the dollar 
influx provided by the Marshall Plan were at the root of the European energy 
transition. The second section deals with the impact of the Allied occupation on the 
Rhine-Ruhr area, particularly with regard to the Ruhr coal industry. The third section 
discusses the Allied oil refining program and its consequences for the oil industry in 
the Rhine-Ruhr region. Then, the fourth and final section will analyse the effects of 
the Allied occupation on the economic composition of the Rhine-Ruhr area, 
particularly with regard to its significance for the West German oil sector.  
 
2.2 The question of energy in post-war Western Europe 
In popular memory, Western Europe came out of the war ruined and destroyed. 
Reconstruction fuelled economic growth in the first two years after the war, but the 
European economic recovery came to a halt in 1947, leading to the inception of the 
Marshall Plan. However, recent work by Hein Klemann and Sergei Kudryashov has 
demonstrated that most countries in Western Europe were not destitute at the end of 
the war and had actually done pretty well economically during the years of the Nazi 
occupation.136 This corresponds with Alan S. Milward’s contention that 1947 was not 
the year of a general economic breakdown, in contrast to what was portrayed at the 
time. In fact, most Western European countries experienced the sustained growth of 
outputs throughout 1946-48 at levels at or above those of 1938.137 However, the main 
issue for European reconstruction was Germany, whose industrial and agricultural 
outputs, energy and food supplies in 1947 were still well below 1938 levels. Germany 
had been Europe’s major supplier of coal and capital goods and the largest export 
market for other European economies. Its economic destitution and the shortages of 
German coal were thus a major obstacle to economic revival in Western Europe.138  
Nonetheless, from 1948 until the first oil crisis of 1973, Western Europe 
experienced an unprecedented period of economic growth. However, behind the 
image of improving welfare and unbounded faith in the benefits of technological 
progress and industrialisation unfolded a dramatic transformation in the energy 
                                               
136 H.A.M. Klemann and Sergei Kudryashov, Occupied Economies. An Economic History of Nazi-Occupied 
Europe, 1939-1945 (London 2012) 433.  
137 A.S. Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-51 (London 1992) 8-12.  
138 Milward, Reconstruction, 13. 
  35
domain, which was one of the fundamental conditions for economic growth and 
industrialisation. In 1952, 80 per cent of Western Europe’s primary energy 
consumption was based on coal. Twenty years later, coal supplied only 24 per cent of 
the region’s primary energy needs; its dominant position had been taken over by oil 
(55 per cent) and natural gas (20 per cent).139 This transition was dramatic for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, the replacement of coal caused major social and economic 
crises in the coal-producing regions of Western Europe, such as the Rhine-Ruhr area 
in West Germany. Furthermore, the transition unfolded in leaps and bounds, 
experiencing intense periods of crisis or fierce competition between energy sources. 
For many in the coal industry, the rapid replacement of coal in the late 1950s and 
early 1960s was unexpected. Indeed, the speed of the transition surprised many, and 
the magnitude of their surprise speaks from the projections of energy consumption 
that were produced by a multitude of organisations in the 1950s.  
 In 1957, a group of influential entrepreneurs active in the Port of Rotterdam 
published a study on the future energy consumption of the most important countries 
in the port’s hinterland.140 The group estimated energy consumption in 1965 in the 
Netherlands, Belgium, West Germany and Switzerland, and then projected the 
composition of the energy balance of each country. Its estimate of the total energy 
consumption in West Germany in 1965 was not far off the mark, albeit rather 
conservative; the study projected the consumption of 225 million tons of coal 
equivalent, while actual consumption that year was 240 million tons.141 However, its 
estimate of the composition of energy consumption, namely the energy balance, was 
dramatically different to what actually happened. In particular, the study estimated 
that coal would remain West Germany’s dominant source of energy, projecting that 
production would grow to 140 million tons of hard coal in 1965.142 In reality, West 
German hard coal consumption declined between 1957 and 1965 to 128 million 
tons.143 The study also completely overlooked the dramatic rise in the consumption of 
oil that occurred in this period, estimating that of West Germany to be 39 million 
tons in 1965 when it was actually around 100 million tons, constituting 40 per cent of 
total energy consumption in West Germany instead of the estimated 17 per cent. 
Although this is only one example, influential international organisations such as the 
European Coal and Steel Community and the Organisation for European Economic 
Cooperation produced similar estimates.144 Even the oil companies were too 
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conservative in their projections. In an internal report from Deutsche Shell that was 
published in 1956, the company estimated that the total West German energy 
demand would grow to 232 million tons of coal in 1965 and 276 million tons in 
1975.145 The estimate was close to the actual consumption in 1965, but missed the 
1975 mark by 50 to 80 million tons.146 The breakdown of the energy balance as 
estimated by Deutsche Shell is presented in Figure 2-1.  
 
Figure 2-1. The estimated and real West German energy balance, 1955-
1975 
 
Note: Both series originally contained three benchmark years (1955, 1965 and 1975 for Deutsche Shell 
and 1957, 1967 and 1977 for Odell). The intervals have been interpolated using compound annual 
growth rates between the benchmark years. The graph serves as an illustration and does not claim 
accuracy for the interval years. 
Source: Data from Deutsche Shell: SHA, MF 48/Installaties/Duitsland/Godorf/Algemeen, Internal 
report Deutsche Shell Hamburg, ‘Planung neue Raffinerie im Rhineland’, 7 June 1956. The data for 
the actual consumption was taken from: P. Odell, Oil and World Power (Harmondsworth 1986 eighth 
edition) 120-121.  
 
Like the Rotterdam Chamber of Commerce report, Deutsche Shell underestimated 
the demand for oil and gas and overestimated that for coal, failing to foresee the 
transition from coal to oil that would transpire in the 1960s. Although Deutsche Shell 
estimated that oil consumption would be 49 million tons in 1965, which was higher 
than the Rotterdam Chamber of Commerce’s 1957 estimate, it was still only half the 
actual amount consumed that year. For 1975, Deutsche Shell underestimated oil 
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consumption by 100 million tons. Strikingly, the company estimated that if the 
energy demand grew at a slower pace, this would be at the expense of oil, not coal. 
These examples serve to illustrate how significant the first two post-war decades were 
in terms of the supply of energy in Western Europe in general, and in West Germany 
in particular.  
 An important cause of the energy transition in the 1950s was the attempt of 
the US to expand European oil refining capacity in order to replace oil product 
imports with crude oil imports, while at the same time expanding oil consumption to 
cover the energy deficit caused by problems with coal production. The Marshall Plan, 
which was the American program for providing coordinated economic aid to Western 
European countries, was an important instrument when it came to achieving that 
goal.147 The Marshall Plan had far-reaching effects on the Western European energy 
balance. Oil was an important part of the plan because, during and shortly after 
World War II, the global oil industry experienced a fundamental structural shift. 
Furthermore, the European recovery was hampered by a severe shortage of coal, 
which necessitated the development of a new source of energy, namely oil. 
The structural shift in the global production of oil was caused by the 
exploration and production of Middle Eastern oil reserves. In 1928, this work was 
cartelised in what became known as the Red Line Agreement, which was made 
between the American, British, Anglo-Dutch and French oil firms participating in 
the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC). 148 The Agreement stipulated that they would 
jointly develop Middle Eastern oil reserves, excluding Kuwait and Iran, which were 
both under British influence. Finds would be reported to the other shareholders and 
shared according to the percentage of ownership in the IPC. After World War II, the 
agreement came under pressure from the American oil companies in the partnership 
which, supported by their government, sought to extend their foreign oil reserve 
holdings to counter fears about the depletion of domestic sources in the US.149 Jersey 
Standard and Standard Oil of New York (Socony) attempted to upend the agreement 
in order to acquire a 40 per cent stake in the Arabian American Oil Company 
(ARAMCO), which held major concessions in Saudi Arabia. Although the French 
initially protested the legality of the American breach, fears over domestic instability 
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in France and deteriorating relations with the US and Great Britain left them with no 
option but to support the end of the Red Line Agreement in 1948.150  
The end of the agreement was part of a great reshuffling of the oil industry 
with respect to the burgeoning reserves of the Middle East, and the changes that took 
place became known as the great oil deals of 1947: the Jersey Standard-Socony deal 
with ARAMCO; a 20-year supply contract between Jersey Standard-Socony and 
Anglo-Iranian (later British Petroleum, BP); and a 10-year supply deal between Gulf 
Oil and Royal Dutch Shell.151 These deals reflected a shift in global oil production 
from the US Gulf coast to the Middle East. Up until World War II, the US had 
produced 90 per cent of the world’s crude oil output, but it was clear that in the post-
war world America would soon become a net importer of oil. Indeed, even during the 
war, it was clear to the US that the Middle East would be the future centre of global 
oil production,152 and that it therefore needed a stake in the region. This was the 
background of the great oil deals of 1947. In the words of Yergin, this “dramatic 
reorientation in the oil industry [...] would have [a] profound impact on the direction 
of world politics.”153  
In 1948, rising domestic demand and a peak in production caused the US to 
become a net importer of oil. As a consequence, it could no longer supply Europe 
with oil, as it had done during and shortly after the war. Although US energy security 
was the rationale behind the great oil deals, the actual state of US oil reserves was not 
as bad as appeared during the war, leaving US companies with a surplus of Middle 
Eastern oil.154 This meant that Europe was an important potential outlet for the 
Middle Eastern oil of these US firms, not least because the largest US oil company, 
Jersey Standard, saw its European markets threatened by a shortage of American oil. 
The problem was that the transportation, processing and marketing infrastructure for 
transporting, refining and distributing Middle Eastern oil to and within Europe was 
lacking. Indeed, it was no coincidence that the great oil deals were between companies 
long on crude oil, but short on European outlets, and vice versa. Jersey Standard and 
Royal Dutch Shell were major oil suppliers to European markets and were thus 
relatively well-suited to addressing the problems that arose.155 The great oil deals not 
only served to provide the less well-equipped companies in the Eastern hemisphere 
with an outlet for their Middle Eastern oil, but  were also, first and foremost, an 
effective means of controlling the world oil market. Carefully worded clauses in each 
deal provided safeguards against overproduction and competition, and according to 
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Howarth and Jonker, the deals were probably more effective in dividing the market 
than the 1928 Achnacarry Agreement.156 
  By 1947, Europe was being threatened by a severe energy shortage, with 
Germany, the most important pre-war continental source of coal, only producing at 
40 per cent of its pre-World War II level.157 Shortages of coal disrupted industrial 
production and household heating, but Europe lacked the financial and natural 
resources to avert the crisis on its own. Resolving the energy crisis was one of the 
goals of the Marshall Plan, which, according to a contemporary American report, 
could not have succeeded without oil.158 According to Yergin, the Marshall Plan, and 
specifically the centrality of oil therein, had major implications for Europe’s energy 
balance.159 Oil was indeed the single largest aspect of the plan’s aid: 10 per cent of the 
dollars allocated under the plan were used to enable the dollar-starved Western 
European countries to import dollar-oil from the Middle East.160 The Economic 
Cooperation Administration (ECA), which was managing the allocation of Marshall 
Plan dollars, directed oil from the Middle East to Europe to resolve the energy crisis 
of the late 1940s and to secure the American oil supply from its own domestic sources. 
This also helped US oil companies to retain their European markets.161 The lower 
price levels of Middle Eastern oil, the increasing size of its production, and the 
structural rise in the cost of labour, which strongly affected the cost price of coal 
production, caused oil to become much cheaper than coal, ultimately setting in 
motion the transition from coal to oil as the primary source of energy in most 
European economies. 162  
 The second part of the solution to Europe’s energy shortage was the 
construction of new refining capacity in Western Europe. This would save dollar 
outlays for oil product imports and thus be beneficial with respect to the effectiveness 
of the Marshall Plan for a European recovery. However, refinery expansion required 
large amounts of steel and equipment, which could only be supplied by US companies 
and thus needed to be paid for in dollars. The ECA agreed to finance a coordinated 
European refinery expansion program. However, due to problems with the execution 
of the plan, it only provided 24 million US dollars to be earmarked for refinery 
expansion, which was a tiny amount compared to the 1.2 billion US dollars used to 
finance dollar oil imports.163 However, according to Painter, Western European 
countries used free dollars – the Marshall Plan aid not earmarked for specific 
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purchases – to nonetheless expand refining capacity, albeit in a less coordinated, more 
national way.  
 
2.3 The impact of the Allied occupation on the Ruhr coal industry 
While the German oil industry experienced a boost from US policy and aid, coal 
mining was struggling. Before the war, Germany was the primary supplier of hard 
coal to many European countries, especially France, the Netherlands and Sweden, and 
restarting production in the Ruhr area was essential for a Western European recovery. 
This was recognised at an early stage by the US military authority, which only took 
control of the Rhine-Ruhr coal mines after the creation of the Bizone in 1947. 
Restarting production was severely hampered by war damage to the mines and 
German infrastructure, restrictive occupation policies, a lack of labour and the 
malnourishment of the workforce that remained.164 Moreover, the preoccupation of 
the Third Reich with military planning and autarky had diverted capital investment in 
the industry towards the building of production facilities for synthetic fuel, ammonia 
and rubber, starving the mines of much-needed investment. According to 
Abelshauser, apart from war damage, the mines in the Ruhr area were thus in dire 
need of maintenance and modernisation. Indeed, Ruhr coal mining never really 
recovered from the burden of the Nazi period and the war.165  
 From early 1946 onwards, the Allied military authorities aimed to increase the 
output of Ruhr coal. This was increasingly accomplished in 1947 and 1948. However, 
the solution to the overarching questions of ownership (the Americans sought to 
decartelise the industry and cut the intimate ties between coal mining and steel 
manufacturing) and the international governance of the region proved elusive. 
Resolving both issues was vital to the creation of a proper foundation for the future of 
Ruhr coal mining and thus for its modernisation. When it came to international 
governance of the Ruhr area, US policies of containment were at odds with European, 
and especially French, interests with regard to coal supplies from the Ruhr. On the 
one hand, from 1947 onwards, the US and Britain aimed for a German recovery, 
which required increased supplies of coal for German industry. On the other, the 
French goal was international control over the Ruhr area and, just as in 1923, France 
demanded guaranteed supplies of Ruhr coal. The US sought a solution through the 
integration of Western Europe. Integration gave sovereignty to a fully reconstructed 
and internationally recognised Germany, as well as providing France with the security 
it required against any future German aggression. The policy of combining German 
reconstruction with the integration of Western Europe gained traction during 1948, 
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and led to the acceptance of the International Authority for the Ruhr by the French. 
The Germans also grudgingly accepted this approach in 1949, but both Germany and 
France remained unhappy with this outcome. To West Germany, the International 
Authority was an infringement on its sovereignty, while to the French it did not 
provide enough guarantees. Mounting tensions between Germany and France over 
the Saar region paved the way for the Schumann Plan of 9 May 1950, which led to 
the inception of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951/1952.166  
 The ECSC was much more in line with the economic interests of the Ruhr 
area than the International Authority. John Gillingham even went as far as 
interpreting the ECSC as reflecting the historical continuity of the cartelisation of the 
Western European coal and steel industries.167 The reality was that Karl Arnold, 
prime minister of North Rhine Westphalia, which contained 80 per cent of West 
Germany’s coal and steel production, had already promoted an international solution 
to the Ruhr question along the lines of the Schumann Plan between 1946 and 1948.168 
Germany’s position as Western Europe’s main coal and steel producer required an 
international and integrative approach to German reconstruction. However, until 
1950, the French and even the Dutch hoped to become Europe’s principal steel 
producer at the expense of Germany. It took France two years to realise that it needed 
the Ruhr at least as much as the Ruhr needed France, and so the Schumann Plan 
came into being.169  
 With regard to the question of ownership, Allied policy and German wishes 
differed greatly. Initially, ownership of the entire Rhine-Ruhr coal mining industry 
came under Allied control. The British, then under the Labour government of 
Clement Attlee, at first pursued full public ownership of the Ruhr coal mines by the 
German states. From late 1947 onwards, the Ruhr coal mining companies regained 
some measure of control over their mines with the inception of the German Coal 
Mining Executive (Deutsche Kohlenbergbauleitung), which consisted of an executive 
and supervisory board made up of the former owners of the mines. Although ultimate 
control resided with the Allied Coal Control Group, the German Coal Mining 
Executive managed day-to-day affairs. Nonetheless, law 75 of November 1948 
ordained the new founding of the coal mines by severing ties with former owners, as 
well as cross-ownership deals with steel and electrical power groups, transferring 
ownership to German trustees. In a specification of the law, in 1949 the Allies 
proposed incorporating 10 independent mining companies that would each own 
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approximately 10 per cent of the mines in the area.170 The Germans were sceptical 
about this proposal. Steel producers needed integrated coal mining and coke 
manufacturing to balance and control their raw material procurement costs, which 
amounted to 70 per cent of the production costs of pig iron.171  
Although the Ruhr coal mining companies wanted a more independent role as 
a safeguard against their subordinated pre-war position vis-à-vis steel and chemicals, 
the German Coal Mining Executive favoured retaining the existing intimate ties with 
both industries and the related level of concentration. However, the Allied High 
Commission came to a different conclusion: as of May 1950, law nr. 27 (replacing law 
nr. 75) stipulated the creation of 23 new and independent coal mining companies 
from the existing eight groups.172 In contrast, German Coal Mining Executive had 
proposed crafting just 10 mining companies out of the same groups. The Allied goal 
of solving the post-war shortage of coal by combining efforts to increase output with 
the aim of increased competition among Rhine-Ruhr coal producers thus prevailed 
over German wishes to retain the existing structure of the industry. According to 
Abelshauser, who quotes the IG Bergbau annual report of 1952, the long-term effect 
of focusing on short-term goals was detrimental to the future health of the Ruhr coal 
mining industry.173  
 However, decartelisation was not entirely successful, because it and the 
creation of the ECSC were somewhat at odds in the sense that the latter provided 
Ruhr industry with an escape route. Faced with constant opposition from the West 
German government, the Allied High Command gradually agreed to shift jurisdiction 
over the coal and steel industry to the High Authority of the ECSC after its 
establishment in 1953, allowing Ruhr industry to gradually scale back decartelisation 
measures. According to Gillingham, decartelisation was ultimately a failure;174 
although the ECSC provided continuity with respect to the coal and steel industry’s 
longstanding attempts to achieve European market coordination, it did not provide 
the Ruhr coal industry with a solution to its long-term problem of limited 
rationalisation and modernisation. Given the wide variety of factors causing possible 
market distortions in the ECSC member states, the best it could do to foster a 
common market for coal was to introduce price controls.175  
 Price controls for Ruhr coal thus prevailed from 1945 to 1956, when ECSC 
listed prices were abolished. Enduring price controls hampered rationalisation and 
modernisation investment. The output growth realised in 1948 was at the expense of 
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the British and US authorities (Coal Control Group), which furnished resources and 
subsidies to cover the gap between rising production costs and the listed price that 
remained unchanged. While the currency reform of 1948 created better financing 
conditions for other industries, the Ruhr coal mining industry did not benefit. 
Although prices more than doubled shortly after currency reform, only a fifth of coal 
mines operated at a profit. As a consequence, much needed investments were 
postponed. Even Marshall Plan funds could not cover the capital requirements of the 
industry. In particular, the issues of the construction of new mines, the mechanisation 
of existing production and new homes for workers remained unaddressed.176  
 The Ruhr coal mines were constantly producing at full capacity, meaning that 
there was little room for production increases. Forced exports of Ruhr coal, which 
were first agreed by the Allied High Command and later by the ECSC, exacerbated 
the problem. During both the raw material boom of the Korean War, which was the 
first hot war of the Cold War and lasted from 1950 to 1953, and the subsequent 
growth of the German steel sector in the wake of the increasing pace of Western 
European rearmament, the Ruhr coal industry was producing at its limits. In 
1950/1951, coal shortages led to an energy crisis, necessitating power cuts for 
consumers, industry and the transportation sector.177 Unwillingness on the part of the 
International Authority for the Ruhr to cut the export quota, resistance from domestic 
industries to supply cuts, and a growing domestic black market for coal required the 
German federal government to stimulate imports of foreign, mainly US, coal in order 
to address the 1951 energy crisis. Germany’s opposition to missing out on the 
rearmament boom because of its tight coal supply led to a deterioration in its balance 
of payments. However, the reintroduction of distribution controls, the importation of 
US coal and a gradual increase in coal production relieved the situation from early 
1952 onwards. Nevertheless, the energy crisis had once again highlighted that an 
investment program that would structurally improve its position was long overdue for 
the Ruhr coal industry. Subsequently, a way to free up capital for the coal mining 
sector was devised, which consisted of a voluntary aid program run by German 
industry on the one hand and federal fiscal measures under the investment aid law – 
Investitionshilfegesetz – on the other. Taken together, this resulted in over 2 billion 
DM of investment capital for critical energy industries. The law also approved price 
rises for Ruhr coal, although this was limited by the price setting competence of the 
High Authority of the ECSC.178   
 The belated investment program for the Ruhr coal mining industry addressed 
the supply side of the energy market. However, the West German government 
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doubted whether the Ruhr coal sector would be able to meet the rising energy 
demands of the rapidly growing economy in West Germany over the decades to come. 
Part of the problem was that the economic boom of the mid-1950s created full 
employment in West Germany, and the Ruhr coal industry thus struggled to find 
people who were willing to work in the mines.179 Consequently, wages and labour 
costs increased, pushing up coal prices. In an attempt to ease the tight West German 
energy market, the government introduced more competition for coal by exempting 
fuel oil from value added tax (1953) and import duties (1956).180 The aim was to 
create greater demand for alternative energy sources, fuel oil in this case, to force the 
Ruhr coal mining industry to rationalise and modernise. 
 
2.4 The Allied refining program: restarting the hydrogenation plants 
During the Allied occupation (1945-1949), the US approach to German economic 
and political development changed a number of times. Initially, the US military 
occupation directive resembled the plan proposed by Henry Morgenthau, the US 
Secretary of the Treasury. Morgenthau’s aim was to de-industrialise Germany in 
order to deny it any future capability to make war. Accordingly, he listed all strategic 
and weapons industries, including synthetic chemical production and steel 
manufacturing, for decommissioning. However, the country was in such a poor state, 
and a prolonged occupation potentially so costly, that the US military government 
soon allowed industrial production to take place again, including in prohibited 
industries. Germany needed to be able to produce and export in order to finance a 
number of essential imports, such as foodstuffs. From the Potsdam Protocols of 
August 1945, via the inception of the combined British-US occupation zone (Bizone) 
in January 1947, the currency reform of 1948, and the start of the Marshall Plan in 
the same year, the US policy for Germany shifted from containment to 
reconstruction.181 However, the dismantling of plants and the bans on the production 
of certain strategic materials (in particular chemicals and steel) remained in place until 
the Petersberg Agreement of November 1949, where the nascent Federal Republic 
exchanged the lifting of industrial bans for the inception of the International 
Authority for the Ruhr. The actual removal of all restraints on German industry 
occurred in 1951, but the reality was that most restrictions had already been lifted by 
1949.182 The intensifying Cold War shifted US priorities from containing German 
industrial power to rebuilding and mobilising it in order to shore up European 
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defences against the Soviet Union.183 The policy shift with regard to Germany had 
important and fundamental consequences for the country’s future energy balance.  
 At the top of the Allied list of essential war industries was the synthetic fuel 
sector. The history of synthetic fuels reveals much about Germany’s pre-war 
technological prowess and the post-war development of the oil and petrochemical 
industry in the Rhine-Ruhr area. The production of synthetic fuels from hard coal or 
brown coal was based on the invention of the high-pressure hydrogenation of coal by 
the Nobel Prize winning German chemist Friedrich Bergius in 1913. Although the 
importance of the hydrogenation process has been played down in the literature on 
account of its failure to produce a viable alternative to oil and its role in the Nazi war 
economy, at the time it appeared to be a revolutionary technology.184 Known as the 
Bergius process for the high-pressure hydrogenation of coal, the technology enabled 
the production of motor fuels (gasoline and diesel) from coal. The process gained 
recognition during and after World War I. Bergius devised a commercial sized plant 
in 1914, but progress was slow and he sold his patent to BASF in 1925. At BASF, 
Carl Bosch further developed the process, which fostered interest from both domestic 
and foreign firms and governments.185 The Bergius-process was an exponent of 
advanced German chemical engineering, belonging to the family of high-pressure 
chemical technologies that was the technological frontier of the time. The decision of 
Carl Bosch, president of both BASF and, since 1925, the chemical conglomerate 
Interessengemeinschaft Farbenindustrie AG (IG Farben for short), to go through with 
the development of high-pressure hydrogenation was the result of the enormous 
technological momentum that had been building up during World War I.  
Ever since the 19th century, innovation in the German chemical industry was 
driven by a relentless search for synthetic substitutes for expensive imports. Limited in 
natural resources, Germany’s chemical ventures sought to produce alternatives from 
the few resources available domestically, in particular coal. Riding the crest of an 
innovation wave, Bosch and his team at BASF had pushed the frontiers of high 
pressure, high temperature and catalytic chemistry by hugely expanding synthetic 
nitrogen production in Germany during World War I. That achievement carried the 
determination to pursue new breakthroughs in industrial chemistry over into 
peacetime.186 The capital required for such ventures provided the rationale for the 
integration of the German chemical industry. Although groups of individual 
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companies had been forming since 1903, the process culminated in 1925 with the 
formation of a single entity, IG Farben, in which BASF acted as the holding 
company.187 The pooled resources of IG Farben allowed it to undertake the 
development of synthetic alternatives to motor fuels from coal. 
 For international oil companies, the hydrogenation process was both a threat 
and an opportunity. On the one hand, it could be used for the production of gasoline 
from heavy oil residues, lube oils, and fertiliser from refinery or coking gas. 
Hydrogenation thus promised to be a valuable addition to the chemical endeavours of 
the oil companies in their search for the valorisation of by-products. On the other 
hand, it could potentially harm their position on the world motor fuel market. 
Foreign oil and chemical companies, notably Royal Dutch Shell, Jersey Standard and 
Imperial Chemical Industries, became interested. In fact, Royal Dutch had 
participated in the Bergius venture in 1921, but lost interest because Bergius seemed 
to be unable to develop the technology commercially.188  
The formation of IG Farben and its vast resources renewed the promise of a 
commercial application for the hydrogenation technology. Indeed, in 1931 Royal 
Dutch and Jersey Standard closed a number of patent-sharing deals in which they 
essentially divided the world market for synthetic fuels, complementing the oil cartel 
that Royal Dutch, Jersey Standard and British Petroleum had formed three years 
earlier in the Scottish town of Achnacarry.189 However, the progress at IG Farben’s 
Leuna plant, near the present-day city of Merseburg in Eastern Germany, was 
overtaken by the economy and expanding world oil reserves. In 1927, synthetic 
gasoline from Leuna had cost 40 pfennig per litre, which was twice as much as 
imported gasoline. By 1931, the price of a litre of Leuna gasoline had dropped to 23 
pfennig, which was close to 1927 prices for imported gasoline. Simultaneously, 
expanding world oil reserves and plummeting demand following the economic 
depression had reduced world market prices for gasoline to roughly 5 pfennig per litre 
by 1931. Even an increase in the tariff on imported gasoline that same year could not 
shield IG Farben from the disastrous losses that it incurred on the hydrogenation 
project.190  
  The rise to power of Adolf Hitler proved to be a boon for IG Farben. 
Following the breakdown of world trade in the wake of the depression, the Nazi 
regime intervened heavily in the German economy in order to protect German 
agriculture and industry and ensure the replacement of hitherto imported goods. The 
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purpose of all this was Hitler’s ultimate, mainly military, goal: German autarky.191 At 
first, Hitler was restrained in his pursuit of autarky in the interests of gaining the 
support of private industry. However, as the speed and volume of rearmament needed 
to increase, greater intervention was required, which led to the rise of Hermann 
Göring as plenipotentiary of the Four Year Plan in 1936.192  
IG Farben’s hydrogenation technology fitted in well with the policy goals of 
the Nazi regime. Presenting the technology as a means to attain strategically vital 
autarky in the production of motor fuels, the company successfully lobbied the regime 
into supporting its hydrogenation technology. The decision of the Nazis to back IG 
Farben was later explained by the company’s management as a decision in favour of 
the more advanced and cost efficient synthesis technology. Ray Stokes adds that IG 
Farben’s managers were much better connected in the Nazi regime than other 
industrial groups with an interest in the oil industry.193 In particular, German heavy 
industry, including the Ruhr iron and steel sector, was weary of and resented Hitler’s 
interference in private business.194 After 1933, the Nazi state became increasingly 
forceful in diverting private industry investments into the autarky industry. In terms 
of investments, whether explicitly or implicitly coerced by the state, synthetic fuels 
represented the largest single autarky project in the Nazi period.195 More or less under 
state coercion, private industry in Germany (mostly coal and steel companies, but also 
IG Farben and even Royal Dutch Shell and Jersey Standard) invested billions of 
Reichsmarks in the construction of 12 hydrogenation plants, which were spread 
among the hard coal and lignite areas in the German Reich. Four of these plants were 
located in the Rhine-Ruhr area.196 The hydrogenation plants complemented 
Germany’s existing oil refineries, which were primarily located in Hamburg, to form 
half of the country’s total production capacity for motor fuels.197 
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Figure 2-2. The refineries and hydrogenation plants in Germany, 1938. 
 
Source: Data on refineries: SHA, Germany country book IV, Dr. P. Schwarz, ‘Germany strives for 
self-sufficiency’, World Petroleum (October 1936). Data on hydrogenation plants: Fischer-Tropsch 
Archive, microfilm reel B1870, item 11, ‘Petroleum Facilities of Germany’, March 1945, 
http://www.fischer-tropsch.org/Tom%20Reels/Linked//B1870/B1870_toc.htm, 11 December 2012. 
Map: MPIDR [Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research] and CGG [Chair for Geodesy and 
Geoinformatics, University of Rostock], MPIDR Population History GIS Collection (Rostock 2011). 
http://censusmosaic.org/web/data/historical-gis-files, 23 July 2014. The data are reported in Appendix 
B: Data Table 0-1 and Table 0-2. 
 
Ownership of the three largest hydrogenation plants in the Rhine-Ruhr area was 
dominated by the region’s big industry. The largest Ruhr coal mining company, 
Gelsenkirchener Bergwerks AG (GBAG), owned the second largest hydrogenation 
plant, Gelsenberg Benzin AG in Gelsenkirchen, with a share capital of 100 million 
Reichsmark. Through GBAG, Vereinigte Stahlwerke held a stake in Gelsenberg 
Benzin. The area’s largest hydrogenation plant, Scholven AG in Gelsenkirchen, with 
a share capital of RM 250 million, was owned by the state-controlled mining giant 
Hibernia AG.198 The area’s smallest plant, Union Rheinische Braunkohlen Kraftstoff 
in Wesseling, was established jointly by the Rhenish brown coal industry around 
Cologne.199 Although the Rhine-Ruhr coal and steel industries invested in 
hydrogenation more or less voluntarily out of a fear of government coercion, for 
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Gelsenkirchener Bergwerks AG and Hibernia, the hydrogenation plants also 
presented an opportunity to valorise a proportion of their coal production that was 
otherwise hard to sell.200 Indeed, the shareholders in Union Krafstoff in Wesseling 
hoped that the hydrogenation plant would spin-off a chemical cluster based on brown 
coal.   
 The plants in the Ruhr area did form the basis for a large-scale integrated 
chemical cluster, which was an ambition that the Ruhr coal and steel industry had 
long entertained. In 1938, IG Farben (74 per cent) and Hibernia AG (26 per cent) 
founded Chemische Werke Hüls for the production of synthetic rubber (Buna) from 
hydrocarbon feedstock from the hydrogenation plants at Gelsenkirchen. In return, 
Hüls provided both hydrogenation plants with hydrogen, which they needed in great 
quantities for the production of synthetic fuels.201 By 1943, the product exchange 
network, through pipelines, had spread to smaller chemical plants in the Ruhr area, 
and comprised five different product flows between eight different plants.202 The 
synthetic technologies of IG Farben had thus provided the Ruhr Montan industry 
with an opportunity to diversify into chemical production, which was entirely 
facilitated by the autarkic proclivities of the Nazi regime, the commercial viability of 
which would have been nil under normal circumstances. 
 The synthetic fuel and rubber industry provided most of the Reich’s fuels, 
lubricants and rubber during the war. Its destruction was vital to the Allied military 
campaign against Germany. Although 72 per cent of the country’s hydrogenation 
capacity was located in East Germany, and was therefore lost to the Soviets, one 
million tons of capacity came under British control. This capacity consisted of four 
plants: Union Kraftstoff in Wesseling, two plants in Gelsenkirchen and a much 
smaller plant in Bottrop-Welheim.203 Initially, any production by these plants was 
banned, but the military government was permitted to restart such work if the 
situation required it.204 The fate of the hydrogenation plants in the Rhine-Ruhr area is 
a fine example of the policy shift of the Allies with regard to Germany; first listed for 
dismantling, they were gradually reopened as German reconstruction became 
increasingly central to the Allied occupation policy. International oil companies were 
closely involved in this policy shift and were quick to profit from it. As the utilisation 
of these plants for coal hydrogenation continued to be banned, and was not 
economically viable in any event, oil refining was the only remaining option. The case 
of Union Kraftstoff in Wesseling shows how and why the Allied policy towards West 
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Germany changed, and highlights the instrumental role of the hydrogenation plants 
in the Rhine-Ruhr area in this Allied policy shift.  
 
2.5 The case of Union Kraftstoff 
In the first few months after the German capitulation of May 1945, the country’s 
food situation was precarious. As one of the least damaged hydrogenation plants, 
Union Kraftstoff realised that it was in a good position to utilise part of its plant for 
the production of chemical fertilisers and methanol using its high-pressure facilities. 
These products formed the heart of the technological breakthrough that BASF had 
forged in the 1910s and 1920s with the synthesis of ammonia and methanol.  
 
Figure 2-3 The German occupation zones, 1947 
 
Source: Map created by the author based on IEG-MAPS, Institut für Europäische Geschichte, Mainz 
/ © A. Kunz, 2004. http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/pdf/deu/p947Zonen_a4_mb.pdf, 4 July 2014. 
 
While the French disposed of fertiliser through its command of IG Farben’s BASF 
Ludwigshafen plant (Figure 2-3, left of the Rhine), the British and American zones 
were short. Electrical power generation was equally critical. As early as 1 June 1945, 
the Allied authority granted Union Kraftstoff permission to repair and restart power 
generation in its power plant. On 27 August 1945, the British occupation authority 
agreed in principle to Union Kraftstoff’s plan to start the production of ammonia to 
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produce fertiliser.205 From November 1945, Union Kraftstoff employed a workforce of 
1,200 to clear the plant of rubble and repair the critical installations such as the power 
generation and high-pressure facilities. However, in November 1946, the company 
heard that it was listed for dismantling. This was part of the US policy of the 
containment of German industry, but did not stop the British from granting Union 
Kraftstoff permission to start producing methanol in October 1946.206 Around the 
same time, Union Kraftstoff director Carl Müller von Blumencron visited Hoechst in 
Frankfurt (in the US zone, Figure 2-3) and learned that the area was looking for a 
daily supply of ammonia of 120 tons, which no one could deliver.  
 As the control commission would possibly deny an application from Union 
Kraftstoff directly, von Blumencron’s English contacts advised him to let Hoechst 
make the application via the US military government. According to von Blumencron, 
this was an approach that everyone in the English zone was taking if they wanted 
something done, especially in the agricultural sector.207 Von Blumencron put in his 
request via the Central Office for Economic Affairs (Zentralamt für Wirtschaft), which 
was the first post-war predecessor to the Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs 
(Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft) that was established in 1946. This office forwarded 
his letter to the Bipartite Economic Control Group. The Zentralamt argued that 
there was a considerable shortage of nitrogen, which could not be supplemented by 
imports.208 This situation was expected to worsen, as BASF no longer delivered 
nitrogen to Hoechst due to an order by the French occupying authorities, which 
aimed to put pressure on their British counterparts to fulfil coal deliveries to the 
French zone (which had apparently faltered). According to the Zentralamt, this 
situation would not be resolved any time soon, meaning that there was a considerable 
shortage of nitrogen in the British zone. The alternative was the possibility of 
granting Union Kraftstoff a permit to produce ammonia, which could start within 
three months. The Zentralamt tried its best to improve the position of Union 
Kraftstoff, because it argued that the company’s production of ammonia would be 
beneficial for BASF. As Union Kraftstoff used abundant brown coal and BASF rare 
hard coal, producing ammonia at Wesseling would alleviate the strain on the latter. 
The Zentralamt’s argument hit the right note, because on 20 May 1947 Union 
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Kraftstoff received a permit for the production of ammonia,209 which started on 15 
September 1947. As both nitrogen and ammonia were critical to the economy of 
Occupied Germany, the British promised Union Kraftstoff that the dismantling 
policy would interfere as little as possible with the already commissioned production 
of methanol.210 
 Indeed, the economic necessities of governing Occupied Germany soon 
overtook the initial industrial dismantling plans of the Allied authorities; as early as 
September 1946, US Secretary of State J.F. Byrne hinted at an Allied policy change in 
this regard. Actual dismantling ended with the formation of the Bizone on 1 January 
1947, although production bans remained in place for products associated with the 
German war economy, such as synthetic fuels and a range of chemicals. Dismantling 
returned to the agenda briefly in April 1949, but was finally abandoned in the 
Petersberg Agreement of 22 November 1949 after fierce protests from the new West 
German government.211 Interestingly, Union Kraftstoff was not on the dismantling 
list of the Allied agreement of April 1949. Carl von Blumencron, managing director 
of Union Kraftstoff at the time, later hypothesised that the company had by then 
proved to be too important to the regional economy to be dismantled, although he 
also entertained the possibility that the Allies were just not interested in brown coal.212 
Production bans on synthetic fuels, which had been the mainstay of Union 
Kraftstoff’s production during the war, remained in place. The production of 
ammonia and methanol utilised only 40 per cent of the plant. Indeed, the majority of 
the plant’s facilities were idle. This included the 800-900,000 tons per annum crude 
oil distillation unit, which was added to the plant during the war for the purpose of 
refining Caucasian crude oil, although this never happened because Hitler’s Russian 
campaign was derailed before Caucasian oil fields could be captured. The distillation 
unit was thus never operational and emerged unharmed from the war.213  
 After the successful start-up of ammonia and methanol production, Union 
Kraftstoff was looking for further opportunities to enhance its financial position. Its 
distillation unit and hydrogenation plant allowed the company to obtain high yields of 
gasoline from crude oil or heavy oil residues. It was therefore in a good position to 
help to reduce the enormous shortage of motor fuels, but had no source of crude oil of 
its own.214 As a consequence, Union Kraftstoff had inquired after the opportunity to 
buy and process crude oil for its own use, but this remained a political impossibility at 
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the time.215 Parallel with the birth of the Bizonal Oil Refinery Plan in 1947, Union 
Kraftstoff began negotiations with Deutsche Shell and Esso AG, the German 
subsidiary of Jersey Standard.216 In 1948, the Bizonal Plan was extended to include 
former hydrogenation plants.217  
 Whereas Union Kraftstoff only began to look for opportunities in oil refining 
in 1947, international oil companies had been interested in the former hydrogenation 
plants from 1945 onwards. As advisors to the military occupation authorities, officials 
from US and British oil companies were in an excellent position to gather information 
on the state of the German oil industry in general and the hydrogenation facilities in 
particular.218 While Union Kraftstoff was talking to Deutsche Shell and Esso AG, 
Royal Dutch Shell was interested in another hydrogenation plant in Gelsenkirchen, 
namely Gelsenberg Benzin AG.219 Although plans to cooperate with this company fell 
through, they highlighted the great interest shown by Royal Dutch Shell in gaining 
refinery capacity in the Rhine-Ruhr area without having to invest. According to 
Union Kraftstoff director von Blumencron, Union Kraftstoff chose to work with 
Deutsche Shell because it was better positioned to deliver the required crude oil to 
Wesseling. Indeed, while Esso AG did not have sufficient transport capacity to ship 
crude oil over the Rhine, Deutsche Shell could use the services of the Shell group’s 
captive fleet on the Rhine, which was operated by the Rotterdam-based Van 
Ommeren.220 The announcement of the Bizonal Plan in May 1948 paved the way for 
the Deutsche Shell-Union Kraftstoff processing deal, which was signed on 13 
October 1948.221 The contract consisted of the distillation of 300,000 tons of foreign 
crude oil and the hydrogenation of 150,000 tons of heavy oil residues from the 
distillation unit.222  
 The processing contract came none too soon for Union Kraftstoff, and 
reflected the plant’s precarious circumstances. The Rhenish brown coal companies 
held Union Kraftstoff’s 90 million DM of paid up capital. As guarantors, the group of 
shareholders was jointly liable for Union Kraftstoff’s debt obligations, which by 1948 
amounted to 211 million RM (before currency reform) of accumulated debts that 
were held by banks and private debenture holders. Union Kraftstoff’s largest 
shareholder, Rheinische AG für Braunkohlenbergbau und Brikettfabrikation 
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(Rheinbraun), which represented the group of shareholders, had managed to keep 
creditors at bay. Union Kraftstoff desperately needed the Deutsche Shell contract if it 
wanted to keep its plant from turning into a rust heap, although it nonetheless 
required repairing and needed damaged installations to be replaced. In order to 
proceed with the Deutsche Shell contract, Union Kraftstoff needed an additional 6.5 
million DM to make the plant operational again. The company was able to finance 
2.5 million DM from its own means, but needed short-term credit to the tune of 4 
million DM, for which the shareholders acted as guarantors.223   
 After the German currency reforms of June 1948, Union Kraftstoff’s total debt 
amounted to 21 million DM, of which 10.4 million in interest payable and 
amortisation was overdue. The banks holding the debt were, nevertheless, willing to 
grant an extended grace period on the loans and to roll over the outstanding 
amortisation instalments. Union Kraftstoff expected to reach a similar agreement with 
the debenture holders. However, getting the shareholders to guarantee new loans was 
not as straightforward.224 Although the Bizonal Plan was an opportunity for Union 
Kraftstoff, there were no guarantees that the Allies would leave the plant intact. 
Indeed, the hydrogenation facilities in particular were still officially listed for 
dismantling, which, if enforced, could potentially lead to the premature end of the 
Deutsche Shell contract.  
 The Deutsche Shell contract was the only thing that could save Union 
Kraftstoff from obsolescence. Deutsche Shell guaranteed to buy Union Kraftstoff’s 
production at a price covering operating costs, amortisation and interest. In turn, 
Union Kraftstoff was expected to run profits on the processing contract of 2.48 
million DM in 1949 and 9.18 million in 1950. Together with the profits from the 
production of power, methanol and ammonia, Union Kraftstoff expected to repay the 
reparation loan of 4 million DM by 1950.225 Moreover, Deutsche Shell had agreed to 
take on the risk of Union Kraftstoff’s reparation loan.226 The contract contained a 
clause in which Deutsche Shell agreed to repay any outstanding instalments of the 
reparation loan in the first three years of the contract if the hydrogenation part could 
not be fulfilled because of either an Allied ban or uneconomical operations.227 This 
clause killed two birds with one stone. On the one hand, and provided that Union 
Kraftstoff succeeded in servicing the processing contract without disruptions, it took 
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from Union Kraftstoff’s shareholders the risk of guaranteeing the new loan in the first 
three years of operations. On the other hand, the contract provided for the 
contingency of an enforced Allied ban on the hydrogenation facility, which was still a 
possibility in late 1948.  
 Guaranteeing the loan was no small risk for Deutsche Shell, which was in the 
midst of an extensive operation to repair war damage to its plants. However, financing 
the investment program was difficult. Royal Dutch Shell’s marketing division 
expenditures had already absorbed the profits and depreciations of 1949, and needed 
external financing through the local affiliate Mineraloelwerke Albrecht & Co to 
furnish the 24 million DM required for reparations that same year.228 For the 
rehabilitation program, Royal Dutch Shell’s manufacturing department estimated a 
further need for DM 15 million in the years after 1949. While Deutsche Shell would 
be able to finance DM 5 million from its own means, there remained a need for a 
long-term loan to the tune of DM 35 million. However, at the time, there were 
virtually no opportunities for obtaining such a facility in Germany, because credit-
granting institutions were either unwilling or incapable of doing so. Accordingly, 
Deutsche Shell was forced to use short-term credit to finance the rehabilitation of its 
refineries. This was not an attractive proposition, but the alternative would be to halt 
rehabilitation, which could be dangerous in the face of the Bizone’s refinery 
rehabilitation and expansion program. Royal Dutch Shell was using all of its powers 
to secure local sources of long-term credit. Guaranteeing a risky loan to the tune of 
DM 4 million for Union Kraftstoff was therefore a considerable financial obligation 
in light of the problematic financial situation at the time. 
 Table 2-1 shows how important the refining contract was for Union Kraftstoff. 
Even in the first year of the contract (the second half of 1949), the production of 
motor fuels from crude oil distillation and hydrogenation would constitute 31 per cent 
of the company’s total operating profits. Then, in 1950, the first full year of 
production, the refining contract would supply 58 per cent of the operating profits. 
Interestingly, crude oil distillation contributed limited profits – just 6-7 per cent of 
the total.  
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Table 2-1. The projected operating profits of Union Kraftstoff, 1948-1950 
(in million DM) 
Profits  1948 1949 (projected 
1950 
(projected) 
Methanol 3.34 2.67 3.00 
In pct. of total profits 67 34 19 
Ammonia 1.67 2.73 3.84 
In pct. of total profits 33 35 24 
Crude oil distillation  0.48 1.08 
In pct. of total profits  6 7 
Hydrogenation  2.00 8.10 
In pct. of total profits  25 51 
Total profits 5.01 7.88 16.02 
Source: HK RWE, C1/10778, UK 12.1945-12.1957, Bericht über die derzeitige wirtschaftliche Lage 
der Union Rheinische Braunkohlen Kraftstoff AG, Wesseling, 11 September 1948, 7-8. 
 
The real added value was in the hydrogenation of the heavy oil residues from the 
distillation that made it possible to convert almost worthless residues into high-grade 
motor fuels. For Deutsche Shell, the refining contract provided the company with 
twice as much refining capacity as it could have mustered with its financial means at 
the time. The reconstruction of the Harburg refinery near Hamburg and the rise in 
crude oil imports had drained the company’s capital reserves and it had to apply for a 
Marshall Plan loan to finance the Harburg reconstruction. By 1949, the company was 
able to recommence work at the Harburg refinery at an annual capacity of 440,000 
tons. The Union Kraftstoff refining contract provided Deutsche Shell with a further 
300-400,000 tons of refining capacity.229  
 The other former hydrogenation plants in the Rhine-Ruhr region, Gelsenberg 
Benzin AG and Scholven AG, closed similar refining deals with Mobil Oil AG in 
1950 and with Deutsche BP AG in 1952. As a consequence, these three plants were 
important additions to the motor fuel production capacity of the newly formed 
Federal Republic of Germany. After the liberalisation of the distribution of the motor 
fuel market in May 1951, the demand for motor fuels increased rapidly. Union 
Kraftstoff’s hydrogenation installation was duly expanded to its maximum capacity of 
260,000 tons. The potential for further growth was constrained by the hydrogenation 
capacity – the distillation unit was not yet operating at its maximum capacity of 
800,000 tons per annum. Accordingly, in the early 1950s, Union Kraftstoff was 
confronted with the issue of how it could expand its secondary refining capacity, i.e. 
the reprocessing of heavy oil residues from the distillery. The company’s technical 
director, Kurt Wissel, decided to opt for a thermal cracker, which became operational 
in 1953. This was Union Kraftstoff’s first major investment program, requiring a total 
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capital outlay of 37 million DM, which was financed by the German counterpart 
funds established by the Marshall Plan.230 Wissel favoured a thermal cracker over a 
catalytic cracker, even though the latter was by then thought to be the more advanced 
technology. His reasoning was that the combination of a thermal cracker and a 
hydrogenation installation could produce better quality gasoline.231 Further quality 
improvements were realised in 1955 by investing in a catalytic reforming installation, 
called a platformer because it used platinum as a catalyst.232 A platformer is used to 
enhance the anti-knock quality or octane level of motor gasoline. The investments 
and technical improvements that were possible under the Deutsche Shell contract had 
propelled Union Kraftstoff into the top three largest refineries in Germany by the 
mid-1950s.233 
 
2.6 The geographical consequences of the Allied occupation 
The consequences of the Allied approach to solving the post-war energy crisis were 
considerable for the structure and geography of the German oil industry. For 
Germany in general, the two most important outcomes were the expansion of refinery 
capacity, which replaced the pre-war dependence on oil product imports with a 
reliance on crude oil imports, and the increase in domestic crude oil production.234 For 
the Rhine-Ruhr area, the first consequence was most significant. Instead of being 
dismantled, the hydrogenation plants constructed by the major coal and steel 
companies in the region were adapted to process oil and, at a stroke, became the 
largest refineries in West Germany. German coal companies thus suddenly owned a 
considerable share of the country’s refinery capacity, although the significance of this 
was limited because these plants mainly produced oil products for international oil 
companies that marketed the products through their own distribution networks. 
Nonetheless, the large amounts of capital sunk into these locations meant that they 
were saved from obsolescence, and the former hydrogenation plants made the Rhine-
Ruhr area the most important oil refining region after Hamburg. Figure 2-4 shows 
the geographical distribution of refinery capacity in West Germany in 1950.  
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Figure 2-4. The geographical distribution of refineries in Germany, 1950 
(in million tons) 
 
Source: Data taken from W. Molle and E. Wever, Oil refineries and petrochemical industries in Western 
Europe: buoyant past, uncertain future (Aldershot, 1984), 164-168. Map produced with QGIS 2.0. See, 
for the data, Appendix B: Data Table 0-3. The refinery capacity in West Germany, 1950-75.  
 
In the late 1930s, the Rhine-Ruhr area represented around 10 per cent of the Reich’s 
refinery capacity.235 By 1950, this had increased to 32 per cent, while the Hamburg 
area still dominated with 49 per cent, and Niedersachsen had an additional 15 per 
cent.236 The West German refinery capacity approximately doubled to 5.2 million tons 
in 1950. The growth of refinery capacity in the Rhine-Ruhr area was entirely due to 
the former hydrogenation plants, and was the start of a shift in the concentration of 
German refinery capacity away from Hamburg to the Rhine-Ruhr region. Although 
the availability of former hydrogenation plants helps to explain that shift, the German 
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division and the Iron Curtain were decisive. Hamburg suffered greatly from the east-
west division of Europe; before World War II, 40 per cent of the city’s cargo flows 
had relied on its Eastern European hinterland. With almost all of that traffic wiped 
out after 1945, the city struggled to recover from the war.237 The Eastern Bloc 
countries developed their seaports during the 1950s and 1960s, establishing ports like 
Rostock in East Germany as the primary seaport of the Eastern Bloc. Hamburg only 
regained its former position after German unification in 1990.238 
As coal was still by far the most important source of energy in the late 1940s 
and early 1950s, the German oil market was relatively small and lopsided. In the early 
1950s, oil represented only 4 per cent of Germany’s energy balance, as opposed to 95 
per cent for coal.239 Oil consumption therefore consisted of 80 per cent motor fuels. 
Household and industrial heating, as well as power production, were still dominated 
by coal, while fuel oil represented just 9 per cent of total oil consumption.240 Although 
the technical design of the former hydrogenation plants fitted in well with this pattern 
of consumption, the 1950s would witness a dramatic shift in West Germany’s energy 
balance, in which the Rhine-Ruhr area and its former hydrogenation plants played a 
central role.  
 
2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter questioned how the Allied occupation of Germany dealt with the energy 
crises of the late 1940s and how and why this affected Rhine-Ruhr industries, in 
particular the regional oil, chemical and coal sectors. The energy crisis of the late 
1940s arose at the time of the great oil deals of 1947. As Anglo-American oil 
companies swam in cheap Middle Eastern oil and the American market was closed to 
Eastern hemisphere imports, Europe was the only large market to turn to. A not 
insignificant aspect of the Marshall Plan was the provision of dollars to finance oil 
imports into Western Europe. The Marshall Plan also provided for dollars to be 
invested in the expansion of European refinery capacity. In West Germany, this 
program was preceded by the Bizonal Refinery Plan, which was a British-American 
plan launched in 1947 to expand Germany’s oil refining capacity. Under the 
American energy order, West Germany was no longer expected to be dependent on 
coal; with the plan, the Americans aimed to solve the energy crisis of 1947 and break 
Germany’s dependence on domestic coal at a stroke. The rapid reconstruction of 
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Royal Dutch Shell’s Hamburg refinery and the reactivation of the hydrogenation 
plants between 1947 and 1949 illustrated the effort expended in expanding West 
Germany’s refinery capacity.  
The Allied authorities played a key role in providing continuity to the oil and 
chemical cluster that had emerged in the Nazi period in the Rhine-Ruhr area. 
Decommissioning the synthetic fuel and rubber plants would not have yielded the 
opportunities for petrochemical projects that emerged in the early 1950s. The 
hydrogenation plants presented foreign oil companies with an opportunity to increase 
their refining capacity in the major market of the Rhine-Ruhr area. This allowed 
Deutsche Shell, for instance, to adapt to the growing market while simultaneously 
dedicating its scarce resources to the reconstruction of its Hamburg refinery. The goal 
of the Allied authorities – to replace oil product imports with domestically produced 
oil products – provided the opportunity for hydrogenation plants to be reopened. Due 
to their technological setup, these plants were particularly well-placed to produce 
motor fuels.  
 The reactivation of the former hydrogenation plants initiated a geographical 
shift in the distribution of refinery capacity in West Germany. This shift was only 
partially on account of the expansion of the oil industry. A second important factor 
was the problematic development of the coal industry under the Allied occupation 
and the early years of the Federal Republic. Faltering production rates, postponed 
modernisation and mechanisation, and controlled prices hampered the ability of the 
Ruhr coal mining sector to deal with the subsequent energy crises of the late 1940s 
and early 1950s. Although it is highly doubtful whether the coal industry could have 
competed successfully against oil in the face of the increasing disparity between the 
costs of producing coal and oil in the 1950s, the condition in which the Ruhr coal 
industry emerged from the war and the Allied occupation certainly did not help.   
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Chapter 3 The transition from coal to oil, 1951-1961 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The actual transition from coal to oil transpired in the late 1950s and early 1960s. It 
was largely rooted in the political decision to completely open the West German 
market up to foreign oil, which was an opportunity that was seized by oil companies 
and oil traders with a view to expanding their operations in West Germany. The 
liberalisation of the energy market aimed to lower the cost of energy for German 
industry. However, the German coal sector was on the receiving end of the liberal 
energy policy. Indeed, from the mid-1950s onwards, it faced crises and declined under 
pressure from cheaper energy imports, culminating in the 1958 coal crisis. Why was 
oil allowed to compete freely with coal in the mid-1950s in the face of an imminent 
coal crisis? How did the West German energy policy of the 1950s affect the position 
of coal with regard to oil? What measures did the West German government take to 
offset the coal crisis in the 1960s, and how did these measures affect oil consumption 
in West Germany? 
 Shortages in both energy and foreign currency in the late 1940s required 
Western European countries to invest in oil refining capacity to substitute oil product 
imports for crude oil imports, which reduced the pressure on the scarcely available 
foreign exchange reserves.241 Although West Germany reconstructed and even 
expanded its refinery capacity considerably between 1950 and 1955, the share of oil in 
the energy balance still amounted to only 11 per cent in 1957, as opposed to the West 
European average of 26 per cent. However, within 15 years, oil consumption 
increased to a share of 52 per cent, just shy of the West European average of 55 per 
cent.242 During the 1950s, West Germany mainly consumed motor fuels (gasoline, 
diesel) and very little fuel oil. In 1950, oil consumption was comprised of 80 per cent 
motor fuels and only 9 per cent fuel oil. In 1965, however, fuel oil consumption had 
increased to 64 per cent of total oil consumption, while the share of motor fuels 
declined to 31 per cent.243 The displacement of coal as the dominant source of energy 
was therefore not caused by the rise of motorisation in the 1950s and 1960s; instead, 
the transition took place in manufacturing, heavy industry, households and the 
chemical sector, which used fuel oil and residual gases and not motor fuels.  
 Fuel oil is a generic term to indicate a class of oil products obtained from crude 
oil. Whereas gasoline, jet fuel and diesel are considered to be light distillates of crude 
oil distillation, fuel oils consist of the range of middle to heavy distillates. Fuel oils are 
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used in burners with a wide range of applications, but generally for heating, traction 
and, to a limited extent, the production of electrical power. Its use depends on its 
specifications. Fuel oil is generally categorised in five groups, but the terms light and 
heavy are most commonly used. Table 3-1 summarises these two types of fuel oil and 
their main applications. 
 
Table 3-1. Types of fuel oil and their main applications 
Type of fuel oil Main applications 
Light fuel oil Domestic heating, small industrial furnaces  
Heavy fuel oil Shipping, industry, electrical power production 
Source: P. F. Schmidt, Fuel Oil Manual (New York, 1985), 19-24; S.J. Rand, Significance of Tests for 
Petroleum Products (West Conshohocken, 2010), 82. 
 
The ascent of fuel oil formed the core of energy transition in West Germany. Years of 
controlled, low coal prices under the ECSC had put the coal industry under strain. 
After price controls were lifted in 1956 and prices were allowed to rise, the coal 
industry hoped to make up for the losses of the years before. However, by that time, 
the market situation had changed dramatically. After the energy crisis of 1950-51, the 
Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs took a liberal economic course and initiated 
competition in the energy market. The reasoning behind such a step was a fear that 
the Ruhr coal industry was unable to overcome its structural problems and would 
therefore be unable to supply enough energy to sustain West Germany’s economic 
growth. The ministry encouraged imports of US coal to solve the 1950-51 energy 
crisis, and in 1953 exempted fuel oil from value added tax. The aim of these measures 
was to force the Ruhr coal industry to adapt to a competitive energy market by 
rationalising and modernising the sector. However, the industry’s problems were 
multiple, with some of them rooted deep in its history. Furthermore, the coal industry 
lost ground to other energy sources, most notably oil, resulting in the 1958 coal crisis 
that led to decades of decline for the sector.  
 
3.2 The competition between coal and oil, 1950-1955 
Initially, the competition from imported coal, mainly from the US, had the greatest 
impact on the position of Ruhr coal. Indeed, although US coal imports at first 
declined after the energy crisis of 1950/1951 subsided, imports started to rise again 
from 1955 onwards, increasing from 6.6 million tons in 1955 to 15.9 million tons in 
1957.244 In fact, by 1957, US coal supplied 21 per cent of the total coal deliveries in 
West Germany.245 At the same time, economic growth in the country slowed down. 
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In particular, between 1956 and 1958, the annual growth of West German GDP fell 
from 11.1 per cent in 1955 to 2.8 per cent in 1958.246  
 
Table 3-2. Ruhr coal production and energy consumption, 1946-1960 (in 
million tons) 
 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) 
 
Ruhr coal 
production  
Primary 
energy 
consumption  
Ruhr 
coal 
stocks  
Coal stocks 
as pct. of 
coal 
production 
Coal 
production as 
pct. of energy 
consumption 
1950 103 136 76% 
1951 111 150 74% 
1952 114 158 72% 
1953 116 156 74% 
1954 119 167 71% 
1955 121 184 66% 
1956 125 195 64% 
1957 123 196 0.9 1% 63% 
1958 122 191 12.9 11% 64% 
1959 115 194 16.4 14% 59% 
1960 115 212 10.5 9% 55% 
Source: Ruhr coal production data from: G. Hempel, Die deutsche Montanindustrie. Ihre Entwicklung 
und Gestaltung von 1900 bis 1966 (1969 [2006]) Histat nr: ZA 8262, series: 01 Steinkohlenförderung in 
Deutschland nach Bezirken in 1000 t (1900-1965), 
http://www.gesis.org/histat/de/project/details/33F343CA1BA2548666303C110F16EC53, accessed 
15 February 2013. Ruhr stocks data: Hellmut von Bibra, Absatzwirtschaftliche Untersuchung des 
Wettbewerbs zwischen Kohle und schwerem Heizo ̈l in der Industrie der Bundesrepublik (Nürnberg 1963) 45 
and C. Salaske, Deindustrialisierung und Restrukturierung –Das Ruhrgebiet im Wandel (1957 – 2007) 
(Cologne 2007 Diplomarbeit) 19. Primary energy consumption data: Arbeitgemeinschaft 
Energiebilanzen (2009), Energieverbrauch in Deutschland 1950 bis 2006, Histat nr: ZA 8370, series: 
‘A.01 Primärenergieverbrauch im Inland nach Energieträgern (1950-2006)’, 
http://www.gesis.org/histat/de/project/details/FD0CF7FD7ED7F24890BBBD32D25BA3C7, 
accessed 15 February 2013. 
 
In response, gross energy consumption, which had been rising along with GDP, 
stabilised in 1957 and actually fell in 1958 by 2.7 per cent (see the dip in the series in 
column B of Table 3-2).247 In order to counter overproduction, the Ruhr mines 
subsequently scaled it back by 7 per cent, from 125 million tons in 1956 to 115 
million in 1959.248 To make matters worse, coal piled up in the Ruhr, with stocks 
exploding from just 0.8 million tons in 1957 to 13 million tons, or 14 per cent of total 
production, in 1958.249 Overall, the Ruhr coal mines experienced a drop in sales of 
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almost 20 per cent of its 1956 production during 1957 and 1958. A fall in demand 
from the economic slowdown and the competition from cheaper US coal did not, 
however, lead to lower Ruhr coal prices. Indeed, Figure 3-1 shows that prices for 
Ruhr coal continued to rise throughout the 1950s and 1960s. 
 
Figure 3-1 Domestic nominal Ruhr coal prices in D-mark, 1947-67. 
 
Note: Plitzko reports prices semi-annually; these have been averaged per year. Abelshauser reports 
prices for some years between 1958 and 1967. Abelshauser specifies prices for Ruhr coking coal, while 
Plitzko only mentions Ruhr coal.  
Source: A. Plitzko, Bemerkungen zu den Wettbewerbsbedingungenzwischen Kohle und Erdöl (Köln 1960) 
47; W. Abelshauser, Der Ruhrkohlenbergbau seit 1945: Wiederaufbau, Krise, Anpassung (München 1984) 
90.  
 
However, more important for the future position of coal than competition from 
foreign imports was fuel oil. The rise of fuel oil initially went largely unnoticed, as 
imported coal was the Ruhr’s main enemy at the time.250 The coal sector served four 
main groups of users: industry (primarily steel) consumed around 50 per cent of the 
domestic supply of coal and coke, households 20 per cent, electricity generation 20 per 
cent, and transport 10 per cent.251 However, all four groups increasingly used fuel oil 
during the 1950s, albeit to varying degrees, due to the extent to which the product 
acted as a complete substitute for coal.   
 The situation in the West German energy market in the early 1950s seemed to 
be fairly straightforward. Despite a small tax benefit for fuel oil, the federal oil tax law 
of 1953 mainly continued the policy of the Allied occupation, which was to encourage 
the substitution of oil product imports for crude oil imports. In practice, this meant 
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stimulating the domestic production of motor fuels and prohibiting motor fuel 
imports.252 As motor fuels were not in competition with coal, the fuel oil question did 
not seem to be particularly pressing. Moreover, the tax and tariff system for oil that 
had existed since the 1930s levied such high duties on imported fuel oil that there was 
traditionally almost no market for fuel oil in Germany.253 However, international 
attention paid to the competition between coal and fuel oil triggered interest at the 
West German Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs. In July 1953, the ministry’s 
section for coal issues requested information from the oil section regarding the 
potential to increase supplies of fuel oil on the West German market.254 The oil 
section referred the request to Friedrich Fetzer, an independent oil man with 
extensive experience of the German oil industry and a former supervisory board 
member of Kontinentale Öl.255  
 One of the principal worries of the ministry’s coal section was whether the 
European refinery expansion program would lead to growing supplies of fuel oil on 
the German market. Fetzer responded that this should indeed be expected, since the 
program entailed the upgrading of European refineries into full refineries. Fuel oil was 
one of the principal products yielded by the processing of crude oil, and the program 
therefore increased the production of fuel oil in Europe.256 However, Germany was an 
exception. Its refinery composition was extraordinarily skewed towards the production 
of motor fuels, owing in part to the large share of hydrogenation facilities in the 
Rhine-Ruhr area, which produced up to 90 per cent of motor fuels from crude oil and 
very little fuel oil. It was generally understood that in the German case, the ascent of 
fuel oil would not simply be a question of oil companies expanding production, but a 
political issue of how far the state was willing to let fuel oil compete with coal. Fetzer 
thus pointed out the primacy of political choice in the matter. Italian, Belgian, French 
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and Dutch refineries that were capable of churning out large volumes of fuel oil all 
disposed of excess capacity. Indeed, the overcapacity of Italian refineries was a 
particular worry for both the German government and the German oil industry.257  
International reports on the competition between coal and fuel oil stressed the 
importance of the differences in pricing structure of the two materials.258 Fuel oil 
prices were found to be much more volatile than coal prices, which was explained by 
the fact that the former was a by-product of motor fuel production, and was therefore 
marketed as a secondary product. Fuel oil prices thus exhibited high price volatility. 
Coal, on the other hand, was characterised by relatively inflexible prices and steadily 
rising costs. Price cuts or reduced production led to job losses, which was deemed to 
be highly undesirable; the oil industry, meanwhile, was much less labour intensive. 
The result of this difference in flexibility was that fuel oil pricing was much more 
responsive to changes in energy demand. In times of high demand, with high energy 
prices, coal had the advantage of its relatively stable prices and high levels of output. 
However, due to their responsiveness to demand, fuel oil prices increased sharply and 
were also often exacerbated by high freight rates. During economic upswings, coal 
thus had little to fear from fuel oil. However, it was at times of weak demand or 
overproduction, which was when fuel oil prices often fell below coal prices, that fuel 
oil posed a real threat to coal.259  
Price was not the only factor determining the substitution rate. In general, 
refitting boilers to burn fuel oil instead of coal was a simple operation, although very 
large boilers, such as in electricity production, were not suitable for fuel oil at the 
time.260 For most other industrial and private consumers, fuel oil was an attractive 
alternative to coal: it was easier to store, was less messy to use, allowed for a higher 
degree of control over temperature, and had a higher calorific value.261 Although 
switching between coal and fuel oil required further investment, studies commissioned 
by the ECSC found that demand for fuel oil was highly elastic, with a small drop in 
its price relative to coal leading to large increases in its consumption.262  
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 The pricing differences between coal and fuel oil were to a large extent 
inescapable. With the rise of motorisation, motor fuel demand could also only rise, 
increasing the output of European refineries. As an increase in motor fuel production 
would automatically lead to an increase in fuel oil production, the amount of fuel oil 
looking for markets in Europe also steadily rose. It was thus up to governments to 
devise rational market policies to secure the long-term stability of the fuel supply, 
while mitigating the potentially disastrous effect of fuel oil competition on the coal 
industry.263 However, the coal and oil sectors had diametrically opposed approaches to 
this dilemma. The oil industry wanted a level playing field, while its coal counterpart 
demanded protection. The choice between protection and competition was a political 
one, and for the German market was made by the federal government, in particular 
the Federal Minister of Economic Affairs Ludwig Erhard. Erhard was a convinced 
liberal, but not a believer in unbounded capitalism.264  His political ideas were shaped 
in the world economic crisis of the 1930s, during which the idea of a social market 
economy was developed as an alternative to Keynesianism, or outright state 
interventionism as practiced by the Nazi regime. The concept of the social market 
economy was based on classical liberalism, but acknowledged a role for the state to 
ensure that the market produced its potential for the common good. Its proponents 
became known as ordoliberals. In the words of Alexander Rüstow, one of the 
principal founders of ordoliberalism: “[state intervention] is not directed against the 
laws of the market but goes along with them, is not aimed at preserving the old but to 
bring about the new, not to slow down but to precipitate the natural course of 
things.”265 This quote contains the core of the ordoliberalist approach to the 
competition between coal and oil: instead of preserving the coal industry by state 
intervention, he chose to guide its adaptation.  
According to Erhard, West Germany required the lowest possible energy costs, 
and the operation of the market was the appropriate instrument to safeguard this in 
the long run. Erhard argued, “[t]he competition between energy sources that we 
pursue will result in a more efficient energy supply in the long run.”266 Exempting fuel 
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oil from import duties in 1956 was in line with that policy. On the other hand, the 
federal government offered the coal industry structural subsidies if it would keep 
prices in check. However, the Ruhr coal price increase of 1957 strengthened the 
government’s commitment to forcing the adaptation of the Ruhr coal industry 
through the market.267  
Erhard’s policy was controversial, even within the federal government. The 
centrality of energy in Erhard’s policies put him in direct confrontation with the coal 
industry. Erhard saw the continued inability of the sector to modernise and rationalise 
as the central bottleneck to the stable growth of the West German economy. His 
energy policy sought to address that problem.268 Combined with the economic 
situation after the Suez Crisis, the liberal avenue pursued by the federal government 
triggered an increase in the inflow of cheap fuel oil between 1956 and 1958. The 
sudden awareness of both politics and business of the coal crisis that was emerging 
elicited a strong reaction that countered the initial trend of the liberalisation of the 
energy market in Germany. However, the long-term effect of the competition 
between coal and fuel oil in the late 1950s could not be stemmed: coal descended into 
a prolonged crisis and declined, while oil enjoyed a decade of unprecedented growth. 
 
3.3 The rise of fuel oil and the 1958 coal crisis 
During the years of 1957-59, fuel oil consumption rose considerably, while Ruhr coal 
production and sales fell. Overall, fuel oil consumption in West Germany increased 
more than eight-fold between 1954 and 1959, from 1.2 to 10 million tons (Table 3-3). 
Due to a limited domestic production capacity for fuel oil (the refineries were 
primarily designed to produce motor fuels), the amount of it that was imported grew 
faster than its domestically produced counterpart between 1954 and 1958, comprising 
up to around 60 per cent of consumption in the 1956-58 period.  
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Table 3-3. Fuel oil consumption and imports in West Germany, 1954-1959 
 Consumption  
(in mln tons) 
Imported  
(in mln tons) 
Imported  
(in pct. of total) 
1954 1.2 0.4 33 
1955 2.0 1.2 60 
1956 3.8 2.4 63 
1957 4.9 3.1 63 
1958 7.5 4.4 59 
1959 10.0 3.5 35 
Source: E. Neuffer, Der Wettbewerb zwischen Steinkohle und Heizöl auf dem westdeutschen Energiemarkt 
(Tübingen 1960), Tabellenanhang, tables 34 and 35.  
 
In 1958, the two largest consumers of fuel oil were households, which consumed 
around 40 per cent, and raw material industries (minerals, oil refining, foundries, steel 
works, metal processing), which consumed around 50 per cent. 269 As a result of the 
urban conglomerations and the high share of the raw material industries, North Rhine 
Westphalia was the largest consumer of fuel oil in West Germany, even though its 
industries were not among the most comprehensive adopters of the product because 
of the availability of cheap coal.  
So, what explains the rise of fuel oil? Two matters played a significant part: 
the price development of fuel oil and that of Ruhr coal. The price of the former in the 
1950s was primarily determined by two factors. The first of these was the West 
German fiscal measure to encourage the use of fuel oil in the wake of the 1950/1951 
energy crisis. Out of a fear of a structural energy gap, the federal government 
exempted fuel oil from the federal oil tax (Mineralölsteuer) in 1953 and from import 
duties in 1956.270 A contributing factor was the Suez Crisis, which set in motion a 
number of developments that had a downwards effect on fuel oil prices in West 
Germany. During the Suez Crisis, oil companies scrambled to replace Middle Eastern 
oil with oil from other sources, for instance Venezuela. Increased production, 
delivered on medium-term supply contracts, continued after the end of the Suez 
Crisis in mid-1957, leading to an oil glut on the world market and depressed prices. 
Furthermore, stocks amassed in response to the crisis were released again in mid-1957, 
adding to the glut of oil products on the market. This surplus of fuel oil on the world 
market coincided with a temporary drop in the otherwise rising demand for energy in 
West Germany. Caused by the economic slowdown of 1956-1958, the energy 
demand fell by more than 3 per cent in 1958. However, import contracts for fuel oil 
had been closed on the expectation of a rising energy demand and caused a surplus of 
supply on the German market.271 Finally, tanker freights, which had tripled between 
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1954 and 1956, again declined rapidly in 1957 and 1958. Spot tanker freights per ton 
from the Persian Gulf to German North Sea ports rose from 44 US dollars in 1954 to 
152 US dollars in 1956, before falling again to 119 US dollars in 1957 and around 30 
US dollars in 1958 and 1959.272 A further factor having an impact was the increased 
refinery capacity in the Caribbean, the Netherlands and Italy in the 1950s. A 
considerable proportion of the production of these countries was exported: in the 
Caribbean case mainly to the US, but also to Europe, and in the case of the 
Netherlands and Italy within Europe.273 Rising exports from the Soviet Union also 
became important for West Germany.  
 Figure 3-2 shows the top five origins of fuel oil imports in West Germany 
from January 1958 to May 1959. In this period, West Germany imported a total of 
6.1 million tons of fuel oil from 23 different countries. Figure 3-2 highlights that two 
thirds of the imports originated from just five countries: Venezuela (24 per cent), the 
Netherlands (19 per cent), the Soviet Union (10 per cent), the Dutch Antilles (7 per 
cent) and the USA (6 per cent). These factors translated into continuously declining 
prices in 1957 and 1958 for both heavy (Figure 3-3) and light fuel oil (Figure 3-4). 
 
Figure 3-2. Fuel oil imports in West Germany, January 1958 – May 1959 
 
Source: B 102/14539 1 von 2, Konkurrenz zwischen Kohle und Heizöl, 1958-1961, Section IV B 3, 
Heizöl-einfuhren nach sorten und Herstellungsländer, Kalenderjahr 1958 
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272 Plitzko, Bemerkungen, 53, 56. 
273 P. Odell, An Economic Geography of Oil (New York 1963) 142-143, 162-164.  
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Figure 3-3. Heavy fuel oil prices, 1955-1958 (in DM per ton) 
 
Source: E. Neuffer, Der Wettbewerb zwischen Steinkohle und Heizöl auf dem westdeutschen Energiemarkt 
(Tübingen 1960) 60. The prices for BRD are: consumer prices in Hamburg; for Belgium, ex tank car in 
Brussels; and for France, consumer prices in Le Havre.  
 
The pattern is similar in both Figure 3-3 and Figure 3-4. Prices in 1955 were already 
lower than in neighbouring countries – except for light fuel oil. The prices for both 
light and heavy fuel oil responded strongly to the price increases during the Suez 
Crisis between November 1956 and May 1957. Coinciding with the winter season, 
stock piling in response to the crisis drove up world prices. However, when the crisis 
subsided, prices in West Germany fell much more between May 1957 and November 
1958 than they did in neighbouring countries.  
Plitzko explained this as the increasing competition between oil companies, 
independent oil traders and coal traders in West Germany. The independent oil and 
coal traders were comprised of two groups who were active on the heating fuel market. 
The first group was comprised of the large numbers of independent traders that 
supplied coal to smaller industries and households. These traders increasingly entered 
the market for fuel oil in order to retain customers who wanted to switch from coal to 
this product. 
  
0 
20 
40 
60 
80 
100 
120 
140 
160 
180 
November February May August November February May August November February May August November 
1955 1956 1957 1958 
Pr
ic
e 
in
 D
M
/t
on
 
West Germany Belgium France 
  72
 
Figure 3-4. Light fuel oil prices, 1955-1958 (in DM per ton) 
 
Source: E. Neuffer, Der Wettbewerb zwischen Steinkohle und Heizöl auf dem westdeutschen Energiemarkt 
(Tübingen 1960) 61. The prices for BRD are: consumer prices in Hamburg; for Belgium, ex tank car in 
Brussels; and for France, consumer prices in Le Havre.  
 
The second group consisted of the marketing branches of the big coal firms in the 
Ruhr area. In an attempt to protect their customer relations, these companies became 
heavily involved in the fuel oil trade. Indeed, major coal companies held up to 40 per 
cent of the light fuel oil market and were also involved in the heavy fuel oil trade. 
These coal firms were the third largest distributor of fuel oil, just behind Esso AG 
(the German subsidiary of Jersey Standard) and Deutsche BP.274 Statistics for 1957 
reported total fuel oil imports of 3.1 million tons, of which 1.9 million tons were 
imported by oil companies, 0.6 million by coal companies and 0.6 million by 
independent companies, part of which was also sold on to coal companies.275 All of the 
major coal firms were involved in trading fuel oil.276  
The glut of fuel oil on the world market found its way, through Caribbean 
refiners and countries in the Eastern bloc among others, to these (independent) fuel 
                                               
274 ‘Heizöl contra Kohle’, in: Der Spiegel, 4.06.1958, p. 27; Plitzko, Bemerkungen, 63-64. 
275 BA Koblenz, B 102/14538, Konkurrenz zwischen Kohle und Heizöl, 1958-1961, internal memo 
from Abt. III 6 A to Abt. III (Dr. Obernolte), I B 1 (Caspari) and IV B 3 (Ministerialrat Kling), ‘Betr: 
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traders.277 Oil companies responded by lowering prices for fuel oil, which triggered a 
price war that sent German prices for both heavy and light fuel oil spiralling down, 
much faster than in neighbouring countries. From the mid-1950s onwards, oil 
companies were in the process of planning to construct new refineries in the Rhine-
Ruhr area that had a considerable fuel oil production capacity to meet the potential 
rise in demand. The first refinery to open, in late 1958, was that of Esso AG near 
Cologne, with Deutsche Shell following in 1960. However, the post-Suez price gap 
was threatening to overtake their plans, as other parties were entering the fuel oil 
market with competitive prices.278 
The second element explaining the rise of fuel oil was the development of coal 
prices. Ever since the late 19th century, Ruhr coal pricing was conducted by 
coordination (first cartels, later the government) rather than through the market. This 
situation endured until ECSC-listed prices were abolished in April 1956. However, 
even then, prices were controlled by both a limited number of marketing organisations 
that were coordinating sales and government interference aimed at holding coal prices 
down to stimulate industrial growth.279 Notwithstanding steady coal price increases 
since 1948, Ruhr coal mines suffered losses throughout the 1950s.280 Coal prices went 
up and up because a shortage of labour led to rising costs of employment, regardless of 
the business cycle.281 
The result of both of these price developments was that heavy and light fuel 
oil became cheaper than coal, not only in Hamburg, where the majority of imported 
oil products were traded, but also in Frankfurt and Munich, where fuel oil prices 
declined below coal prices in 1959 due to the difference in energy content per ton. 
Expressed in heat equivalence prices, fuel oil became cheaper than coal in virtually 
every area in West Germany.282 Indeed, the country had become the dumping market 
for fuel oil, largely because domestic refineries produced little fuel oil and hitherto 
uncontested markets could now be successfully challenged.  
 The long-term effect of the increasing competition between coal and fuel oil 
in the late 1950s is set out in Figure 3-5. Between 1955 and 1970, Ruhr coal 
production declined from 120 million tons to around 90 million tons, while crude oil 
imports increased to around 100 million tons in the same period. Fuel oil 
consumption, meanwhile, rose from only 2 million tons in 1955 to 75 million tons in 
1970. During the 1960s, oil overtook coal as the largest supplier of energy in West 
Germany.  
                                               
277 Plitzko, Bemerkungen, 63-64. 
278 Neuffer, Die Wettbewerb, 275. 
279 Neuffer, Der Wettbewerb, 176-179.  
280 Neuffer, Der Wettbewerb, Tabellenanhang, Table 24 contains net loss calculations per ton of coal 
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Figure 3-5. Fuel oil consumption and Ruhr coal production, 1950-1970 
 
Source: Fuel oil and crude oil data taken from Mineralölwirtschaftsverband e.V., ‘Inlandsabsatz 1950-
2008’ and ‘Rohöl-Versorgung 1950-2008’, in: Jahresbericht Mineralölzahlen 2009, 27, accessed 11 
January 2013,  http://www.mwv.de/upload/Publikationen/dateien/2009_JB_KL763hj1mjg3LYm.pdf. 
Ruhr coal data taken from: Neuffer, Die Wettbewerb, 72 (for 1950); Horn, Die Energiepolitik, 73 (for 
1955-1970). The trend lines are polynomials.  
 
Notwithstanding the findings of a number of European studies on the competition 
between coal and oil, the Ruhr coal industry was unprepared for the energy transition 
that unfolded after 1956. Indeed, in the full conviction that industrial production 
would grow unabatedly and coal would remain scarce, it increased prices throughout 
the late 1950s. The sudden slackening of the demand for coal and the growth of coal 
stocks in 1957-1959 thus came as a shock.283  
The coal crisis of 1958 was the tipping point for the sector, although the 
experience was not limited to the Ruhr area.284 The competition with US coal brought 
to bear the inability of the Ruhr coal industry to be flexible in its response to market 
conditions. Its massive production apparatus and preoccupation with keeping miners 
at work caused the sector in the Ruhr to demand protective measures, which duly 
followed in the form of the imposition in September 1958 of an import tariff of 20 
DM per ton on coal imports from non-ECSC countries.285 However, the decline 
could not be halted, and between 1958 and 1969 production decreased by 30 per cent. 
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Over the same period, both the numbers employed in the industry and the number of 
mine shafts fell by 59 per cent.286 This decline was the result of a state-initiated 
rationalisation process that limited production to the most productive mines. The 
West German government attempted to guarantee demand for 140 million tons of 
coal annually for all of the country’s coal mines by making the German coal sector the 
exclusive supplier to the steel and electricity producing industries. Both the West 
German and North Rhine Westphalian governments awarded massive subsidies to 
finance mechanisation, allow incomes to rise, provide schooling and an income for the 
unemployed, and subsidise coal prices.287  
  
3.4 Stemming the tide: attempts to limit the rise of fuel oil   
After restricting imports of US coal, the next challenge for the federal government 
was to deal with the coal crisis. In December 1958, Helmut Burckhardt, the chairman 
of the employers federation of the Ruhr coal mining industry called for a higher tax 
on fuel oil of 30 DM per ton.288 This provoked protests from a number of German 
industries within which fuel oil was consumed in growing proportions. A higher fiscal 
burden on fuel oil would thus increase their energy costs.289 The opposition to higher 
taxes on fuel oil came from various directions, including from the Cologne Chamber 
of Commerce, which claimed that a fuel oil tax would be detrimental to the firms that 
had invested in switching from coal to fuel oil. The chamber asked Erhard not to 
burden these companies with “dirigiste measures” [sic], as they had “trusted in the 
workings of the social market economy by switching to fuel oil”.290  
Erhard was susceptible to such pleas. After all, his aim was to increase 
German competitiveness and output by reducing the costs of energy. Taxation would 
clearly have been detrimental to that effort, because it directly increased the costs of 
energy inputs for German industry. Consequently, rather than taxing fuel oil, Erhard 
favoured the self-regulation of the industries involved. Along with the coal and oil 
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industry, Erhard thus condoned the founding of “the largest private cartel in Europe”, 
the Coal-Oil Cartel (Kohle-Öl-Kartell), on 22 December 1958.291 The establishment 
of the cartel came at a curious time, because West Germany had just adopted the 
anti-trust law of January 1958.292 Anti-trust legislation had been one of the pillars of 
US policy towards Europe after 1945.293 Germany was the first of the Western 
European nations to commit to anti-trust legislation, largely because it had extensive 
experience in dealing with anti-trust matters under American occupation.294 After a 
prolonged and heated debate between German industry and conservative political 
factions on the one hand, and Adenauer, Erhard and ordoliberal academics such as 
Walter Eucken and Franz Böhm on the other, the West German government 
implemented anti-trust legislation. A staunch ordoliberal, Erhard had been in favour 
of adopting the new laws, but the imminent coal crisis forced him to temporarily 
exempt coal and oil companies to allow them to sort out the fuel oil market.  
The participants in the new cartel were the largest producers and marketers of 
fuel oil: the largest coal companies in the Ruhr and Aachen areas on the one hand, 
and Germany’s largest oil firms on the other.295 The duration of the cartel was set at 
two years, and the members committed themselves to selling heavy fuel oil at world 
market prices to end the price war and allow the coal industry to rationalise and 
modernise under stable market conditions.296 The oil companies promised not to 
expand their market share for the duration of the cartel,297 because Erhard’s plea to 
refrain from further price competition brought about the realisation that an escalation 
of the coal crisis would be detrimental to all of the parties involved.298 Independent 
traders did not, however, take part, as participation was voluntary.  
 The major coal and oil companies had a clear incentive to stabilise the fuel oil 
market. By the mid-1950s, the major oil firms and the former hydrogenation plants in 
the Rhine-Ruhr area noted the rising demand for fuel oil and started planning to 
                                               
291 I. E. Schwartz, ‘Antitrust Legislation and Policy in Germany. A Comparative Study’, University of 
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increase their refining capacity to meet it. Esso AG, Deutsche Shell and Deutsche BP 
planned to construct new refineries in the Rhine-Ruhr area to maximise fuel oil 
production, which started in 1959 and 1960. The design of these refineries differed 
from those in Hamburg. The latter typically contained cracking installations that 
transformed heavy oil fractions into light oil products (motor fuels). The new 
refineries in the Rhine-Ruhr, however, typically lacked cracking installations because 
they aimed to maximise the yield of fuel oil instead of transforming it into motor fuel. 
Indeed, the fuel oil yield of the Hamburg refineries was typically around 20 per cent, 
while that of the Rhine-Ruhr refineries was 50-60 per cent.299   
 The former hydrogenation plants also planned to add new capacity, which was 
particularly aimed at increasing their output of fuel oil.300 Up to 1958, the former 
hydrogenation plants had primarily produced motor fuels under the protection of the 
so-called Hydrierpräferenz, which was a tax break specifically for these plants. This 
premium allowed these plants to produce high volumes of motor fuels, which proved 
to be valuable during the Suez Crisis, when these were in short supply. The premium 
thus equalised the higher production costs of hydrogenated motor fuels. However, the 
1958 treaty that established the European Economic Community harmonised 
external tariffs and abolished the levying of import duties between EEC member 
states. The German system of protecting the domestic production of oil products, 
including the Hydrierpräferenz, was thus no longer tenable under the EEC treaty. 
This forced the hydrogenation plants to shift their production programs from motor 
fuels to fuel oil, which occurred in the late 1950s and early 1960s and greatly 
increased the volume of fuel oil on the West German market in the latter decade. The 
EEC treaty allowed West Germany to extend the Hydrierpräferenz for six years until 
1964 to give the hydrogenation plants time to adapt.301 Although these plants were 
already contemplating expansion prior to 1958, the actual treaty of that year suddenly 
increased the importance to them of the fuel oil market enormously.  
 Notwithstanding the careful planning of the oil companies, fuel oil 
consumption increased rapidly in 1956 and 1957, and the firms thus needed to adjust 
their projections continuously. Deutsche Shell’s projections for its required extra 
production capacity in 1964 rose from 1.4 million tons in 1955 to 4.5 million tons in 
1957. The amount of fuel oil in these projections increased from 60 per cent in 1955 
to over 90 per cent in 1957.302 The growing demand in 1956 and 1957 was primarily 
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covered by imports (Table 3-3). The price reductions in the wake of the Suez Crisis 
caused a surge in demand, further increasing the volume of imported fuel oil in 1958. 
The major oil companies responded to this by unleashing a price war to protect their 
markets in West Germany. However, a race to the bottom in the fuel oil market 
promised no profitable future for their new refineries. Their business cases were 
particularly built on fuel oil to repay the vast amounts of capital laid out for these new 
refineries. Not competing with independent traders – who operated freely outside the 
cartel – for the fuel oil market was not an option either, as a loss of market share 
would later have to be regained when the new refineries started production. The oil 
companies thus had a strong incentive to bring order to the market and to attempt to 
retain or even expand their share of it. The expansions of the former hydrogenation 
plants were a similar incentive for the coal companies, whose capital positions were 
much more precarious than those of the oil firms. Moreover, the coal situation itself 
required action, with the coal companies needing to stop the decline of their industry 
and protect their fuel oil production at the former hydrogenation plants of 
Gelsenberg-Benzin and Scholven. 
 The cartel proved to be a spectacular failure; on 13 August 1959, after only 
nine months, Esso AG unilaterally dissolved it. Der Spiegel reported that Esso’s 
market share in the fuel oil market before the cartel was 35 per cent, but by August 
1959 it was below 25 per cent.303 The position that Esso AG claimed to have lost was 
not, however, as dramatic as it sounded, if indeed it was true at all.  
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Figure 3-6. Heavy fuel oil production and imports in West Germany, 
1958-59. 
 
Note: The graph depicts the volume of heavy fuel oil sold in West Germany from the first quarter of 
1958 to April/May 1959. The total marketed volume comprises both domestic production (dark 
columns) and imports (light columns). The dotted line is the share of imports of total marketed heavy 
fuel oil.  
Source: B 102/14539 1 von 2, Konkurrenz zwischen Kohle und Heizöl, 1958-1961, memo (section IV 
B 3), ‘Betr: Entwicklung der Marktanteile von Firmengruppen nach ihrer Kartellzugehörigkeit für 
schweres Heizöl’, 1 August 1959. Own calculations. 
 
Figure 3-6 shows that as the total volume of heavy fuel oil marketed in West 
Germany increased in 1958 and 1959, the share of imports dropped, from 35 per cent 
in the first quarter of 1958 to 21 per cent in April/May 1959.  A calculation of the 
respective market shares of cartel members and non-members (Figure 3-7) reveals 
that the overall market share of the cartel members remained unchanged after the 
inception of the cartel in the fourth quarter of 1958 through to the second quarter of 
1959. The cartel members even strengthened their position in domestically produced 
heavy fuel oil. The only significant change in market share was for imports, where 
outsiders gained almost 20 percentage points to the detriment of the cartel members. 
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Figure 3-7. The market shares of the cartel members, 1958-1959. 
 
Source: B 102/14539 1 von 2, Konkurrenz zwischen Kohle und Heizöl, 1958-1961, Memo (section IV 
B 3), ‘Betr: Entwicklung der Marktanteile von Firmengruppen nach ihrer Kartellzugehörigkeit für 
schweres Heizöl’, 1 August 1959. Own calculations. 
 
However, imports became less important as domestic production in West Germany 
picked up in early 1959, when the Esso AG refinery near Cologne, which was the 
first of the new fuel oil refineries in the Rhine-Ruhr area, became operational. The 
increased domestic production put Esso AG in a better position to compete with 
independent fuel oil traders and integrated competitors alike. The cartel had thus 
become an obstruction rather than a solution.  
 The cartel certainly failed to provide stability in the heavy fuel oil market; after 
it was dissolved, heavy fuel oil prices declined to as low as DM 48 per ton (almost half 
the cartel’s official price), as the new refineries in the Rhine-Ruhr area attempted to 
regain (or expand) their market share.304 The price gap between coal and fuel oil 
increased throughout 1958 and 1959.305 In early 1960, heavy fuel oil prices were 
between DM 14 and DM 27 per ton less than coal prices throughout West 
Germany.306 It was thus clear that the cartel had not achieved its goal and that an 
alternative had to be found. On the day the cartel was dissolved, Erhard responded by 
proposing a sales tax of DM 30 per ton on all types of fuel oil. The proposal met with 
fierce resistance from both the oil industry and non-coal producing German states. 
The latter bargained the proposed tax down to 25 DM per ton for heavy fuel oil and 
only 10 DM for light fuel oil. The tax was finally imposed seven months later, but 
changed little in terms of the rising demand for fuel oil, although the tax revenue was 
used to subsidise the reductions in work hours that became a daily practice in the 
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Ruhr area.307 Simultaneously, the establishment of the EEC opened West Germany 
up for imports of fuel oil from EEC member states like the Netherlands and Italy.308 
The creation of the EEC liberalised the West German oil market and limited the 
policy options for the country’s government to intervene in the fuel oil market. West 
Germany was allowed to maintain its fiscal regime with regard to the oil industry 
until 1964. After that year, the stakes of France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Italy 
in the West German oil market were too great to allow West Germany to continue 
with its interventions in the German energy market.309 As an alternative, the West 
German government agreed a system of self-limitation (Selbstbeschränkung) with the 
oil industry. In practice, this was a quota system.  
The quotas were set in advance according to a set distribution formula. The 
effect of the voluntary quota system was a stabilisation of fuel oil prices. This was not 
only in the interests of the coal industry, but also those of the oil sector. Due to 
superfluous supply, fuel oil prices had been falling since the late 1950s. Although this 
had fostered an enormous demand for fuel oil, it had also depressed the oil industry’s 
profit margins. Both of these interests seemed to be served by the quota system, 
although it also functioned as a barrier to entry for newcomers. The effectiveness of 
the system varied. For heavy fuel oil, the number of buyers was limited to heavy 
industry, which proved to be quite manageable. The much larger market for home 
heating proved to be much less controllable. Although the quota system allowed 
annual growth of the light fuel oil market of 4 per cent, the real growth rate was 
around 8 per cent throughout the 1960s, as independent traders and coal industry 
sales organisations active in the light fuel oil market often exceeded the quota limits.310 
Under pressure from industry, the quota system was revised in 1968, when the 
allowed annual growth rate for light fuel oil was increased to 8 per cent, and 
effectively ended in 1970.311  
 The effects of the competition between coal and oil were therefore most 
notable in the domestic heating market, which was still the largest market segment for 
West German coal in 1960 with 60 million tons or 43 per cent of total production. By 
1975, the importance of the heating market for the German coal industry had shrunk 
to around 15 million tons (around 15 per cent of total production), and trailed such 
markets as the steel industry, electricity and even exports.312 During the attempts of 
Erhard to regulate heavy fuel oil in the 1950s, light fuel oil (for domestic heating) 
became the real bane of the coal industry, which is clearly demonstrated in Figure 3-8. 
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During the 1960s, the West German consumption pattern became increasingly 
skewed towards light fuel oil.  
 
Figure 3-8. The composition of oil consumption, West Germany, 1950-
1975 (per cent) 
 
Source: Mineralölwirtschaftsverband, ‘Daten zum Mineralölverbrauch1950-2008’; ‘Inlandsabsatz 1950-
2008’. 
 
Figure 3-8 shows that heavy fuel oil was indeed the most important type of fuel oil in 
the 1950s, but both Erhard and the coal industry had misjudged its significance. The 
advantages of fuel oil over coal became particularly important in the home heating 
market. The other large consumers, mainly steel and utilities, remained much more 
dependent on coal, although this was primarily caused by governmental interventions 
such as the Verstromungsgesetze, which was a set of laws adopted in 1965 and later that 
obliged new power plants to use coal for the production of electricity.313 Moreover, the 
steel industry relied on coke for smelting, for which oil provided no viable alternative. 
As a consequence, the demand for heavy fuel trailed the demand for light fuel oil 
from the mid-1960s onwards. The oil companies thus geared their production to the 
continuously growing demand for fuel oil. Indeed, refineries quadrupled their output 
between 1955 and 1965, of which fuel oil constituted 58 per cent, up from 21 per cent 
a decade earlier (Figure 3-8). Even in the face of the expansion of refinery capacity in 
the late 1950s and 1960s, fuel oil imports increased more than five-fold in the same 
period to 13 million tons.314 Fuel oil was consistently the largest component of oil 
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product imports (Figure 3-9), ranging between 72 and 84 per cent of imported liquid 
fuels between 1956 and 1973.315  
Although fuel oil was consistently the most imported oil product between 
1956 and 1973, the composition of fuel oil imports changed over the period. In 1958-
59, light fuel oil constituted 59 per cent of fuel oil imports.316 However, by 1970, this 
figure was 82 per cent.317 This dominance was partially due to the production 
programs of the newer refineries in West Germany. As heavy fuel oil was more 
cumbersome to transport, most of the refineries constructed after 1955 predominantly 
produced heavy fuel oil to supply the local and regional market.318 
 
Figure 3-9. Oil product imports, West Germany, 1956-1973. 
 
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, Jahrbuch für Statistik, Versorgung und Verbrauch, 1956-1973.  
 
This was particularly the case for the Rhine-Ruhr refineries that had been built in the 
late 1950s. The refineries that were constructed in Bavaria in the 1960s typically 
produced more light than heavy fuel oil.319 Accordingly, the Rhine-Ruhr area, with its 
large and dense population, was a major export market for foreign refineries with an 
excess production of gas oil and light fuel oil. This led to a situation where, although 
light fuel oil was the single most important oil product consumed in West Germany 
(36 per cent of all oil products consumed) in 1970, only 63 per cent of it was supplied 
from domestic production; 38 per cent was imported, which was much more than the 
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average import quota of 24 per cent for West German oil consumption overall (Table 
3-4). In the case of heavy fuel oil, West Germany was self-sufficient and even 
produced more than domestic demand.320  
 Overall, Table 3-4 shows that between 1950 and 1965, oil consumption grew 
at an annual rate of around 20 per cent, while consumption, refinery capacity and oil 
product imports kept rising until 1975, albeit at a slower pace owing to the economic 
slowdown of the late 1960s and the 1973 oil crisis.  
 
Table 3-4. The oil industry in West Germany, 1950-1975 
 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 
Consumption (in mln tons) 4.1 9.7 28.7 74.3 124.4 129.6 
Annual growth rate (in percent) 19 24 21 11 1 
Refining capacity (in mln tons) 3.2 13.2 29.1 74.5 115.4 148.8 
Annual growth rate (in percent) 33 17 21 9 5 
Crude oil imports (in mln tons) 2.2 7.1 23.2 59.1 98.7 90 
Annual growth rate (in percent) 26 27 21 11 -2 
Oil product imports (in mln tons) 0.9 1.9 7.2 16.1 31 37.3 
Annual growth rate (in percent) 16 31 17 14 4 
 
Source: Mineralölwirtschaftsverband, Daten zum Mineralölversorgung, Mineralölverbrauch, 
Mineralölausfuhr, http://mwv.de/index.php/daten/statistikeninfoportal, accessed on 14 May 2009. 
Data on refining capacity: W. Molle and E. Wever, Oil refineries and petrochemical industries in Western 
Europe: buoyant past, uncertain future (Aldershot 1984) 164-168.  
 
Underlying the West German energy transition was the fact that global oil surpluses 
and changes in the global demand structure caused nominal oil prices to remain low 
and stable throughout the 1950s and 1960s (Figure 3-10), giving oil a decisive 
advantage over coal.321. In real terms, the posted prices for Middle Eastern oil even 
declined between 1948 and 1970, only to start rising in 1971 after the demise of the 
Bretton Woods system. However, the period of steady oil prices abruptly ended with 
the 1973 oil crisis, after which nominal oil prices rose to over 11 US dollars per barrel. 
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Figure 3-10. Posted prices for Arabian light crude oil, 1945-1975 (in US 
dollars) 
 
Note: The prices – both nominal and constant – are the posted prices for a barrel of Arabian light 
crude oil free on board at Ras Tanura (Saudi Arabia) in US dollars. Real prices use 2009 as the base 
year. A barrel contains approximately 138 kilograms of crude oil; a metric ton contains approximately 
seven barrels.  
Source: BP statistical review of world energy, ‘Crude prices since 1861’, June 2011, 
http://www.bp.com/statisticalreview, accessed on 31 January 2013. Real prices are calculated using the 
GDP deflator provided by S.H. Williamson, "What Was the U.S. GDP Then?" MeasuringWorth, 
2014. http://www.measuringworth.org/usgdp/ 7 July 2014.  
 
As the Kohle-Öl Kartell clearly illustrated, the combination of the developing 
international oil industry, the structural problems of the coal industry and the federal 
government’s conception of the market economy provided the setting for a rapid 
energy transition (Figure 3-11) and a huge expansion of the oil industry in the late 
1950s and early 1960s. Up to 1957, the share of oil in the West German energy 
balance was 15 per cent below that of the Western European average. Within 15 years, 
the difference declined to only 3 per cent, the largest aspect of which was realised in 
just five years, between 1957 and 1962.  
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Figure 3-11. The share of oil in the energy balance of West Germany, 
1952-1972 
 
Source: Odell, Oil and World Power, 120-121. Own calculations. Western Europe includes the United 
Kingdom, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg and West Germany (BRD). 
 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
Why was oil allowed to compete freely with coal in the mid-1950s in the face of an 
imminent coal crisis? How did the West German energy policy of the 1950s affect the 
position of coal with regard to oil? What measures did the West German government 
take to offset the coal crisis in the 1960s and how did these measures affect oil 
consumption in West Germany? The economic policy of the Adenauer cabinets of 
the 1950s faired a liberal course with regard to the question of the West German 
energy supply. The federal government collided with the Ruhr coal industry more 
than once. Ludwig Erhard was convinced that market discipline could force the coal 
industry to rationalise its production. However, he did not opt for all out 
confrontation, because direct competition with imported coal was abandoned again in 
the late 1950s by the imposition of a tariff on imported coal from non-ECSC 
countries. Erhard did not regard the Ruhr coal industry as being capable of supplying 
marginal demand, as the West German energy demand grew faster than Ruhr coal 
production. The federal government calculated that fuel oil could fill the gap, hoping 
that coal and oil would complement each other in terms of meeting the West German 
energy demand. Many contemporary observers held similar views. The reduction of 
taxes on fuel in 1953 and 1956 aimed to encourage competition between coal and oil 
for marginal demand. The bottom line was that West German industry received its 
energy at the lowest possible price.  
 However, allowing oil to compete freely with coal had unexpected effects. 
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Particularly eventful was the period directly after the 1956 Suez Crisis, when both oil 
prices and spot tanker freights fell dramatically. The West German market was wide 
open to fuel oil imports and became a dumping ground for foreign suppliers. West 
German fuel oil markets also dipped far below prices in neighbouring countries. The 
falling prices were not only caused by low taxation; they were also the result of fierce 
competition between oil companies, coal companies and, to some extent, the relatively 
important independent West German oil traders. The oil companies aimed to retain 
their market share in the suddenly growing markets for light and heavy fuel oil in view 
of their planned refineries in the Rhine-Ruhr area. Meanwhile, the coal companies 
tried to retain existing clients by supplying both coal and fuel oil. By late 1958, fuel oil 
was cheaper than West German coal throughout the country and the situation 
became urgent for the mining companies. Exacerbated by an economic down-cycle, 
coal stocks rose and the association of Ruhr coal employers demanded protection 
from fuel oil, eliciting strong opposition from a number of industries that had 
switched to fuel oil. Rather than interfering directly, the federal government opted to 
allow the major oil and coal companies to form a cartel, the Kohle-Öl Kartell, in order 
to stabilise the market and buy time for the coal industry to adapt. Although the cartel 
was in the interests of the coal and oil companies, it failed to bring stability to the fuel 
oil market and was disbanded in mid-1959 as both the oil and coal companies had 
expanded their domestic production of fuel oil. Although the federal government 
subsequently tried to stymie the growth of fuel oil consumption by reintroducing taxes 
on both light and heavy fuel oil, opposition from German industries and the creation 
of the EEC gradually reduced the room for state intervention in the West German oil 
market. The alternative to the direct or indirect taxation of fuel oil was the quota 
system of self-limitation, but this failed entirely, particularly for light fuel oil.  
  The result of the liberalisation of fuel oil imports in the 1950s had far-
reaching effects. The chronic problems of the Ruhr coal industry did not help matters, 
but the sudden price drop in 1957 caused a coal crisis of unexpected magnitude. 
Subsequent measures to stop the transition from coal to fuel oil in both industry and 
households were to no avail. Continuing well into the 1960s, the growth of light fuel 
oil consumption in particular caused a substantial decline in the production of Ruhr 
coal, and many mines closed and thousands of members of staff were laid-off in the 
process. The dominance of heavy fuel oil in the production programs of the Rhine-
Ruhr refineries subsequently opened West Germany up to large imports of light fuel 
oil and gas oil, which continued unabated throughout the 1960s and early 1970s. 
The West German Wirtschaftswunder had a clear loser – coal – and a clear 
winner – oil, although the outcome of the federal government policies of the mid-
1950s might have had much wider consequences than foreseen at the time. 
Notwithstanding the haphazard way in which Bonn dealt with the Ruhr coal industry, 
the oil companies, particularly the major foreign firms, recognised the opportunity 
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and set out to benefit from it.  
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Chapter 4 An oil and petrochemical cluster in the Rhine-Ruhr area 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The transition from coal to oil fundamentally changed the West German economy, 
paving the way for the unprecedented growth of petrochemicals, which was one of the 
foundations of the West German post-war economic miracle.322 Where and why did 
oil companies decide to invest to adapt their West German operations to the growing 
consumption of oil? To what extent did existing industrial clusters determine the 
location choice of oil companies? And, lastly, how did the transition from coal to oil 
affect the demand for transportation in the Rhine-Ruhr area?  
Partly rooted in the Allied occupation of Germany after World War II, the 
transition also became part and parcel of the post-war economic miracle of West 
Germany. Although the Allied oil program and Erhard’s liberal approach to the 
energy problem had national implications, they were especially consequential for the 
Rhine-Ruhr area. Here, a mix of pre-war inheritances and post-war discontinuities 
laid the basis for the emergence of an oil and petrochemical cluster, while 
simultaneously causing the coal crisis of 1958 and, in the long run, the decline of the 
region itself.323 The establishment of synthetic fuel and rubber plants in the late 1930s, 
and their reactivation by the Allied occupation in 1949, provided the Rhine-Ruhr area 
with its first large-scale oil industry. Unlike the well-developed and integrated oil 
cluster of Hamburg, these facilities were German-owned, fairly isolated, and limited 
in their operations. However, the proximity of existing chemical complexes provided 
an opportunity for the German chemical industry to experiment on a commercial 
scale with petrochemical production methods and feedstock based on by-products 
from these plants. The increasing demand for fuel oil in North Rhine Westphalia in 
the second half of the 1950s also created a market for the further expansion of the 
area’s oil industry, as the major oil companies established their own refineries between 
1958 and 1961 and subsequently expanded them in the 1960s.   
 
4.2 The Rhine-Ruhr refineries 
West German refinery capacity expanded greatly in the 1950s. Indeed, between 1950 
and 1960, it increased eight-fold from 5.1 million tons to 40.5 million tons. The 
expansion in North Rhine Westphalia was part of a westwards reorientation of the 
West German oil industry, and comprised a geographical shift from Hamburg to the 
Rhine-Ruhr area. Hamburg lost its main hinterland due to the separation of East 
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Germany, which was detrimental to its position as the German centre of the oil 
industry.324 In 1950, North Rhine Westphalia already contained 33 per cent of West 
German refinery capacity, owing mainly to the three former hydrogenation plants in 
Gelsenkirchen and Wesseling. By 1960, however, North Rhine Westphalia had 
disposed of 57 per cent of its total refining capacity.325 This shift was partly caused by 
the extension of the processing contracts between multinational oil companies and the 
former hydrogenation plants, which duly doubled their capacity between 1955 and 
1960. However, the specific design of the former hydrogenation plants (as well as the 
upgraded refineries in the Hamburg area) aimed to maximise the production of motor 
fuels.  
The rapid increase of imports of fuel oil from 1955 onwards showed that the 
oil companies needed additional capacity for fuel oil production. By the mid-1950s, it 
was already clear to the multinational oil firms that the changing demand structure in 
West Germany required new refineries. As North Rhine Westphalia was developing 
into a major consumer of fuel oil in the mid-1950s, these refineries were planned in 
the Rhine-Ruhr area. Responding to the rise of fuel oil, the major international oil 
companies and their German partners in the Rhine-Ruhr area planned to expand 
their capacity by 26 million tons between 1958 and 1963. The two cases of Union 
Kraftstoff and Deutsche Shell, which will be discussed in the next section, 
demonstrate how rapid and consequential the liberalisation of the heating fuel market 
was.  
 
4.3 Deutsche Shell and Union Kraftstoff, 1951-1958 
Having survived the Allied occupation unscathed, Union Kraftstoff upgraded its 
refinery by adding a thermal cracker and a platformer in 1953 to make its production 
more flexible and of a higher quality. The thermal cracker and platformer are two 
chemical processes that aim to both convert heavy oil products into lighter ones and 
improve the quality of the latter. The thermal cracker allowed for a higher yield of 
light products (gasoline mainly) from heavier ones, while the platformer improved the 
ignition quality of the gasoline.326 These investments were protected by the fuel 
strategy of the federal government, which maintained the Allied policy of boosting 
West Germany’s domestic oil industry. The federal tax and tariff law of 1953 
supported domestic crude oil production and refining. Meanwhile, the former 
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hydrogenation plants received further support through special tax breaks for oil 
products produced with hydrogenation technology, the so-called Hydrierpräferenz.327  
As heating and power generation were exclusively achieved with coal, oil 
refineries were geared to maximising the production of motor fuels, as was Union 
Kraftstoff. However, the revision of the tax and tariff law in 1955 aimed to stimulate 
competition in those markets by abolishing import duties on light and heavy fuel oil. 
In terms of refining economics, the challenge for any refiner was to choose the 
optimal mix of oil products from a barrel of crude oil, which depended on the type of 
crude oil to be processed, the combination of processes available in the refinery and 
the market situation. With its mix of hydrogenation, thermal cracker and platformer 
installations, Union Kraftstoff was well equipped to respond to fluctuations in the 
demand for oil products. However, its refining contract with Deutsche Shell was 
rather restrictive, prescribing the amounts that Union Kraftstoff was to produce for 
fixed cost-based compensation.  
The increasing German demand for fuel oil was such a fundamental change 
that Deutsche Shell presumably became susceptible to Union Kraftstoff’s objections to 
the 1948 processing contract. Accordingly, to optimise the use of the refinery, the two 
companies agreed to give Union Kraftstoff more flexibility in choosing its refining 
program in a new contract signed on 1 October 1955;328 henceforth, Union 
Kraftstoff’s profits would be determined from the difference between the value of the 
crude oil and the value of the final products. Instead of producing according to a fixed 
program, Union Kraftstoff was now challenged to maximise its margins on its 
production given the prevailing market conditions. The company could thus establish 
its own production program, which was reviewed every six months by Deutsche Shell. 
This was an important step towards a more independent way of doing business for 
Union Kraftstoff.  
 In the 1950s and early 1960s, Union Kraftstoff’s production of fuel oil 
increased rapidly, illustrating the changing structure of West German demand (Figure 
4-1).  
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Figure 4-1. Fuel oil production at Union Kraftstoff, 1950-1962 
 
Source: HK RWE, C3/12380, Einsatz und Ausbeute der Union Kraftstoff, 1950-1967. Own 
calculations. 
 
In 1950, Union Kraftstoff produced only 4,000 tons of fuel oil, which was one per 
cent of its total output of fuels. In 1960, its fuel oil output was higher than its 
production of motor fuels (893,000 tons versus 806,000 tons), comprising 53 per cent 
of its total production of fuel. Two years later, in 1962, the company’s fuel oil 
production increased to 1.2 million tons or 58 per cent of its total fuel production. By 
1967, this figure was 71 per cent, although it was light fuel oil that accounted for the 
growth after 1962. Fuel oil production was the main driver of the growth in Union 
Kraftstoff’s production capacity in the 1950s and early 1960s. The company’s data 
illustrate the nature and extent of the West German energy transition well. Moreover, 
the fuel oil produced at Union Kraftstoff became an important source for the sales 
apparatus of the Brown Coal Group, the Vereinigungsgesellschaft der Rheinische 
Braunkohlewerke (Verges), which used it to counter the declining sales of brown coal 
briquettes.329 
During the 1950s, Union Kraftstoff was significant for the region’s 
development for four reasons. Firstly, it and other former hydrogenation plants were 
important for the fuel supply in the region, which traditionally sourced its fuel from 
either Hamburg and Bremen or Rotterdam. This reflected the continued Allied policy 
of the Federal Republic, which was aimed at stimulating the domestic refining of 
imported crude oil rather than importing finished products. Secondly, Union 
Kraftstoff was important to Deutsche Shell as a way to maintain its market share. 
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Thirdly, the increasing amounts of fuel oil produced by Union Kraftstoff during the 
1950s were vital to the sales organisation of the Rhenish Brown Coal Group because 
it allowed the group to retain a market share in the face of clients switching to oil. 
This also highlights the competing interests of the coal industry with regard to the 
former hydrogenation plants they owned. On the one hand, the rising demand for oil 
threatened their markets. On the other, the former hydrogenation plants allowed coal 
companies to retain their clientele by also offering them oil. Lastly, Union Kraftstoff 
and the other former hydrogenation plants were important for the emergence of a 
petrochemical industry in the region. Indeed, the by-products of oil refining at the 
former hydrogenation plants provided the opportunity for their onwards processing 
into petrochemicals.  
 
4.4 The Rhineland refinery of Deutsche Shell 
As the Rhine-Ruhr area contained a large concentration of urban agglomerations and 
industries, it was the biggest growth market for fuel oil in West Germany in the 
1950s. It was already the largest consumer of fuel oil in the mid-1950s, and increased 
its share of West German fuel oil consumption from 33 per cent in 1956 to 37 per 
cent in 1959 and 38 per cent in 1961.330 By 1955, it was apparent to Deutsche Shell 
that its available refining capacity in the area (Union Kraftstoff) was completely 
inadequate with respect to supplying the burgeoning demand for fuel oil. Moreover, 
competitors were planning similar expansions in the Rhine-Ruhr area (Table 4-1). 
Along with Deutsche Shell, Esso AG and Deutsche BP were also planning to build 
new refineries with more than 3 million tons of annual capacity each, while the 
existing former hydrogenation plants in Gelsenkirchen were also doubling their 
capacity between 1960 and 1963.  
At the time, Union Kraftstoff was producing around 800,000 tons of oil 
products for Deutsche Shell, which it would continue to do until the 1952 contract 
ended in 1963. However, a product requirement projection produced by Deutsche 
Shell director Hubert van Drimmelen in December 1955 showed that, for 1964, and 
disregarding the production of Wesseling, the company expected a shortfall to the 
tune of 1.56 million tons of oil products. The shortfall was especially large for heavy 
fuel oil (620,000 tons), but was also significant for gas oil (357,000 tons, containing 
both diesel and light fuel oil) and gasoline (502,000 tons). A further estimate for 1970 
predicted a total shortfall of 2.2 million tons.331 
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Table 4-1. Planned refinery expansions in the Rhine-Ruhr area, 1959-
1968 
Company Expansion Year Added capacity (Mt/y) 
Shell (Godorf) 1st stage 1960 4.0 
 2nd stage 1963 3.0 
Esso (Cologne) 1st stage 1959 3.0 
 2nd stage 1961 3.0 
Petrofina (Duisburg) 1st stage 1959 1.0 
 2nd stage 1961 2.0 
BP (Dinslaken) 1st stage 1960 3.0 
 2nd stage 1963 3.0 
Scholven AG (Gelsenkirchen) extension 1959 1.0 
(present cap 1 Mt/y)    
Gelsenberg Benzin AG 
(Gelsenkirchen) 1st stage extension 1961 2.0 
(present cap 3 Mt/y) 2nd stage extension 1963 1.0 
 3rd stage extension 1968 2.0 
Total announced added capacity 29.0 
Source: SHA, Archive of manufacturing department (MF), inv. no. 48, file: 
Installations/Germany/Godorf: Budget Revision, Return no. 513, 15 March 1957, 2. 
 
Van Drimmelen tried to estimate the best location for the new refinery, with the aim 
being to supply the lower and middle Rhine basin with oil products. Based on 
transport cost calculations, Van Drimmelen weighed the possibility of a Strasbourg 
area refinery against one in the Cologne region.332 For freight costs within Germany, 
Van Drimmelen used the cheapest routes possible from each location, with these costs 
on the Rhine under normal circumstances being an important share of the cost 
structure. The calculations revealed very little difference between the two locations in 
terms of the costs per ton of product deliveries to Karlsruhe: from Strasbourg the 
figure was 15.84 DM, while it was 15.80 DM from Cologne. However, Van 
Drimmelen also pointed out that experience had shown that water levels on the upper 
Rhine tended to be problematic, which would make distribution to Karlsruhe from 
Strasbourg more difficult than from the Cologne area. Moreover, Strasbourg could 
only be reached by a limited number of vessels, depending on their draught, so there 
was a real danger that continuous supplies from there could not be ensured. Van 
Drimmelen also assumed that rail cars would be needed much more often in the case 
of Strasbourg than in the Cologne area. Accordingly, as rail costs were expected to 
rise more than Rhine tanker freight rates in the long run, the costs for Strasbourg 
could actually be considerably higher than for Cologne. Van Drimmelen therefore 
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concluded that, disregarding the differences in the costs of supplying crude oil and the 
capital expenditure required to construct pipelines, a refinery in the Cologne area 
would be the best option. 
 The second question was where to locate the refinery in the Cologne region. 
Van Drimmelen regarded a location close to Rheinische Olefinwerke in Wesseling as 
advantageous. Olefinwerke was a joint venture between the Shell group and BASF, 
and was established in 1953 to produce polyethylene (a basic plastic) from gaseous by-
products from Union Kraftstoff. However, the processing deal with Union Kraftstoff 
was due to end in 1963, and as the feedstock providing partner for Olefinwerke, 
Deutsche Shell was contractually bound to provide it with an alternative feedstock 
supply.333 In August 1956, a promising plot of land close to Olefinwerke was found in 
Cologne-Godorf in the municipality of Wesseling. The capital expenditure proposal 
in which the capital was requested for the purchase of the land stated that:    
 
“one of the essential requirements of a refinery in the Rhineland is the supply of 
the gas feedstock for ROW [Rheinische Olefinwerke].”334  
 
Apart from supplying Olefinwerke, the new refinery was primarily aimed at supplying 
the additional production needed to retain a 20 per cent share in Deutsche Shell’s 
main product markets, which were expanding rapidly, especially for heavy and light 
fuel oil. In retrospect, it is interesting to see how quickly projections became outdated. 
Whereas the anticipated shortfall in production for 1964 was estimated at 1.56 
million tons in December 1955, a June 1956 estimate projected a deficit of 3.8 million 
tons in 1964, an increase of 160 per cent from six months earlier.335 The final budget 
proposal for the new refinery, which was submitted to the Committee of Managing 
Directors of the group in March 1957, predicted a shortfall for 1964 of 4.5 million 
tons, which was three times higher than the original 1955 estimate. The deficit was 
especially acute in the fuel oil and gas oil markets. Figure 4-2 shows the progression 
of the consecutive projections between December 1955 and March 1957. The 
columns give the total shortfall in 1,000 tons, while the lines give the progression of 
the projected deficit in the main three product groups: gasoline, gas oil (including 
light fuel oil) and heavy fuel oil.  
  
                                               
333 SHA, inv. 82, nr. 129, Verhouding BPM en ROW, Agreement Deutsche Shell-Badische, article 12, 
October 1953. 
334 SHA, inv. MF, nr. 48, Installaties/Algemeen-Godorf/Installaties/Duitsland/Godorf/Algemeen, 
Germany: Rhineland refinery site, 14 August 1956 (original quote).  
335 SHA, inv. 48, MF, Installaties/Algemeen-Godorf/Installaties/Duitsland/Godorf/Algemeen, 
memorandum of discussion between DS and BPM regarding 'New Rheinland Refinery', 12 June 1956. 
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Figure 4-2. The progression of the projected shortfall in 1964 for 
Deutsche Shell 
 
Source: SHA, inv. MF, nr. 48, Installaties/Algemeen-
Godorf/Installaties/Duitsland/Godorf/Algemeen, Memo Deutsche Shell regarding ‘Planung neue 
Raffinerie im Rheinland’, 7 June 1956; letter, Van Drimmelen to Hofland, regarding ‘Purchase of a site 
for a new refinery in the Rhineland’, 28 December 1955; Budget Revision, supplementary projects - 
manufacturing, 15 March 1957. Own calculations. 
 
In December 1955, the projection seemed to be quite conservative and the difference 
in the shortfall for the three products small. Six months later, reflecting the rising 
demand for heavy fuel oil in West Germany, the projected deficit more than doubled 
and the heavy fuel oil position became the most problematic of the three main 
products. In March 1957, the projected shortfalls had increased, although by then it 
had become clear that gas oil and light fuel oil in particular were relatively more 
important, in line with the rising demand for the former between 1955 and 1960. The 
progression of these projections shows not only how fast oil product demand in West 
Germany grew in the mid-1950s, but also illustrates the rapidly changing composition 
of this demand. 
 As the technical designs were altered to match the adjusted marketing 
projections, Deutsche Shell requested the capital budget for the construction of the 
refinery. In August 1956, a suitable tract of land was found in Godorf, near Cologne, 
and a capital expenditure proposal was filed with the group’s oil directorate in the 
same month to reserve the required amount of funding for Deutsche Shell’s 1957 
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budget.336 Then, the Suez Crisis unfolded, and, as an economy measure, the new 
Rhineland refinery (as it was called internally) with Royal Dutch Shell was removed 
from the manufacturing budget for 1957.337 There were a number of issues arising 
from the crisis. For example, the new refinery was projected to process Kuwaiti crude 
oil, the supply of which became uncertain when the crisis struck. Moreover, 
emergency measures to increase production in Venezuela, arrange additional transport 
capacity to get oil from alternative sources to Europe, and the subsequent rising 
freight rates required extra cash outlays for Royal Dutch Shell, which were created by 
scrapping parts of the capital budget. However, the estimated shortfall projection of 
March 1957 highlighted that any further delay with respect to the Rhineland refinery 
would put the market position of Deutsche Shell at risk. The earlier mentioned 
shortfalls in existing refinery output by 1960 and beyond made it imperative that the 
refinery started production in 1960. Moreover, the competition showed no sign of 
slowing down either.338 The final design of the new refinery aimed to meet the 
estimated future heavy fuel oil demand, while also balancing the gasoline supply and 
leaving a shortfall in Deutsche Shell’s gas oil requirements.339 The shortfall of gas oil 
production would remain an issue throughout the 1960s for the entire West German 
market, which necessitated rising imports in the second half of the decade. Rotterdam 
was to play an important role with respect to those imports.  
 As a consequence of the transition from coal to fuel oil, the centre of gravity of 
the West German oil industry shifted from Hamburg to the Rhine-Ruhr area. 
Hamburg suffered from the division of Germany and the Iron Curtain, but remained 
important for the production and export of high-grade oil products, nonetheless.  
Figure 4-3 shows how the geographical distribution of refinery capacity in West 
Germany evolved between 1950 and 1975. It clearly demonstrates that during this 
period, four distinct clusters of refineries appeared, with North Rhine Westphalia 
becoming the largest. Other clusters emerged along the Upper Rhine in Baden-
Württemberg and the Rhineland Palatinate and in Southern Bavaria. The clusters 
match closely the distribution of West Germany’s major industrial regions, i.e. the 
Rhine-Ruhr, Mannheim-Karlsruhe-Stuttgart and Munich areas. 
 
 
                                               
336 SHA, MF/48/Cologne-Godorf: supplementary capital expenditure proposal, Germany 56/106, 
reservation of an additional DM 6 million for the purchase of Cologne-Godorf site in 1957 Deutsche 
Shell budget, 14 August 1956.  
337 SHA, MF/48/Godorf: budget revision, Return no. 513, 15 March 1957, 1.  
338 Ibid., 1-2. 
339 SHA, inv. 48, MF, Installaties/Algemeen-Godorf/Installaties/Duitsland/Godorf/Algemeen, budget 
revision, supplementary projects - manufacturing, 15 March 1957. 
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4.5 The post-war transition of the chemical industry 
As the cases of Deutsche Shell and Union Kraftstoff have already highlighted, it was 
not just the liberalisation of the heating fuel market in the mid-1950s that caused the 
growth of an oil and petrochemical cluster in the Rhine-Ruhr area. Indeed, the 
opportunities from increased oil processing in the region, starting with the 
reactivation of the hydrogenation plants in the late 1940s, provided hydrocarbon 
byproducts that could be valorised as feedstock for the chemical industry. The 
development of the Rhine-Ruhr refinery cluster was therefore different from 
Hamburg’s, and focused on fuel oil on the one hand and petrochemical feedstock on 
the other. In fact, the links to the German chemical industry in the Rhine region 
largely explained the location patterns of new refineries. The pre-war sites of chemical, 
synthetic fuels and rubber plants therefore go a long way to explaining the economic 
geography of the oil and petrochemical industry in the Rhine-Ruhr area after 1945.  
Whereas IG Farben had enjoyed a hugely privileged position under the Nazi 
regime, it became clear after World War II that Farben had largely missed the 
petrochemical revolution that Anglo-American oil companies had embarked on 
during the 1930s and the war.340 After the war, Farben was therefore confronted with 
the competition from the petrochemical advances of the international oil industry, 
and also had to deal with the problems from the break-up and the rising costs of coal 
feedstock. However, instead of being wiped out, the Farben successor companies 
successfully re-established themselves on the world market. Moreover, with the 
balance being tipped in favour of the relatively new petrochemical industry, a renewed 
collaboration between the German chemical and the international oil companies 
ensued. As a result, the former gradually switched from coal to petroleum, although 
Stokes points out that the switch was not as self-evident as is often suggested in the 
literature.341 Stokes mentions several reasons for the relative strength of the German 
chemical industry, with its technological prowess, research tradition and advanced 
coal-based techniques being the most important. Moreover, it must be stressed that 
coal-based chemistry did not disappear entirely, even though the transition to 
petrochemicals seemed to be an obvious development. The Ruhr industry’s 
proprietary Fischer-Tropsch technology, for instance, remained in use well into the 
1960s for the production of niche products for which petrochemical alternatives had 
yet to be found.342  
 The transition of the German chemical industry has been dealt with 
extensively in the literature. Ray Stokes’s Opting for Oil is the most important 
publication on the actual transition of the four main Farben successors: Bayer, BASF, 
                                               
340 Stokes, Opting, 3. 
341 Ibid., 7, 96-101.  
342 Stokes, Opting, 5.  
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Hoechst and Hüls. Other authors have published business histories of the pre- and 
post-war evolutions of individual firms, as well as on the development of the 
industry.343 The present study is not aiming to add anything to that body of literature 
in terms of a better understanding of the post-war development of these companies. 
Instead, the purpose here is to identify the significance of their transition for the 
economic composition of the hinterland. The most important observation of that 
body of literature is that rather than becoming obsolete, the West German chemical 
industry regained its competitiveness by successfully transforming its raw material 
base. This implies that its plants remained important industrial locations and, 
therefore, loci for growth. An important aspect of this path-dependent development 
was the enduring relationship with international oil companies that was established in 
the 1920s and reactivated in the 1950s.344 In fact, IG Farben’s Carl Krauch was 
reputed to have stated in the 1930s that it was his dream to combine the company’s 
chemical know-how with the oil-based feedstock of the Anglo-American oil firms.345  
Immediately after the war, German chemical companies had a clear picture of 
the advantages of petrochemical production and how to catch up with the level of 
their Anglo-American competitors. For instance, when Bayer was carefully looking 
for avenues into petrochemicals, it talked to a number of German, as well as 
American and British, chemical and oil companies with a view to gaining access to 
petrochemical feedstock. The American contacts dated back to the pre-war 
cooperation between IG Farben and Jersey Standard, although the latter was 
apprehensive about entering into a joint project with Bayer due to a fear of raking up 
its past dealings with IG Farben and its entanglement with the strict US anti-trust 
legislation.346 The intimate relationship between Royal Dutch Shell and BASF that 
developed from the early 1950s onwards is another striking example. The post-war 
transition from carbo- to petrochemical production dated back to the 1910s and 
1920s, when IG Farben developed technology to produce motor fuels from coal and 
Royal Dutch Shell ventured into the synthetic nitrogen business. In particular, the so-
called Bergius hydrogenation of coal to produce motor fuels was a landmark in the 
                                               
343 W. Abelshauser, German industry and global enterprise: BASF: the history of a company (Cambridge 
2004); P. Kleedehn, Die Rückkehr auf den Weltmarkt. Die Internationalisierung der Bayer AG Leverkusen 
nach dem Zweitem Weltkrieg bis zum Jahre 1961 (Stuttgart 2007). Industry studies include R. Stokes’ 
Divide and Prosper (Berkeley 1988) and Opting for Oil (Cambridge 1994 (2006)); and J. E. Lesch (ed.), 
The German Chemical Industry in the Twentieth Century (Dordrecht 2000). On the history of IG 
Farben: H. Tammen, Die I. G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft (1925-1933): ein Chemiekonzern in der 
Weimarer Republik (Berlin 1978); P. Hayes, Industry and ideology: IG Farben in the Nazi era (Cambridge 
1987); G. Plumpe, Die IG Farbenindustrie AG (Berlin 1990); and S. H. Lindner, Inside IG Farben: 
Hoechst during the Third Reich (Cambridge 2008).  
344 W. Abelshauser, Die BASF, ein Unternehmensgeschichte (München 2002) 442-443. 
345 R. Stokes, ‘Technology and the West German Wirtschaftswunder’, Technology and Culture 32 
(1991) 1-22, here: 10. 
346 Stokes, Opting for Oil, 156-157, 164.  
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technological crossover between coal and oil.347   
 Whereas in the pre-war period the international oil companies were highly 
indebted to chemical knowledge and research from Germany, the post-war period of 
transition was characterised by a high degree of mutual dependence and benefits. As 
Stokes has pointed out, the German chemical industry boasted a strong research 
tradition and state of the art chemical technology and know-how. International oil 
companies, on the other hand, disposed of the feedstock that the Germans lacked. 
However, the oil companies had also built up experience in the design, engineering 
and construction of large-scale petrochemical plants. While chemical engineering was 
typically advanced in relatively small-scale, customised installations for extreme 
pressures and temperatures, the oil industry’s engineering specialised in large-scale, 
continuous process plants. Chemical installations were often constructed, tested and 
tweaked, while oil refineries and petrochemical plants had to be delivered turn-key, 
with outages and the need for tweaking reduced to a minimum. Along with the 
differences in design, engineering and construction experience, the two industries also 
differed in their research tradition. The chemical sector was focused on devising 
elegant synthesis processes to obtain the highest yield of chemically pure compounds. 
The oil industry, however, was much messier than its chemical counterpart, and its 
chemical research was focussed on finding the cheapest and most practicable solution. 
Up to the 1920s, oil companies rarely understood even the chemical composition of 
crude oil or the oil products they produced. Although the efforts of firms like the 
Shell group and Jersey Standard propelled them into petrochemicals, the industry’s 
chemists were still not as advanced as their German counterparts in the chemical 
sector.348 It is thus important to understand that both parties had something to gain 
from the renewed cooperation in the 1950s.  
 
4.6 An oil and petrochemical cluster in the Rhine-Ruhr area 
The origins of the petrochemical cluster in the Rhine-Ruhr can be traced back to the 
late 19th century, when the Ruhr coal and steel industry started investing in developing 
the production of byproducts from the growing number of coking plants in the Ruhr 
area. Although the Ruhr coal and steel industry was relatively apprehensive about 
diversification into organic chemistry, the distillation of coal tar gave rise to the first 
group of chemical enterprises in the Rhine-Ruhr region up to World War I.349 
                                               
347 E. Homburg, J. Small and P. Vincken, ‘Van carbo- naar petrochemie, 1914-1940’, in: J.W. Schot et 
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the Chemical Industry at War, 1914-1924 (Dordrecht 2006) 123-144, here: 125-126. 
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Increasing numbers of coal tar distillation plants were established in the late 19th 
century. The first major chemical plants in the region were dedicated to the 
production of dyes and pharmaceuticals from the basic chemicals obtained from coal 
tar. These plants were mainly set up by chemical companies – Bayer, Hoechst, and 
BASF – or engineers, and not by coal or steel industrialists. In the 1920s, the 
synthesis of nitrogen by Fritz Haber and Carl Bosch gave a second wind to the 
Rhine-Ruhr chemical industry, because it valorised the gas that was yielded by coking, 
namely coking gas, which was available in abundance. Indeed, between the late 1920s 
and late 1930s, the region’s largest steel companies established five major synthetic 
nitrogen plants in the Ruhr area.350  
The diversification ambitions of the coal industry were given further 
opportunities with IG Farben’s development of other synthetic alternatives to natural 
or imported products, such as motor fuels, lubricants and rubber. Although the 
investments of the coal and steel industry under the framework of the Nazi Four Year 
Plan were not entirely voluntary, the sector did invest heavily in a number of plants 
dedicated to synthetic fuels, lubricants and rubber. These investments were derived 
from the proprietary technology of Ruhrchemie on the one hand (Fischer-Tropsch) 
and IG Farben on the other (the Bergius hydrogenation of coal). In total, the coal 
industry invested in three major hydrogenation plants in Gelsenkirchen (2) and 
Wesseling near Cologne (1), as well as a number of Fischer-Tropsch plants.351 
Additionally, IG Farben and the state mining company Hibernia AG established a 
synthetic rubber plant in Marl on the northern edge of the Ruhr area in 1938, 
subsequently developing a physical exchange network with the hydrogenation plants 
in Gelsenkirchen.352 The investments made by the Ruhr coal and the Rhenish brown 
coal industries were part of their aim to diversify the valorisation of coal, hoping to 
develop a vibrant and profitable chemical cluster as a spin-off from their original 
activities. Such a chemical cluster did indeed develop, but it was not to be based on 
coal, but on oil. 
The actual transition to petrochemicals began in the early 1950s with the 1953 
foundation of Rheinische Olefinwerke as a joint venture by Deutsche Shell and BASF, 
which was the first West German petrochemical plant to be founded. Union 
Kraftstoff was also closely involved; soon after it commenced production on the 
processing deal with Deutsche Shell in 1949, it played a key role in the birth of this 
very first petrochemical plant in West Germany and was therefore at the heart of the 
                                                                                                                                       
Weltkriegs in Deutschland und inbesondere im Ruhrgebiet, Ein Überblick’, in: G. Bayerl (ed.), 
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German chemical industry’s transition from coal to oil. With the decision to build a 
thermal cracker at Union Kraftstoff in 1951, an opportunity to construct a 
petrochemical plant emerged. The cracking of heavy oil residues yields a gaseous 
byproduct containing highly reactive hydrocarbon compounds called olefins. Crack 
gas (apart from natural gas) is the most obvious source of olefins, with ethylene and 
propylene being the most important elements (see Appendix C for more information). 
These form the basis for a wide range of synthetic materials such as plastics, synthetic 
rubber and synthetic fibres. Union Kraftstoff hoped the cracker would give the 
company the opportunity to enter the petrochemical industry, as this enjoyed higher 
margins than oil refining.  
Union Kraftstoff did not own the crack gases that became available from its 
thermal cracker from 1953 onwards. Instead, it was paid to process the crude oil 
supplied to it by Deutsche Shell, which also had sole responsibility for marketing. It 
was therefore Deutsche Shell and its staff and directors in London and The Hague 
who began to look for a third party interested in buying the crack gases for further 
petrochemical processing. Deutsche Shell was eager to find a German partner, and so 
turned to BASF. According to Ray Stokes, the company had already approached 
BASF in 1948 to see whether it would be interested in joining forces in a wax-
cracking venture. BASF was certainly interested, but was ultimately looking for a 
much more comprehensive joint venture into petrochemicals.353 Although BASF was 
still predominantly active in coal-based chemistry, it was already familiar with 
processing petrochemical feedstock like ethylene into plastics. Indeed, it had already 
devised a small-scale production facility at Ludwigshafen at the end of the war for this 
purpose. Immediately after the war, BASF perfected its process and the question was 
not whether to proceed with the technology, but how to obtain feedstock security to 
expand its production to a commercial size.354 
However, opportunities for closer cooperation between oil companies and 
German chemical firms were limited at the time. First of all, there was limited 
availability of the gaseous feedstock required for the production of ethylene and 
propylene, which is probably why Deutsche Shell only proposed a wax-cracking 
venture in 1948. Wax was also easily transported to BASF’s plant in Ludwigshafen, 
which was approximately 200 kilometres south of Wesseling. Secondly, the volume of 
byproducts from Union Kraftstoff was initially relatively small; in 1950, it processed 
350,000 tons of crude oil, which yielded only 4,000 tons of heavy fuel oil and 22,000 
tons of refinery gas as byproducts for potential petrochemical use.355 Deutsche Shell 
became more interested in BASF’s idea of a comprehensive joint venture with the 
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construction of the thermal cracker in Wesseling, which yielded a substantial amount 
of crack gases with high olefin content. This provided an opportunity for BASF to 
start producing polyethylene, a basic plastic, from petrochemical feedstock.  
However, once the opportunity was there, other problems arose. On 23 and 24 
January 1952, representatives from the Shell group, BASF and Union Kraftstoff met 
in Ludwigshafen, with the two principal points of discussion being the location of the 
plant and the position of Hoechst in the venture.356 With respect to the first issue, 
Deutsche Shell and BASF had three opportunities: transporting the entire crack gas 
stream to Ludwigshafen, cracking the gas stream into individual products and only 
transporting the transportable goods to Ludwigshafen, or treating the entire gas 
stream locally and building the processing plant next to it. In general, ethylene causes 
a clustering of backwards and forwards steps in the production chain. On the one 
hand, ethylene production tends to be located close to the ethylene buyer, because it is 
not easily transported. On the other, the production of ethylene tends to be located 
close to the supply source of the gas stream (the refinery), because the byproducts of 
ethylene production are fed back to the refinery.357 BASF chose to locate the 
polyethylene venture in Wesseling, next to Union Kraftstoff, with the view being that 
it would take too long to expand the separation capacity in Ludwigshafen to a level 
whereby it could process the entire crack gas stream from Union Kraftstoff. Moreover, 
separating the crack gas in Wesseling and sending only the transportable fraction 
(propylene) to Ludwigshafen was uneconomical.358  
BASF and Deutsche Shell finalised their negotiations in September 1952. All 
of the necessary contracts were signed over the course of 1953 and Rheinische 
Olefinwerke was duly founded. Construction of the plant in Wesseling started in 
1954 and, by 1955, the first production of Lupolen commenced. During the 1952 
negotiations, BASF estimated that the German market could not absorb more than 
6,000 tons of polyethylene per year and that export opportunities were limited. 
Nevertheless, during the construction of the plant, its maximum capacity was raised to 
10,000 tons. Subsequent expansions of its capacity in 1957, 1959 and 1963 raised the 
maximum to 190,000 tons per annum, making Olefinwerke the biggest producer of 
polyethylene in Europe and among the largest in the world.359  The consecutive 
expansions of Olefinwerke led Deutsche Shell to establish its Cologne-Godorf 
refinery near Wesseling to meet the growing demand for feedstock. In 1968, 
Olefinwerke was further expanded to produce 660,000 tons of ethylene per year.360 
The feedstock for such a capacity required 3.5 million tons of naphtha, which in turn 
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demanded a crude oil distillation capacity of 20 million tons.361 Royal Dutch Shell was 
obliged to meet the burgeoning demand for feedstock by BASF’s plants in Wesseling 
and Ludwigshafen based on a long-term supply contract signed in 1953. Deutsche 
Shell’s Cologne-Godorf refinery was expanded in 1965 – from 4 to 8 million tons – 
and additional investment was aimed at increasing the production of naphtha to 
enable the expansion of Olefinwerke.362 As a result of the developing close relationship 
between the Cologne-Godorf refinery and Olefinwerke, the Cologne area became 
Deutsche Shell’s largest investment location in West Germany. Indeed, between 1951 
and 1964, Royal Dutch Shell nominally invested 270 million US dollars (1.5 billion in 
US dollars of 2009) in West Germany,363 more than half of which (53 per cent) was 
sunk into the Cologne-Godorf refinery and Olefinwerke.364  
In 1957, Bayer and BP followed suit and established Erdölchemie Dormagen 
adjacent to the former’s Dormagen plant, which would be supplied with naphtha 
from the BP refinery that became operational in 1960.365 Hoechst faired a different 
course.366 In the 1950s, it tried to develop in-house petrochemical production 
technology, but largely failed and so, in the 1960s, sought out external technology and 
petrochemical feedstock. Hoechst cooperated for a while with the American oil 
company Caltex (present day Chevron and Texaco) to supply its main plant in 
Frankfurt with petrochemical feedstock. Then, for its principal plant in the Cologne 
area, namely Knapsack AG, it developed a close feedstock relationship with Union 
Kraftstoff.  
Chemische Werke Hüls, the fourth largest IG Farben successor, was an earlier 
adopter of petrochemicals. Taking advantage of its existing exchange network with 
Scholven AG and Gelsenberg Benzin AG, which were the former hydrogenation 
plants in Gelsenkirchen, Hüls succeeded in the 1950s in rapidly expanding its 
petrochemical product gamut. Technologically, however, it remained dependent on 
BASF, Bayer and Hoechst.367 In 1955, Hüls joined with these three companies to 
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establish the synthetic rubber plant Buna Werke Hüls. Meanwhile, Hüls and 
Scholven jointly developed a commercial scale production unit for polyethylene, a 
plastic, and in the mid-1960s, the two companies jointly established a steam cracker 
to increase the production of ethylene for their joint polyethylene business.368 
 After the German chemical industry’s hesitant start in petrochemical activities 
in the early-1950s, petrochemical production experienced rapid growth in the late 
1950s and 1960s. The expansion of the former hydrogenation plants and the 
construction of the Rhine-Ruhr refineries in the late 1950s served to fuel that growth. 
The BP refinery at Dinslaken supplied naphtha to Dormagen, which also obtained 
additional feedstock from the nearby Esso refinery north of Cologne. The latter in 
turn also supplied gas and later ethylene to Hüls, Bayer and Hoechst’s Ruhrchemie 
plant in Oberhausen. The BP refinery also supplied gas to Hüls. The Deutsche Shell 
refinery south of Cologne provided feedstock and ethylene to its joint venture with 
BASF, namely Rheinische Olefinwerke, which also received gas from Union 
Kraftstoff. Union Kraftstoff, meanwhile, provided ethylene and other basic 
petrochemicals to nearby Knapsack AG, a subsidiary of Hoechst. These are just a tiny 
indication of the range of input-output relationships that developed in the 1960s 
between chemical and petrochemical plants and refineries in the Rhine-Ruhr area.369 
Over the course of the 1960s and early 1970s, the Rhine-Ruhr developed two clusters 
of oil and petrochemical plants: one in the Ruhr area centred on Hüls, and the other 
in the area to the north and south of Cologne grouped around Bayer in Leverkusen 
and Knapsack AG and Olefinwerke south of Cologne (Figure 4-4).  
  
                                               
368, ‘Die Petrochemie’, 22-23, 34. 
369 Broich, ‘Die Petrochemie’, 42-48; Mittmann, Die Chemische Industrie, 72-105. 
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Figure 4-4. The oil and petrochemical clusters of the Rhine-Ruhr area, 
1960s 
 
Note: The map is not meant to be exhaustive and merely aims to convey the fact that refineries and 
petrochemical plants were located close to existing chemical plants. The Rhine-Ruhr area consisted of 
two interrelated clusters, a northern Ruhr cluster and a southern Cologne cluster. 
Source: Mittmann, Der Chemische Industrie, 21-129; Broich, ‘Die Petrochemie’, 13-40, Rasch, 
‘Kohleveredlung’, 36-72, B.H. Davis and M.L. Occelli (eds.), Fischer-Tropsch synthesis, catalysts and 
catalysis (Amsterdam 2007) 13-15.  
 
The cluster of petrochemical activity that thus emerged (Figure 4-4) was derived from 
the outcome of two oppositional institutional frameworks. The first petrochemical 
activities in the Rhine-Ruhr area were based on the byproducts from the reactivated 
former hydrogenation plants, particularly with regard to Chemische Werke Hüls and 
the first petrochemical green-field investment, Rheinische Olefinwerke. With its 
focus on autarky, the Nazi period fostered the rather haphazard development of a 
synthetic industry in the Rhine-Ruhr area. In direct opposition to this, the US 
occupation authorities attempted to radically break with these autarkic tendencies and 
the high level of cartelisation of the German chemical industry, aiming to dismantle 
the synthetic industry in the Rhine-Ruhr area. The reactivation of the former 
hydrogenation plants within the framework of the Allied refining program was the 
result of the inability of the Allies to fully erase the autarkic industries from the 
German economy, which had proved to be influential when it came to the transition 
of the German chemical sector. The subsequent rise of the Rhine-Ruhr petrochemical 
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cluster is thus the result of a number of continuities in the German chemical industry, 
which provided it with the foundation to successfully pursue the transition from coal 
to oil.370 
Cluster formation is a common characteristic of the petrochemical industry,371 
as the transportation of basic petrochemicals is often difficult, which is why chemical 
activities cluster around the producers. As a result of the many input-output 
relationships among the different stages of the production process, the economies of 
scale were high. The expansion of an existing plant or complex was therefore favoured 
over the development of entirely new production locations. The high degree of 
vertical integration in the industry also encouraged clustering, because petrochemical 
complexes are often owned and operated by a limited number of firms active in most 
or all of the stages of the production process. Finally, agglomeration economies also 
stimulate clustering, as existing production locations pull additional producers to them, 
because of the availability of skilled labour, suppliers and buyers. As a result of this 
tendency to cluster, the Rhine-Ruhr area developed into the foremost petrochemical 
region in West Germany and one of the main petrochemical clusters in Europe.  
 
Table 4-2. Ethylene production capacity in the Rhine-Ruhr, 1960-75 (in 
million tons) 
 1960 1965 1970 1975 
Ethylene production capacity Rhine-Ruhr  0.23 0.70 1.34 3.05 
As a percentage of West German capacity  92 67 63 75 
As a percentage of Western European capacity  32 26 17 23 
Source: Molle and Wever, Oil Refineries, 172-173. 
 
The production capacity of ethylene is a good indicator for determining the relative 
importance of a petrochemical cluster, because it was the most important basic 
petrochemical.372 Although the Rhine-Ruhr cluster’s share of total West German and 
Western European production declined during the 1960s, as other regions developed 
a petrochemical and oil industry, the petrochemical cluster in the Rhine-Ruhr grew 
rapidly, especially in the early 1970s (Table 4-2). Moreover, in 1967, North Rhine 
Westphalia consumed 67 per cent of the country’s petrochemical feedstock and 
produced 70 per cent of the country’s basic petrochemicals. With respect to the most 
important basic petrochemicals, namely ethylene and propylene, North Rhine 
Westphalia produced 68 and 73 per cent, respectively, in 1967.373 Throughout the 
1960s and early 1970s, the region contained at least 60 per cent of West Germany’s 
                                               
370 Stokes, Opting for Oil, 106-107. 
371 Molle and Wever, Oil Refineries, 112-113. 
372 Molle and Wever, Oil Refineries, 19, 70, 84-85; Waddams, Industrial Organic Chemicals, 10-11.  
373 Broich, ‘Die Petrochemie’, 49-50. 
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production capacity of ethylene (Table 4-2). It was not, however, only in West 
Germany that the Rhine-Ruhr area became a dominant petrochemical cluster; it also 
held a major share of Western Europe’s petrochemical industry. For instance, the area 
was responsible for between 20 and 30 per cent of the Western European production 
capacity of ethylene (Table 4-2).  
The initial emergence and expansion of the petrochemical cluster was related 
to the strong growth in refinery capacity in the late 1950s, as the Rhine-Ruhr area 
developed into the largest concentration of refinery capacity in West Germany (61 per 
cent of total West German refining capacity in 1960, Figure 4-5). Notwithstanding 
the unimpeded growth of the refinery capacity in the region, the Rhine-Ruhr area’s 
share stabilised at around 35 per cent of West Germany’s capacity, with Baden-
Württemburg and Bavaria adding substantial capacity during the 1960s and early 
1970s.374  
  
                                               
374 Molle and Wever, Oil Refineries, 164-169. Own calculations. 
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Figure 4-5. West German refinery capacity by state, 1950-75 (in 
percentage of total West German capacity) 
 
Source: Molle and Wever, Oil Refineries, 164-169. Map: author. 
 
The growth of both the oil and petrochemical industries in the Rhine-Ruhr area was 
facilitated by economies of scale. Indeed, between 1950 and 1975, the average size of 
refineries in the region grew more than ten-fold at an annual rate of 11 per cent, from 
0.4 million tons in 1950 to over 5 million tons in 1975.375 Ethylene production units 
expanded at an even faster rate (16 per cent annually), from 56,000 tons on average in 
1960 to an average of 500,000 tons in 1975.376 These cursory data allude to 
agglomeration in the petrochemical industry. Rather than developing new complexes, 
existing ones were expanded to profit from potential internal and external economies 
                                               
375 Own calculations derived from Molle and Wever, Oil Refineries, 164-169. 
376 Own calculations derived from Molle and Wever, Oil Refineries, 172-173. 
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of scale. This made the conditions for the initial emergence of the cluster hugely 
significant. It also had long-term, path-dependent consequences for the development 
of the region. As a result, the reactivation of the former hydrogenation plants was 
decisive for the development of the petrochemical cluster in the Rhine-Ruhr area. 
Indeed, these plants effectively transformed the region from being dominated by 
resource-dependent industries to one that attracted traded industries. Resource-
dependent industries have the majority of their production and labour located near 
their dominant resource, although they often operate in foreign markets. Traded 
industries, meanwhile, are located in a region based on “broader competitive 
considerations.”377 With petroleum feedstock becoming ever more attractive in the 
face of constantly rising coal prices in the 1950s, the coal-based chemical industry in 
the Rhine basin faced an imminent threat. The reactivation of the former 
hydrogenation plants as oil refineries meant that petrochemical feedstock was 
available to the chemical industry and allowed them to transform their production 
basis on an increasingly large scale from coal to oil. The competitive petrochemical 
clusters that emerged were further sustained by the expanding oil refinery capacity, 
which increased the supply of feedstock in the region.  
 
4.7 Effect of the transition on transport demand in the hinterland 
Ports and hinterland transport connections came under pressure with the construction 
of inland refineries in the late 1950s. Until then, distribution from coastal refineries to 
inland markets was performed mainly by barge, rail tank car and, in the 1960s, 
increasingly by road tank cars. Barge transport had been dominant for the haulage of 
products and crude oil in the Rhine basin. However, with the plans for inland 
refineries from the mid-1950s onwards, these transport modes no longer sufficed. 
Those already in existence could only deliver crude oil in batches. As a consequence, 
although push barges and round-the-clock sailing schedules could partly solve the 
problem, it was much more economical for refinery operations to have a continuous 
supply. In 1955 and 1956, several groups of oil companies emerged with plans for 
pipeline connections to the new refineries in the Rhine-Ruhr area. One consortium 
studied Wilhelmshaven and Rotterdam as potential landing ports,378 while another 
considered a trans-European system of pipelines connecting the French port of 
Marseille with refineries in France, Switzerland, West Germany, the Netherlands and 
Belgium.379  
For the Port of Rotterdam, such plans could have significant consequences. In 
                                               
377 M. Porter, ‘The Economic Performance of Regions’, Regional Studies 37 (2003) 549-578, here: 559.  
378 ‘Pipeline nach Wilhelmshaven oder Rotterdam’, Die Welt, 31 August 1955. 
379 ‘Wer schlägt das Öl um?’, General-Anzeiger, 8 June 1956; ‘Transeuropa-Pipeline’, Die Zeit, 12 April 
1956. 
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1954, a year before the general public was introduced to the pipeline plans for the new 
Rhine-Ruhr refineries, West Germany imported 5.9 million tons of crude oil. Almost 
95 per cent of these imports landed at three ports: Hamburg, Bremen and Rotterdam. 
With 1.5 million tons, or 25 per cent of West German imports, Rotterdam was the 
second most important landing port for crude oil in West Germany.380  The imported 
crude was then shipped from Rotterdam by barge over the Rhine to the refineries in 
the Rhine-Ruhr area. However, with the expansion of the refinery capacity in the 
region, the Rhine tank fleet was faced with competition from large diameter, cross-
border crude oil pipelines, which did not yet exist at the time in Western Europe.  
The expansion of the oil industry in the Rhine-Ruhr area thus gave rise to a 
huge increase in transport demand. In principle, this was an opportunity for 
Rotterdam’s port, because the increasing demand for crude oil transhipment and 
transportation occurred in its traditional hinterland. However, the economics of 
pipeline transportation did not automatically dictate that the new pipeline would start 
in Rotterdam. Indeed, the oil companies contemplated a variety of solutions, one of 
which had Rotterdam as one of the candidates. Rotterdam thus stood to lose part of 
the transport flow to its traditional hinterland and with it a share in the future growth 
of West Germany’s oil consumption. The Municipal Port Authority was well aware 
of the opportunities and threats that awaited the port in its efforts to secure a pipeline 
connection to the hinterland.381  
Around the same time, the Dutch Rhine fleet was still suffering from German 
limitations with respect to cabotage (the right to operate in Germany under a foreign 
flag) on the German Rhine. These limitations were suddenly lifted in 1956, 
presumably because the industrial production of the Rhine-Ruhr area experienced a 
second post-war period of growth, raising the level of output in 1955 to above the 
pre-war high point of 1938 for the first time since the war. The increasing demand 
for barge transportation as a result of the growth of industrial output in the Ruhr 
required the services of the Dutch Rhine fleet.382 The Dutch inland tank fleet was 
already allowed to operate in Germany in 1951, presumably because refinery output in 
the Rhine-Ruhr area quintupled between 1948 and 1953. This could be interpreted as 
the result of a regional dependence on the Rhine and its shipping industry, i.e. the 
Ruhr industry needed the Dutch Rhine fleet to meet its transportation requirements. 
As the Rhine cannot be easily diverted, this created a compelling geographical reason 
to resolve the cabotage dispute in favour of the Dutch Rhine fleet. In the case of a 
pipeline to the Ruhr, such a compelling geographical argument did not exist. The 
economics of pipeline transportation allowed for a number of possible starting points 
                                               
380 Vollrath, Die Mineralölwirtschaft in die Bundesrepublik, 93; 99. 
381 GAR, AHB, 589.01, inv. nr. 70, letter from Koomans (director Port Authority) to Mayor and 
Aldermen of Rotterdam City Council, 30 September 1955, 2. 
382 Lak, ‘Because we need them…’, 188-190, 229. 
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for the Ruhr pipeline. However, as much as the Rotterdam Port Authority wanted 
such a pipeline connection to the hinterland, it depended on the oil companies for a 
decision.  
 
4.8 Conclusions 
The sudden rise in oil consumption provoked an expansion effort from the oil 
industry, which subsequently questioned when, where and how to achieve the 
required new refineries. The development of an oil and petrochemical sector 
constituted a dual process of energy transition: the rise of fuel oil partially displacing 
coal and the transition of the chemical industry to petrochemical feedstock. The two 
processes were interrelated. At least three factors were of major importance for the 
development and geographical dispersion of the oil and petrochemical cluster in the 
Rhine-Ruhr area. The first was the presence of an industrial and urban agglomeration 
in the region, which constituted the largest potential market in West Germany for the 
main driver of the energy transition, namely fuel oil. Secondly, longstanding relations 
between foreign oil companies and the German chemical industry, which were 
developed and maintained to share and exploit technological know-how, provided 
opportunities for joint petrochemical ventures. Thirdly, the inheritance of 
hydrogenation plants from the Nazi period, and their successful transformation into 
oil refineries under the auspices of multinational oil companies, functioned as 
geographical ‘anchors’ for the expansion of the oil and petrochemical industry in the 
region.  
 These forces were clearly visible in the case of Deutsche Shell and its relations 
and investments in the Rhine-Ruhr area. The changing composition of oil 
consumption in the mid-1950s required Deutsche Shell to adapt its refinery set-up to 
produce heavy fuel oil instead of gasoline. Its contract refiner in the Cologne area, 
Union Kraftstoff, was geared towards producing high grade gasoline, but Deutsche 
Shell’s own refinery needed to address the growing shortfall of fuel oil in the Rhine-
Ruhr area. The subsequent choice of location revealed just how important the 
reactivation of the former hydrogenation plants, such as that of Union Kraftstoff, was 
for the localisation of the newly-emerging oil and petrochemical cluster in the region. 
West Germany’s first petrochemical plant, Rheinische Olefinwerke, was constructed 
next to Union Kraftstoff to allow the Deutsche Shell-BASF joint venture to use the 
refinery gas produced there. Deutsche Shell’s Cologne-Godorf refinery was located 
next to the Olefinwerke plant in order to take over the feedstock supply after the 
processing contract with Union Kraftstoff ended in 1964. Olefinwerke was 
subsequently expanded during the 1960s, mainly enabled by the expansion of 
Deutsche Shell’s Cologne-Godorf refinery in 1965. The two plants became strongly 
integrated through input-output relationships. Due to the high capital intensity, the 
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characteristics of the products, and the input-output relations between the various 
steps in the petrochemical production process, the petrochemical industry has a strong 
tendency to cluster. This was why a relatively small event such as the construction and 
location of Union Kraftstoff could have such major and enduring consequences. 
Similar processes of cluster formation also took place around the plants of Bayer and 
Hüls, which were already in existence before World War II.  
 The transition from coal to oil gave rise to an increased demand for crude oil 
transportation and transhipment services, which in turn necessitated the construction 
of a new infrastructure of crude oil pipelines. Unlike Rhine-based transportation, the 
economics of pipeline transport did not provide a compelling reason to choose 
Rotterdam as the most favourable starting point for a pipeline to the Ruhr. The 
energy transition thus provided an excellent test case to question whether the 
transport relations of the Port of Rotterdam, with its traditional Rhine-Ruhr 
hinterland, could extend beyond the Rhine.  
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Chapter 5 Rotterdam’s contested hinterland, 1955-1956 
5.1 Introduction 
The increasing amounts of crude oil that needed to be shipped to the expanding 
refineries at new inland locations in West Germany required both maritime and 
overland transportation capacities to increase, i.e. larger tankers and the introduction 
of pipelines.383 The maritime ports of Western Europe thus needed to adapt to the 
growing scale and shifting pattern of production and consumption in the oil sector. 
As both industrial locations and providers of transport and transhipment services, 
ports stood to gain from the unprecedented growth of the oil industry, albeit at the 
cost of substantial capital investment in port expansion and adaptation. Those ports 
that could muster the financial capacity – and disposed of favourable geographical 
conditions – could benefit hugely. The Port of Rotterdam was no exception.  
For the oil industry, the key issue was to find the optimal complementary 
configuration of tanker and pipeline transport between the Middle East and 
continental refineries in Western Europe. On the one hand, very big tankers provide 
cheap transport and are highly flexible, but the larger they are the more limited the 
number of ports able to receive them. The case of the Port of Rotterdam has 
historically shown that its regional monopoly on deep-sea access led to relatively high 
port dues for the biggest ships, including super tankers and very and ultra large crude 
carriers.384 On the other hand, pipelines provide the cheapest possible form of 
overland transport, but they are inflexible and the relatively large capital outlay 
required is sunk once the pipeline is constructed.385 The future position of the Port of 
Rotterdam for Western Europe in the oil supply chain depended on the issue of how 
to optimally configure tanker and pipeline transportation given the macro-economic, 
technological and geopolitical context of the 1950s. 
In the summer of 1955, the Rotterdam Port Authority was notified of the 
pipeline plans being developed by a consortium of German subsidiaries of 
multinational oil companies. In particular, Rotterdam and Wilhelmshaven were being 
studied as potential starting points for a crude oil pipeline to the Rhine-Ruhr area. A 
year later, rumours emerged in Rotterdam about a second plan for a trans-European 
crude oil pipeline system, which aimed to supply the entire northwestern European 
crude oil requirements from Marseille, including those in the Rhine-Ruhr area and 
the Port of Rotterdam. Such a system made commercial sense at the time. Most of 
Western Europe’s oil came from the Middle East, either through the Suez Canal or 
                                               
383 E.G. Parke, ‘Pipelines and tankers: Two complementary forms of oil transportation’, Tijdschrift voor 
vervoerswetenschap 3 (1967) 297-310, here: 298-299. 
384  F. de Goey (ed.), Comparative Port History of Rotterdam and Antwerp (1880-2000) (Amsterdam 
2004) 9-10. 
385 Parke, ‘Pipelines and tankers’, 305-306. 
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by pipelines terminating at Mediterranean ports in Lebanon and Syria. The 
development of a major European port in the Mediterranean as the feeding point of 
Western Europe’s crude oil requirements was thus a sensible plan.   
The Rhine-Ruhr area was the Port of Rotterdam’s primary hinterland and the 
basis for its initial growth from the 1890s onwards.386 However, in the mid-1950s, at 
least two ports, Wilhelmshaven and Marseille, appeared to be contesting the position 
of Rotterdam as the principal oil port of the Rhine-Ruhr area. This posed an 
immediate threat to Rotterdam. In the short term, losing a share of the crude oil 
inflow destined for the Rhine-Ruhr area would mean losing a significant amount of 
revenue from docking ships for the Rotterdam Port Authority. Although the costs of 
port expansions were also earned back by renting out land, an important share of 
revenue came from docking and quay fees. Not obtaining a pipeline to the Rhine-
Ruhr area would thus reduce the earning power of future port adaptations, which 
could threaten its attractiveness for industrial settlement. Ever since the 1930s, the 
Port Authority, which was created in 1932 as the municipal agency for port 
development, had developed a policy to industrialise the port to make it less 
dependent on the transhipment of a limited number of transit goods, cereals, pit wood, 
coal and iron ore. The world wars and the economic crisis of the 1930s had fostered a 
belief in Rotterdam that the industrialisation of the port was the panacea for its 
sensitivity to external shocks.387 The upgrading of the Royal Dutch Shell refinery at 
Rotterdam-Pernis in 1947 and the establishment of the Caltex refinery just before 
World War II were the first successes for the Port Authority on the path to 
industrialisation.388 These early successes also made clear that oil was the new growth 
industry. 
 The ability of the Port of Rotterdam to obtain a pipeline connection to its 
hinterland depended on the considerations of the West German government on the 
one hand and the oil companies on the other. The locational considerations of the 
latter were dependent on a number of factors. Pipelines have a high degree of asset 
specificity, meaning that they are geographically fixed and dedicated to serving a 
limited number of users in a limited space. As the capital invested in pipelines is sunk, 
their routing, operation and transport tariffs need to be concluded and fixed before 
they are actually built, especially when private capital is involved. Privately-funded 
pipelines therefore tend to be part of vertically integrated oil companies so that the 
potentially high transaction, coordination and contracting costs can be managed.389 
Another source of uncertainty is government legislation and regulation. Jeffrey 
                                               
386 Klemann and Wielenga, ‘Die Niederlande und Deutschland, oder verschwindet die nationale 
Ökonomie?’, 11-14; Laspeyres, Rotterdam und das Ruhrgebiet, 195. 
387 Van Walsum, Rotterdam-Europoort, 12-13. 
388 De Goey, Ruimte voor industrie, 76. 
389 J. D. Makholm, The Political Economy of Pipelines (Chicago 2012) 4-6. 
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Makholm’s recent study of the history of the political economy of pipelines shows 
that although oil and gas pipelines are technically similar the world over, their 
operations, governance and regulation differ from country to country.390 In contrast to 
the US, where pipeline legislation and regulation was already in place (an inheritance 
from the Standard Oil Trust era), in Western Europe in the 1950s, there was no 
legislation, let alone laws relating to cross-border pipelines. The oil companies 
considering pipelines in Western Europe in the 1950s were therefore making plans in 
a regulatory void.  
This chapter questions to what extent the Port of Rotterdam was successful in 
adapting the port and hinterland infrastructure to the new demand for transportation 
in the latter. What were the constraints on adaptation and how were these overcome? 
The focus of this chapter is on the 1955 German consortium of oil companies that 
proposed a pipeline from Wilhelmshaven to the Rhine-Ruhr area.  
 
5.2 A pipeline to the Rhine-Ruhr area 
In the 1950s, the cost of transportation made up around 30 per cent of the oil 
industry’s total operating costs for getting oil supplies to European markets (excluding 
taxes). As a consequence, it was the single largest cost component in the value 
chain.391 As long as individual products were shipped to individual markets from large 
refineries located at source, transport operations remained fairly small-scale in the 
sense that opportunities for scale economies were limited. Typically, 10-12,000 ton 
tankers laden with, for instance, gasoline would call at several ports in Europe, 
depending on the particular demand structure of each country. When, however, the 
consumption pattern changed significantly in the post-war years, and crude oil was 
increasingly shipped to consumer refineries in Europe, major opportunities for scale 
economies in transportation arose. Instead of calling at several ports to supply a single 
type of product, larger-sized tankers would call at one port to supply the local refinery 
with crude. In short, the incentives for scale economies induced the oil companies to 
limit the number of entry ports for the European market.392   
Further distribution to inland markets was performed mainly by barge, rail 
tank car and, in the 1950s and 1960s, increasingly by road tank cars. For the 
transportation of products and crude in the Rhine basin, barge transport was 
dominant. However, with the planning for inland refineries from the mid-1950s 
onwards, these transportation modes came under pressure, as they could only deliver 
crude in batches. Although push barges and round-the-clock sailing schedules partly 
helped to resolve the problem, it was much more efficient for refinery operations to 
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have a continuous supply. Indeed, this general shift in the pattern of oil transportation 
could be observed in Deutsche Shell’s planning for its new Rhineland refinery in 1957, 
when the company concluded that feeding the Cologne-Godorf refinery would no 
longer be possible by barge.393  
On 31 August 1955, Die Welt published a small article entitled ‘Pipeline to 
Wilhelmshaven or Rotterdam.’394 The piece mentioned the existence of a group of oil 
companies that was planning a pipeline connection to a new refinery in the Ruhr area. 
Most of this new pipeline firm would be comprised of several of the major oil 
companies with overseas capital. The starting point would be either Wilhelmshaven 
or Rotterdam. According to the article, Wilhelmshaven’s city council had already 
promised a 5km2 tract of land for the project, while the state government of 
Niedersachsen had also pledged its support. Moreover, Wilhelmshaven pointed out 
that its port had better tidal conditions than Rotterdam.395 
 The article in Die Welt referred to a consortium of multinational and German 
oil companies. With Esso in the lead, the group was gathering information on the 
opportunities for a crude oil pipeline to the new and expanded refineries in the Rhine-
Ruhr area. Around the time of the article’s publication in Die Welt, Esso AG had 
published a report on its initial findings. This stated that the consortium was 
considering Wilhelmshaven and Rotterdam as potential starting points for the 
pipeline, which Esso projected to have an initial throughput capacity of 8 million tons 
per year. Table 5-1 presents the partners in the project and their share in the 
throughput. The consortium consisted of German firms, with three German 
subsidiaries of multinational oil companies (Esso, Deutsche BP and Deutsche Shell) 
comprising the majority of the pipeline’s projected capacity. Also involved were the 
German-owned Scholven and Union Krafstoff, which were participating in 
conjunction with Deutsche Shell and Deutsche BP. The consortium was 
complemented by three other German-owned companies, the former hydrogenation 
plant Gelsenberg Benzin, the much smaller Ruhrchemie (owned by coal and steel 
companies in the Ruhr area) and Ruhröl (part of the Stinnes group). 
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Table 5-1. The German pipeline consortium, 1955  
Partners Throughput (million tons) 
Esso AG 3.00 
Deutsche BP / Scholven 1.50 
Shell / Union Kraftstoff  1.50 
Gelsenberg Benzin 1.50 
Ruhrchemie 0.35 
Ruhröl 0.15 
Total initial pipeline capacity 8.00 
Source: GAR, AHB, 589.01, inv. nr. 70, letter from Koomans (director Port Authority) to Mayor and 
Aldermen of Rotterdam City Council, 30 September 1955, 2. 
 
The German partners Wesseling, Scholven and Gelsenberg had made long-term 
processing deals with Deutsche Shell, Deutsche BP and Mobil, respectively, in the 
course of the late 1940s and early 1950s. 396 As these multinational partners planned to 
increase their refining capacities, so did the German partners, hence their 
participation in the Esso-plan.  
 Although the Esso AG pipeline was the first crude oil pipeline in Western 
Europe, other large-scale pipeline projects were being developed simultaneously. 
From 1952 onwards, NATO had been constructing a network of oil product pipelines 
in France, Belgium, the Netherlands and West Germany to supply military bases and 
airports with fuel. Accordingly, by the late 1950s, large sections of the so-called 
Central European Pipeline System were already in place.397 In Eastern Europe, 
meanwhile, the Soviets planned a huge system of oil pipelines (the Friendship or 
Druzhba Pipeline System), which aimed to supply the Comecon states with Soviet 
crude oil. The process of importing crude oil and refining it near the market that 
evolved in Western Europe in the 1950s and 1960s was mirrored in the Eastern 
Bloc.398 The construction of the Friendship pipeline brought surplus Soviet crude oil 
to the doorstep of the Western Bloc, simultaneously enticing and horrifying Western 
powers. The abundance of Soviet crude oil seemed to some Western European 
countries to be an attractive alternative source of oil that was both cheap and sold 
indiscriminately.399 The Soviet Union started exporting crude oil on a large scale from 
1955 onwards, sending shockwaves through world oil markets and causing Western 
oil companies to lower posted prices to counter the competition. This in turn led the 
Middle Eastern oil-producing countries to form OPEC in 1960 to put them in a 
                                               
396 Karlsch and Stokes, Faktor Öl, 292. 
397 J. Hoffenaar, D. Krüger and D.T. Zabecki, Blueprints for battle: planning for war in central Europe, 
1948-1968 (Lexington 2012) 92.  
398 J. S. Prybyla, ‘Eastern Europe and Soviet Oil’, The Journal of Industrial Economics 13 (1965) 154-167, 
here: 155-156. 
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stronger position to face the unilateral price cuts of the Western oil companies.400 
Strategically, the Friendship pipeline signalled a strengthening of Soviet military 
potential in Eastern Europe, provoking NATO in the early 1960s to impose a ban on 
the export of large diameter steel pipes to the Soviet Union in an attempt to obstruct 
the influx of its crude oil into Eastern Europe.401 Oil pipelines, therefore, commanded 
not only commercial, but also considerable strategic and military attention and 
interest in the 1950s and 1960s.  
 
5.3 Rotterdam competing with Wilhelmshaven 
For the Port of Rotterdam, the pipeline plan could have significant consequences. 
With 1.5 million tons, or 25 per cent of West German imports, Rotterdam was the 
second most important landing port for crude oil for West Germany.402 The imported 
crude was shipped from Rotterdam by barge over the Rhine to two refineries in the 
Rhine-Ruhr area.403 Pipelines, however, could change that pattern entirely. Capital 
costs and amortisation make up 65 per cent of the total operating costs of pipelines.404 
The longer the pipeline, the higher the capital outlay required for its construction. 
Moreover, due to the high share of fixed costs in a pipeline’s cost structure, ton-mile 
costs do not reduce with distance, unlinke most other transport modalities.405  The 
capacity of a pipeline has a much greater impact on ton-mile costs than its length. 
Increasing the capital expenditure that is due to distance can be offset by increasing 
the diameter of the pipe, because capacity rises exponentially while capital costs 
increase linearly, causing the ton-mile costs to fall as the capacity rises.406 However, 
because their fixed costs are relatively high, pipelines require a stable and continuous 
payload in order to be competitive and efficient. A key factor is thus the question of 
whether there is sufficient demand to warrant a continuous payload on or near the full 
capacity of the pipeline.407  
As capacity and payload are the largest determinants of ton-mile costs, it is 
generally more efficient to serve a region or market with one large-diameter pipeline 
than with several pipelines with a smaller capacity.408 In theory, the capacity of a 
                                               
400 Yergin, The Prize, 515.  
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408 Makholm, The Political Economy of Pipelines, 29. 
  123 
pipeline is unlimited as long as pumps can be added to increase the speed of the flow 
through it. However, adding pumps adds to the operating costs, at some point 
increasing these faster than the amount of oil pumped through the pipe, causing ton-
mile costs to rise again.409 The effect of adding horsepower to the pumping capacity is 
greater in larger diameter pipelines than in smaller ones. The main economic problem 
with pipeline planning is finding the optimal configuration of diameter and pumping 
power at the expected throughput in order to ensure the lowest possible ton-mile 
cost.410 An additional problem is the need to plan for adequate spare capacity in the 
pipeline to allow for future growth while maintaining low enough ton-mile costs in 
the first few years of its operations. This means that if a pipeline from Marseille could 
operate a sufficiently higher capacity pipe to the Rhine-Ruhr area than Rotterdam, it 
could in theory be cheaper to supply crude oil from Marseille, even though the 
distance from there to Cologne is four times longer than that from Rotterdam to 
Cologne. However, pipeline costs were not the only determining factor in terms of 
planning, because the political economy of this modality is just as important when it 
comes to understanding how and why pipeline developments evolved historically.411 
A pipeline for the transportation of crude oil with a capacity of 2 million tons 
per year and a length of 250 kilometres – the distance between Rotterdam and 
Cologne – would be more expensive than shipping the crude by river barge.412 
However, the new inland refineries were projected to have a combined first stage 
capacity of 8 million tons per year,413 and with annual capacities of 4 million tons or 
more, pipelines were much cheaper than barges. As distance was less of an issue than 
capacity when considering pipeline trajectories, suddenly the choice of landing ports 
for crude oil was also questioned. Pipelines for crude oil would not only push out 
barge transport, as barges were quite cumbersome and costly, but would also decisively 
establish long-term connections between ports and their hinterlands.414  
In 1955, the director of the Rotterdam Port Authority, N. Koomans, signalled 
the threat of pipelines to Rotterdam’s position as a crude oil gateway to the Rhine 
basin. In a letter to Rotterdam City Council, Koomans outlined what a choice for 
Wilhelmshaven would mean for the Port of Rotterdam. Taking the projected initial 
capacity of the pipeline at 8 million tons per annum, this would involve between 400 
and 450 ship movements through the port annually, amounting to roughly 2 million 
Dutch guilders in port dues. Losing the pipeline connection to Wilhelmshaven would 
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thus seriously damage the position of Rotterdam’s port as an oil transhipment location, 
let alone costing it a good deal of revenue.415  
The strategy behind the post-war expansion of the Port of Rotterdam can be 
described as tonnage maximisation.416 This was related to the policy of 
industrialisation and the role of the Port Authority, which is usually defined as a type 
of landlord.417 A landlord-type port authority invests in expansion and the 
maintenance of the port, and raises revenue by levying port dues (for docking and 
cargo handling) and renting out land. A landlord port authority does not own and 
exploit installations, although the Rotterdam Port Authority did to some extent. As a 
result, its turnover consisted of 65 per cent of port dues and income from rents. This 
would increase to almost 90 per cent in 1980.418 The growing importance of port dues 
and rents for the Port Authority’s turnover derived from the enormous expansion of 
the Port of Rotterdam between 1945 and 1975 in terms of rentable commercial land, 
the number and size of the ships arriving, and the volume of cargo handled.  
Contemplating the oil industry’s opportunities with respect to the growth 
potential of the Port of Rotterdam, Koomans was well aware that the oil sector could 
become a key player. Indeed, oil companies operated refineries that required large 
plots of land close to water; they also transported huge volumes of oil and did so using 
large ships. They were, in short, the port’s ideal client. In terms of revenue, the 
estimate of 2 million guilders in port dues that Koomans referred to in his letter to the 
city council represented 10-11 per cent of the total revenue from port dues in the 
port’s turnover for 1955-57, which was a substantial amount.419  
However, the German pipeline consortium had a list of requirements. Esso 
AG planned to have its new refinery operational by early 1959. The pipeline thus 
needed to be up and running by then, which required a suitable feeding terminal in a 
suitably adapted port. Speed was therefore of the essence for both Rotterdam and 
Wilhelmshaven. In a preliminary report on its findings regarding the suitability of the 
two ports, Esso AG concluded that Rotterdam was attractive for fiscal reasons, but its 
nautical situation was lagging behind Wilhelmshaven.420 Esso AG expected 
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Wilhelmshaven to be better positioned to successfully adapt its port to Esso’s 
requirements in time. In response, Koomans urged Rotterdam City Council to 
contact the ministries of finance, economic affairs and transportation to probe them 
about solutions to Esso’s concerns. As for providing space in the port for a pipeline 
terminal and docks, the Port Authority initially thought of the Third Petroleum Dock 
(Derde Petroleumhaven) in the Botlek area. This area was the result of the first post-
war expansion of Rotterdam’s port. Construction had finished in 1955 and the first 
tracts of land had been let out. However, it was by no means full, and seemed to be 
the logical site for a pipeline terminal. Soon, however, it became apparent that Esso 
envisaged the use of larger tankers than the Botlek docks could handle. So, between 
summer 1955 and March 1956, the Port Authority drew up alternative plans, which 
involved dredging the New Waterway to accommodate bigger tankers, enlarging the 
Third Petroleum Dock, and building a completely new port to the west of the Botlek 
area, closer to the sea. In March 1956, the Port Authority asked City Council to 
obtain national government approval for these plans.421  
The adaptation of the port to resolve the problems highlighted in the Esso 
report was not moving quickly enough to accommodate the immediate requirements 
for a pipeline. After drafting the first plans in early 1956, which sought to address the 
concerns of Esso AG, the Port Authority became entangled in a complex planning 
process in which the regional and national governments were scrutinising the 
Rotterdam plans and even drafting their own alternatives. The planning board of the 
province of Zuid-Holland and the water department of the Ministry of Transport 
were particularly actively involved. Whereas the Port Authority had its eye firmly on 
the short-term goal of facilitating the pipeline connection, the regional and national 
government agencies aimed to address planning and water management issues within 
a broader framework. The active involvement of other municipalities, the province 
and the national government complicated matters considerably for the Port Authority. 
It was, however, dependent on the agreement of the authorities to obtain overall 
approval for its expansion plans. The involvement of diverse levels of government led 
to the expansion plan becoming disconnected from the pipeline plan.422 Nonetheless, 
Esso AG frequently used the efforts of the Rotterdam Port Authority to pressurise 
the German government into financially supporting the adaptation of the Port of 
Wilhelmshaven. Esso AG thus played the Dutch off against the Germans and vice 
versa. That it was in a position to do so was because the German government was 
keen on securing a German solution to the pipeline question.  
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5.4 Wilhelmshaven: “the best deep water port in Europe”?423 
The German governmental response to the Esso plan started in Wilhelmshaven. Esso 
AG had provided Wilhelmshaven City Council with a detailed calculation of the 
pipeline and its economic benefits.424 The annual throughput of the pipeline would 
start at 10 million tons in 1959, increasing to 20 million tons in 1970. The tankers 
docking there would pay docking and quay fees and would also require towing and 
pilotage services, repairs and supplies. The port itself would have to be adapted to 
allow a 300 metre wide port entrance at a depth of 12 metres in 1959, to be dredged 
to 13 metres at a later stage. The pipeline plan resonated with the city council and the 
government of the state of Lower Saxony, and the numbers provided by Esso were 
used by representatives from both Wilhelmshaven and the state government to 
request federal support to secure the pipeline.  
Wilhelmshaven City Council produced a report for the Federal Ministry of 
Economic Affairs to petition for federal support for the adaptation of the 
Wilhelmshaven port to the required depth of 12 metres.425 The report stressed that 
federal support for the changes would guarantee the pipeline for Wilhelmshaven. If 
the federal government hesitated, the project would surely be lost to Rotterdam.426 
The city council stressed that both Rotterdam and Wilhelmshaven offered equal 
opportunities and that the decision hinged on nautical factors. Guaranteeing a depth 
of 12-13 metres was essential for Wilhelmshaven to obtain the pipeline. The pipeline 
plan was one of the few potential growth options for the economically depressed city 
of Wilhelmshaven, with its high unemployment rate and otherwise limited 
opportunities for development. Provided that the federal government invested in it, 
Wilhelmshaven could even become “the best deep water port in Europe.”427 The total 
cost of dredging was estimated at 29 million DM for a depth of 12 metres, with an 
additional 8 million DM to reach 13 metres, which were sums that were entirely 
justifiable given the economic merits of the project for Wilhelmshaven.428  
The city council pointed to the strategic risk of allowing Rotterdam to acquire 
an even greater concentration of oil transhipments than it already boasted. “The entire 
oil supply of Central Europe could potentially be disrupted and in case of a nuclear 
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attack entirely wiped out.”429 It was thus not in German interests to have the largest 
part of its oil supply flowing through a foreign pipeline. Moreover, it was to be 
expected that a second pipeline could be constructed for the supply of the eastern 
parts of Germany, for which Wilhelmshaven was well positioned. Furthermore, the 
investment would also be beneficial for Wilhelmshaven as a NATO port.  
Around the same time, the minister-president of Lower Saxony, Heinrich 
Hellwege, backed the plea of Wilhelmshaven City Council for federal support.430 
According to Hellwege, the Federal Ministry of Transportation (headed by his fellow 
Deutsche Partei member Hans-Christoph Seebohm) had already conceded that Esso’s 
request was feasible, but would not provide the means for dredging the port from its 
own budget. It was therefore important that the federal government produced the 
funds. Speed was of the essence because Hellwege expected the oil companies to make 
a decision within two to three weeks. 
A third effort to mobilise federal support for Wilhelmshaven was undertaken 
by the Lower Saxony Minister of Economic Affairs, Hermann Ahrens, a close 
political ally of Hellwege. Ahrens also stressed that Rotterdam and Wilhelmshaven 
were equal candidates for the pipeline. As a decision in favour of the latter would 
involve a longer sea journey (350 kilometres longer) and a longer pipeline to Cologne 
(Rotterdam was 60 kilometres closer), the city needed financial aid from the federal 
government to gain an advantage over Rotterdam.431 Ahrens pointed out that it would 
be detrimental to the future position of all German North Sea ports if the federal 
government allowed Esso AG to go to the Dutch city. Indeed, the tempestuous 
growth of the Port of Rotterdam in the post-war years translated into a rising force of 
attraction for international oil companies. The Wilhelmshaven project was therefore 
in the local, regional and national interest.  
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In March 1956, representatives from Wilhelmshaven and Lower Saxony met 
with representatives from the federal ministries of economic affairs, transportation, 
defence, finance and labour.432 Those from the Ministry of Transportation pointed out 
that Wilhelmshaven was the only German port that could offer the appropriate depth 
for the pipeline project. The dredging of the Elbe (Hamburg) or the Weser (Bremen) 
would require capital outlays of at least 100 million DM or more, which was 
considerably higher than the 30 million DM required to dredge the Jade, which was 
the entrance to the Port of Wilhelmshaven. The Ministry of Defence expressed an 
interest in disposing of a German deep-sea port, although at the time the navy 
operated no ships with a draught of more than six metres. However, in preparation 
for the reconstitution of the German army, air force and navy in 1955, the ministry 
had already selected Wilhelmshaven in 1952 as one of the principal bases for the new 
German navy (Bundesmarine).433 Modernising the Wilhelmshaven port was thus also 
of military interest.  
The national interest and the regional economic benefits were unanimously 
agreed upon by the federal ministries involved, which were in principle prepared to 
support Wilhelmshaven financially.434 Finding a consensus on how to share the 
dredging costs, however, was much harder. The costs were considerable and higher 
than calculated by Wilhelmshaven City Council: up to 11 metres, dredging would 
entail a cost of 30 million DM, while at 12 metres this figure would rise to 42 million 
DM. On the one hand, the federal ministries concluded that they would all have to 
make a contribution, although part of the financial burden should also fall on Lower 
Saxony and Wilhelmshaven itself. Lower Saxony responded that its finances were too 
weak to take on such a burden. Moreover, it pointed out that the federal government 
had a constitutional obligation to finance the maintenance of waterways and ports. 
Accordingly, Wilhelmshaven, Lower Saxony and the federal ministries agreed to start 
by offering to limit dredging to 11 metres for the first phase of the pipeline’s 
operations in order to keep costs down.435  
In April 1956, the representatives of the federal ministries of economic affairs, 
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transportation and finance, as well as those from the Lower Saxony Ministry of 
Economic Affairs, met in Hamburg with the general managers of the four largest oil 
companies, Esso AG, Deutsche Shell, Deutsche BP and Mobil Oil AG.436 During the 
meeting, Geyer of Esso rejected outright the suggestion of limiting the first stage 
dredging to 11 metres, asserting that 36,000 ton tankers required 11.8 metres, while 
45,000 ton vessels required 12.8 metres. Half of the tanker fleets of the oil companies 
already employed 36,000 ton tankers, and several 45,000 ton versions were on order. 
Moreover, with the continuous arrival of tankers all year round, the efficiency of 
operations hinged on the ability to dock and unload tankers 24 hours a day. The oil 
companies were already incorporating a longer sea route if they chose Wilhelmshaven. 
As a consequence, compromising the draught of the port would be an extra burden.  
The meeting concluded that the federal government should find the financial 
means to dredge to 12 metres, but there was no concrete timescale for increasing the 
depth to 13 metres. The oil companies made it clear that no financial participation by 
them for the dredging should be expected; the government must provide the necessary 
means. The Ministry of Finance suggested a financial arrangement in which the 
Ministry of Defence would provide 12 million DM, while the annual costs to 
maintain the depth would be borne by the Ministry of Transportation. That left an 18 
million DM financial hole for the actual dredging works needed to reach a depth of at 
least 12 metres.437  
For the oil companies, the choice between Rotterdam and Wilhelmshaven 
seemed to be edging in favour of the latter. Although the question of federal financial 
support was still open, there seemed to be a tentative agreement that the federal 
government would grant financial support in exchange for Esso AG choosing 
Wilhelmshaven. In an internal memo, the federal Ministry of Finance expressed the 
view that the oil companies were obliged to choose a German port, because the 
pipeline marked the opening of the German market for these firms, i.e. it allowed oil 
to compete with coal.438 From the side of the oil companies, Esso AG had privately 
confided in Max Adenauer, Mayor of Cologne and the son of Chancellor Konrad 
Adenauer, that the company strongly supported Wilhelmshaven, but needed a swift 
decision from the federal government to close the deal.439  
For several months, the oil companies had communicated that their final 
decision would be made in April 1956. However, at the meeting that took place then, 
it became clear that the committees responsible for studying the opportunities of 
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Rotterdam and Wilhelmshaven could not yet reach a decision.440 Rotterdam still had 
some considerable advantages over any German port. The Dutch capital market, for 
instance, was much more liquid and the interest rate was half the prevailing rate in 
Germany. Fiscally, Rotterdam was also attractive, because the Dutch did not levy 
sales tax and taxes on assets and capital, while the tax on profits was considerably 
lower than in Germany. Moreover, the Dutch allowed for an additional 20 per cent 
depreciation on assets in the first five years of operations. Moreover, the Rotterdam 
Port Authority had worked strenuously to develop plans for a new deep-sea port on 
the western tip of the Rhine delta (Hook of Holland).  
Wilhelmshaven’s only real advantage over Rotterdam had been its deep-sea 
access. However, the developments in the Netherlands had improved Rotterdam’s 
chances, notwithstanding the efforts of the German government to support 
Wilhelmshaven. The meeting between the oil companies on 19 April concluded that 
it had not brought a decision any closer; instead, the meeting had only made things 
more difficult.441 The oil companies had a list of favours to obtain from the federal and 
state governments. Most importantly, they demanded that the Wilhelmshaven port 
be dredged to a depth of 12 metres, fully paid for by the German federal government, 
including for its maintenance and pilotage services, shore radar installations, and the 
free docking and unloading of tankers. Other demands included measures to offset 
the disadvantages of the German capital markets and fiscal regulations vis-à-vis the 
Dutch.  
In May, the relevant federal and state ministries met again with the oil 
companies to discuss their demands. The meeting was tense. The oil companies 
produced maps of the proposed new docks at the Hook of Holland in Rotterdam, 
demonstrating how forthcoming the Dutch were. The government representatives, on 
the other hand, had the impression that the oil companies were overstating the 
positive aspects of the Rotterdam candidacy; the firms were praising the efforts of the 
Rotterdam Port Authority to develop an entirely new dock, but were silent about the 
problems with the plan, for instance, salinisation and the related issue of using 
locks.442 Furthermore, the claim that the Dutch had already offered the oil companies 
a right of eminent domain seemed doubtful to the German government 
representatives.443  
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Pressurising the German government was of course part and parcel of the 
process. In Germany, the oil companies stressed the advantages of Rotterdam (fiscal 
and financial), whereas in the Netherlands they pressed those of Wilhelmshaven (a 
ready-to-use deep-sea port, save for some minor adaptations). However, within the 
consortium, tensions were mounting. Although federal support for changes to the 
Wilhelmshaven port was coming together, Royal Dutch Shell still strongly supported 
Rotterdam and did not want to give up its preference, which was a position firmly 
defended by Deutsche Shell in the German consortium.444 By June 1956, the pipeline 
issue seemed to have reached a deadlock. The consortium was divided internally and 
the federal government was also struggling to make a decision on its support for 
Wilhelmshaven. Meanwhile, the proposal for a fourth petroleum dock (Vierde 
Petroleumhaven) by the Rotterdam Port Authority was gaining momentum, 
regardless of the many problems the plan was still facing and the fact that it involved 
the construction of a completely new port complex.  
The Rotterdam promise of a guaranteed depth of 13 metres for the new dock 
was alarming for the Lower Saxony and federal ministries.445 The question of financial 
support seemed to hinge on the objections of the Minister of Transport, Hans-
Christoph Seebohm (Deutsche Partei), who feared that a positive decision on 
Wilhelmshaven would have major financial repercussions for his ministry, because 
Bremen and Hamburg would then also want port expansions. Hellwege, the minister-
president of Lower Saxony, pressed his fellow Deutsche Partei member to realise the 
political, economic and strategic importance of the issue at stake.446 Hellwege pointed 
out that the project was in the national interest and that it solely served to facilitate a 
German port for the largest tankers, which would otherwise be sent to Rotterdam or 
even a French port, diverting 80 per cent of German crude oil imports to a foreign 
port. As Wilhelmshaven would thus only serve to welcome the largest vessels, it 
would not pose a threat to the other German seaports.  
By mid-June 1956, the funding for federal support of the Wilhelmshaven 
project had been secured.447 The remaining obstacle was Seebohm’s objection with 
regard to the effects of the pipeline project on other German ports and modes of 
transportation.448 Seebohm had reservations about what he saw as a lack of 
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consideration of the consequences of a pipeline for the competitive position of other 
forms of transport, most notably inland shipping and rail. He feared that the 
Wilhelmshaven pipeline was only the start of a growing network of pipelines in West 
Germany. Indeed, the lower transport costs of pipelines would undoubtedly hurt the 
oil transport hitherto performed by rail and inland navigation.449 Seebohm was 
therefore adamant that pipelines should be subjected to the transport tax that the 
railways were paying, and he therefore disagreed with the ease with which Schäffer 
waived the levying of this tax on pipelines. Seebohm was thus not inclined to give in 
easily to the wishes of the ministries of economic affairs and finance, who expressed 
full support for the oil industry and the pipeline plan.  
Ludger Westrick (CDU), the Federal Secretary of Economic Affairs, objected 
to an additional tax on oil pipelines. Westrick stressed that it was of utmost 
importance to increase the level of oil supply to the German economy in view of the 
tight situation on the energy and labour markets, particularly to create competition for 
coal. It made no sense to Westrick to lift the tariff on imported fuel oil (in 1956) 
while also increasing the tax burden on transporting it. Moreover, with the rising 
consumption of oil, it was to be expected that pipelines would perform an increasing 
share of oil transportation to and within West Germany in the near future. For 
Seebohm, this was all the more reason to consider how the German government 
should handle pipeline transportation in the future. The basic question was thus 
whether the government should develop regulations for pipelines. Seebohm opined 
that pipelines should be defined as a mode of transport, and that their competitive 
position vis-à-vis other forms of transport should be regulated according to the 
existing regulatory framework that applied to inland waterways, railways and road 
haulage. The ministries of finance and economic affairs were not, however, willing to 
discuss the issue and so Seebohm ultimately gave in.450  
In late June 1956, the representatives of the federal ministries met with the oil 
companies again.451  All remaining issues had been dealt with. The oil firms thus 
announced that they would make a decision in July 1956, for which they required an 
official statement from the federal government regarding their demands and 
containing a pledge of its support. The Ministry of Economic Affairs prepared a draft 
letter after the meeting and again Seebohm raised objections.452 According to 
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Seebohm, two issues remained open: the question of a transport tax and the option of 
subjecting the pipeline to a federal concession. Seebohm wanted a fundamental 
discussion about the two issues, fearing that the draft letter created a precedent that 
would render it impossible to apply a transport tax or subject pipelines to a concession 
in future projects, which he deemed to be indefensible.453 Neither the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs nor the Office of the Chancellor were amused, and feared that 
omission of this commitment in the letter to Esso AG would nullify the efforts of the 
federal government to secure the pipeline project for Wilhelmshaven.454  
Reflecting the balance of power in the cabinet, Seebohm’s objections were 
swept aside and the draft letter was agreed, which was subsequently sent to Esso 
AG.455 The oil companies could not, however, come to an agreement and the decision 
was postponed once again.456 The reason for this delay was that Deutsche Shell 
withdrew from the consortium, which altered the share distribution among the 
remaining participants.457 Royal Dutch Shell, the parent company, deemed the 
Wilhelmshaven pipeline to be a senseless solution and, jointly with British Petroleum, 
was already studying alternatives. In a concerted effort, BP and Royal Dutch 
attempted to destabilise the consortium. Deutsche BP announced that a new study 
had found that construction costs for a pipeline from Rotterdam to Cologne were 30 
million DM lower than for Wilhelmshaven to Cologne. Combined with lower 
interest rates and a lower freight rate to Rotterdam that saved up to 0.70 DM per ton, 
the Wilhelmshaven candidacy was suddenly shaky.458 In response to the retreat of 
Deutsche Shell and the BP report, the consortium thus needed more time to decide, 
which led to yet another delay of the final decision.459 Apparently, Deutsche BP was 
reconsidering its participation in the consortium. Esso AG, meanwhile, was 
determined to see the project through, with or without BP.460 Although BP had 
harboured serious doubts about the economic benefits of the Wilhelmshaven pipeline 
from the start, it recognized:  
 
“that the obvious appeal [of] an all German line to nationalistic 
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ambitions is making it increasingly difficult to achieve any 
dispassionate all-party examination of relative merits. It is, therefore, 
necessary to make a decision between the material advantages of 
building a line from Rotterdam and the less tangible but equally 
important consequences of proceeding in the face of German 
opinion.”461  
 
After several months, the consortium, along with BP, finally agreed to choose 
Wilhelmshaven and incorporated the Nord-West Oelleitung GmbH on 15 
November 1956.462 The pipeline started operations in late 1958, and its throughput 
increased steadily during the 1960s, rising from 14.2 million tons per year in 1962 to 
24.5 million tons per year in 1973. Between 1971 and 1973, a second, 40-inch 
pipeline was constructed between Wilhelmshaven and Cologne. The rising 
throughput required increasing depths of the Jade, which was dredged several times 
during the 1960s. Particularly after the closure of the Suez Canal in 1966, increasing 
the depth was of great importance to the oil companies participating in the Nord-
West pipeline. Dredging started in September 1967, with the aim being to increase 
the depth of the Jade to 19 metres, allowing 200,000 ton tankers to dock at the 
terminal. By early 1968, a depth of 15 metres was realised, accommodating 100,000 
ton tankers. By 1971, Wilhelmshaven welcomed 200,000 ton tankers and the federal 
government promised to dredge the Jade further to allow for 250,000 ton vessels.463 In 
1973, 22 per cent of Germany’s crude oil imports flowed through the Nord-West 
pipeline.464 
 
5.5 Conclusions 
BP’s observation that economic reasoning was trumped by political and popular 
pressure in the decision-making process for the pipeline to the Rhine-Ruhr area 
characterises the episode nicely. Esso AG played German sentiments about an all-
German pipeline cunningly. Understanding the federal nature of the political 
decision-making process in the Federal Republic, Esso fostered local and regional 
support by presenting a convincing case for local development. It then pressurised the 
federal government with the rival candidacy of the Port of Rotterdam, and frequently 
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pointed out the exaggerated positive aspects of Rotterdam and the Dutch business 
environment.  
 The strategy worked quite well, although actual decision-making in the federal 
cabinet moved slowly, mainly because government funding was scarce, but more 
importantly because tensions arose between the ministries of transportation, finance 
and economic affairs. The latter two ministries maintained a liberal approach to the 
West German economy, and their aim was to bring down energy costs and welcome 
foreign investment. The Ministry of Transportation, meanwhile, approached the 
matter from the perspective of the German transport sector and wanted to integrate 
pipelines in the legal and regulatory framework under which other modes of transport 
operated. Although the discussion would continue into the early 1960s, the objections 
of Seebohm in the case of the Wilhelmshaven pipeline were swept aside in the 
economic cabinet in favour of the position taken by the ministries of economic affairs 
and finance.  
 The ultimate decision of the consortium was also delayed, partly because of 
slow decision-making in Bonn, and partly because of differences within the group. 
Deutsche Shell and Deutsche BP, egged on by their respective parent companies, 
disagreed with the case put forward by Esso AG. Deutsche Shell withdrew as Royal 
Dutch Shell decided that national pipeline solutions were uneconomical and not in 
the interests of the company. Whether Royal Dutch was guided by Dutch national 
sentiment was not explicitly voiced, but it was clear from its communications with the 
Municipal Port Authority in Rotterdam that it favoured Rotterdam over 
Wilhelmshaven, not least because of its longstanding presence in the port. Although 
Deutsche BP ultimately remained in the consortium, BP shared Royal Dutch’s 
reservations with regard to the Wilhelmshaven pipeline and attempted to dissuade the 
consortium from choosing it, but to no avail. A possible explanation for the 
determined manner in which Esso AG pursued the all-German solution was the 
predominantly German composition of the consortium. Esso AG enjoyed a high 
degree of autonomy in the Jersey Standard group, and was therefore presumably less 
constrained by group level policy than Deutsche Shell or Deutsche BP. Moreover, 
although Deutsche BP and Esso AG held the majority of the pipeline shares, the 
consortium also consisted of German oil companies.  
Although the Port of Rotterdam went out of its way to devise port adaptations 
that complied with Esso AG’s wishes, Wilhelmshaven was chosen. To some 
companies, this proved that economic rationality had been trumped by political 
sentiment. Indeed, the assertion of national interests over private economic planning 
was, for the Rotterdam port, a major obstacle. The Municipal Port Authority, 
however, used its limited means to counter the danger from nationalistic policies in its 
most important hinterland, relying in no small way on the decision-making of Royal 
Dutch Shell. Although sympathetic to the Rotterdam port, Royal Dutch was 
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pursuing its own goal, which was to study pipeline planning in Western Europe from 
a transnational rather than a regional or national perspective.  
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Chapter 6 The trans-European pipeline, 1956-1958  
6.1 Introduction 
Notwithstanding slow decision-making and discontent in the Esso AG pipeline 
consortium, Wilhelmshaven was preferred to Rotterdam. Dissatisfied with the 
planning and decision-making process, Royal Dutch Shell withdrew from the 
consortium to pursue a grander scheme: the merger of all national pipeline ventures 
like the Wilhelmshaven project into a single trans-European system of crude oil 
pipelines. However, if the issue of the pipeline to the Rhine-Ruhr area gave rise to 
nationalistic responses, how would states react to a trans-European pipeline? The 
notion of pipeline planning in this period accentuates the tensions between national 
interests and transnational opportunities. To a multinational company like Royal 
Dutch Shell, it seemed obvious that national solutions to transport problems were 
unable to yield the potential economies of scale of tankers and pipelines. If each 
country wanted to arrange its own crude oil supply infrastructure, the transport flows 
of crude between the Middle East and Western European markets would remain 
fragmented. If, however, flows could be bundled, larger tankers and pipelines could be 
deployed, leading to substantial savings on ton-mile costs as economies of scale could 
be achieved. However, this implied that a combination of a small number of landing 
ports and a few large-diameter cross-border pipelines would be supplying all of 
Western Europe’s crude oil imports. As a consequence, Royal Dutch envisaged more 
rational and therefore also more transnational planning of the crude oil supply chain. 
Meanwhile, to national governments, pipelines offered a means to secure national oil 
supply and develop local ports and industries.  
This chapter focuses on the case of the trans-European pipeline plan and 
questions to what extent the Port of Rotterdam was successful in adapting to it, what 
the obstacles were and how these were overcome. The decision-making process for 
Western Europe’s crude oil pipeline infrastructure therefore brought out the tensions 
between local, national and transnational interests, as well as the conflicts that arose 
from negotiating these diverging interests among firms and governments. The 
pipeline infrastructure that would emerge from the negotiations at the end of the 
1950s would turn out to be a compromise between national and transnational 
perspectives on the respective interests of states and firms. In that sense, the trans-
European pipeline system envisaged by Royal Dutch Shell never materialised and, as 
such, was an utter failure. Nonetheless, studying this particular episode illuminates 
and explains how and why the Western European crude oil pipeline system developed 
as it did. Moreover, the story of the trans-European pipeline is also essential to 
understanding why Rotterdam, after initially losing out to Wilhelmshaven, succeeded 
in getting its prized pipeline connection to the Rhine-Ruhr hinterland.  
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6.2 From national to transnational: the trans-European pipeline plan 
By the summer of 1956, it had become clear to the Rotterdam Port Authority that 
Royal Dutch Shell was its only hope for obtaining a pipeline to the Rhine-Ruhr area. 
Its capacity would, however, be smaller than the pipeline from Wilhelmshaven, which 
would carry the majority of the crude supply for the German consortium. Although 
the decision-making process of the German consortium was delayed to November 
1956, the agreement of the federal government to finance the changes to the Jade at 
Wilhelmshaven in early July 1956 had effectively sealed the deal. Local, regional and 
national government commitments and the German perspective of the consortium 
had created momentum for the Wilhelmshaven plan.  
From an early stage, the Rotterdam Port Authority understood that it needed 
its good contacts within Royal Dutch Shell in order to secure a pipeline connection to 
the Rhine-Ruhr area. Whereas Jersey Standard’s New York headquarters had no 
involvement in Esso AG’s pipeline venture, Royal Dutch Shell’s head offices in 
London and The Hague, particularly the Bataafsche Petroleum Maatschappij (The 
Hague), were intimately involved and supported the Rotterdam candidacy. However, 
one of the Bataafsche directors, H. Bloemgarten, signalled that the Esso-led 
consortium needed to play on German sentiment if the international oil companies 
were to successfully operate on the German market.465 Royal Dutch Shell therefore 
chose not to intervene, because it wanted to maintain a good relationship with Jersey 
Standard and thought it was too early to put pressure on Esso AG to choose 
Rotterdam. The Port Authority was aware of these limitations in Rotterdam’s 
bargaining position right from the start.466  
However, the interests of Esso AG did not coincide with those of Royal 
Dutch Shell. The Esso AG consortium was made up entirely of German-owned 
companies and German subsidiaries of multinational oil firms. The principal aim was 
to organise pipeline transportation for refineries in the Rhine-Ruhr area, and so the 
issue was therefore conceived as a German problem. Although the consortium delayed 
its final decision time and again, Rotterdam never seemed to be a serious option for 
Esso and the German members of the group. Playing Rotterdam off against 
Wilhelmshaven seemed to be a strategy to extract concessions from the German local 
and federal governments. The fact that Deutsche Shell left the consortium altogether 
suggested that Rotterdam was only intended to create leverage when it came to 
obtaining subsidies from the German government. It was also clear that Esso 
overstated the merits of Rotterdam in its negotiations with the Germans (and vice 
versa), for instance by exaggerating the promises made to the consortium by the 
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Dutch government.467 This spawned a public image of German government inaction, 
which was a story that resonated strongly with the country’s regional and national 
press.468 In short, Esso AG chose to maximise the outcome of a German solution. 
Although BP remained doubtful about the economics of the Wilhelmshaven option, 
it was the fastest solution to getting crude oil to Esso’s refinery by 1959. 
Notwithstanding its many advantages, Rotterdam’s elaborate expansion plan would 
simply have taken too long to materialise for Esso to bank on it.  
For the Royal Dutch Shell Group, Rotterdam was home to its largest refinery 
on the European continent. The Rotterdam refinery was the group’s regional 
balancing refinery, which was essential to providing it with flexible refining capacity. 
Whereas the projected refineries in the Rhine-Ruhr area would operate on one type of 
crude oil, a balancing refinery could handle a multitude of crudes and was therefore 
able to balance the market positions of the Shell group in the Western European 
region. Rotterdam was thus an important crude oil port for Shell, and when the 
company became increasingly exasperated with the one-sided approach of Esso AG 
during the summer and autumn of 1956, it moved to serve its own interests.469 
According to BP, Deutsche Shell could leave the consortium because its contract 
refiner in the Rhine-Ruhr area, Union Kraftstoff, was still part of the German group. 
Deutsche Shell had a refining contract with Union Kraftstoff until 1963, which would 
cover its crude oil requirements in the Rhine-Ruhr area through the Wilhelmshaven 
line until then. In the meantime, Royal Dutch Shell could study alternative pipeline 
solutions and, if necessary, construct a separate pipe from Rotterdam to the Rhine-
Ruhr region in due course.470  
Royal Dutch’s exasperation with the German consortium resonated with BP. 
Even in March 1956, which was before the long summer of drawn out negotiations in 
Germany, BP had contacted Royal Dutch Shell in London and Jersey Standard in 
New York to coordinate European crude oil pipeline development. BP’s concern was 
slowing down the German consortium to enable the alternatives to be considered.471 
BP and Royal Dutch were anxious not to jump into pipeline projects before they had 
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a more established picture of the long-term development of the European oil demand 
and the corresponding requirements of inland refineries in Western Europe. After 
Deutsche Shell had retreated from the German consortium, it was left to BP to delay 
the decision-making in order to study the alternatives. Although Esso AG claimed to 
have no time for alternatives other than Rotterdam, BP, Royal Dutch and Jersey 
Standard jointly ordered the American engineering company Bechtel Corporation to 
perform an additional study into the Wilhelmshaven pipeline. BP used this study to 
delay the German consortium, thus buying time to study different pipeline options.472  
The principal alternative to the German pipeline was Royal Dutch Shell’s plan 
for a trans-European pipeline system from Marseille to Rotterdam via Strasbourg and 
the Rhine-Ruhr area. Its aim was to set up a small, dedicated research team to study 
the possibilities of such a plan, and it hoped to attract the attention of other oil 
companies as future participants. The company particularly hoped to persuade BP to 
detach itself from the Esso AG consortium and join the transnational pipeline system 
that Royal Dutch envisaged. According to an internal BP memo on the Ruhr pipeline, 
Arnold Hofland, director of the Shell Petroleum Company, was quoted as being:  
 
“emphatic that it was essential to take these pipeline questions out of 
the hands of local companies and have them dealt with on a Head 
Office basis although he recognized the difficulties which this might 
present to Esso with their highly de-centralized organization.”473 
 
With increasing volumes of Middle Eastern oil being available to Europe, for instance 
through the Suez Canal, the Iraq Petroleum Company and Trans-Arabian pipelines, 
connecting the Mediterranean ports to the crude oil demand in the heartland of 
Western Europe started to make commercial sense. The Shell group was not the only 
company to consider such an undertaking. Another such plan was a study-consortium 
formed around the French Pechelbronn SA/Antar group, which ran a small refinery 
in the Merkwiller-Pechelbronn area in northern France that processed crude oil from 
an old and depleted oil field in the Alsace. The plan was to reinvigorate its operations 
by constructing a modern refinery that could supply northeast France and southwest 
Germany. To circumvent the high transportation costs of supplying crude oil to the 
new refinery over the Rhine, Pechelbronn brought up the idea of a pipeline from 
Marseille in April 1956, the so-called SOPIMER plan.474 Apart from 
Pechelbronn/Antar, the group consisted of the French state-owned oil company CFP, 
Jersey Standard, Standard of New York (Socony), Caltex (a European combine 
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between present-day Chevron and Texaco), Royal Dutch Shell, BP, Petrofina and 
German oil companies.475 The SOPIMER plan projected supplying 18 million tons of 
crude oil annually from 1961 onwards to refineries in the Upper Rhine and Rhine-
Ruhr areas.476 The French pipeline company TRAPIL, which operated an oil product 
pipeline between Le Havre and Paris, undertook a study of the technical and 
economic feasibility of the plan.  
The SOPIMER initiative was well received in the Western European press. 
At its launch in April 1956, the German daily Die Zeit reported enthusiastically that 
the pipeline plan would entail a freight economy of up to DM 3 to 4 per ton of crude 
oil delivered to refineries in the Upper and Middle Rhine areas. The article had a 
decidedly positive outlook on the plan, as it would prove to be a good investment 
given the large observed growth rates of oil consumption in Western Europe. 
Moreover, such a trans-European connection would have positive effects on the 
economies of Germany, France, Switzerland and Luxemburg, as it would obviously 
serve the common good of these European economies and offer politicians a new 
example of European cooperation, i.e. it would be “a new binding element for the 
common interests.”477 
Although SOPIMER’s objective served Deutsche Shell’s market interests in 
the Upper Rhine region (Strasbourg), Royal Dutch’s own vision extended the 
Marseille pipeline to the Rhine-Ruhr area and even Rotterdam. Its initial 
examination of the idea attracted attention from the other majors, and by late July 
1956, the Shell group, BP, Jersey Standard, Caltex and Socony started discussing the 
trans-European pipeline project. On 23 July 1956, Royal Dutch Shell, through its 
Dutch operating company Bataafsche Petroleum Maatschappij, incorporated the 
Company for the Study and Planning of Pipeline Projects in Western Europe NV 
(SAPPEUR) and invited the firms in the trans-European group to join it. The 
objective of SAPPEUR was to develop, jointly with SOPIMER, a crude oil pipeline 
from Marseille to Rotterdam. The pipeline was estimated to save capital costs for 
tankers, inland distribution facilities and tankage.478 Notwithstanding the potential 
advantages of a trans-European pipeline, the project was politically sensitive. Indeed, 
the Royal Dutch proposal anticipated that “both before and after completion such a 
pipeline would be subject to protracted negotiations at Governmental level.”479  
At the first meeting between the prospective SAPPEUR partners on 31 July 
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1956, Royal Dutch Shell was especially wary of French government intervention. The 
company pointed to French state participation in TRAPIL (the oil product pipeline 
between Le Havre and Paris) and the fact that the French government had declared 
Middle Eastern oil to be in the French national interest. The trans-European pipeline 
would initially exclusively pump Middle Eastern crude oil. In short, Royal Dutch 
feared that the French state would interfere with private pipeline plans.480 The fact 
that TRAPIL was conducting SOPIMER’s feasibility study could be interpreted as a 
sign of the interest of the French state in such ventures.481 In that sense, SOPIMER 
could be regarded as yet another nationally-oriented pipeline plan. SAPPEUR, 
however, was aiming for a transnational approach, which was highlighted by its 
choice of the Bechtel Corporation to conduct the economic and technical feasibility 
study for the trans-European pipeline.482  
There were also other institutional concerns. To coordinate pipeline planning, 
the companies needed to share information about market expectations and company 
objectives. The American firms objected to this, presumably on the basis of US anti-
trust legislation. The group thus agreed to devise a legal company structure that would 
allow the Americans to participate in the planning and, in time, construction and 
operation of the pipeline. Within this framework, the group considered the option of 
setting up the pipeline as a common carrier pipeline, i.e. a pipeline open to third 
parties without price discrimination, which was a model that was already being 
applied in the US.483  
The SAPPEUR initiative was open to any company that was interested. The 
group held its first official meeting on 21 September 1956 in The Hague, which was 
attended by all of the companies involved in SOPIMER and representatives of the 
Bechtel Corporation.484 The meeting discussed conditions for participation in the 
study-company and the parameters of Bechtel’s feasibility research. Bechtel initially 
proposed limiting the study to devising scenarios for Western European oil demand, 
Middle Eastern production and the development of maritime transportation, with a 
view to discerning whether a trans-European pipeline would make economic sense. 
                                               
480 BPA 97335, Ruhr pipeline scheme, minutes of a meeting held in The Hague on 31 July 1956, 
‘Trans-European Pipeline Project’, 2. 
481 BPA 97335, Ruhr pipeline scheme, internal memo BP, ‘Some particulars on the Pechelbronn 
initiative for a pipeline from Marseille to the Rhine’, 25 July 1956, 2. 
482 BPA 43379, Sappeur NV minutes of meetings, ‘SAPPEUR NV. Record of a meeting held on 
Friday, the 21st of September 1956, at the Hotel Wittebrug in The Hague’, 28 September 1956, 1. 
483 BPA 97335, Ruhr pipeline scheme, minutes of a meeting held in The Hague on 31 July 1956, 
‘Trans-European Pipeline Project’, 4. 
484 BPA 43379, Sappeur NV minutes of meetings, ‘SAPPEUR NV. Record of a meeting held on 
Friday, the 21st of September 1956, at the Hotel Wittebrug in The Hague’, 28 September 1956, 4. The 
companies present included: Shell, BP, Jersey Standard, Caltex, Socony, Deutsche Erdöl AG, 
Gelsenberg Benzin, Scholven Chemie, Union Kraftstoff, Ruhrchemie, CFP, Pechelbronn SA, 
Petrofina and Bechtel Corporation. Later, Wintershall also joined SAPPEUR. 
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Bechtel’s assignment also included studying a pipeline branch to Dunkirk, with 
opportunities being considered for the transhipment of Middle Eastern crude oil from 
North Sea ports to southern England, as well as alternatives to Marseille as the 
starting point of the trans-European pipeline.485 In short, Bechtel was asked to review 
the future of the Western European crude oil supply. According to Bechtel, the future 
size of crude oil tankers would be particularly important in determining whether all 
crude oil supplies to Western Europe would flow in a south to north direction in the 
future, rather than the north to south route taken by the Wilhelmshaven-Ruhr 
pipeline.486  
In December 1956, Bechtel presented its final report to SAPPEUR. By that 
time, however, the German pipeline consortium had agreed to opt for Wilhelmshaven. 
Moreover, SAPPEUR came to understand that plans for a French pipeline had 
preceded SOPIMER’s initiative. The SAPPEUR meeting of 7 December 1956 
therefore concluded that the Bechtel report required further consideration, 
particularly with regard to the question of how a set of national pipelines would 
compare to the trans-European pipeline that SAPPEUR was pursuing.487 In addition, 
SAPPEUR needed additional advice on the legal and financial implications of a 
trans-European pipeline. 
On 31 January 1957, SAPPEUR’s shareholder meeting in The Hague 
convened with experts from all of the participating oil companies and Bechtel. The 
purpose of the meeting was to discuss Bechtel’s updated feasibility study concerning 
the trade-offs between an integrated trans-European pipeline system and the 
combination of tankers and national pipelines.488 The update was required to allow for 
the establishment of Nord-West Oelleitung as a separate venture in December 1956. 
The Nord-West pipeline’s supplies of crude oil to the Rhine-Ruhr area would 
obviously affect the operation of a trans-European pipeline. Bechtel’s baseline capital 
cost estimate showed that a trans-European pipeline required less capital, less steel, 
less power (for pumping) and less manpower than a set of separate, national pipelines 
(Table 6-1).  
  
                                               
485 BPA 43379, Sappeur NV minutes of meetings, ‘SAPPEUR NV. Minutes of a meeting of the Board 
of Directors held on Friday, the 21st of September 1956, at the Hotel Wittebrug in The Hague’, 28 
September 1956, 1. 
486 BPA 43379, Sappeur NV minutes of meetings, ‘SAPPEUR NV. Aide memoire to a meeting held 
on Thursday, the 20th of September 1956, at the Hotel Wittebrug in The Hague’, 28 September 1956, 
2. 
487 BPA 43379, Sappeur NV minutes of meetings, ‘SAPPEUR NV. Aide memoire to a meeting held 
on Friday, the 7th of December 1956, at the Company’s head office in The Hague’, undated, 2. 
488 BPA 43379, Sappeur NV minutes of meetings, ‘SAPPEUR NV. Aide memoire to a General 
Meeting of Shareholders’ Experts held in The Hague on the 31st January 1957’, undated, 2. 
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Table 6-1. Capital cost comparison of the trans-European pipeline and 
individual pipelines, 1957 
  Individual pipelines Reduction 
when served 
by super 
tankers 
(In 1957 prices) Trans-European Pipeline 
Served by 
T2's* 
Served by 
super 
tankers** 
Capital cost (mln dollars) 325 385 350 -9,1% 
Steel (short tons) 353,000 424,000 417,000 -1,7% 
Horsepower (HP) 120,000 300,000 260,000 -13,3% 
Direct operating manpower 220 2,400 950 -60,4% 
     
*T2 tanker 16,000    
**Max size in Rotterdam 45,000  
    Max size in Wilhelmshaven 60,000  
Source: BPA 43379, Sappeur NV minutes of meetings, ‘SAPPEUR NV. Aide memoire to a General 
Meeting of Shareholders’ Experts held in The Hague on the 31st January 1957’, undated, ‘Attachment 
1 (‘Comparison with tankers plus individual pipelines serving 1964 requirements of Germany and 
Central France’). 
 
The estimate also showed that larger tankers would reduce the capital costs of 
national pipelines considerably. Indeed, serving individual pipelines with super 
tankers would allow for capital costs that were almost 10 per cent lower, reducing the 
cost difference between an integrated system and separate pipelines to just 25 million 
US dollars (instead of 60 million US dollars if T2 tankers were used).  
The initial Bechtel study of December 1956 envisaged a trans-European 
pipeline system that would ultimately extend from Marseille via Strasbourg and 
Cologne to the Ruhr area, where it would branch into a northern section to 
Wilhelmshaven and Hamburg and a western section to Rotterdam and Antwerp by 
1970 (Figure 6-1).  
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Figure 6-1. Bechtel’s 1956 trans-European pipeline flow rate projection, 
1965-1970. 
1965 1970 
  
Source: BPA 43379, Sappeur NV minutes of meetings, ‘SAPPEUR NV. Aide memoire to a General 
Meeting of Shareholders’ Experts held in The Hague on the 31st January 1957’, undated, ‘Attachment 
2a (‘Trans-European pipeline flow rates and refining demands’). Maps created by author. 
 
The estimated flow rate of the pipeline (starting in Marseille) was expected to increase 
from 20 million tons in 1960 to 57 million tons in 1965.489 By 1957, however, it was 
clear that the Nord-West pipeline would emerge as a separate, German venture. The 
updated Bechtel report estimated that the impact of the Nord-West pipeline would 
slash the flow rate of the trans-European pipeline by almost 50 per cent to 29 million 
tons in 1970.490 In the original scheme, the trans-European pipeline was projected to 
transport crude oil from Marseille to Hamburg via Wilhelmshaven by 1965. The 
original scheme did not, therefore, incorporate a sustained and increasing flow of 
crude oil from Wilhelmshaven to the Rhine-Ruhr area, which was what transpired 
after the establishment of the Nord-West pipeline as a separate venture in December 
1956. The up-to-date Bechtel study therefore projected a more limited version of the 
trans-European pipeline system (Figure 6-2).   
                                               
489 BPA 43379, Sappeur NV minutes of meetings, ‘SAPPEUR NV. Aide memoire to a General 
Meeting of Shareholders’ Experts held in The Hague on the 31st January 1957’, undated, ‘Attachment 
2a (‘Trans-European pipeline flow rates and refining demands’). 
490 BPA 43379, Sappeur NV minutes of meetings, ‘SAPPEUR NV. Aide memoire to a General 
Meeting of Shareholders’ Experts held in The Hague on the 31st January 1957’, undated, ‘Attachment 
2a′ (‘Trans-European pipeline flow rates and refining demands. Alternate system without 
Wilhelmshaven Line’). 
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Figure 6-2. Bechtel’s 1957 trans-European pipeline flow rate projection, 
1965-1970. 
1965 1970 
  
Source: BPA 43379, Sappeur NV minutes of meetings, ‘SAPPEUR NV. Aide memoire to a General 
Meeting of Shareholders’ Experts held in The Hague on the 31st January 1957’, undated, ‘Attachment 
2a′ (‘Trans-European pipeline flow rates and refining demands. Alternate system without 
Wilhelmshaven Line’). Maps created by the author. 
 
Even in the alternative set-up, the trans-European pipeline system was unprecedented, 
“as it linked two oceans and supplied oil both to inland destinations and to the far 
coast.”491 The question of whether or not the trans-European system as proposed was 
feasible depended largely on the development of the size of crude oil tankers and the 
extent to which seaports such as Rotterdam and Wilhelmshaven invested in 
expanding their facilities to accommodate the largest vessels. The pipeline system 
therefore required a tariff system that allowed for price discrimination between inland 
and seaboard locations. As the pipeline would compete with tanker transportation in 
seaports (Rotterdam, Antwerp), Bechtel proposed setting lower tariffs for coastal 
destinations. This proposal illustrated that apart from national pipeline initiatives, the 
trans-European system’s main competitor was maritime tanker transportation.492 Any 
feasibility study of the project therefore needed to consider the shrinking spread of the 
transportation costs from the Middle East to Marseille and Rotterdam caused by 
larger tankers. Tankers of 80,000 tons reduced the spread by 31 per cent compared to 
45,000 ton tankers (also see Appendix B: Data Table 0-4).493 Even larger tankers 
                                               
491 BPA 43379, Sappeur NV minutes of meetings, ‘SAPPEUR NV. Aide memoire to a General 
Meeting of Shareholders’ Experts held in The Hague on the 31st January 1957’, undated, 5. 
492 Ibid., 5-6. 
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would further reduce the spread in transportation costs of delivered Middle Eastern 
crude oil between Marseille and Rotterdam, and therefore also to Wilhelmshaven. 
The centrality of the port adaptations in Wilhelmshaven in the negotiations of the 
German pipeline consortium was thus self-evident in light of this trade off between 
pipelines and tankers.  
  
6.3 The trans-European pipeline and the Port of Rotterdam  
Triggered by the incorporation of SAPPEUR NV in July 1956, the Rotterdam port 
saw the trans-European pipeline as yet another problem. By then, ideas for extensive 
port expansions had developed further in response to the initial Esso plan. Although 
Esso seemed destined to choose Wilhelmshaven, the Port Authority was convinced 
that the economic foundations for the further expansion of Rotterdam’s port were in 
place, with or without the Esso pipeline.494 From the first pipeline-related plans in 
1955 to the early sketches of a much larger expansion to the west of the Botlek area, 
the Europoort-plan emerged. Although this plan was not presented to the public until 
1957, by July 1956, the Port Authority had firmly set a goal of achieving a large-scale 
expansion similar to the later Europoort plan.  
The initial ideas about a comprehensive trans-European pipeline system fed 
from Marseille shook the foundations of this plan. On 25 July 1956, the Port 
Authority drafted a memorandum to A. Hofland, a board member of SAPPEUR and 
director of the Shell Petroleum Company, which was one of the Shell group’s 
international operating firms overseeing its sales. The Port Authority asked Hofland 
to clarify when the trans-European pipeline was projected to become operational to 
enable it to calculate whether investment in new port expansions (Europoort plan) 
would be worthwhile; port expansion to accommodate a pipeline terminal for a 
Rotterdam-Ruhr pipeline would not be sensible if crude oil would eventually flow 
from Marseille to Rotterdam within the foreseeable future. The Port Authority had to 
earn back the investments partly through fees paid by docking tankers.  
On the other hand, the Port Authority recognised the importance of port 
expansion for accommodating new facilities for oil companies wanting to locate in the 
Port of Rotterdam. It therefore pledged to continue to commit to new port 
expansions. However, to be able to adapt these plans to the future needs of the 
industry, the Port Authority needed more detailed information on the changes that a 
trans-European pipeline system would entail for the port. The most pressing 
questions were: for how long would a Rotterdam-Ruhr pipeline pump crude to the 
Ruhr before starting to pump oil in the opposite direction? Would exports from 
                                                                                                                                       
Meeting of Shareholders’ Experts held in The Hague on the 31st January 1957’, undated, Attachment 3, 
‘Tanker transportation cost. Persian Gulf via Cape of Good Hope and return via Suez Canal’. 
494 De Goey, Ruimte voor industrie, 83.  
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Rotterdam then increase? What would the consequences be for the pipeline terminal 
installations once the pumps were reversed? And, finally, would it be possible to start 
a Rotterdam-Ruhr pipeline from the first and second petroleum docks near Pernis, 
which was the current home of Royal Dutch Shell’s refinery?495  
The last issue clearly revealed the anxiety felt by the Port Authority. Even if a 
trans-European pipeline would reduce the revenue derived from the major port 
expansion envisaged by the Port Authority in the medium term, not having a pipeline 
connection was worse. Finding the compromise of getting the pipeline connection 
without having to expand would resolve some of the uncertainties faced by the Port 
Authority. On the other hand, the memorandum showed that it was also committed 
to the longer-term development of the Port of Rotterdam. Expansion to 
accommodate larger tankers was the trend, so Rotterdam should forge ahead with its 
expansion plans. The economic value of doing so was, however, in the balance, as the 
questions to Hofland showed.  
In November 1956, Royal Dutch Shell director F.A.C. Guépin delivered a 
speech in Rotterdam about the need to study crude oil transportation in Europe in a 
transnational context. In his speech, he stressed that he envisaged an important role 
for the Port of Rotterdam in such a system. However, the Rotterdam role “[would] 
depend strongly on the availability of port facilities to accommodate the tankers of the 
future.”496 This was part of the answer to the questions raised by the Rotterdam Port 
Authority in its memo to A. Hofland in July 1956. 
For Royal Dutch Shell, incorporating Rotterdam in the trans-European 
pipeline system was the highest priority, because it would enable it to feed its largest 
refinery cheaply via Marseille. Conversely, because Wilhelmshaven had no refineries, 
it was of no interest for Royal Dutch Shell to have the Nord-West pipeline as part of 
the trans-European pipeline system. Constructing a pipeline from Rotterdam to 
Cologne was an essential part of the trans-European pipeline plan, because 
Rotterdam was of vital importance for its European operations. Moreover, because 
Deutsche Shell’s new refinery in Cologne-Godorf (near Cologne) was planning to 
start production in 1960, it was imperative to have a crude oil pipeline to the area that 
was operational by then.497  
By April 1957, Royal Dutch Shell announced to the Rotterdam Port 
Authority that SAPPEUR had progressed with its study to the point that the 
Rotterdam-Rhine pipeline could be constructed without the risk of it not fitting into 
                                               
495 GAR, AHB, 589.01, inv. nr. 70, memo from F. Posthuma, director of engineering at the 
Rotterdam MPA, to A. Hofland regarding the interests of the Rotterdam port in the trans-European 
pipeline project, 25 July 1956.  
496 NL-HaNA, EZ / Centraal Archief, 2.06.087, inv.nr. 408, Dutch newspaper (title unknown), 
Stijgende olie-vraag vergt studie pijpleidingnet, 16 November 1956. 
497 BPA 43379, Sappeur NV minutes of meetings, ‘SAPPEUR NV. Aide memoire to a Board Meeting 
held on Thursday, 14th March 1957 at the Company’s office, The Hague’, 22nd March 1957, 2. 
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the envisaged trans-European system.498 For the Rotterdam port, the decision of 
Royal Dutch Shell to construct the Rotterdam-Rhine pipeline was significant. After 
losing the initial pipeline to Wilhelmshaven, the expansion plans developed by the 
Port Authority (Europoort plan) had become a long-term project. The Rotterdam-
Rhine pipeline terminal was therefore constructed on the Second Petroleum Dock 
next to Royal Dutch Shell’s Pernis refinery, which was a location that was regarded by 
Esso AG as unsuitable because of the limited depth of the Pernis docks. This suggests 
that the efforts of the Port Authority to accommodate the pipeline to the hinterland 
were less important for the short-term chances of obtaining a pipeline connection to 
the Ruhr than were the strategic and internal considerations of the Shell group. 
However, the Port Authority’s commitment to the Europoort plan ushered in a third 
phase in the planning of the trans-European pipeline system. In its revised report of 
January 1957, Bechtel had concluded that, if the pipeline was to compete with 
maritime tankers, its future hinged on the ability to set competitive transport tariffs 
for inland, but particularly coastal, destinations (Rotterdam and Antwerp). If 
Rotterdam intended to invest in port expansion, thus allowing it to accommodate 
larger tankers, it would make competitive pricing of the trans-European pipeline 
harder to achieve. Larger tankers and better port facilities thus seemed to weaken the 
strength of the pipeline’s business case. 
 A prominent feature of the episode was the intimate relationship between the 
Rotterdam Port Authority and Royal Dutch Shell. Port Authority officials have often 
pointed to the importance of Jan Willem Ernste, director of the Shell refinery at 
Rotterdam-Pernis, for inspiring the Port Authority planners to think big.499 Equally, 
Ernste was once quoted as saying that business deals in Rotterdam were only a phone 
call away. Rather than starting with time-consuming formal procedures, the 
Rotterdam Port Authority understood the importance of accommodating business 
needs first and arranging the formalities later, keeping the pace of development 
high.500 The pipeline episode thus underscores the close relationship between the port 
and Royal Dutch, but adds the hitherto neglected transnational dimension to the 
relationship.  
 
6.4 The unravelling of the trans-European pipeline plan 
Although the question of tariffs was important and thorny, the study group also 
considered legal, fiscal and financial issues. The company’s second board meeting in 
                                               
498 NL-HaNA, EZ / Centraal Archief, 2.06.087, inv.nr. 408, internal memo of the Directorate-
General for Industrialisation and Energy Supply of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, 1 May 1957, p.1. 
499 W.F. Lichtenauer, 'Ernste, Jan Willem (1899-1971)', in Biografisch Woordenboek van Nederland. 
http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/bwn1880-2000/lemmata/bwn2/ernste, 14 April 2014. 
500 De Goey, Ruimte voor industrie, 11. 
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The Hague on 14 March 1957 agreed that the revised Bechtel report was suggesting 
that the trans-European pipeline in a slimmed down form (without Wilhelmshaven) 
still made economic and technical sense.501 However, the plan needed further legal, 
fiscal and financial work before any concrete proposals about trajectory, the company 
structure and financing could be made. This additional research would delay the 
construction of the pipeline to such an extent that Royal Dutch Shell announced a 
plan to build one between Rotterdam and Cologne as a separate venture to feed the 
Cologne-Godorf refinery. It also pledged to do so in line with Bechtel’s 
recommendations for the trans-European pipeline.  
 In terms of the overall feasibility of the pipeline, the delays caused by further 
studying legal, fiscal and financial aspects did not seem to be problematic. Demand 
forecasts showed that refineries in Eastern France and Southern Germany were not 
yet required. SAPPEUR therefore banked on supplies to the coastal refineries of 
Rotterdam and Antwerp to ensure a reasonable throughput for the pipeline in the 
early stages of its operation.502 In the short-term, the Rotterdam-Rhine pipeline 
seemed to fit in well as part of the plan.  
 The board agreed to proceed with the study of the legal, fiscal and financial 
aspects of the pipeline plan. The legal issues seemed to be the most pressing. The goal 
was to achieve a legal status for the pipeline company that could “ensure the 
permanent stability not only of the legal but also of the economic and fiscal conditions 
regulating its activities in the various territories concerned.”503 As this was an 
international venture, the board looked for a team of lawyers with experience in 
international law, which was to be headed by C.R.C. Wijckerheld Bisdom, a well-
known Dutch lawyer. His leading role in the legal team advising the Consortium for 
Iran in 1954 made him an expert in oil-related international law.504 Although it was 
acknowledged that the contours of a unified Europe were emerging, SAPPEUR 
stressed the need for legal conditions that ensured the satisfactory operation of the 
pipeline. The legal team was instructed: to define what those legal conditions should 
be, whether they could be achieved within existing legal frameworks or whether they 
                                               
501 BPA 43379, Sappeur NV minutes of meetings, ‘SAPPEUR NV. Aide memoire to a Board Meeting 
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would require ad hoc agreements with separate governments, and to devise an 
institutional form with the appropriate international legal status.505  
 The legal issue was central to the work of the study group because no pipeline 
legislation existed in the countries concerned. With the discussion of the pipeline 
plans in the European transport markets, governments began to contemplate whether 
and how pipelines could be integrated within existing legislation and regulate with 
respect to traditional modes of transport. Three main concerns dominated the 
discussion: competition with other modes of transport, tariff discrimination and 
taxation.506 In West Germany, the debate on pipeline regulation focussed on two 
opposing views embodied by the federal Ministry of Transportation on the one hand 
and the federal Ministry of Economic Affairs on the other. The former argued for 
state interference in order to integrate pipelines into the existing transport markets. 
The latter, meanwhile, argued that pipelines were an integral part of the privately-
owned energy infrastructure. Interfering in that infrastructure could increase the cost 
of energy, which was to be avoided for the sake of the German economy.  
With regard to state interference, there were two possible approaches. When 
an oil pipeline between Le Havre and Paris was constructed in the late 1940s, the 
French state took a stake in it as a way to influence its tariff-setting with a view to 
mitigating the possible negative effects of the pipeline on inland shipping on the 
Seine. The second approach originated from the United States, where pipelines were 
compelled to allow third party shippers to use them and were subjected to tariff 
regulation to preclude tariff discrimination against third party shippers by the 
pipeline’s owner. These options were also discussed at length as part of the 
negotiations on transport and energy coordination in the European Economic 
Community.507 For the oil companies involved in pipeline planning, looming 
legislation and regulation could potentially interfere with the financing, operation and 
financial performance of their pipeline ventures.  
As pipelines have a high degree of asset specificity and require large initial 
capital outlays, the companies involved needed guarantees that their investments were 
safe and that they enjoyed optimal freedom to operate so as to ensure a satisfactory 
return on investment, including the setting of tariffs.508 Therefore, the legal conditions 
required for a satisfactory operation consisted of the freedom of transport and transit 
and a legal status permitting the company to arrange rights of way, taxes and currency 
                                               
505 BPA 43379, Sappeur NV minutes of meetings, ‘SAPPEUR NV. Aide memoire to a Board Meeting 
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regulations. The central issue of how to achieve such conditions was the question of 
whether to opt for a number of national operating companies or to aim for one 
international company with an international legal status. The former required no 
particular international legal agreements, as each national operating firm operated 
under national law, although this could lead to potential problems in the case of 
disagreements between these national companies. The alternative, namely a single 
company responsible for the construction and operation of the entire pipeline system, 
seemed to be the best solution. However, to enable such a business to operate 
satisfactorily, an international legal status was required to manage the international 
legal issues that the national legislation of the company’s country of domicile would 
not be able to resolve. The necessary conditions for satisfactory operations would thus 
need to be laid down in an international agreement between the national governments 
of the countries involved.  
 By June 1957, the legal and financial advisers revealed their initial findings.509 
Their report proposed establishing a single trans-European pipeline company in one 
of the countries served by it, most probably the Netherlands. A general convention 
signed between the company and the countries concerned would ensure stable 
conditions under which the company could operate internationally. An international 
agreement between a single pipeline company and the countries it operated in would 
offset the danger of individual countries asserting their national interest over the 
transnational interests of the pipeline company and its parents, the multinational oil 
firms.510 This plan had a precedent, but also reflected contemporary concerns. Not 
only could an arrangement in international law solve the cumbersome process of 
obtaining individual concessions for each country involved in the trans-European 
project, it could also be a useful precedent for the foreign oil companies in the Middle 
East.  
Following the damage and upheaval caused by the Suez Crisis in late 1956 and 
early 1957, the oil industry attempted to secure its investments in the region through 
an international agreement or treaties of protection.511 These treaties were drafted by 
the oil sector in order to create an international agreement between the Middle 
Eastern nations and the home countries of the major international oil firms, i.e. the 
United States, France, United Kingdom and the Netherlands. The treaties contained 
guarantees with respect to the free flow of oil, the restitution of damage, the 
prohibition of nationalisation and the option of bringing disputes to the International 
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Court of Justice in the case of violations. The treaties were entirely aimed at securing 
private property rights and severely curtailing the position of the Middle Eastern 
countries. The French government drafted a counter proposal with more detail on the 
statutory position of the Middle Eastern countries and the beneficial effects of the 
agreement for all signatories.512 These treaties were part of a much wider effort by 
capital exporting countries to devise a system of international agreements for the 
protection of investments after a number of prominent cases in which post-colonial 
nations had sequestrated foreign investors.513 Trade and investment liberalisation had 
been conceived in the 1947 Havana Charter but, when it was not ratified by the US, 
only trade, and not investments, became regulated by the General Agreement on 
Trade and Tariffs.514 The late 1950s and early 1960s thus marked a high point in the 
drafting of various solutions to the question of the international regulation and 
protection of investments.515 
The interesting aspect of this episode is the juxtaposition of private and public 
interests in the oil industry, and the implications thereof for investments by the oil 
industry. West Germany had generally adopted a free market approach, which posed 
few problems for Royal Dutch Shell’s realisation of the Rotterdam-Rhine pipeline. In 
the case of France, however, Royal Dutch feared that it would run into problems. 
France’s opposition in the case of the protection treaties only increased these fears. 
For the same reason, the company and Wyckerheld Bisdom, SAPPEUR’s legal 
advisor, were negotiating with the Dutch government with a view to pursuing an 
international agreement with West Germany for the Rotterdam-Ruhr pipeline, even 
though this made little practical sense because all legal, fiscal and financial issues had 
been successfully concluded with the Dutch and German governments separately. 
However, Royal Dutch thought that a Dutch-German international agreement could 
set a precedent for the trans-European pipeline case and pave the way for other 
European states (most notably France) to enter into such an international accord.516  
The most important message from the legal team was that the companies 
involved in SAPPEUR needed to make haste. The next step for the consortium was 
to set up the international pipeline company proposed by the legal team. Speed was 
essential for two reasons. Firstly, the Wilhelmshaven and Rotterdam pipelines 
                                               
512 NL-HaNA, Buitenlandse Zaken/Code-Archief 55-64, 2.05.118, inv.nr. 12024, memo of the legal 
advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 20 May 1957. 
513 K. J. Vandevelde, ‘A Brief History of International Investment Agreements’, U.C. Davis Journal of 
International Law & Policy 12 (2005-2006) 157-194, here: 162, 166.  
514 P. Demaret, ‘Metamorphoses of the GATT: From the Havana Charter to the World Trade 
Organization’, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 34 (1996) 123-171, here: 126-127.  
515 A.A. Fatouros, ‘An International Code to Protect Private Investment-Proposals and Perspectives’, 
The University of Toronto Law Journal 14 (1961) 77-102. 
516 NL-HaNA, Buitenlandse Zaken/Code-Archief 55-64, 2.05.118, 12024, memo of the legal advisor 
to the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, 19 June 1957. 
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signalled that crude oil requirements were increasing faster than SAPPEUR’s 
decision-making. Indeed, the entire project could be jeopardized if the consortium 
failed to integrate the Rotterdam-Rhine pipeline into a trans-European pipeline 
system, or if further delays necessitated the construction of other separate pipelines, 
destroying the business case for an integrated system. Secondly, the legal team 
thought that it was only after the establishment of a pipeline company that the 
conclusion to an international agreement with national governments could be 
pursued.517  
Following the report by the legal advisors, the board concluded that the 
process of negotiating an international agreement and actually constructing the 
pipeline would take up to four years. Accordingly, to meet the crude oil requirements 
of inland refineries in France and Switzerland by 1961-62, the board needed to make 
a decision in 1957. It therefore decided to install a steering committee to draft a 
memorandum of principles for the pipeline company, compose a tariff structure and 
choose the country of incorporation for the firm.518 Notwithstanding the board’s desire 
to accelerate the decision-making process, the feasibility of the trans-European 
pipeline was questionable, because the schedule for the crude oil requirements of the 
respective inland refineries in France, Switzerland, Germany and the Rhine delta 
diverged considerably.519 The French refineries in the Strasbourg area would need a 
pipeline connection to Marseille in 1962. Given the timeframe of three years to 
construct a pipe, the decision to adopt the trans-European system would have to be 
taken in early 1959 at the latest. However, Royal Dutch Shell needed a pipeline to be 
ready by 1960 in order to feed its Rhineland refinery near Cologne.   
Royal Dutch Shell’s commitment to constructing the Rotterdam-Rhine 
pipeline undermined the feasibility of the trans-European version. Although Royal 
Dutch was the initiator and lead company in SAPPEUR, its decision to construct the 
Rotterdam pipeline was the first nail in the latter’s coffin. Royal Dutch Shell’s 
proposal was to construct the Rotterdam-Rhine pipeline to pump crude oil to the 
Rhine-Ruhr area until the trans-European pipeline was operational. Then, the pumps 
would turn and the Rotterdam and Antwerp refineries would be supplied from 
Marseille. For the trans-European pipeline to succeed, SAPPEUR estimated that the 
system needed the supplies to Rotterdam and Antwerp in order to earn back the 
capital investment in it.  
At the projected start of the trans-European pipeline in 1960, the estimated 
demand for Middle Eastern crude oil in the Rhine-Ruhr region was roughly the same 
                                               
517 BPA 43379, Sappeur NV minutes of meetings, ‘Report to the Board’, 7 June 1957, 4-5. 
518 BPA 43379, Sappeur NV minutes of meetings, ‘Sappeur NV aide-memoire to a Board Meeting 
held on Tuesday 9th July 1957, at the Company’s Office, The Hague’, 12 July 1957, 1-3. 
519 BPA 43379, Sappeur NV minutes of meetings, ‘Sappeur NV aide-memoire to a Meeting held on 
26th September 1957, at the Company’s office, The Hague’, 11 October 1957, 3-4. 
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as the demand in the Rotterdam area (Figure 6-3).  
 
Figure 6-3. The 1957 estimate of demand for Middle Eastern crude oil in 
the Rotterdam-Antwerp area, the Rhine-Ruhr area and Eastern France, 
1960-1970 (in per cent of total) 
 
Source: BPA 130129, Southern Pipeline Project, Internal memo BP, ‘The Trans-European pipeline 
project’, Attachment 1, 7 June 1957.  
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counterpart, less than half of the crude oil supply to the Rhine-Ruhr region would 
initially fall to the Marseille pipeline. According to the 1957 SAPPEUR projections, 
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Figure 6-4. Estimated throughput of the trans-European pipeline, 1960-
1970 
 
Source: BPA 130129, Southern Pipeline Project, internal memo BP, ‘The Trans-European pipeline 
project’, Attachment 1, 7 June 1957. 
 
 
Figure 6-5. The 1957 estimate of the trans-European pipeline throughput, 
1962-1970 (in per cent of total throughput) 
 
Source: BPA 130129, Southern Pipeline Project, internal memo BP, ‘The Trans-European pipeline 
project’, Attachment 1, 7 June 1957.  
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As the initial demand for crude oil flows via Marseille in the Rhine-Ruhr area was 
low, the pipeline’s operations depended on flows to Rotterdam and Antwerp in the 
first five years of the trans-European system’s operations (Figure 6-5). It was only 
after the Nord-West pipeline reached its peak capacity in 1965 that rising demand in 
the Rhine-Ruhr area would become available to the trans-European pipeline. After 
1965, supplies to the Rotterdam-Antwerp area would drop to less than 10 per cent in 
1970 (Figure 6-5).  
Like some of the other participants in SAPPEUR, BP was unsure of the 
soundness of this plan. As a large diameter pipeline was required to pump crude all 
the way from Marseille to Rotterdam. John Davies, the BP representative in 
SAPPEUR, argued that the Rotterdam pipeline was needed to ensure a sufficient 
return on the investment in the trans-European system.520 In particular, the 
Rotterdam-Antwerp demand was required to provide the initial payload for the 
pipeline, which would be taken over by the Rhine-Ruhr demand after 1965. However, 
BP’s operational research department disagreed because, once constructed, the 
Rotterdam-Rhine pipeline would either be obsolete by 1970, as supplies from 
Marseille would no longer reach Rotterdam in profitable quantities, or would start to 
compete with supplies from Marseille in the Rhine-Ruhr area. BP therefore favoured 
a slimmed-down trans-European pipeline that would only connect Marseille to the 
Rhine-Ruhr area. As this would require less pipe, as well as a pipe with a smaller 
diameter, the capital outlay of the project would be reduced. Calculations by BP’s 
operational research department revealed that the return on investment for the 
slimmed down trans-European pipeline was equal to that of the original plan. 
Meanwhile, a pipeline including a Rotterdam branch would enjoy a higher return in 
the first five years of its operations, whereas one without a Rotterdam branch would 
have a higher return after the first five years (Figure 6-6). In short, the latter option 
was less costly and would produce an equal return on average and a higher return in 
the long run. 
  
                                               
520 BPA 130129, Southern Pipeline Project, letter from Derek Mitchell (BP operational research) to 
John Davies (BP representative in SAPPEUR), 24 October 1957.  
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Figure 6-6. BP estimates of the return on investment of the trans-
European pipeline with and without the branch to Rotterdam, 1962-1970 
 
Source: BPA 130129, Southern Pipeline Project, letter from D.F. Mitchell (BP operational research) 
to J.E.H. Davies (BP representative in SAPPEUR), 24 October 1957. 
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Rotterdam-Rhine pipeline project,522 while Jersey Standard concluded that with the 
Rotterdam-Rhine pipeline in place:  
 
“construction of the Trans-European pipeline system from the 
Mediterranean to the Köln-Ruhr [sic] area [was] premature and 
unneeded for several years.”523  
 
The key question for SAPPEUR’s board was therefore whether to opt for a separate 
pipeline to serve the French refineries, which could be integrated with other 
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individual pipelines at a later stage, or choose the trans-European system right away. 
In the first scenario, the integration of the separate pipelines could be complicated due 
to differences in the financial set-ups and national legal statuses of the separate 
companies. Moreover, it was also questionable whether a smaller, separate French 
pipeline could be usefully integrated into a European system at all. On other hand, in 
the second case, the economic foundations and demand projections needed to be 
relatively secure, and all of the participating companies would have to agree on the 
feasibility of, and commit capital to, the project. Ultimately, however, there was no 
consensus among the participating companies to commit to the integrated trans-
European pipeline option.  
The case of the Rotterdam-Rhine pipeline illustrates that three of the most 
important companies had diverging interests. On the one hand, BP and Jersey 
Standard were involved in the Nord-West pipeline and had no direct need for an 
additional crude oil supply in the Rhine-Ruhr area. On the other, Royal Dutch Shell 
did not participate in the Nord-West pipeline and required a crude oil pipe to its 
Rhineland refinery. Although Royal Dutch was committed to SAPPEUR, the 
decision-making was moving too slowly for its immediate requirements in the Rhine-
Ruhr area, even though making other plans would undermine the feasibility of the 
trans-European pipeline project. Competing needs were not the only issue of debate. 
For instance, the proposed tariff structure of the trans-European pipeline was a cause 
for disagreement. In order to serve the Rotterdam and Antwerp refineries, the 
pipeline had to be able to compete with maritime tankers in those ports. SAPPEUR 
therefore suggested a tariff structure in which the Rotterdam and Antwerp refineries 
paid lower tariffs than their counterparts in the Rhine-Ruhr area, despite being closer 
to Marseille.524 
Adding insult to injury, several important factors for long-term planning 
seemed to be on shaky ground in late 1957. The pace of the growth in demand for oil 
seemed to be slackening, the situation in the Middle East remained unstable, and 
European capital markets were tight. Finally, the falling spot tanker freights after the 
end of the Suez Crisis made tanker transport cheaper than pipeline transport in the 
short term. The discord among participants and the economic uncertainties made it 
almost impossible for SAPPEUR’s board to make a confident decision to move 
forward with the trans-European pipeline project.525 These uncertainties were 
reflected in the tentative attitudes of the participants in the consortium. Some were 
unwilling to proceed with the trans-European plan in its original form, and were only 
willing to incorporate the possibility of integrating separate pipelines at a later stage. 
                                               
524 BPA 130129, Southern Pipeline Project, file note on SAPPEUR by D.F. Mitchell, 25 October 
1957. 
525 BPA 43379, Sappeur NV minutes of meetings, ‘Sappeur NV aide-memoire to a Meeting held on 
26th September 1957, at the Company’s office, The Hague’, 11 October 1957, 4. 
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Others, however, were not yet ready to abandon the idea of an integrated pipeline 
system.526  
Those at the board meeting in July 1957 expected to make a decision in 
December that year, but given the many uncertainties the meeting and final decision 
were postponed until April 1958. By then, it had become clear that there was no 
common understanding among the participants, and so the board decided not to 
pursue the project any further. Even before this decision, the French oil companies 
CFP and Pechelbronn had decided to pursue the construction of their own pipeline 
from Marseille to Strasbourg.527 The establishment of new refineries in the Upper 
Rhine region added momentum to this initiative, as it would both make a separate 
Southern European pipeline feasible and render an integrated system from Marseille 
to the North Sea obsolete.  
Moreover, the expected coordination of European transport legislation and 
regulation under the European Economic Community promised to tackle most of the 
legislative obstacles to the transnational pipeline operations identified by SAPPEUR. 
Indeed, between 1955 and 1963, the EEC member states discussed the need for and 
requirements of pipeline legislation.528 Although no common legal framework 
emerged, the pipeline regulations in the different member states removed the 
uncertainty experienced by SAPPEUR about the treatment of private industry 
investments in a transnational pipeline system.  Legislative action to regulate the 
construction and operation of pipelines in France had been provoked by the 
CFP/Pechelbronn plans to pursue a separate Southern European pipeline. Rather 
than claiming a stake in the project, the French state pledged to cooperate with the oil 
companies to identify the most suitable legal framework for the construction and 
operation of the pipeline. For this purpose, CFP/Pechelbronn incorporated a pipeline 
company to conduct the negotiations with the French government.529 This company 
was open to all oil firms that deemed it worthwhile to participate in the eventual 
Southern European pipeline. With this move, the trans-European pipeline project 
was effectively dead and SAPPEUR remained what it was, a study group. However, 
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as it had succeeded in bringing together the high level representatives of virtually all of 
the important oil companies active in Europe, it remained in place as a service 
company to assist European crude oil pipeline projects like the Southern European 
pipeline consortium with planning and negotiations.530 Moreover, all of the companies 
that joined the consortium went on to participate in the Southern European pipeline 
company that was established on 30 July 1958.531 The major oil companies even 
remained under the impression that the trans-European pipeline system would one 
day materialise. In the words of an internal BP memorandum:  
 
“Because a large capacity pipeline system from the Mediterranean 
does have future economic benefits, it is important that all pipeline 
companies formed in Western Europe to transport crude into the 
European interior be organized according to certain principles which 
will permit the integration, if desired, of any one pipeline into a 
larger system in order to achieve the most economical transportation 
costs at some later date.”532  
 
6.5 Why the trans-European pipeline never materialised 
The oil companies’ hopes of one day integrating the various crude oil pipelines into 
one trans-European system never materialised. There were several reasons for this, 
with a rise in crude oil production outside the Middle East being just one of them. 
However, probably the most important factor was the growth in the size of crude oil 
tankers after World War II. Larger tankers had a substantial effect on the European 
crude oil supply chain. In the course of the 1960s, crude oil pipelines to Southern 
Germany were constructed from the ports of Marseille, Genoa and Trieste, but none 
of these lines extended past Karlsruhe (Figure 6-7). The crude oil pipelines into West 
Germany therefore consisted of a northern and a southern system. Analogous to the 
term watershed in hydrology, the divide between the northern and southern pipeline 
systems has been called the “oil-shed.”533 Part of the explanation for this oil-shed is 
that the southern pipelines had to cross the Alps, thus increasing costs.534 Moreover, 
the growing size of tankers in the 1960s caused tanker freight rates to drop relative to 
those for pipelines.  
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Figure 6-7. Crude oil pipelines to West Germany, c. 1970 
 
Source: W. Molle and E. Wever, Oil refineries and petrochemical industries in Western Europe: buoyant 
past, uncertain future (Aldershot 1984) 53, 164-168.  
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rendering Rotterdam’s transit function for German crude oil obsolete. However, by 
the time the Southern European pipeline was actually being constructed, larger 
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Rhine-Ruhr area. Furthermore, tanker freights were brought down so much relative 
to pipeline freights that Rotterdam’s pipeline connection to the hinterland was even 
extended as far as Frankfurt am Main. In theory, if tankers did not get bigger than 
100,000 tons, Frankfurt could be supplied more cheaply from Marseille than from 
Rotterdam. However, using tankers of 100,000 tons or more, Frankfurt would be 
supplied more cheaply via Rotterdam.535 With the first 100,000 ton tankers rolling off 
the blocks in 1959, the possibility of turning the pumps in the Rotterdam-Rhine 
pipeline to bring crude oil to the Rotterdam refineries via Marseille and the Ruhr 
faded quickly.536 In 1963, Caltex Deutschland, the German subsidiary of the 
California Texas Oil Company (a joint venture between present day Chevron and 
Texaco), constructed a refinery in Raunheim near Frankfurt.537 The Rotterdam-Rhine 
pipeline was extended in the same year to feed the Caltex refinery.538  
In an attempt to discover whether or not Frankfurt would remain a captive 
hinterland for the Rotterdam port, the Port Authority ordered the engineer L. Cohen 
to study the long-term effects of oil pipelines on the hinterland connections of the 
port and the transhipment of crude oil and oil products. Cohen’s report concluded 
that Rotterdam would probably not need to fear the Southern European pipelines 
originating in Marseille, Genoa and Trieste reaching further than Karlsruhe by the 
1970s. The falling cost of tanker transportation, due to the growing scale of tankers 
and the limitations on the capacity of the Southern European pipelines, favoured 
Rotterdam in its competition with the Mediterranean ports for access to the Rhine 
basin hinterland.539 As the minutes of SAPPEUR revealed, the choice not to pursue 
an integrated pipeline system was not made because tankers became cheaper relative 
to pipelines. Indeed, the cost divergence was only obvious some years after the 
rejection of the trans-European pipeline plan. Instead, the plan was abandoned 
because the timing for the different parts of the pipeline diverged to the extent that 
constructing the system all at once became unfeasible. In addition, the economic and 
legislative environment proved to be too uncertain in 1957. As a consequence, the 
trans-European pipeline continued in a slimmed down version as the Southern 
European pipeline with the primary aim of serving the Upper Rhine area. The 
capacity of the pipeline was therefore too small in the longer term, and the tariffs were 
too high to compete with the Northern European pipelines for the supply of the 
Middle and Lower Rhine areas.  
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6.6 Conclusion 
Notwithstanding the frantic attempts of the Port Authority to leverage its relations 
with the Dutch government and the Shell group, Rotterdam was fairly powerless in 
influencing the decision-making process of the German pipeline consortium. 
Ultimately, the port depended on the Shell group for its future. However, before 
Royal Dutch Shell decided to construct the Rotterdam-Rhine pipeline, it first wanted 
to consider the options available to it. The company had enough time to do so, 
because it was covered for its crude oil supply by the participation of its refining 
contractor Union Kraftstoff in the Wilhelmshaven pipeline.  
Royal Dutch took a transnational view on pipeline planning, studying the 
pipeline question from a European perspective. In response to the Esso AG 
consortium, BP and Royal Dutch shared the belief that pipeline planning should be 
wrested from the hands of national subsidiaries. With SAPPEUR, Royal Dutch 
succeeded in building a large group of national and multinational oil firms around the 
trans-European pipeline project. Although Rotterdam was the company’s home-port 
on the European continent, this did not automatically translate into a pipeline 
connection between Rotterdam and the Rhine-Ruhr area. Indeed, it was only when 
Royal Dutch felt confident that a Rotterdam pipeline could fit within the trans-
European system that it actually decided to construct the Rotterdam-Rhine pipeline.  
However, the decision to build the Rotterdam pipeline was based on 
uncertainty. The SAPPEUR project faltered because it simply proved to be too 
difficult to simultaneously consider and synchronise the production planning of 
individual companies, the complexities of regulatory uncertainty, and the speed and 
direction of economic growth and the oil demand in Western Europe. Whereas the 
refineries of the Upper Rhine required a pipeline by 1963, Deutsche Shell’s Rhineland 
refinery needed one by 1960, which would have required SAPPEUR to proceed with 
the construction of the trans-European pipeline in 1957, as it would take three years 
to build. However, in 1957, SAPPEUR was not yet ready to make a decision in 
favour of the trans-European system, and it was soon clear to Royal Dutch that the 
Marseille pipeline would come too late for its requirements in the Rhine-Ruhr area. 
As separate legs of the trans-European pipeline materialised, the opportunities and 
benefits of an integrated system disappeared. The legal and regulatory problems that 
SAPPEUR anticipated turned out to be of minor importance, as the Rotterdam-
Rhine and Southern European pipelines operated across borders without any 
problems, largely because individual countries and the EEC refrained from 
implementing pipeline legislation other than technical and safety regulations. The 
need for a single European pipeline company with an international legal status based 
in international law thus no longer existed. Moreover, the economic foundations of 
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the trans-European pipeline disappeared with declining freight rates in maritime tank 
shipping. Larger tankers also brought down the cost of transporting crude oil relative 
to pipeline transportation, closing the gap between what it cost to transport crude oil 
to Marseille and Rotterdam.   
The contest for pipelines thus resulted in a collection of national and 
transnational pipelines, allowing the Port of Rotterdam to capture a large share of the 
crude oil supplies to its traditional hinterland. Yet what were the long-term effects of 
the contest for pipelines for Rotterdam’s port? When the construction of the 
Rotterdam-Rhine pipeline commenced in 1958, its starting point was Royal Dutch 
Shell’s existing Pernis facility, rather than a new site in the Europoort expansion. 
Although the initial ideas for the Europoort expansion were developed in direct 
response to the Esso AG pipeline plan, its further development was out of sync with 
that of the Rotterdam-Rhine pipeline. Royal Dutch announced its decision to choose 
Rotterdam in April 1957, while the Port Authority presented the Europoort plan in 
November that year.540    
Even though the Port Authority seemed relatively powerless to influence the 
decision-making of the major oil companies, it was clear that Royal Dutch Shell and 
the port maintained a close relationship. Bataafsche directors briefed the Port 
Authority at critical junctures in the process, and urged Rotterdam to continue its 
expansion plans when the pipeline connection to the Rhine-Ruhr area seemed to be 
lost to Wilhelmshaven in late 1956. The ongoing dialogue between the Port 
Authority and Royal Dutch Shell with regard to the long-term development of the oil 
demand and the requirements of the infrastructure enabled the port to respond 
accordingly, which proved to be useful in the long run. The Europoort extension, 
which opened its first dock in 1960 (the Fourth Petroleum Dock), adapted the port to 
the trend of larger oil tankers. Although Royal Dutch Shell’s Rotterdam-Rhine 
pipeline initially started in Pernis, the company simultaneously urged the port to 
make haste with the Europoort project. Larger tankers of 100,000 tons were being 
built and, to optimally benefit from their lower freight rates, Royal Dutch needed a 
terminal to receive them fully laden. This was impossible at Pernis. Ten years after 
the construction of the initial Rotterdam-Rhine pipeline, a second, larger crude oil 
pipeline to the Ruhr region, originating in the new Europoort area, was constructed. 
This one had a larger capacity, in tune with the growth of oil consumption in West 
Germany.541 The fact that the larger pipeline meant lower transportation costs was 
further enhanced by the capabilities of the new Europoort area to accommodate the 
continuously growing tankers.  
The Europoort expansion proved to be successful in securing a long-term 
                                               
540 De Goey, Ruimte voor industrie, 89.  
541 RRP NV, Annual Report 1968, 5.  
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competitive advantage for Rotterdam as a deep-water port catering for the biggest 
tankers on the planet. L. Cohen’s report proved that Rotterdam had secured a strong 
and long-term presence in its traditional Rhine basin hinterland, notwithstanding the 
competition from other European ports specialising in the transportation of mineral 
oil. The key to this success was to recognise the future trend and capitalise on the 
geographic advantages of the location of the Rotterdam port. As Royal Dutch director 
Guépin had called for in his speech in November 1956, the Port Authority proved to 
be successful in its efforts to secure a relevant role for the Port of Rotterdam in the 
future.  
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Chapter 7 Expanding beyond the Rhine-Ruhr hinterland 
 
7.1 Introduction   
The appearance of crude oil pipelines on the European continent allowed several ports 
to contest Rotterdam’s traditional position as the main outport of the German Rhine-
Ruhr area. The vested interests of the Shell group had been decisive in securing 
Rotterdam’s crude oil pipeline connection to the Rhine-Ruhr hinterland. Although 
the pipeline planning and decision-making process had made it clear that the 
Rotterdam Port Authority had very few ways of influencing the decision of the major 
oil companies in the short term, it also revealed that Royal Dutch Shell and the Port 
of Rotterdam maintained a close relationship. However, in the long run, the Port 
Authority successfully catered to the industry’s need for deep-water access with the 
construction of the Europoort expansion. The negotiations with the German pipeline 
consortium had shown that deep-water access was one of the key factors in deciding 
where to locate the pipeline terminal. The Port Authority expressly attuned the 
Europoort plan to accommodate the largest ships of the day.542  This chapter 
questions the consequences of these 1955-60 changes to the port and hinterland 
infrastructure for the 1960s and early 1970s. 
 At the time, the growing size of ships became the most important driver of 
port expansion projects.543 During and after completion of the Europoort project, the 
depth of the channel to its docks increased from 14 to 19 metres in the 1960s, 
allowing access to ships ranging in size from 100,000 up to 225,000 tons. Just a 
handful of ports in the Atlantic and North Sea area had similar facilities (Le Havre, 
London, and Wilhelmshaven); some came close (Liverpool, Dunkirk), while others 
fell behind (Hamburg, Bremen, Antwerp).544 The relationship between oil and ship 
size was a driving force for port expansion, because it heightened the competition for 
oil flows between ports. In the 1960s, ports like Antwerp and Hamburg lost their 
former position as oil landing facilities simply because their geographical 
circumstances did not allow deep-water access. Indeed, as Le Havre, Rotterdam and 
Wilhelmshaven in particular continued to invest in dredging and port expansion, they 
captured oil shipments from other ports. Over the course of the 1960s, oil flows to 
Europe therefore tended to concentrate in a small number of ports connected by 
large-scale pipelines to the hinterland. The competition between ports to attract oil 
flows was thus an important aspect of the Rhine-Ruhr pipeline case in the late 1950s, 
and continued unabated in the 1960s, as will become clear from this chapter.  
                                               
542 De Goey, Ruimte voor industrie, 88-89.  
543 R. Oldewage, Die Nordseehäfen im EWG-Raum. Fakten und Probleme (Tübingen 1963) 87.  
544 P. Kirschnick, Der Wandel in der o ̈konomischen Bedeutung der großen europa ̈ischen Seeha ̈fen im 20. 
Jahrhundert (Kiel 1969) 72-77.  
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The two large-scale expansion projects of the Port of Rotterdam in the 1960s 
and early 1970s, namely Europoort and Maasvlakte, were a direct consequence of the 
competition between ports. Constructed between 1958 and 1964, Europoort enjoyed 
a high profile in the international business community. By 1966, 82 per cent of the 
facility was rented out.545 As the prized establishment of a blast furnace and steel plant 
never materialised, Europoort became primarily filled with oil and petrochemical 
plants, welcoming the refineries of Gulf (now Kuwait Petroleum) in 1962 and BP in 
1966, adding to the existing refineries in Pernis and Botlek of Royal Dutch Shell, 
Caltex (now Chevron and Texaco) and Jersey Standard. During the 1960s, Rotterdam 
developed into Western Europe’s largest concentration of refinery capacity.546 Indeed, 
between 1955 and 1966, tank storage capacity in the port more than tripled from 4 to 
over 13 million tons, and almost doubled again to 23 million tons in 1972.547  
The existing literature has carefully studied the consequences of Europoort for 
the industrial establishments and cargo throughput in the port, but has neglected to 
consider its impact (and that of Maasvlakte) on Rotterdam’s position in the wider 
West European oil supply system. This chapter aims to fill that lacuna by looking 
more closely at the effects of the Europoort and Maasvlakte expansions on the 
development of Rotterdam’s transport connections with its hinterland.  
Although the Rotterdam-Rhine pipeline ensured the continuation of 
Rotterdam’s traditional ties with the Rhine-Ruhr area, the port expansions in the 
1960s enabled the city’s oil port to expand its reach beyond the Rhine-Ruhr 
hinterland. The chapter is divided into four sections. The first deals with the question 
of why Rotterdam captured most of the increasing demand for crude oil supplies in 
the Rhine-Ruhr area in the mid-1960s. The second section looks at how this 
expansion was related to the creation of Germany’s first and only transnational oil 
product pipeline, which connected Rotterdam with Frankfurt am Main and 
Mannheim-Ludwigshafen. The third section considers the effect of the oil product 
pipeline on Rhine tank shipping, which was traditionally the dominant mode of 
transport for distributing oil products in the Rhine region. Finally, the fourth section 
deals with the conception of the Rotterdam-Antwerp pipeline, an episode that caused 
considerable political and popular hostility between Rotterdam and Antwerp, but was 
ultimately settled by the prevailing business interests of the major oil companies.  
 
                                               
545 De Goey, Ruimte voor industrie, 123.  
546 Molle and Wever, Oil refineries, 60-61. Also see, Appendix B: Data Table 0-6 for a list of refinery 
capacity by region between 1950 and 1975. 
547 Figures kindly provided by Hugo van Driel. Sources: Kamer van Koophandel Rotterdam, Annual 
Reports for 1946-1970 and Dirkzwager’s Guide to the New Waterway. 
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7.2 The expansion of the Rotterdam-Rhine pipeline, 1965-1968  
The continued growth of oil consumption in the Rhine-Ruhr hinterland required the 
Rotterdam-Rhine pipeline to extend its pumping capacity in 1965 and 1966 in order 
to utilise its maximum annual capacity of 18 million tons of crude oil throughput by 
1969.548 The Wilhelmshaven pipeline was to reach its maximum capacity in 1968, at 
22 million tons. By 1969, the two pipelines would thus supply 40 million tons of 
crude oil to the Rhine-Ruhr area and Frankfurt. In response to rising demand in the 
Rhine-Ruhr region, oil companies in the area were planning to expand their refinery 
capacity to 45 million tons by 1970 and 48 million tons in 1975. Additional pipeline 
capacity was therefore required, and both the Rotterdam-Rhine and Nord-West 
pipelines started to study opportunities for expansion.549 However, it soon became 
clear that there was no need for two expanded pipelines. The Nord-West pipeline 
aimed to construct a 40-inch pipe with an ultimate capacity of 34 million tons per 
year, while its Rotterdam-Rhine counterpart aimed for a 36-inch pipeline with an 
ultimate annual capacity of 32 million tons. The two expansions would thus provide 
66 million tons of total capacity, royally overshooting the actual requirements in 1975 
by 18 million tons.550 
Regardless of potential overcapacity, those behind the Rotterdam-Rhine 
pipeline asked the Dutch government to grant a new concession to expand in 1966.551 
According to the concession application, the Rotterdam-Rhine pipeline was eligible 
for expansion mostly because the sea route for imported crude was shorter in the case 
of Rotterdam. Moreover, Rotterdam boasted a facility, Europoort, which had been 
specially constructed to receive the latest generation of super tankers of up to 200,000 
tons. Wilhelmshaven, on the other hand, could only handle tankers up to 120,000 
tons by dredging continuously. According to the shareholders in the Rotterdam-
Rhine pipeline, the advantages of Rotterdam over Wilhelmshaven were also 
acknowledged by a number of refiners (not named) in the Rhine-Ruhr area, which 
were contemplating moving their imports from Wilhelmshaven to Rotterdam. 
According to the concession application, even though the Wilhelmshaven pipeline 
would remain operating at full capacity in the future, it was imperative for the 
competitiveness of Rotterdam that the Rotterdam-Rhine pipeline remained in a 
position to cater for growing demand in the hinterland.  
The Rotterdam-Rhine pipeline had one major disadvantage: the 
Wilhelmshaven concession allowed it to transport both crude oil and oil products, 
                                               
548 RRP NV, Annual Report 1966, 5. 
549 BPA 33660, German NWO-pipeline, BP internal memo, ‘NWO-RRP’, 15 August 1966, 1. 
550 Ibid. 
551 Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Ministerie van VROM: Centrale Sector, (1938) 1940-1981 (1987), 
nummer toegang 2.17.03, inventarisnummer 2991, letter RRP NV to Minister of Economic Affairs 
regarding new concessions for RRP, 18 October 1965. 
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while its Rotterdam-Rhine rival could only the transport of crude oil. Future growth 
was not so much expected to come from refinery expansion and, thus, crude oil 
throughput, but from growing imports of oil products in the hinterland, especially gas 
oil and chemical feedstock (naphtha). Accordingly, to be able to fully utilise its 
potential, the Rotterdam-Rhine pipeline needed to be in a position where it could 
cater for both the extra demand for crude oil and the increasing importation of oil 
products. To that end, the Dutch government granted two new concessions. The first 
was an adaptation of the old concession, with the addition of allowing the pipeline to 
transport oil products. The second was a concession to construct a 36-inch pipeline 
along the trajectory of the first pipe, with an extension to the new deep-water 
terminals of Europoort.552 The concessions were granted in February 1967, because 
“the construction of the second pipeline, which enhances the transport capacity 
greatly, is of great importance for the transit position of the Rotterdam port and the 
utilisation of Europoort as a port for super tankers.”553  
 The relative ease with which the Rotterdam-Rhine pipeline obtained its new 
concession obscures the turmoil that the rival expansion plans of Rotterdam and 
Wilhelmshaven caused in the oil industry. Vested interests ensured that participants 
in either pipeline argued in favour of expansion. The Federal Republic of Germany 
pledged financing to dredge the Wilhelmshaven port to enable it to handle tankers up 
to 170,000 tons. However, Rotterdam’s Europoort expansion promised to 
accommodate the largest tankers of the day (200,000 tons) and seemed to several 
companies to be the designated port for expanding pipeline capacity to the Rhine-
Ruhr area. A BP study had shown that because Europoort could accommodate 
200,000 ton tankers, it was the optimal crude oil hub for supplies to northwestern 
Europe, both as a break bulk location and for the expansion of pipeline capacity to the 
Rhine-Ruhr area. This caused “a lot of jockeying for position” among the oil 
companies involved.554 BP, which was a shareholder in the Nord-West pipeline, 
considered selling its stake and acquiring a share in the Rotterdam-Rhine pipe. 
Meanwhile, other Nord-West pipeline shareholders urged the construction of a 
second Nord-West pipeline from Rotterdam. Esso was considering yet another 
alternative by studying the possibility of expanding refinery capacity in Karlsruhe 
rather than in the Rhine-Ruhr area, thereby reducing the demand for a pipeline 
expansion from either Rotterdam or Wilhelmshaven.555 
                                               
552 NL-HaNA, VROM/Centrale Sector, 2.17.03, inv.nr. 2991, letter RRP NV to the Minister of 
Economic Affairs regarding new concessions for RRP, 18 October 1965. 
553 NL-HaNA, VROM/Centrale Sector, 2.17.03, inv.nr. 2991, letter Rijksplanologische Commissie 
(National Planning Commission) to Minister van Volkshuisvesting en Ruimtelijke Ordening (Housing 
and Spatial Planning), 17 January 1967, 4. 
554 BPA 33660, German NWO-pipeline, BP internal memo, ‘NWO-RRP’, 15 August 1966, 2. 
555 BPA 33660, German NWO-pipeline, letter from Dr Buddenberg (director of Deutsche BP) to BP 
London, ‘NWO/RRP’, 2 August 1966. 
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 Although the jockeying for position led to no actual changes in the 
shareholdings of either pipeline, Rotterdam seemed to have won the contest to 
expand hinterland transport capacity to the Rhine-Ruhr. The construction of the 36-
inch pipeline between a new Royal Dutch Shell terminal in Europoort and the Rhine-
Ruhr area started in 1967, and the project was completed in 1968. Following the BP 
study of 1966, several oil companies active in the Port of Rotterdam urged the Port 
Authority to further dredge the port’s access channel to the sea in order to welcome 
tankers up to 225,000 dwt.556 The subsequent dredging of the so-called oil channel in 
1968 and 1969 was beneficial not only to the expanded Rotterdam-Rhine pipeline, 
but also to the various refineries situated in the port area. Between 1969 and 1975, the 
BP refinery, which had opened in Europoort in 1966, expanded from 5 to 15 million 
tons, Royal Dutch Shell went from 18 to 25 million tons and Esso from 8 to 16 
million tons, creating some of the largest refineries on the Western European 
continent.  
 With Rotterdam expanding its port and pipeline capacity, expansion of the 
Nord-West pipeline no longer seemed to be required. The capacity of the existing 
facility could, however, be enhanced somewhat by putting in additional pumping 
capacity.557 Nonetheless, the growing refinery capacity in the Rhine-Ruhr area and 
demand estimates seemed to suggest that an additional 40-inch pipeline made 
economic sense. After securing German federal government funding for the 
expansion of the Wilhelmshaven facilities, the shareholders in the Nord-West 
pipeline announced the new pipe in March 1971.558 By 1973, the new pipeline, 
Germany’s largest, was in operation. However, less than 10 years later, it had closed 
down again; the projected annual volumes of 85 million tons of crude oil never 
materialised, and the 1970s’ oil crises thus halted the growth of oil consumption. By 
1982, just 15 million tons of crude oil flowed through the Nord-West pipelines, 
which was less than it pumped in the 1960s.559 Although Rotterdam faced the same 
oil crises, the impact on pipeline operations was less disastrous. Indeed, instead of 
operating two parallel crude oil pipelines, the Rotterdam-Rhine pipeline converted 
the old 24-inch pipe into an oil product pipeline in 1968.  
 
7.3 The Rhine-Main pipeline, 1965-1971 
Closely related to the expansion of the Rotterdam-Rhine pipeline was the 
development of Germany’s first and only cross-border oil product pipeline system, the 
Rhein-Main-Rohrleitung or Rhine-Main pipeline. Rising demand for oil in Southern 
                                               
556 De Goey, Ruimte voor industrie, 182.  
557 Förster, Geschichte der Deutschen BP, 322. 
558 ‘Gündlich verschätzt’, Der Spiegel, 23 August 1982, 56.  
559 Ibid. 
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Germany created opportunities to construct inland refineries in concentrated 
consumer areas along the Middle and Upper Rhine and in Bavaria.560 During the 
planning and construction of these refineries in the 1950s, consideration was given to 
building an oil product pipeline from the Rhine-Ruhr area into Southern Germany to 
supply Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria. However, these plans never came to 
fruition; the oil companies decided to build refineries in Bavaria itself because the 
market was sufficiently large. By the mid-1960s, the pattern of refinery locations in 
Germany had formed a watershed between the northern and southern pipeline 
systems,561 with the latter serving refineries in Bavaria and along the Rhine up to 
Karlsruhe and Mannheim, and the former supplying refineries on the Lower and 
Middle Rhine up to Frankfurt.  
 
Figure 7-1. German metropolitan regions in the Rhine basin 
 
Source: Map created by the author based on regional definitions provided in: Bundesamt für Bauwesen 
und Raumordnung (BBR) and Initiativkreis Europäische Metropolregionen in Deutschland (IKM), 
Regionales Monitoring 2008. Daten und Karten zu den Europäischen Metropolregionen in Deutschland 
(Bonn 2008) 7. http://www.deutsche-metropolregionen.org/fileadmin/ikm/IKM-
Veroeffentlichungen/IKM-Monitoring2008_lite.pdf, accessed 11 July 2014.  
 
When demand for fuel and chemical feedstock in the Rhine-Main and Rhine-Neckar 
areas (Figure 7-1) increased in the 1960s, Deutsche Shell began to ponder whether to 
                                               
560 Karlsch and Stokes, Faktor Öl, 320-321; M. Gassner, ‘Lokale Umwelt oder transnationale Chance? 
ENIs Reaktion auf die Proteste gegen die CEL-Pipeline in den 1960er Jahren’, Zeitschrift für 
Unternehmensgeschichte 57 (2012) 1, 31-46, here: 35-37; T. Schlemmer, Industriemoderne in der Provinz. 
Die Region Ingolstadt zwischen Neubeginn, Boom und Krise, 1945 bis 1975 (München 2009) 203-210. 
561 Molle and Wever, Oil refineries, 49. 
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construct a new refinery near Frankfurt or to supply the area via a pipeline from 
Cologne.562 Initially, the company aimed to supply growing demand in the Rhine-
Neckar and Rhine-Main regions from its refinery near Strasbourg. However, BASF’s 
growing demand for petrochemical feedstock, with which Deutsche Shell was 
cooperating closely, required an increasing stream of naphtha to be supplied to 
Ludwigshafen. Although Strasbourg was closer to Ludwigshafen than Cologne-
Godorf, its naphtha stream was inadequate. Accordingly, as the naphtha yield of a 
refinery is closely related to its size, the additional demand in Ludwigshafen was to be 
supplied from Cologne-Godorf, which was twice the size of the Strasbourg refinery in 
1965.563  
In 1964, Deutsche Shell incorporated the Rhine-Main Pipeline Company 
(Rhein-Main-Rohrleitungstransportgesellschaft) for the construction and exploitation of 
an oil product pipeline between the Rhine-Ruhr, Rhine-Main and Rhine-Neckar 
areas (Figure 7-2). In 1965, Deutsche BP joined Deutsche Shell, because the 
distribution of its refinery locations was similar, with facilities in Hamburg, the 
Rhine-Ruhr area, Bavaria and Strasbourg, but none in the Rhine-Main and Rhine-
Neckar regions. By 1967, four more companies joined the Rhine-Main pipeline 
group.564 With the exception of Deutsche BP, the participating firms also owned the 
Rotterdam-Rhine pipeline. The expansions of the two pipelines were thus closely 
coordinated. 
  
                                               
562 Riffel, Mineralöl-Fernleitungen, 114; H.-J. Burchard, ‘Neuere Entwicklungen im 
Rohrleitungstransport’, Erdöl und Kohle – Erdgas – Petrochemie 18 (1965) 11, 1008. Literature about the 
creation of the Rhine-Main pipeline is scarce, and is mostly produced by German geographers and 
authors active in the oil industry; none of it is historical. The following is compiled from a number of 
such publications, trade journals and some archival material found in the BP Archive. 
563 Riffel, Mineralöl-Fernleitungen, 114; Molle and Wever, Oil Refineries, 165-169.  
564 Riffel, Mineralöl-Fernleitungen, 115. The  company’s shares were divided between Deutsche Shell 
AG (55 per cent), Deutsche BP AG (29), Chevron Erdöl Deutschland GmbH (5), Texaco Oel GmbH 
(5), Gelsenkirchener Bergwerks AG (4) and Mobil Oil AG (2). 
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Figure 7-2. Map of the Rhine-Main pipeline trajectory 
 
Source: Map created by the author based on the trajectory described by: D. Nagel, Die ökonomische 
Bedeutung von Mineralöl-Pipelines (Hamburg 1968) 41; E. Riffel, Mineralöl-Fernleitungen im 
Oberrheingebiet und in Bayern: Arbeit aus dem Geographischen Institut der Universität Mannheim (Bonn 
1970) 115-117.  
 
The locations of the tank depots and major clients of the pipeline’s owners dictated its 
trajectory. At a total cost of 260 million DM, the pipeline was constructed in two 
parts.565 In 1967, the first, southern part was built between the Cologne area, 
Frankfurt and Ludwigshafen, connecting Deutsche Shell’s Cologne-Godorf refinery 
to its tank depots along the Rhine (Figure 7-3).566 Near Frankfurt, the pipeline was 
connected to the Caltex refinery in Raunheim, which was the principal supplier of 
feedstock to Hoechst, which was Germany’s third largest chemical company and 
located in Frankfurt. In Ludwigshafen, the pipeline connected to BASF’s vast 
petrochemical plant, to where it delivered naphtha based on a long-term supply 
contract between Deutsche Shell and BASF for the delivery of 500,000 tons of the 
product annually.567 Moreover, part of this delivery contract included the obligation to 
supply the naphtha via pipeline, which was one of the initial reasons for building it.  
In 1968, the northern part of the pipeline was constructed and connected BP’s 
refinery in Dinslaken (on the Rhine just north of the Ruhr area) with Deutsche Shell’s 
                                               
565 D. Nagel, Die ökonomische Bedeutung von Mineralöl-Pipelines (Hamburg 1968) 41. 
566 ‘Die Produktenleitung Godorf – Ludwigshafen – Flörsheim’, Erdöl und Kohle 19 (1966) 1, 64-65. 
567 Riffel, Mineralöl-Fernleitungen, 115; Nagel, Mineralöl-Pipelines, 39.  
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Cologne-Godorf plant and the UK Wesseling refinery in Wesseling (Figure 7-3). 
Branches of the pipeline also connected the Gelsenberg Benzin refinery in 
Gelsenkirchen, Erdölchemie (a 50/50 joint venture between BP and Bayer) in 
Dormagen and Rheinische Olefinwerke (a 50/50 joint venture between Royal Dutch 
Shell and BASF) in Wesseling.568 In late 1968, the Rhine-Main pipeline was 
connected to the Rotterdam-Rhine pipeline at Venlo, for which a pipe between Venlo 
and Dinslaken was constructed. A transport contract between the Rotterdam-Rhine 
and Rhine-Main pipelines governed the cross-border transportation of oil products 
through them. The connection to the Rotterdam-Rhine pipeline enabled Deutsche 
Shell, BP and Chevron to pump oil products from their refineries and tank depots in 
the Port of Rotterdam into the Rhine-Main pipeline, creating an integrated pipeline 
system for oil products between Rotterdam and Ludwigshafen. The Rhine-Main 
pipeline system, meanwhile, was dedicated to performing transport for the 
participating firms. Independent tank storage companies in Rotterdam, such as 
Paktank, did have a physical connection to the pipeline, but the actual use of it by 
outsiders was restricted and almost never occurred.569  
 
 
                                               
568 Riffel, Mineralöl-Fernleitungen, 116.  
569 Interview with Jan Brouwer, former director of Paktank International, 16 April 2013.  
  176
Fi
gu
re
 7
-3
. R
ef
in
er
ie
s,
 p
et
ro
ch
em
ic
al
 p
la
nt
s 
an
d 
ta
nk
 d
ep
ot
s 
co
nn
ec
te
d 
to
 th
e 
R
hi
n
e-
M
ai
n
 p
ip
el
in
e 
Rh
ine
-R
uh
r a
rea
 
Rh
ine
-M
ain
 an
d R
hin
e-N
ec
ka
r a
rea
 
 
 
So
ur
ce:
 M
ap
 cr
ea
ted
 by
 th
e a
uth
or
 ba
sed
 on
 th
e t
raj
ect
or
y d
esc
rib
ed
 by
: D
. N
ag
el,
 D
ie 
öko
no
mi
sch
e B
ede
utu
ng
 vo
n M
ine
ral
öl-
Pi
pel
ine
s (
H
am
bu
rg 
19
68
) 4
1; 
E.
 R
iff
el,
 
M
ine
ral
öl-
Fe
rn
lei
tun
gen
 im
 O
ber
rhe
ing
ebi
et 
un
d i
n B
ay
ern
: A
rbe
it a
us 
dem
 G
eog
rap
his
che
n I
nst
itu
t d
er 
Un
ive
rsi
tät
 M
an
nh
eim
 (B
on
n 1
97
0) 
11
5-
11
7. 



	












	












	
























	


	








	












	





















  177 
The creation of the Rhine-Main pipeline served four purposes. Firstly, it solved the 
distribution problems of the participating oil companies. Secondly, it secured the 
continuous supply of petrochemical feedstock to BASF and Bayer. Thirdly, the 
expansion of Rheinische Olefinwerke in Wesseling in 1968 required a naphtha supply 
that corresponded to a crude oil distillation capacity of 20 million tons per year. As 
the principal supplier of naphtha, namely Deutsche Shell’s Cologne-Godorf refinery, 
only disposed of 8 million tons, the Rhine-Main pipeline was vital for the operations 
of Rheinische Olefinwerke.570 Fourthly, and most fundamentally, its connection to the 
Rotterdam-Rhine pipeline helped to resolve the mismatch between supply and 
demand on the German oil markets.  
In the late 1950s, German oil consumption increasingly consisted of heavy 
fuel oil. Refineries constructed between 1958 and 1965 aimed for a high yield of 
heavy fractions to serve growing demand. However, during the 1960s, demand for 
lighter oil products increased relative to heavier ones. This demand could be met 
either domestically or via imports, for instance from Rotterdam. Domestic production 
would also entail a higher yield of heavy fuel oil, for which there was no demand in 
Germany. Importing the additional volumes of lighter oil products was therefore the 
better option, and the Rhine-Main pipeline’s connection to Rotterdam provided an 
efficient and secure solution.571 Indeed, Mobil Oil, Chevron, Texaco, BP and 
Deutsche Shell all supplied the German market with oil product imports via 
Rotterdam. 
 The Rhine-Main pipeline primarily became a competitor to inland tank 
shipping. All of the refineries and tank depots served by the pipeline were constructed 
next to inland waterways. The initial capacity of the pipeline in Germany was 4.5 
million tons annually, but its maximum capacity was more than twice that amount. 
The pipe mainly transported gasoline, kerosene (jet fuel), naphtha and light fuel oil, 
which were products that were also commonly transported by inland tank ships. 
Consequently, the owners of these ships objected strongly to the pipeline. However, 
the cost benefits of the pipeline vis-à-vis inland tank shipping were substantial.572 The 
Rhine was one of the principal waterways for the movement of oil products, because 
the freight rates of inland tank shipping were low due to the large volumes 
transported on this river. Yet, for the same reason, it became feasible to transport 
these volumes by pipeline.573 The calculation of the Rhine-Main pipeline’s tariff 
structure also revealed its competitive nature. Usually in pipeline operations, the pay-
                                               
570 ‘Die ROW als Beispiel fruchtbarer Zusammenarbeit zwischen Mineralöl- und chemischer Industrie’, 
Erdöl und Kohle, Erdgas, Petrochemie 22 (1969) 11, 721-723 
571 Riffel, Mineralöl-Fernleitungen, 116. 
572 Ibid., 117.  
573 G. Heimerl, ‘Neue Raffineriestandorte und Produkten-Pipelines. Eine verkehrswirtschaftliche 
Studie für den südwestdeutschen Raum’, Erdöl und Kohle 19 (1966) 1, 536. 
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out time of the capital investment forms the basic assumption for setting the pipeline’s 
transportation tariff, based on capital and operating costs, which are then divided 
between the shareholders’ relative share in the transport performed by the pipe. In the 
case of the Rhine-Main pipeline, the competitiveness vis-à-vis barge transport formed 
the basis for tariff setting, regardless of the point in time when the pipeline would 
start turning a profit.574 Tariffs were based on the actual barge freight rates on 
corresponding trajectories minus a fixed rebate, so as to ensure that the pipeline tariff 
followed the movement of barge rates at a competitive level. There was some 
disagreement between the major shareholders (Deutsche Shell and Deutsche BP), 
who were more concerned about their return on investment, and the smaller 
shareholders, who were mainly interested in low freight rates. However, to ensure that 
the pipeline was used enough, the shareholders ultimately agreed to low rates for 
transporting freight.575 
Whereas the traditional method of distributing a refinery’s production 
involved a combination of barge, train and road tank car, a pipeline replaced barge 
and rail for a large central tank depot from which road tank cars covered the last few 
miles to the client. Although a pipeline delivered unrivalled transport cost reductions, 
the drawback was the need to construct one or two large tank depots or a system of 
branch pipelines with a number of smaller tank depots, adding substantially to the 
capital investment. A pipeline only made sense for the continuous transport of large 
volumes to a small number of central tank depots that were close to a major 
concentration of consumers (state, business or private).576 This was the function 
hitherto performed by inland tank shipping. After its inception, the Rhine-Main 
pipeline took care of 30 per cent of the transport of oil products from Deutsche Shell’s 
Cologne-Godorf refinery.577 Then, between 1967 and 1973, the throughput of the 
Rhine-Main pipeline increased from 2.5 to 12.8 million tons, while in the same 
period, the intra-German transport of Royal Dutch Shell’s captive fleet of inland 
tankers remained stable between 2.5 and 3 million tons.578 As a consequence, not only 
did the Rhine-Main pipeline take over a substantial part of intra-German inland 
shipping transportation, but the pipeline system also allowed for oil product imports 
to be pumped rather than barged.  
                                               
574 BPA 40963, Germany – RMR, record notes of RMR tariff committee meetings on 6 March 1968, 
11 April 1966, 20 May 1966 and 19 June 1966.  
575 Ibid. 
576 Heimerl, ‘Neue Raffineriestandorte und Produkten-Pipelines’, 535-536. 
577 ‘Weitere Einzelheiten über den Ausbau der Shell-Raffinerie Godorf’, Erdöl und Kohle 20 (1967) 5, 
379.  
578 Mineralölwirtschaftsverband e.V., ‘Statistikanhang, Mineralölpipelines über 40 km Länge’, 
Mineralölversorgung mit Pipelines (Hamburg, 2006). 
http://www.mwv.de/upload/Publikationen/dateien/030_Pipelines_Z03yDZ9hZhcN2Q7.pdf, accessed 
1 August 2013; VOA, 1260/86-89, Vervoersstatistieken INTERNATIONALE, 1950-1976.  
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 Figure 7-4 represents the volumes of oil products transported by the Rhine-
Main pipeline in its first four years of operation. Three main production areas 
dictated the pattern of transportation flows through the pipe: Rotterdam (home to the 
refineries of Royal Dutch Shell, BP and Caltex), Dinslaken (BP refinery) and 
Cologne-Godorf (Deutsche Shell refinery). Three main consumption regions were 
supplied from these production areas: Rhine-Ruhr, Rhine-Main and Rhine-Neckar. 
The flows depicted in Figure 7-4 represent the flows between these major areas of 
production and consumption.  
 
Figure 7-4. The volumes of the oil products transported by the Rhine-
Main pipeline 1968-1971 
  
  
 
Source: BP Archive, 21090 & 21093, RMR Progress Reports, 1968-1971. Map created by the author. 
The data are reported in Appendix B: Data Table 0-5.  
 
In 1968, the Rhine-Main pipeline pumped a total of 1.4 million tons of oil products, 
66 per cent of which was intra-German transport. The trajectories of Rotterdam-
Cologne, Dinslaken-Dormagen and Cologne-Ludwigshafen constituted the largest 
flows, which were comparable in size (between 0.2 and 0.3 million tons). In 1969, the 
first full year of operations, imports from Rotterdam already amounted to 52 per cent 
(3.3 million tons) of the pipeline’s total transported volumes, and this pattern 
intensified in 1970 and 1971 when this figure rose to up to 67 and 70 per cent (Table 
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7-1). Imports from Rotterdam-Pernis were evenly distributed between the Rhine-
Ruhr and the Rhine-Main-Neckar regions (Table 7-1), with the vast majority of 
imports to the latter were destined for the Frankfurt area (Figure 7-4).  
Within Germany, the majority of the transported volumes went to the Rhine-
Main and Rhine-Neckar areas (Table 7-1 Intra-German transport), rising from 66 
per cent in 1968 to 80 per cent in 1970. Whereas all the participants in the Rhine-
Main pipeline carried imports from Rotterdam, intra-German transport differed 
markedly. BP, for instance, used the pipeline mainly to distribute products within the 
Rhine-Ruhr region and its tank depot in the Rhine-Main area; it rarely transported 
goods to the Rhine-Neckar region.  
 
Table 7-1. Oil product transport, Rhine-Main pipeline, 1968-1971 
(million tons) 1968 1969 1970 1971 
Imports from Rotterdam-Pernis 0.48 3.27 5.89 6.30 
Pct. of total transported volume 34 52 67 70 
To Rhine-Ruhr 0.32 1.75 3.02 3.53 
Percentage of German imports 67 53 51 56 
To Rhine-Main-Neckar 0.16 1.53 2.87 2.77 
Percentage of German imports 33 47 49 44 
Intra-German transport 0.92 3.06 2.86 2.70 
Pct. of total transported volume 66 48 33 30 
In Rhine-Ruhr 0.31 1.02 0.69 0.53 
Percentage of intra-German 34 33 24 20 
To Rhine-Main-Neckar 0.61 2.04 2.17 2.17 
Percentage of intra-German 66 67 76 80 
Total 1.40 6.34 8.75 9.01 
Source: BP Archive, 21090 & 21093, RMR progress reports, 1968-1971. Own calculations. The full 
data are reported in Appendix B: Data Table 0-5.  
 
Deutsche Shell, on the other hand, rarely used the pipeline to distribute products 
within the Rhine-Ruhr area; all of its transport was destined for the Rhine-Main and 
Rhine-Neckar areas, with 20 per cent of this consisting of deliveries to BASF under a 
long-term supply contract for naphtha.579  
 It is striking to note that soon after the pipeline became operational, its initial 
function changed quite dramatically. The pipeline had been intended to perform 
intra-German transport from the Rhine-Ruhr region to the Rhine-Main-Neckar area, 
but its connection to the old Rotterdam-Rhine pipeline rapidly made its importing 
function more important. By 1971, the Rhine-Main pipeline imported a total of 6.3 
million tons of oil products in West Germany. As such, it was responsible for 45 per 
cent of the oil product flows between Rotterdam and West Germany, which 
                                               
579 BP Archive, 21090 & 21093, RMR progress reports, 1968-1971. Own calculations. 
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constituted almost 19 per cent of Germany’s total oil product imports in 1971.580 The 
Rhine-Main pipeline system thus rapidly developed into an important hinterland 
connection between the Port of Rotterdam and West Germany.  
 
7.4 Rhine tank shipping and the transition of the hinterland 
The Rhine-Main pipeline became feasible because the volumes of oil product 
movements in the Rhine region presented potential economies of scale in 
transportation. The pipeline aimed to divert flows from inland tank shipping, as the 
setting of pipeline tariffs showed, and it had a considerable impact on the competitive 
position of Rhine tank shipping. It is therefore necessary to take a closer look at the 
development of this mode of transport and its role in shaping port-hinterland 
relations between 1945 and 1975.  
One of the largest Rhine tank ship owners was the Rotterdam-based Phs. Van 
Ommeren NV. Van Ommeren operated its own fleet, but also managed an inland 
tank fleet for Royal Dutch Shell, which was a joint venture between the two 
companies.581 The transport data of Van Ommeren give a clear picture of how and 
why Rhine tank shipping changed between 1947 and 1975. The data reveal two 
distinct periods, which reflect the changes in the demand for oil in the Rhine-Ruhr 
hinterland. Between 1945 and 1959, German imports of crude oil and oil products 
rose rapidly, causing the strong growth of Rhine tank shipping, in particular between 
Rotterdam and West Germany after 1956. However, between 1960 and 1968, 
imports levelled off and the transport demand shifted from cross-border shipments to 
intra-German shipments as West Germany’s domestic refinery capacity was expanded 
and the Rotterdam-Rhine and Nord West pipelines diverted all crude oil shipments 
from inland tank shipping to pipelines.  
Notwithstanding the many obstacles to trade in the first 15 years after the war, 
especially with Germany, the total volume of oil products shipped over the Rhine 
increased by 25 per cent annually between 1947 and 1959.582 Van Ommeren profited 
from this growth, and transport also increased by 25 per cent annually, from only 0.5 
million tons in 1947 to 5.3 million tons in 1956. The pattern of the transport flows in 
this period changed substantially, mainly due to the removal of limitations on trade 
and transport arising from subsequent Allied and Federal Republic policies.  
 The most inhibiting policy barred foreign flags from partaking in intra-
German transport, and had been implemented during the Allied occupation of 
                                               
580 Based on data compiled for: M. Boon, ‘Energy Transition and Port-Hinterland relations. The 
Rotterdam oil port and its relations to the West German hinterland, 1950-1975’, Economic History 
Yearbook (2012) 2, 217, note 10. 
581 C. Boele and P. van de Laar, Geschiedenis Koninklijke Van Ommeren NV (Rotterdam 2001) 96-99. 
582 VOA, 1260/87, Quarterly transport statistics, 1947-1975. Own calculations. 
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Germany between 1945 and 1949. The Allied Joint Export and Import Agency 
(JEIA), which oversaw German foreign trade, had issued a directive (nr. 30, in 1949) 
stipulating that foreign flags should only partake in intra-German transport when the 
German inland fleet was fully employed. This was mainly a means to limit foreign 
exchange outlays.583 Part of the problem was that almost 75 per cent of the Elbe 
inland tank fleet was looking for employment in West Germany, because of the 
blockade of Berlin.584 Van Ommeren’s transport therefore concentrated on shipments 
from Rotterdam to West Germany and Switzerland until 1951 (Figure 7-5 and 
Figure 7-6).585  
 
Figure 7-5. The total volumes of oil products transported by Van 
Ommeren, 1947-75 (in million tons) 
 
Source: Van Ommeren Archive (VOA), archive number 1260, box number 87, quarterly transport 
statistics, 1947-1975. Own calculations. 
  
                                               
583 VOA, 1260/260, Hervatting innerdeutsche transporten, 1948-1953, internal memo on intra-German 
transport, 12 May 1949, 1.  
584 VOA, 1260/260, G. Meyer, ‘Wo steht die Elbeshiffahrt’, Zeitschrift für Binnenschiffahrt (1950) 5, 
114.  
585 Van Ommeren also shipped to Belgium and France, as well as within Belgium and the Netherlands. 
Figure 7-6 only depicts the most important destinations, for the sake of clarity.  
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Figure 7-6. Destinations of the Van Ommeren transported volumes, 1947-
75 
 
Source: Van Ommeren Archive (VOA), archive number 1260 box number 87, quarterly transport 
statistics, 1947-1975. Own calculations. 
 
Although JEIA directive 31 liberalised cross-border shipping between the 
Netherlands and Germany in September 1949, intra-German transport (or cabotage) 
remained closed to foreign flags,586 with the restrictions applying to all forms of inland 
shipping. Before the war, intra-German transport had been an important part of Van 
Ommeren’s operations, but consecutive rounds of Dutch-German trade negotiations 
could not achieve a solution to the issue. As one of the largest ship owners in the 
Rhine tank shipping business, Van Ommeren was thus closely involved in these 
Dutch-German negotiations.   
 The main German concern was the dumping of foreign inland barge capacity 
on the German market. This represented a shift in the country’s argument against 
intra-German participation by foreign flags, which had hitherto been based on a 
shortage of foreign currency in Germany.587 As long as the Dutch Rhine fleets could 
not agree on market discipline by setting minimum rates, the Germans continued to 
be anxious about allowing the Dutch fleet access to intra-German transport.588 Van 
Ommeren, however, argued that this was not the position in the inland tanker market, 
because it was much more concentrated and coordinated than dry bulk and general 
                                               
586 VOA, 1260/240, letter from the Dutch Ministry of Transport to the Rotterdam Chamber of 
Commerce, ‘Betr. JEIA-instructie No. 31’, 8 September 1949.  
587 Lak, ‘Because we need them…’, 178.  
588 VOA, 1260/240, letter from the Dutch Ministry of Transport to the Rotterdam Chamber of 
Commerce, ‘Betr. JEIA-instructie No. 31’, 8 September 1949. 
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cargo shipping.589  
Notwithstanding Van Ommeren’s arguments regarding the organisation of 
the Dutch inland tank shipping business, Dutch-German negotiations suffered from 
the overcapacity in German tank shipping and a Dutch claim to 80 tank ships that 
were built in the Netherlands for German companies during the war. However, as the 
Dutch-German negotiations with regard to Rhine shipping generally moved into 
deadlock, the inland tank ship owners made progress and reached an agreement on 14 
December 1950.590 The agreement stipulated that the Dutch and German inland tank 
fleets could freely participate in domestic transport. In return, the Dutch gave up their 
claim to the 80 German inland tankers mentioned above.591 The accord on Rhine tank 
shipping reflected the highly concentrated nature of the inland tank shipping business. 
The ability of Dutch tank ship owners to coordinate their activities allowed them to 
close an agreement with their German counterparts. However, for the other 
categories of Rhine shipping (dry bulk and general cargo), a Dutch-German accord 
was not concluded until 1956.592 
Although the dropping of the claim to the 80 tank ships by the Dutch sealed 
the deal, the agreement probably also arose from necessity. The European refinery 
expansion program as part of the Marshall Plan provided for the scheduled expansion 
of West German refinery capacity from 0.86 to 5.3 million tons per annum between 
1948 and 1953.593 At least 1.5 million tons of this would take place in the Rhine-Ruhr 
region, considerably increasing the demand for intra-German tanker transport on the 
Rhine. As a result, between 1949 and 1953, the volume of the intra-German 
transport of oil products grew annually by 29 per cent from 1 to 2.6 million tons. 
Over the same period, the total capacity of the German inland tanker fleet increased 
by just 9 per cent annually, from 154,000 to 218,000 tons.594 Although it is hard to say 
much about the loading rate of the German inland tanker fleet based on these data, it 
is quite plausible to conclude that the discrepancy between the growth of the German 
fleet and the transported volumes allowed for the participation of foreign fleets in 
intra-German transport. Moreover, in the early 1950s, the German inland tank fleet 
still consisted predominantly of barges; motor tankers made up just 38 per cent of the 
                                               
589 VOA, 1260/240, letter from Van Ommeren to the Rotterdam Chamber of Commerce, 7 September 
1949.  
590 VOA, 1260/240, minutes regarding Rhine shipping as part of the Dutch-German trade 
negotiations, 19 May 1950. 
591 VOA, 1260/260, letter from C. Matthijssen (Van Ommeren) to the Directorate-general of 
Shipping of the Dutch Ministry of Transport, 29 Maart 1951.  
592 Lak, ‘Because we need them…’, 186. 
593 VOA, 1260/240, memo from Van Ommeren Hamburg, ‘Durchsatz der Oelraffinerien’, 10 
December 1949. The estimate was incomplete, because it did not include two refineries in 
Gelsenkirchen with a combined capacity of 1 million tons. 
594 Statistisches Bundesamt, Die Binnenschiffahrt im Jahre 1949, 1950, 1952 and 1953 (Köln, 1950, 1951, 
1953, 1954). Own calculations.  
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fleet.595 As towed tank barges had a much lower transfer capacity than motor tankers, 
the Dutch inland tanker fleet, with its higher share of motor tankers, could deliver 
higher a turnaround.596 As a consequence of import liberalisation in 1949 and the 
freeing up of intra-German transport in 1951, West Germany again became the most 
important market for Van Ommeren. Indeed, by 1959, 50 per cent of the total 
volumes transported by the firm were destined for West Germany and 17 per cent 
consisted of intra-German transport (Figure 7-6).  
The explosive growth in the demand for oil in Western Europe in the late 
1950s and the 1960s resulted in new refineries in the Rhine-Ruhr area in the period 
1955-1960, followed by refineries in Strasbourg, Karlsruhe, Western Switzerland and 
Bavaria in the 1960s.597 Imports via the Rhine dropped from a high point of 10 
million tons in 1958 to 6.5 million tons in 1961, only to reach the 1958 level again in 
1970.598 Van Ommeren’s transport pattern changed radically as a result. Inland 
refineries altered transport patterns to the benefit of road tank haulage and to the 
detriment of combined traffic, i.e. the combination of barge and rail traffic to supply 
clients. Around 1955, Germany disposed of an intricate structure of tank depots, 
which were typically supplied from coastal refineries (Hamburg) by barge or rail or a 
combination of the two. Clients were then supplied from these depots. By 1968, they 
were more often supplied directly from inland refineries by road tank cars. The 
intricate pattern of the placement of tank depots was replaced by a smaller number of 
large tank depots located in areas that could not be served directly by road tank cars. 
In 1964, these transported more than three times the volume moved by inland tank 
barges, and five times the amounts transported by rail tank cars.599   
This structural change in the transportation pattern occurred particularly after 
the construction of refineries in Southwestern and Southern Germany in the early and 
mid-1960s. The average transport performance per unit (expressed in tons per 
kilometre) increased for road tank cars, while it decreased for tank barges and rail tank 
cars.600 A shortening of the average distance per shipment was the primary cause, and 
this applied to all transport modes. For road tank cars, however, the growing volumes 
caused the total transport performance to rise along with the profitability of the road 
tank haulage sector. On the other hand, the declining transport performance of inland 
                                               
595 A. Kunz, Statistik der Binnenschiffahrt in Deutschland 1835-1989 (1999 [2005]) GESIS Köln, 
Deutschland ZA8157 Datenfile Version 1.0.0, accessed 30 July 2013. Own calculations. 
596 Boele and Van de Laar, Geschiedenis Koninklijke Van Ommeren, 62; Centrale Bond van Werknemers 
in het Transportbedrijf, De positive van de Nederlandse Rijnvaart in internationaal verband (Rotterdam 
1951) 5. 
597 Waller and Swain, ‘Changing patterns of oil transportation’, 2, 143-156. 
598 VOA, 1260/87, quarterly transport statistics, 1947-1975. Own calculations. 
599 O. Schneider, ‘Die Auswirkungen des Strukturwandels in der Mineralölindustrie auf die 
Verkehrsträger und Verkehrsmittel in der Bundesrepublik’, Erdöl und Kohle 19 (1966) 1, 58-60.   
600 Seidenfuss, Energie und Verkehr, 168-175. 
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tank barges and rail tank cars led to a fall in their respective profitability and increased 
the competitive pressure from road tank cars on inland navigation and rail transport.601 
Van Ommeren’s transport performance changed from a predominantly cross-
border pattern – shipments from Rotterdam to West Germany comprised 54 per cent 
of the company’s total transport in 1958 – to intra-German transport. Then, between 
1959 and 1961, the share of intra-German transport rose from 17 to 37 per cent 
(Figure 7-6), and from then on remained more important than cross-border 
shipments to West Germany. This shift shortened the average voyage performed by 
inland tanker fleets, which in turn led to a falling average ton-kilometre performance. 
As a result, Van Ommeren’s profit margins declined. This was particularly 
problematic for Royal Dutch Shell’s captive fleet on the Rhine, which was operated 
and co-owned by Van Ommeren.602  
 A further complicating factor that reduced the opportunities for the profitable 
exploitation of the captive fleet was the construction of the Rhine-Main pipeline 
system between 1965 and 1968. This threatened the captive fleet in two ways. Firstly, 
because a pipeline operates most efficiently at (near) full capacity, the shipments sent 
through it in this period consisted of regular and frequent volumes to fixed 
destinations. Secondly, the pipeline replaced barges on the long-haul trips between 
the Cologne area and Frankfurt and Ludwigshafen, as well as between Rotterdam and 
German destinations. The Rhine-Main pipeline therefore caused the transport of the 
captive fleet to become shorter and less regular, which increased the costs per voyage 
and reduced its profit margins.603 Moreover, as a result of the pipeline, Deutsche 
Shell’s demand for inland tank shipping transport became volatile. Regular batches 
that were hitherto reserved for the captive fleet were shifted to the pipeline, leading to 
spikes in demand. This required a level of flexibility that was not present in the fleet. 
As a result, Deutsche Shell, which was its most important client, found its rates to be 
too high. Accordingly, by the early 1970s, the fleet was no longer useful to the Shell 
group,604 and was liquidated in 1976.605 The fate of the captive fleet reflected the 
transformation of the way in which Royal Dutch Shell organised its transportation of 
oil in the Rhine basin, replacing an inland tanker fleet with a pipeline for long haul 
and cross-border shipments, leaving local distribution at the discretion of local 
subsidiaries.  
 The fate of non-captive fleets was not as dramatic, but in the longer term was 
no less problematic. Between 1961 and 1973, the volume of oil product flows over the 
                                               
601 Schneider, ‘Die Auswirkungen des Strukturwandels’, 59.  
602 VOA, 1260/85, minutes of the Supervisory Board of INTERNATIONALE, 1967-1969. 
603 VOA, 1260/85, minutes of the Supervisory Board of INTERNATIONALE, 1967-1969.  
604 VOA 1260/239, internal memo from the director of inland tank shipping Van Ommeren to RvB 
Van Ommeren, 22 August 1972, 1-3. 
605 VOA 1260/239, internal memo on the Van Ommeren-Shell negotiations in 1973, 10 May 1973, 2-
3. 
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Rhine between Rotterdam and Germany increased almost three-fold in response to 
the growth of oil product imports coming into the country. Although Van Ommeren 
and most other inland tank ship owners profited from the rise in German imports, 
inland tanker fleets in general experienced declining profit margins due to, for 
instance, shorter voyages and rising labour costs, which the ship owners sought to 
offset by modernising and rationalising their fleets.606  
 
Figure 7-7. The German inland tanker fleet, 1950-1975 
 
Source: A. Kunz, Statistik der Binnenschiffahrt in Deutschland 1835-1989 (1999 [2005]). GESIS Köln, 
Deutschland ZA8157 Datenfile Version 1.0.0, accessed 30 July 2013. Own calculations. 
 
Figure 7-7 shows the capacity of the German inland tanker fleet between 1950 and 
1975. The modernisation and expansion of the fleet occurred in two stages. During 
the first period, between 1955 and 1963, the German tanker fleet expanded its 
capacity from around 200,000 tons to 650,000 tons. The fleet was also modernised 
with the addition of motor tankers of increasing sizes; the average capacity of the 
motor tankers rose between 1952 and 1963 from 500 tons to little under 800 tons. By 
1963, when the refineries along the Rhine (Ruhr area, Cologne, Frankfurt, 
Mannheim, Speyer, Woerth, Karlsruhe and Strasbourg) were mostly operational, fleet 
expansion halted. Moreover, internal German voyages generally shortened, and 
imports from Rotterdam, Amsterdam and Antwerp plateaued. However, the growth 
of oil product imports in the late 1960s drove a second period of expansion and 
modernisation that lasted until 1975. The total capacity of the fleet increased from 
650,000 tons in 1968 to a little over 800,000 tons in 1974. With the number of motor 
tankers declining from 702 in 1968 to 638 in 1975, their average size nevertheless 
                                               
606 Boele and Van de Laar, Geschiedenis Koninklijke Van Ommeren, 81. 
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increased sharply from 800 tons to a little less than 1,200 tons.607 This period of 
expansion was generally experienced in all Western European countries.608 
 However, it is not right to say that the inland tank shipping sector enjoyed a 
sustained period of growth. Notwithstanding the expansion and modernisation of the 
early 1970s, it experienced decline and overcapacity in the wake of the first oil crisis. 
The major investments made by ship owners in expanding and modernising their 
fleets in response to the increase in transport demand in the late 1960s, led to 
overcapacity and declining freight rates.609 Indeed, on average, spot freight rates 
between Rotterdam and four major Rhine ports (Duisburg, Cologne, Karlsruhe and 
Basel) declined by 34 per cent between 1972 and 1975, which rendered the operations 
of many Dutch ship owners unprofitable. Although long-term contracts between ship 
owners and cargo owners probably experienced more stable freight rates, overcapacity 
was calculated at 20 to 25 per cent in 1975 for the Dutch inland tank fleet.610  
 
7.5 The Rotterdam-Antwerp pipeline, 1967-1969 
Europoort was not only instrumental in attracting additional oil flows destined for the 
German hinterland. By the mid-1960s, the continuously growing scale of oil 
transportation became a problem for the Port of Antwerp and the refineries located 
there. The Scheldt, which was the waterway connecting the Antwerp port to the sea, 
allowed access to tankers up to 70,000 tons. However, in the mid-1960s, tankers of 
200,000 tons were rolling off the blocks. The economies achieved from shipping 
crude oil in such vessels were substantial, but would, given the limited depth of the 
Scheldt, accrue exclusively to Rotterdam refineries and thus the Rotterdam 
petrochemical cluster. It was therefore unsurprising that, in 1967, two major Antwerp 
refineries took the initiative of building a pipeline between Rotterdam-Europoort and 
Antwerp. Their combined annual intake of crude oil was substantial at 19 million tons. 
Moreover, with such quantities, it was cheaper to divert the crude oil to Rotterdam 
and receive it through a 100-kilometre pipeline rather than continuing to ship it to 
Antwerp, even though the construction of a pipeline was a substantial investment. On 
25 July 1967, Esso Netherlands, representing Petrofina, BP, Chevron and Esso 
Belgium, applied to the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs for a concession to 
construct a 34-inch pipeline.611 The pipeline’s maximum capacity was projected to be 
                                               
607 A. Kunz, Statistik der Binnenschiffahrt in Deutschland 1835-1989 (1999 [2005]). GESIS Köln, 
Deutschland ZA8157 Datenfile Version 1.0.0, Table A 2.1., accessed 30 July 2013.  
608 Economisch Bureau voor het Weg- en Watervervoer, Een structuurschets van de Nederlandse 
binnentankvaart (Rijswijk 1976) 13. 
609 I. Heidbrink, Deutsche Binnentankschiffahrt, 1887-1994 (Hamburg 2000) 100-101. 
610 Economisch Bureau voor het Weg- en Watervervoer, Een structuurschets, 14-17. 
611 NL-HaNA, EZ/Directie Wetgeving en andere Juridische Aangelegenheden, toegangsnummr 
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28 million tons, which could later be upgraded to 33 million tons, as other planned 
refineries would connect to it in the future. The consortium requested a concession 
not only for the transportation of crude oil, but also for oil products and 
petrochemical feedstock.  
For the Port of Rotterdam, the pipeline would raise substantial extra revenues 
from docking tankers and additional land leases, as the interested companies needed 
to expand their terminals at Europoort to receive the oil. However, the plan was 
controversial. Although the pipeline would be beneficial to the long-term 
development of the petrochemical cluster of Antwerp’s port, Belgian shipping 
interests were not keen to see the pipeline materialising, instead favouring the 
expansion of the Port of Zeebrugge for economic and strategic reasons.612 Coverage in 
the Belgian press reflected a strong anti-Rotterdam sentiment. Although the fear in 
Belgium of becoming increasingly dependent on the Dutch was unanimous, Antwerp 
steered a different course from other Flemish ports. 
Antwerp City Council favoured the option of diverting the crude oil in 
300,000 ton tankers via Brest, where it would be transhipped into 80,000 ton tankers 
for onwards transportation to Antwerp. In doing so, not only would the Antwerp port 
retain income from docking and towage services, but it was also reportedly cheaper 
than transporting the crude oil via Rotterdam by pipeline.613 Moreover, Antwerp had 
no appetite for plans that would only strengthen the competition it faced within 
Belgium, instead preferring to divert oil flows to French ports before helping 
domestic rivals.614  
The calls to find an alternative to the Rotterdam-Antwerp pipeline found 
fertile ground with the Belgian government, which formed a ‘pipeline committee’ in 
October 1967 to study the available options. The committee consisted of the 
ministers of economic affairs, public works and transportation, who were 
complemented by representatives of the initiators of the Rotterdam-Antwerp pipeline. 
The committee studied alternatives ranging from pipeline connections from other 
Belgian ports to transhipment options via French ports such as Le Havre, Brest and 
Dunkirk. Le Havre in particular received considerable attention, because at the time it 
was developing plans to make the port accessible to oil tankers of 200,000 tons and 
above.615 It was thus developing into Rotterdam’s main competitor as Western 
Europe’s largest oil port, especially as a hub for the transhipment of crude oil flows to 
                                                                                                                                       
(Foreign Affairs), 25 July 1967.  
612 ‘Olie’, Limburgsch Dagblad, 12 July 1967, 2.  
613 ‘Havens’, Limburgsch Dagblad, 5 August 1967, 2. 
614 NL-HaNA, Min BuZa/Code-Archief 1965-1974, 2.05.113, inv.nr. 5178, memo of the Directorate 
Europe of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, ‘Belgische havenplannen 
bij Zeebrugge, 11 July 1969. 
615 ‘Pijpleiding’, Limburgsch Dagblad, 27 October 1967, 2. 
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Western Europe.616 In 1970, a daring plan for a crude oil pipeline between Le Havre, 
the Lorraine area and the Rhine-Ruhr region was contemplated with a staggering 
capacity of 50 million tons annually.617  
Although the plan for a Le Havre pipeline to the Rhine-Ruhr area never 
materialised, it demonstrated that Rotterdam was experiencing competition with 
respect to its Rhine-Ruhr hinterland, at least in theory. Between 1970 and 1976, Le 
Havre expanded its port to receive oil tankers of 500,000 tons, and had the goal of 
becoming Rotterdam’s primary competitor for supplying oil to West Germany. The 
pipeline plan resurfaced several times during the early 1970s.618 A possible background 
to this could also have been the development of plans for French-German cooperation 
in the oil and petrochemical industry in which Compagnie Francaise de Petrole 
(CFP) and coal mining firms with interests in the oil and petrochemical sector in the 
Ruhr area participated.619  
Although the initiators of the Rotterdam-Antwerp pipeline plan had the aim 
of finishing the construction of the pipe by 1969, by mid-1968 a decision had still not 
been made by either the Dutch or Belgian governments about granting a concession 
to build the pipeline. While French ports were initially favoured over Rotterdam, in 
the course of 1968 alternatives were narrowed down to Belgian options, such as 
expanding the Port of Zeebrugge and connecting it by pipeline to Antwerp.620 
However, by mid-1968, the Belgian government was considering granting approval 
for the Rotterdam-Antwerp pipeline. In July 1968, Antwerp City Council 
acknowledged that, contrary to its earlier standpoint, a pipeline from Rotterdam 
would be the most economic solution. However, to make up for the loss of port 
revenues, the council demanded a tax on the oil to be transported by the pipeline.621 
Agreeing to the plan, but taxing its operations, showed that the city was clearly 
struggling to combine its different interests. On the one hand, it wanted to protect 
Belgian interests in general and the position of Antwerp’s port in particular from 
competition from the Port of Rotterdam. On the other, it wanted to create the best 
possible environment for the industries located in the port. However, taxing oil 
imports via the Rotterdam-Antwerp pipeline would be detrimental to the competitive 
advantage of the Antwerp petrochemical cluster that the pipeline was seeking to 
create.622 For Rotterdam, the pipeline would bring in considerable additional revenue, 
up to 4.5 million guilders in port dues annually. Moreover, the pipeline could provide 
                                               
616 De Goey, Ruimte voor industrie, 230. 
617 ‘Rohölpipeline Le Havre – Rhein/Ruhrgebiet?’, Erdöl und Kohle 23 (1970) 11, 772.  
618 ‘Grootse olieplannen – maar daarnaast betekent haven niet veel’, Het Vrije Volk, 19 February 1974; 
‘Havenbedrijf Rotterdam heeft oliegeul nodig’, De Waarheid, 23 August 1974. 
619 ‘Chemie’, Limburgsch Dagblad, 2 April 1969. 
620 ‘Havens’, Limburgsch Dagblad, 9 July 1968, 2. 
621 ‘Pijpleiding naar Rotterdam. Antwerpen accoord’, De Waarheid, 26 July 1968, 3. 
622 ‘Olie’, Limburgsch Dagblad, 30 July 1968, 2.  
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the basis for the development of a refinery in the Dutch province of Zeeland, as well 
as stimulating petrochemical cluster formation at Terneuzen and Moerdijk (Figure 
7-8).623  
 
Figure 7-8. The Rotterdam-Antwerp pipeline 
 
Source: Map created by the author. The pipeline route is an approximation and serves merely to 
illustrate the argument.   
 
Presumably, the hesitant agreement of Antwerp City Council revived doubts about 
the pipeline in Brussels. There were also other interests at stake. The question of the 
crude oil supply boiled down to the development of Belgian ports, growth 
opportunities for Belgian chemical and related industries and regional economic 
development in general.624 In August 1968, the Belgian Federal Ministerial 
Committee for Economic and Social Coordination announced a new study to 
compare the costs of obtaining the oil from Rotterdam or via transhipment in Le 
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Havre.625 The latter option would retain revenues for Antwerp’s port, but the prime 
minister of Belgium, Gaston Eyskens, openly mused about the advantages of the 
pipeline for developing Antwerp’s industry.626 Simultaneously, Antwerp City Council 
published a report by the Rivierloodsendienst (river pilotage service), which claimed 
that transhipping crude oil at a floating dock in the North Sea off the coast of 
Zeebrugge would be between 15 and 75 centimes per ton cheaper than the pipeline.627 
A deep-sea port in the channel off the coast of Zeebrugge was thus a serious option at 
the time (Figure 7-9).628  
 
Figure 7-9. The proposed deep sea ports off the Belgian coast, 1969.  
 
Source: Ministerie van Openbare Werken, Verslag van de commissie belast met de studie van een nieuwe 
haven in volle zee of aan de Belgische kust (Brussels 1969) 21-22. 
 
Several proposals were made over the course of 1968 and 1969, of which those by 
engineer J. Mortelmans and US engineering consultant Frederic R. Harris were the 
most notable. Mortelmans intended the deep-sea port to be part of a wider 
development plan of the Belgian seaports, which could contribute to strengthening 
Belgian industries as well as the country’s role as a North Sea gateway (Noordzeepoort). 
Mortelmans argued that, with his delta plan, Belgian ports could reclaim the role of 
port innovator in the Hamburg-Le Havre range.629 Flemish members of parliament, 
senators and burgomasters voiced their support for alternatives to the pipeline, in 
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particular the expansion of the Port of Zeebrugge, claiming that the construction 
costs would be too high.630 The Belgian union for transport labourers also protested 
against the pipeline plan, because it would divert income from handling the shipments 
of crude oil away from Antwerp. The union promoted a plan to dig a new canal from 
Bath to Antwerp to make the port accessible for tankers up to 100,000 tons.631  
The promoters of a Belgian solution to the pipeline question attracted interest 
from ‘economic circles in the Ruhr area’ to study the possibility of constructing a 
deep-sea port off the coast at Zeebrugge. The foreign parties interested in this plan – 
later identified as French and German firms represented by banks – were also received 
by the Belgian ministers of economic affairs and public works.632 The ‘syndicate for a 
deep sea port’ was backed by ‘major German interests’ and aimed to supply Antwerp, 
Ghent, Wallonia and the Ruhr area with oil from the new port. According to the 
syndicate’s plan, the port would cost half a billion guilders, could handle 500,000 ton 
tankers and could be constructed in less than three years. The syndicate had the ear of 
the Belgian government,633 and the foreign backing for the Zeebrugge plan seemed to 
be a serious attempt to shift oil transhipment away from Rotterdam, which could not, 
at the time, accommodate 500,000 ton tankers. Indeed, if Zeebrugge built docks for 
super tankers and a pipeline to the Rhine-Ruhr area, it could seriously threaten 
Rotterdam’s competitive position in the Northwest European crude oil supply chain. 
According to the communist daily De Waarheid, the syndicate plan could, on the one 
hand, be interpreted as a reflection of the wishes of German industrialists, backed by 
Bonn, to gain a foothold on the North Sea coast. On the other hand, the far-fetched 
plan could just be a means to pressure the Dutch into granting concessions to the 
benefit of the Belgian transport sector.  
However, the Belgian government postponed making a decision, but made it 
clear that it was not going to support the Zeebrugge plan financially. It was willing to 
issue construction permits, but only if the industry itself would furnish the capital. 
According to the promoters of the Rotterdam-Antwerp plan, there were three groups 
willing to invest in Zeebrugge. Meanwhile, Antwerp had become more careful. In 
response to the syndicate plan, the city council stated that it still supported Rotterdam. 
For Antwerp, everything came down to the cost per ton of transported crude oil. 
However, if realisation of the Zeebrugge plan would prove to be faster than the 
Rotterdam pipeline, then Antwerp would choose the former.634 Moreover, Antwerp 
                                               
630 ‘De concurrentie’, Limburgsch Dagblad, 17 September 1968, 2. 
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warned that the city council would only agree to the pipeline if the Dutch concession 
expressly forbade branch pipelines from being constructed on the Dutch section of the 
pipe. This was because such branches could benefit firms competing against 
Antwerp’s petrochemical cluster located on the Dutch side of the border, such as Dow 
Chemical and its major plant complex in Terneuzen, just 50 kilometres west of 
Antwerp, or Shell Chemical’s complex in Moerdijk.635 
Although the initiators of the Rotterdam-Antwerp plan initially seemed to be 
amenable to the syndicate’s proposal, by early October they went into a full frontal 
attack. Petrofina publicly announced in a press conference that the Rotterdam-
Antwerp consortium was refusing to compromise and demanded that the Rotterdam-
Antwerp pipeline should be constructed, irrespective of any of Zeebrugge’s 
alternatives. Petrofina even threatened to cancel its plans for a new petrochemical 
plant in the Walloon city of Feluy if the Belgian government refused permission for 
the pipeline. The press conference ended in a violent argument when syndicate 
members started to interrupt the meeting.636 According to Petrofina, without the 
pipeline, the transport costs for a ton of crude oil in Antwerp were 3.30 guilders 
higher than in Rotterdam; with the pipeline, Antwerp’s refineries would pay only 63 
cents more.637 Esso Belgium also announced its commitment to Rotterdam, because of 
its existing transhipment facilities in that port.638 
Finally, in October 1968, the Belgian government announced its conditional 
agreement to the construction of the Rotterdam-Antwerp pipeline. The pipeline 
companies were expected to agree to continue crude oil shipments to Antwerp to the 
tune of 9.5 million tons per year for five years. Moreover, the pipeline could only be 
used to supply the two refineries in Belgium.639 The news of the Belgian conditions 
caused a ripple in the Netherlands, especially in Zeeland. Dutch senator M.C. 
Verburg, who was originally from Zeeland and was committed to its industrial 
development, questioned foreign affairs minister Joseph Luns about the news, 
referring to the potential positive effect of the pipeline for the chemical sector in the 
Zeeland region. If the Belgian conditions were indeed as the press reported them to 
be, they would be detrimental to the industrial development of Zeeland. The 
provincial government of Zeeland petitioned the Ministry of Housing and Planning, 
pointing out that excellent industrial locations such as Flushing and Terneuzen could 
benefit from the new pipeline if branch lines were allowed. Both Verburg and the 
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provincial government thus asked the Dutch government to negotiate with the 
Belgians.640  
In Belgium, the conditional concession for the pipeline was met with 
disappointment. Members of all parties in the provincial parliament of West Flanders 
protested against the concession, and a German representative in Liege stated that 
German interests continued to look into a pipeline from Zeebrugge via Liege with 
branches to Hannover and Nürnberg.641 Among the West German industrial interest 
in the Zeebrugge plan was Salzgitter, a large German state-owned industrial 
conglomerate located in Salzgitter near Hannover in the state of Lower Saxony, 
which committed itself to the syndicate in December 1968. The controversy over the 
Rotterdam-Antwerp pipeline had turned into a battle over the future of oil 
transhipment in Northwest Europe;642 apparently, the conditional approval of the 
Belgian government for the pipeline was not the end of the Zeebrugge plan. 
Strikingly, the controversy over the Rotterdam-Antwerp pipeline was more than just 
an issue of port competition, as industrial interests in the hinterland were involved as 
well, although it remained unclear what their misgivings about Rotterdam were. One 
plausible explanation could be that German companies outside the network of the 
large multinational oil firms (Royal Dutch Shell, BP, Jersey Standard) and their 
German chemical partners (BASF, Bayer) were looking for an opportunity to 
establish their own transhipment facilities in, and pipelines from, North Sea ports.  
After the consternation in Zeeland about the restrictive conditions under 
which the Belgian government wanted to issue a concession for the pipeline, the 
Dutch government negotiated with the Belgians to resolve the issue. It took until June 
1969 for the two governments to reach an agreement in principle, and until December 
1969 for the exact wording of the concessions to be hammered out. According to an 
internal memo of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, the Dutch had ensured that the 
Belgian concession would no longer contain any restrictions on its operations by using 
the influence of Royal Dutch Shell. Although Royal Dutch was not a partner in the 
pipeline project, it was planning a refinery in Antwerp that would become operational 
in 1975. As a consequence, for its crude supply, the refinery would require access to 
the pipeline. If the Belgians restricted the pipeline concession to just BP, Petrofina 
and Esso Belgium, it could seriously harm the operations of the future Royal Dutch 
refinery, which was not in the interests of Antwerp’s port.643 The Belgian government 
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was sensitive to this reasoning, not least because the Rotterdam-Antwerp pipeline was 
promising to be the cheapest way to supply the newly projected refineries in the 
chemical complex around Feluy, which the impoverished Walloon region dearly 
needed. By October 1969, the Belgian government was already pressurising the 
Rotterdam-Antwerp pipeline consortium to allow the new Chevron refinery in Feluy 
to participate in the project.644 Finally, the Dutch and Belgian concessions for 
constructing the pipeline were granted on 19 December 1969.645 
The controversy over the Rotterdam-Antwerp pipeline caused a shift in 
competitive relations between Rotterdam and its closest competitor, Antwerp. After a 
year of strife over the pipeline, Antwerp City Council acknowledged that it might be 
counterproductive to continue the fierce competition between the city and Rotterdam. 
The council stated that the industry had already led the way and that both local and 
national governments should aim for cooperation in the Rhine-Scheldt delta.646 The 
Rotterdam-Antwerp pipeline was only one of many examples of how the oil and 
petrochemical industry was arranging its transportation and production facilities to 
optimally profit from the fiscal and transport conditions in the delta. Although the 
pipeline would send Antwerp down the list of the world’s largest ports, Rotterdam 
was unquestionably the port for super tankers. Indeed, according to Antwerp City 
Council, “the Antwerp port [was] attuned to that situation with the construction of 
the pipeline.”647  
The cases of the expanded Rotterdam-Rhine pipeline, the Rotterdam-
Antwerp pipeline and the connection to the Rhine-Main pipeline show that the Port 
of Rotterdam developed into a hub for crude oil and oil product distribution. This 
role also became visible in the increasing sea-sea transhipment of crude oil and oil 
products that occurred in the late 1960s and early 1970s. BP had concluded in 1966 
that using Rotterdam as a transhipment hub would be the cheapest way of supplying 
smaller North Sea, Scandinavian and Baltic ports. In 1969, for instance, Jersey 
Standard announced that it was no longer going to supply its refineries in Hamburg 
and Kalundborg (Denmark) directly, but via transhipment from 200,000 ton tankers 
at Rotterdam. The company planned to tranship around 4 million tons annually.648 
BP’s 1966 study and Jersey Standard’s announcement were connected to the final port 
expansion that Rotterdam constructed in the 20th century, the Maasvlakte.  
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Europoort, which was the expansion that was planned in the wake of the 
1955-56 pipeline episode, materialised between 1958 and 1963. The new port area 
soon filled with industry and the Port Authority started to develop plans for further 
expansion in the early 1960s. It was clear that maritime ships would continue to 
become larger and that Rotterdam needed to expand further westwards to maintain 
accessibility for the world’s largest ships. Maasvlakte I was constructed between 1965 
and 1971.649 After various attempts to establish a steel plant there faltered, the area 
mainly attracted transhipment activities, most notably for containers, ores, coal and oil. 
Elaborating on BP’s 1966 study to use Rotterdam as a crude oil transhipment hub, 
Royal Dutch Shell, Jersey Standard, BP and two other companies participated in the 
construction of the Maasvlakte Olie Terminal, which was the world’s largest crude oil 
terminal and started operations in 1974. The consecutive expansions of Europoort 
and Maasvlakte thus turned Rotterdam into one of Europe’s largest distribution hubs 
for crude oil and oil products.  
 
7.6 Conclusion  
This chapter questioned the 1955-60 consequences of the adaptation of the port and 
hinterland infrastructure for the 1960s and early 1970s. The expansion of the 
Rotterdam-Rhine pipeline, and the construction of the Rotterdam-Antwerp pipeline, 
showed how and why the increasing scale of transport concentrated oil flows in a 
small number of ports, creating intense competition between them. The consecutive 
expansions of the Port of Rotterdam in the 1960s and early 1970s allowed the port to 
keep pace with the growth of crude oil tankers, attracting transit flows and allowing a 
cost effective supply to the refineries in the port. The scale increases of the port’s 
operations – larger docks, longer jetties and deeper access channels – not only 
attracted more oil flows to the port, but also allowed it to strengthen its connections 
to the Rhine-Ruhr hinterland and to capture new hinterlands.  
The expansion of the Rotterdam-Rhine pipeline provided the opportunity to 
link Rotterdam to the Rhine-Main pipeline. The latter was designed by Deutsche 
Shell in 1965 to facilitate cost effective transport from Cologne to Frankfurt and 
Ludwigshafen. The link to Rotterdam, however, proved to be more important, as it 
provided the opportunity to complement imbalances on the German oil market. The 
connection provided three of Rotterdam’s large export-oriented refineries (Royal 
Dutch Shell, BP and Caltex) with an outlet to the German market. The tariff setting 
of the Rhine-Main pipeline aimed to undercut inland shipping freight rates and gave 
its owners a competitive advantage in terms of moving their products. Third party 
access was significantly restricted. Common carrier or not, the pipeline did provide 
                                               
649 De Goey, Ruimte voor industrie, 122, 132.  
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Rotterdam with a captive hinterland for oil products stretching beyond the Rhine-
Ruhr area all the way to Frankfurt and Ludwigshafen. The extended hinterland reach 
that the Rotterdam port thereby enjoyed was a path-dependent effect of the manner 
in which the crude oil pipeline system in Western Europe had materialised in the late 
1950s. Instead of an integrated trans-European system, West Germany was divided 
into a northern and a southern supply arrangement. Given the cost advantages of 
large tankers being able to dock in Rotterdam, the port extended its captive hinterland 
for crude oil supplies into the Rhine-Main area. When the Rotterdam-Rhine pipeline 
was expanded by constructing a new one, the old pipe provided an opportunity to 
capture the Rhine-Main hinterland for the supply of oil products.  
The expansion of the port also allowed Rotterdam to function increasingly as a 
transit oil port, not just for the Rhine-Ruhr area, but also for other North Sea and 
Baltic Sea destinations. The Rotterdam-Antwerp pipeline was a case in point, 
although the plan met with fierce political opposition in Belgium. The Rotterdam-
Antwerp case had some interesting parallels with the Rotterdam-Wilhelmshaven 
contest, particularly with regard to how the benefits of a pipeline were conceptualised. 
Apart from a certain competitive animosity between Antwerp and Rotterdam, the 
issue facing the Belgium government was whether to choose between sacrificing 
Antwerp’s position for the benefit of Belgian industry or try to protect Antwerp and 
the Belgian port and shipping interests. The German government faced a similar 
dilemma with respect to Wilhelmshaven, although the German Ministry of 
Economic Affairs shortly after the 1955-56 epidose noted that the nationality of 
crude oil pipelines was of little interest, as long as they provided the cheapest possible 
energy to German industry. From the perspective of the national economies of 
surrounding countries, Rotterdam’s expansion seemed to be worrisome. However, 
from the perspective of the oil companies, it was embraced as it reduced the cost of 
supplying oil to refineries and markets in Northwest Europe. Key to the falling cost of 
transportation and transhipment was the interplay between larger tankers and a 
deeper port, as became clear from the pipeline studies in the 1960s. Once tankers of 
100,000 tons and larger became active, Rotterdam’s oil port had a secure hold over a 
hinterland access network for oil that stretched right up to Frankfurt and 
Ludwigshafen.  
 Meanwhile, Rhine tank shipping was strongly affected by the construction of 
refineries and pipelines in the hinterland. In general, the function of the Dutch Rhine 
tank fleet, at least in the case of Van Ommeren, changed from predominantly serving 
demand for cross-border flows between Rotterdam and West Germany to 
participating in intra-German transport. At first, during the 1950s, Van Ommeren 
profited from rising West German oil imports. Although West German restrictions 
on cabotage hindered Dutch inland tank ship owners until 1951, the sharp rise in 
West German refinery output required the services of the Dutch Rhine tank fleet, and 
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the issue of cabotage was settled that year. However, with the construction of 
refineries along the German Rhine, which replaced oil product imports, the pattern of 
oil distribution in West Germany was fundamentally altered. Moreover, the 
construction of crude oil pipelines diverted all crude oil shipments from inland tank 
shipping to pipelines. As a result, intra-German transport became the most important 
market for Van Ommeren. As the number of inland refineries in West Germany 
increased, serving al of Germany’s major markets, there were fewer long distance 
hauls, as the distance between refineries and tank depots in final markets fell. The 
resulting decrease in the ton-kilometre performance of inland tank fleets thus 
increased costs and reduced profitability.  
 The construction of the Rhine-Main pipeline further exacerbated the situation, 
although rising West German imports in the late 1960s off-set the declining margins 
to some extent. The effect of the pipeline was particularly detrimental to the 
performance of Royal Dutch Shell’s captive fleet on the Rhine, which became 
obsolete and was subsequently liquidated in 1976. After a period of stagnating growth 
with respect to the inland tanker fleets, the sector invested heavily again, buoyed by 
rising imports in the late 1960s. However, the up-cycle was short-lived, as the 
demand for oil plummeted after the 1973-4 oil crisis, leading to overcapacity and 
crashing freight rates. The golden years of Dutch inland tank shipping had been the 
1950s when, after 1949 and 1951, the West German market opened up again and 
growing oil imports relied on Dutch Rhine tank shipping. However, after the 
emergence of inland refineries and pipelines, the sector changed fundamentally and 
only experienced a short-lived period of 1950s-type growth in the late 1960s and early 
1970s. 
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Chapter 8 Industrialisation and the rise of Rotterdam’s oil port 
8.1 Introduction 
The transition of the hinterland and the subsequent adaptation of both its 
infrastructure and the Port of Rotterdam strongly affected the composition of the 
hinterland of the oil port. A hinterland is constituted of the actual cargo flows 
through a port. Cargo flows are the result of firms organising their transport based on 
their demand for it and the costs associated with its supply, i.e. the quality and 
capacity of the infrastructure. The transition from coal to oil established an oil and 
petrochemical cluster in both the Port of Rotterdam and its Rhine-Ruhr hinterland, 
creating new demand for transportation. Port expansion and investment in pipelines 
were undertaken to ensure that the transport network could meet the new demand. 
These investments in turn changed the organisation of transport flows to and from 
the port and its hinterland and thus presumably also altered the relationship between 
the two. The question, however, remains as to what extent these changes actually 
affected the hinterland relations of Rotterdam’s port between 1945 and 1975.  
  This chapter examines how and why these scale shifts affected the cargo flows 
through the Rotterdam port. It also addresses the issue of what transport modalities 
were used, how this changed and why. The first section reviews the current debate on 
the post-war oil boom and its impact on the relationship between the Rotterdam oil 
port and the German hinterland. The second section discusses how the cargo flows in 
the port developed between 1946 and 1975. Then, the third section looks at the 
position of the port in Northwest Europe, while the fourth deals with how scale shifts 
affected the origins and destinations of cargo flows through the port.   
 
8.2 Port industrialisation and the hinterland: an ongoing debate 
Before 1940, the Port of Rotterdam primarily performed a transit function for the 
Ruhr area, which made it extremely sensitive to external shocks. After two world wars 
and a series of major economic crises, Rotterdam City Council sought to change the 
dominance of transit traffic in the port’s economy and adopted a policy of port 
industrialisation. By attracting (heavy) industry, the council hoped to stabilise the port 
economy and make it less dependent on transit traffic to and from its German 
hinterland.650 Port industrialisation gained momentum in the late 1940s with the first 
major port expansion project, the Botlek Plan of 1947. As the industrialisation effort 
coincided with the emerging transition from coal to mineral oil, it was particularly 
successful in the oil and petrochemical sector. The expanding scale of the Port of 
Rotterdam becomes clear in Figure 8-1. After a hesitant start during the late 1940s, 
pre-war peak levels were only achieved in 1953, eight years after the end of the war. 
                                               
650 Van Walsum, Rotterdam Europoort, 12; De Goey, Ruimte voor industrie, 46. 
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The slow start was entirely due to the problematic economic reconstruction of West 
Germany under the Allied occupation, which obstructed cross-border trade and 
transport. Indeed, growth only really took off in the early 1950s.651  
 
Figure 8-1. The total cargo flow through the Port of Rotterdam, 1946-1975 
 
Source: Database on cargo flows in the port of Rotterdam, 1880-2000, persistent identifier 
urn:nbn:nl:ui:13-n6w-g4s, accessed 7 March 2014. 
 
An economic slowdown between 1957 and 1959 depressed growth somewhat, but 
from 1960 onwards cargo throughput in the port grew exponentially, only to come to 
an abrupt halt after the first oil crisis of 1973. By 1962, Rotterdam had become the 
largest port in the world.652 The explanations for this unprecedented expansion include 
port industrialisation, the transition from coal to oil and the creation of the European 
Common Market from 1957 onwards.653 The extent to which the growth of the Port 
of Rotterdam influenced its relationship with its hinterland, in particular the Rhine-
Ruhr region, is varied. While economic ties between the Rotterdam port and the 
German hinterland were evident in the age of coal, the relationship became much less 
clear in the age of oil. It seems obvious that port industrialisation, energy transition 
and the subsequent crisis in Ruhr coal mining would alter the economic relations 
between the port and the Rhine-Ruhr hinterland. However, the literature thus far has 
largely neglected the question of how important the German hinterland was for the 
development of Rotterdam’s oil port. Renate Laspeyres touched upon the issue, but 
focused in particular on the steel industry and did not look beyond the Ruhr area. 
                                               
651 Lak, ‘Because we need them…’, 224-227. 
652 De Goey, Ruimte voor industrie, 255. 
653 Ibid., 27. 
Pre-war high (1938) 
42.4 
0 
50 
100 
150 
200 
250 
300 
350 
400 
19
46
 
19
47
 
19
48
 
19
49
 
19
50
 
19
51
 
19
52
 
19
53
 
19
54
 
19
55
 
19
56
 
19
57
 
19
58
 
19
59
 
19
60
 
19
61
 
19
62
 
19
63
 
19
64
 
19
65
 
19
66
 
19
67
 
19
68
 
19
69
 
19
70
 
19
71
 
19
72
 
19
73
 
19
74
 
19
75
 
M
ill
io
n 
to
ns
 
Throughput Rotterdam port Pre-war high (1938) Expon. (Throughput Rotterdam port) 
  203 
Other authors have also analysed the impact of industrialisation, the role of the Port 
Authority or the effects of port competition on the development of the Port of 
Rotterdam.654   
 The consensus seems to be that the combined effects of scale shifts in 
transport and industry, leading to port industrialisation, energy transition and the 
growing scale and volume of maritime shipping, have made Rotterdam’s port less 
dependent on its Rhine-Ruhr hinterland than in the age of coal. Ferry de Goey and 
Hugo van Driel who, in 2009, attempted to estimate the impact of port 
industrialisation on port-hinterland relations, delivered the most notable contribution 
on this point.655 To this end, they used a comprehensive database of all of the 
international cargo flows in the Port of Rotterdam.656 De Goey and Van Driel defined 
the port-hinterland relationship as the share of transit goods in the total cargo flows 
through the port. As the oil and petrochemical cluster in the port consumed a large 
share of the growing volumes of incoming crude oil, the overall share of transit goods 
in the total commodity flows fell. Figure 8-2 illustrates their argument. Between the 
mid-1920s and the late 1930s, around 70 per cent of all seaborne cargo entering the 
Rotterdam port was destined for the (German) hinterland. After 1945, and 
particularly from 1949 onwards, as the port-hinterland relationship recovered from 
war and occupation, the ratio of seaborne incoming to landside outgoing cargo settled 
at around 50 per cent. The dotted line represents the same ratio excluding oil, which 
shows that by omitting the oil and petrochemical cluster the port would be more 
dependent on transit traffic. From this, De Goey and Van Driel concluded that the 
growth of the oil and petrochemical cluster in the port had reduced its dependence on 
transit flows to the (German) hinterland, which they named the oil effect.657  
  
                                               
654 Laspeyres, Rotterdam und das Ruhrgebiet, passim; De Goey, Ruimte voor industrie, passim; De Goey 
(ed.), Comparative Port History of Rotterdam and Antwerp (1880-2000). Competition. Cargo and Costs, 
passim; Winkelmans, De moderne havenindustrialisatie, passim.  
655 De Goey and Van Driel, ‘Rotterdam und das Hinterland’, 127-152. 
656 Database Rotterdam-Antwerp: a century and a half of port competition 1880-2000, persistent identifier 
urn:nbn:nl:ui:13-n6w-g4s, 13 October 2009. 
657 De Goey and Van Driel, ‘Rotterdam und das Hinterland (1920-1995)’, 144.  
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Figure 8-2. The ratio of sea incoming to land outgoing cargo flows in the 
Port of Rotterdam, 1920-1975 
 
Note: Figure 8-2 differs considerably from the original calculations published by De Goey and Van 
Driel in 2009, which were derived from missing pipeline data in the original database (see source). De 
Goey and Van Driel originally reported a decline of the ratio including oil (solid line) to 40 per cent 
between 1960 and 1970. However, when the pipeline data are added, there is in fact no decline, but a 
remarkably stable ratio between 50 and 60 per cent between 1950 and 1975.  
Source: Database on cargo flows in the Port of Rotterdam, 1880-2000, persistent identifier 
urn:nbn:nl:ui:13-n6w-g4s, 13 October 2009. Own calculations. 
 
However, this is a rather broad conception of the port-hinterland relationship: it does 
not look beyond aggregate flows and does not distinguish between the port as a 
transportation hub and a production location. In particular, the significance of the 
Rhine-Ruhr hinterland for the oil and petrochemical cluster in the port is rarely 
studied.  
 
8.3 Changing cargo: the rise of oil and the decline of coal 
The huge expansion of the cargo flows in the port was an expression of a number of 
processes, which can be derived from the cargo flows depicted in Table 8-1. Port 
industrialisation in particular caused the inflow of seaborne cargo to rise. Growing 
equally remarkably were seaborne and landside outflows. The latter grew the most, 
but this is explained mainly by the low levels of trade and transport with the German 
hinterland in the first five years after the war. Lagging dramatically behind were 
landside cargo inflows, highlighting the changing economy in the Rhine-Ruhr 
hinterland.  
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Table 8-1. Cargo flows through the Port of Rotterdam, 1946-1975 
Million tons Indices 
Sea in 
Sea 
out 
Land 
in 
Land 
out 
Sea 
in 
Sea 
out 
Land 
in 
Land 
out 
1946-50 55.7 30.7 23.2 20.2 100 100 100 100 
1951-55 158.6 73.9 35.3 81.5 285 241 152 403 
1956-60 275.2 98.9 35.3 142.8 494 322 152 706 
1961-65 400.2 126.1 41.3 213.4 719 411 178 1055 
1966-70 629.5 207.6 72.3 329.9 1130 676 312 1631 
1971-75 989.7 360.5 81.2 536.6 1777 1175 350 2652 
Source: Database on cargo flows in the port of Rotterdam, 1880-2000, persistent identifier 
urn:nbn:nl:ui:13-n6w-g4s, accessed 7 March 2014. The full data for the cargo flows are reported in 
Appendix B: Data Table 0-7. The Port of Rotterdam cargo flows, 1950-1975 (in tons). 
 
The transition from coal to oil had a particularly major impact on the composition of 
the cargo flows. Table 8-2 presents the make-up of seaborne incoming cargo flows 
between 1946 and 1975. The largest and fastest growing commodity by far was oil, 
which increased from 18.3 million tons in 1946-50 to over 652 million tons in 1971-
75. Iron ore was the second most important cargo, growing from 5.8 million tons in 
1946-50 to over 145 million tons in 1971-75. The foreign coal imports, particularly 
those of West Germany, were the third largest cargo until 1960, but import 
restrictions after the 1958 coal crisis and the diversion of the remaining imports to 
North German sea ports by the West German government reduced the importance of 
hinterland coal imports for Rotterdam.658 Chemicals also experienced a sharp growth, 
particularly after 1965 when the expansion of the petrochemical industry in the port 
took off. A fourth group of products that remained important throughout the period 
consisted of agricultural goods and foodstuffs. Table 8-3 presents the landside 
incoming cargo flows. Although still dominated by coal exports from the Ruhr area, 
the volumes were a far cry from pre-war levels; Rotterdam received 50 million tons of 
coal between 1934 and 1938, compared to the post-war high point of 19 million tons 
in 1951-55.659  
                                               
658 Horn, Die Energiepolitik der Bundesregierung, 244-245. 
659 Database on cargo flows in the port of Rotterdam, 1880-2000, persistent identifier urn:nbn:nl:ui:13-
n6w-g4s, accessed 7 March 2014. 
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Other important cargo flows originating from the hinterland were iron, steel and 
metal products, crude minerals and other manufactured goods (vehicles, machinery). 
Although the inflow of all types of commodity grew over the period, it was the 
growth of oil and ores that best captured the post-war boom of the Port of Rotterdam. 
Indeed, the consecutive expansions of the port in search of deeper water and the 
development of oil and petrochemical activities created Europe’s largest bulk port.  
 This was further accentuated by the landside outgoing cargo flows seen in 
Table 8-4. Two types of cargo dominated: oil and iron ore. Strikingly, the landside 
outgoing cargo flows did not reach pre-war levels until well into the 1950s (1955), 
underscoring the debilitating effect of the war and the subsequent occupation on trade 
and transport with West Germany. This was particularly apparent in the flows of iron 
ore, which, in 1960, were still at pre-war levels. Notwithstanding Germany’s slow 
recovery, iron ore remained the most important commodity in hinterland destined 
cargo flows until 1960. From 1960 onwards, oil became the fastest growing and most 
important cargo, increasing by 14 per cent annually between 1950 and 1975. A second 
commodity with striking growth between 1960 and 1975 was chemical products, 
which grew from 0.6 million tons in 1946-50 to 21.7 million tons in 1971-75. This 
growth of chemical products emanated from the development of the petrochemical 
sector in the Rotterdam port. Table 8-4 thus paints a dual picture: on the one hand, 
the retention of the iron ore transit trade in the Ruhr area and, on the other, the 
emergence of an oil and petrochemical sector, as reflected by the strong growth of oil 
and chemical products. The deep-sea docks of Europoort and Maasvlakte still host 
two giant transhipment terminals for iron ore (among others), Ertsoverslagbedrijf 
Europoort BV (Europoort, established in 1970) and Europees Massagoed-Overslagbedrijf 
BV (Maasvlakte, established in 1974). The dominance of wet and dry bulk activities in 
the three major post-war port expansion projects (Botlek, Europoort, Maasvlakte) is 
not easily expressed in an exact metric, but Europoort in particular (constructed 
between 1958 and 1963) became almost entirely filled with the oil and petrochemical 
industry. Moreover, with the start of the container era after 1966, plots of land in 
Europoort and Maasvlakte were also reserved for container terminals. Even today, 
roughly 50 per cent of the rentable sites in the port are occupied by wet bulk 
activities.660 
 The seaborne outgoing cargo flows again point to the dominance of oil and 
petrochemicals, reflecting the transformation of the port between 1946 and 1975 
(Table 8-5). Whereas the outbound transit of Ruhr coal (solid mineral fuels) was a 
primary function of the Rotterdam port in the inter-war years, the post-war period 
                                               
660 Port of Rotterdam Authority, ‘Port Infrastructure 2013’, 
http://www.portofrotterdam.com/en/Port/port-
statistics/Documents/Port%20infrastructure%20and%20equipment.pdf, accessed 14 July 2014; Idem, 
Facts and figures Rotterdam energy port and petrochemical cluster (Rotterdam 2010) 7.  
  209 
was dominated by the seaborne outflows of oil. While coal was still the largest 
seaborne outgoing cargo flow between 1946 and 1950, oil took over in an 
unprecedented fashion thereafter. Indeed, oil and chemicals were the fastest growing 
commodities after 1950, while coal declined and stagnated, although it remained the 
third largest cargo flow of the seaborne outflows throughout the period. The 
transition from coal to oil not only reflects the changing function of the Rotterdam 
port from transit to industry, but also the changing relationship between port and 
hinterland. Whereas seaborne outflows were entirely dominated by the transit of Ruhr 
coal before 1940, the importance of transit flows from the hinterland declined in the 
post-war period in favour of export and transit flows generated by the port’s own oil 
and petrochemical cluster. Between 1946-50 and 1971-75, the ratio of landside 
incoming flows to seaborne outgoing flows dropped from 76 per cent to 23 per cent.661 
Accordingly, by the early 1970s, the volume of cargo flows from the hinterland was 
less than a quarter of the seaborne outgoing flows.  
 The preceding cursory overview of the development of cargo flows through 
the Port of Rotterdam between 1946 and 1975 revealed continuities and 
discontinuities in the function of the port and its relations with the hinterland. Firstly, 
it was found that the port remained an important transit hub for the iron ore and 
foodstuff imports of the hinterland. Secondly, the transition from coal to oil clearly 
added oil and (petro) chemicals to the array of hinterland-bound cargo flows. Thirdly, 
the 1958 coal crisis had a major impact on the position of coal flows through the port; 
although still sizable throughout the post-war period, the volume of coal 
transhipments stagnated. On the one hand, West Germany limited the importation 
of foreign coal after 1958, while diverting remaining imports to the North German 
sea ports, further limiting coal imports through the Rotterdam port. On the other 
hand, the export of Ruhr coal stagnated and declined after 1958, limiting coal exports 
through the port.662 Fourthly, the growth of seaborne outgoing cargo flows 
underscored the implications of the third point: the outbound transit function that the 
port traditionally performed for its hinterland in the pre-war period declined in favour 
of an exporting role for the port’s own industrial cluster in the post-war period. These 
major shifts in the composition and direction of the port’s cargo flows between 1945 
and 1975 point to a substantial transformation in the relations between the port and 
the hinterland in general, and the German hinterland in particular.  
 
8.4 Rotterdam as a regional transhipment hub for oil 
The dramatic shift in the composition of the cargo flows in the Port of Rotterdam 
                                               
661 Database on cargo flows in the port of Rotterdam, 1880-2000, persistent identifier urn:nbn:nl:ui:13-
n6w-g4s, accessed 7 March 2014. Own calculations. 
662 Laspeyres, Rotterdam und das Ruhrgebiet, 37-38. 
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was caused by the expansion of the oil and petrochemical industry in both port and 
hinterland, which in turn changed the demand for transport in the latter. This 
changing demand led to the adaptation of the transport infrastructure and therefore 
had a considerable impact on the organisation of cargo flows and the distribution of 
cargo between the various modes of transport. The modal split of incoming and 
outgoing cargo flows in the Rotterdam port shows the extent to which the relative 
importance of the respective modes of transport changed over the period.  
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With regard to incoming cargo flows, oil became increasingly dominant, while 
inflows of coal declined. As a consequence, maritime shipping became even more 
important than it already was at the start of the period. In 1950-55, 80 per cent of all 
incoming cargo was shipped by sea, with 19 per cent coming in by inland shipping 
(Table 8-6). By 1971-75, the share of maritime shipping had increased to 92 per cent, 
while that of inland shipping had declined to only 6 per cent. Rail and road haulage 
made up the remaining 2 per cent.  
Outgoing cargo flows (Table 8-7) were predominantly shipped by inland 
shipping in 1950-55 (50 per cent), followed by maritime shipping (48 per cent). 
Inland shipping remained the most important modality until 1970. During the late 
1950s and the 1960s, pipelines became increasingly important (11 per cent in 1961-65 
and 16 per cent in 1966-70), primarily at the expense of the share of maritime 
shipping, which dropped to 30 per cent. However, from 1968 onwards, the 
Rotterdam port progressively became a regional break bulk hub for oil, while seaborne 
and landside transit flows of oil increased the shares of maritime shipping and 
pipelines to 37 and 23 per cent respectively in 1971-75. Meanwhile, the share of 
inland shipping declined sharply to 36 per cent in the same period.  
 In terms of incoming cargo flows, the increasing size of maritime vessels 
stimulated the expansion of the Rotterdam port. The docks of Europoort and 
Maasvlakte not only allowed seaborne incoming cargo flows to grow, but also hosted a 
number of large storage hubs, in particular for oil, from which onwards transportation 
to other European ports was arranged. Figure 8-3 shows how both incoming flows 
and transit flows of crude oil through Rotterdam grew, particularly after 1960. Until 
1959, the volumes of incoming crude oil increased gradually, with between 10 and 20 
per cent of these being in transit to the hinterland (Figure 8-4). After the construction 
of Europoort and the opening of new refineries in the early 1960s, the volume of 
incoming crude oil flows increased, and with that so did the share of crude oil transit 
flows, which grew from 18 per cent in 1959 to 58 per cent in 1975. Initially, the 
majority of the transit flows were performed by the Rotterdam-Rhine pipeline. After 
1966, crude oil was also increasingly transhipped by maritime shipping, with its share 
increasing from 10 per cent in 1966 to 39 per cent in 1975.  
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Figure 8-3.The total incoming and transit flows of crude oil in the Port of 
Rotterdam, 1946-75 
 
Source: Database on cargo flows in the port of Rotterdam, 1880-2000, persistent identifier 
urn:nbn:nl:ui:13-n6w-g4s, accessed 7 March 2014. 
 
Figure 8-4. The share of crude oil transit flows in the Port of Rotterdam, 
1946-75 
 
Source: Database on cargo flows in the port of Rotterdam, 1880-2000, persistent identifier 
urn:nbn:nl:ui:13-n6w-g4s, accessed 7 March 2014. 
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The share of incoming crude oil that was transhipped to foreign destinations other 
than the German hinterland rose with the expansion of the (independent) tank 
storage capacity in the port. Pipelines typically had their own dedicated storage 
facilities, owned by the pipeline company, which only served the purpose of feeding 
the pipeline. However, with the expanding acreage created by Europoort and 
Maasvlakte, the space for large (independent) tank storage depots also increased. 
Figure 8-5 shows the development of independent tank storage capacity between 
1946 and 1972. Between 1946 and 1965, this capacity grew on average by around 0.5 
million tons annually. After 1965, the average added capacity rose to between 1.5 and 
2 million tons annually in the period 1968-72. Although the precise size of the 
dedicated refinery tank depots is unknown, the total storage capacity for oil in the 
Rotterdam port grew a great deal, particularly in the late 1960s. Indeed, utilising the 
access to deep water, the tank depots of Europoort and the gigantic crude oil terminal 
of Maasvlakte (opened in 1972) particularly stimulated the transhipment of crude oil 
at Rotterdam.  
 
Figure 8-5. Independent tank storage for mineral oil in the Port of 
Rotterdam, 1946-72 
 
Source: Kamer van Koophandel Rotterdam, Jaarverslagen 1946-1970 and Dirkzwager’s Guide to the 
New Waterway 1973-1985. Data compiled by Hugo van Driel.  
 
The spectacular growth of the oil port in the second half of the 1960s also becomes 
clear in Figure 8-6; between 1946 and 1968, oil product outflows from the port grew 
from almost nothing to 20 million tons.  
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Figure 8-6. The outflow of oil products from the Port of Rotterdam, 1946-
75 (in million tons) 
 
Source: Database on cargo flows in the port of Rotterdam, 1880-2000, persistent identifier 
urn:nbn:nl:ui:13-n6w-g4s, accessed 7 March 2014. 
 
Between 1968 and 1973, the volume of oil product outflows more than doubled to 45 
million tons, with outflows to foreign destinations representing, on average, 52 per 
cent of the total volume of oil products moving through the port throughout this 
period.663 Indeed, less than half of the oil products produced or imported were 
destined for the Dutch market. Figure 8-3 through to Figure 8-6 all testify to the 
accelerating growth of the export and transit function of the Rotterdam oil port.  
 
8.5 The cargo flows through the Port of Rotterdam 
The changing composition of the cargo flows and the rising importance of maritime 
shipping and pipeline transportation reflect how the transition from coal to oil 
affected the transport relations of Rotterdam’s port between 1945 and 1975. Seaborne 
incoming flows increasingly originated from the Middle East and Africa, while 
Western Europe and North America became relatively less important (Table 8-8). By 
the early 1970s, oil became so dominant that in 1971-75, 63 per cent of all seaborne 
incoming cargo in the Rotterdam port came from the Middle East and Africa.  
 
                                               
663 Database on cargo flows in the port of Rotterdam, 1880-2000, persistent identifier urn:nbn:nl:ui:13-
n6w-g4s, 7 March 2014. Own calculations. 
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Table 8-9 presents the 10 most important countries of origin for seaborne incoming 
cargo flows in Rotterdam. In 1950-55, the USA was the port’s most important source, 
with 20 per cent, followed by Kuwait by virtue of Royal Dutch Shell’s long-term 
supply contract with Gulf Oil from 1947 onwards.664 Other important countries not 
included in Table 8-9 comprise the Nordic countries, Syria and the Netherlands 
Antilles. Although the USA remained an important trading partner throughout the 
period, in particular because of its importance in the world supply of manufactured 
and capital goods, its share dropped to 8 per cent in 1971-75. The early 1960s saw the 
rise of the oil exporting countries in the Middle East, such as Saudi Arabia, Iran and 
Kuwait. These were followed in the late 1960s and early 1970s by the second wave of 
oil exporting countries, such as Libya, Qatar and Nigeria.  
Seaborne outflows, on the other hand, were focused mainly on Western 
Europe (Table 8-10). Indeed, already concentrated in 1950-55 (65 per cent), these 
products increasingly left Rotterdam for other Western European destinations. Again, 
oil was the principal reason for this shift, as Rotterdam became Western Europe’s 
largest oil port and the region’s principal oil market. The gigantic Maasvlakte Olie 
Terminal (in operation since 1972) and the crude oil transit pipelines to the Rhine-
Ruhr area and Antwerp, as well as the sizable share of exports from Rotterdam’s oil 
refineries, created transit and (re) export flows of crude oil and oil products that were 
mainly shipped to Western European markets and refineries.665 The main destinations 
of the seaborne outflows in 1971-75 were the United Kingdom and West Germany, 
which together represented 44 per cent of these outflows (Table 8-11). The position 
of the two countries had changed substantially, as in 1950-55 West Germany 
represented just 4 per cent of total seaborne outflows, which was much less than the 
UK (20 per cent) and Italy (17 per cent). In the case of West Germany, the growth of 
seaborne outflows mainly occurred after 1968, and was primarily caused by super 
tankers with crude oil destined for West Germany that were breaking bulk in 
Rotterdam.  
                                               
664 SHA, 190C/16, Agreements – Royal Dutch/Shell - Gulf agreement. The agreement stipulated the 
volumes and areas where Royal Dutch Shell could refine Gulf crude oil. Rotterdam Pernis was one of 
the principal refineries where Gulf crude could be refined.  
665 Royal Dutch Shell’s Pernis refinery, for instance, exported on average 70 per cent of its production 
between 1957 and 1963. (Source: SHA, 976/114, Statistical data on Shell Nederland Raffinaderij NV). 
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On the landside, around 95 per cent of incoming cargo flows originated in just four 
countries throughout the period (Table 8-12). West Germany remained the most 
important origin, with a stable share of around 70 per cent. Belgium became more 
important, although the volume of cargo from there remained small in comparison to 
West Germany. Cargo flows from France halved proportionately.   
Landside outgoing cargo flows were concentrated among the same four 
countries (Table 8-13). Throughout the period, West Germany remained 
Rotterdam’s most important destination for landside outflows, slightly increasing its 
share from 77 per cent in 1950-55 to 87 per cent in 1961-65, only to decline again to 
71 per cent in 1971-75. Cargo flows to Belgium more than doubled over the period, 
although this was entirely due to the construction of the Rotterdam-Antwerp pipeline 
in 1972, causing landside outflows to jump from 7 million tons in 1968 to almost 30 
million tons in 1973.  
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Overall, the position of West Germany in the cargo flows through the Rotterdam 
port developed along two divergent paths. On the one hand, the flows originating in 
West Germany grew much slower than total incoming cargo, averaging 5 per cent as 
against 10 per cent annually between 1951 and 1973.666 The share of cargo originating 
in West Germany therefore dropped considerably from 16 per cent in 1951 to only 6 
per cent in 1973 (Figure 8-7). Over the period, West Germany ceased to be a source 
of high volume bulk shipments, as seaborne incoming cargo became increasingly 
dominant.  
 
Figure 8-7. The share of West Germany in total incoming cargo flows, 
1950-75 
 
Source: CBS, Statistiek van de Zeevaart (1950-51; 1961-65); CBS, Maandstatistiek van de zeevaart en 
van het havenverkeer (1952-60); CBS, Statistiek van het internationaal goederenvervoer in de havens 
van Amsterdam en Rotterdam (1966-75); CBS, Statistiek van de internationale binnenvaart (1950-
1975); CBS, Historische reeksen, Historie verkeer en vervoer van 1899, Goederenvervoer met 
pijpleidingen, http://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb/selection/?DM=SLNL&PA=37406&VW=T, accessed 12 
October 2011. For the complete table, see Appendix B: Data, Table 0-7. The Port of Rotterdam cargo 
flows, 1950-1975 (in tons). 
 
On the other hand, West Germany remained hugely important as a destination for 
outgoing cargo flows from Rotterdam. Indeed, until the country re-entered the 
international community and engaged with international markets again from 1949 
onwards, the Dutch economy struggled to recover from the war. The trade agreement 
of 1950 signalled the normalisation of Dutch-German economic relations, with the 
subsequent expansion of the West German economy in the 1950s stimulating Dutch 
economic growth as well as that of Rotterdam. Buoyed by what has become known as 
                                               
666 Calculated from the data in Figure 8-7 and Figure 8-8.  
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the economic miracle (Wirtschaftswunder), West Germany became more, rather than 
less, important for the Rotterdam port as a destination for outgoing cargo flows 
(Figure 8-8). Indeed, growing as fast as total outgoing cargo flows (10 per cent 
annually), cargoes destined for West Germany increased from 29 per cent of total 
outgoing cargo in 1950 to 62 per cent in 1964, only to fall again to 49 per cent in 
1975.  
 
Figure 8-8. The share of West Germany in total outgoing cargo flows, 
1950-75 
 
Source: CBS, Statistiek van de Zeevaart (1950-51; 1961-65); CBS, Maandstatistiek van de zeevaart en 
van het havenverkeer (1952-60); CBS, Statistiek van het internationaal goederenvervoer in de havens 
van Amsterdam en Rotterdam (1966-75); CBS, Statistiek van de internationale binnenvaart (1950-
1975); CBS, Historische reeksen, Historie verkeer en vervoer van 1899, Goederenvervoer met 
pijpleidingen, http://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb/selection/?DM=SLNL&PA=37406&VW=T, accessed 12 
October 2011. For the complete table, see Appendix B: Data, Table 0-7. The Port of Rotterdam cargo 
flows, 1950-1975 (in tons). 
 
8.6 Conclusion 
The transition from coal to oil caused a fundamental change to both the Port of 
Rotterdam and its hinterland. In the latter, the mounting crisis in the coal industry, as 
well as its incorporation into the European Coal and Steel Community, caused a 
relative decline in the share of Ruhr coal as part of Rotterdam’s cargo flows. Moreover, 
the enormous expansion of the oil and petrochemical industry in both port and 
hinterland caused oil to become, in both relative and absolute terms, the most 
important cargo flow in the Rotterdam port. The changing composition of 
Rotterdam’s cargo throughput also significantly altered the port’s transport relations. 
The West German hinterland became of only marginal importance for incoming 
cargo flows, showing that the port became less and less important as a hub for 
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German exports. For outgoing cargo flows, however, West Germany remained by far 
the most important destination, as its demand for oil and iron ore continued to rise 
throughout the 1960s and early 1970s. This showed that Rotterdam remained an 
important bulk port throughout the period, particularly for West German imports. 
 Growth in scale was the key term in the development of the Rotterdam oil 
port between 1945 and 1975. The mounting scale of oil transportation and processing 
set in motion a series of port expansions in the 1960s and early 1970s, starting with 
the further development of Europoort  and followed by the Maasvlakte expansion in 
1968. Although the direct reason for the Europoort expansion was the need to 
construct a pipeline infrastructure to supply crude oil to the refineries in the Rhine-
Ruhr hinterland, this is not the only explanation for the growth of the Rotterdam oil 
port. Indeed, expansion became increasingly necessary to fend off competitors, as 
other European ports - Le Havre, for instance - adapted to the larger scale of 
maritime shipping and threatened Rotterdam’s position as Europe’s primary oil port 
in the late 1960s.667 As a consequence, maritime oil tankers and pipelines carried an 
increasing share of Rotterdam’s cargo flows, while the relative share of inland 
shipping declined. As the self-proclaimed raw materials gateway to Europe, 
Rotterdam concentrated heavily on seaborne bulk imports and large-scale landborne 
outflows.  
 The port expansions of the 1960s and early 1970s secured deep sea access for 
larger tankers, provided space for storage and processing facilities and, as such, 
developed the Rotterdam port into a transhipment hub for crude oil and home to 
Europe’s largest concentration of refinery capacity. Between 1950 and 1975, the 
number of refineries in the Rotterdam port rose from two to seven, while primary 
refining capacity increased from 2.7 million tons per annum in 1950 to 98.9 million 
tons in 1975. With the rising number of refineries, the scale of refinery operations 
expanded considerably, from an average capacity of 1.4 million tons per year in 1950 
to 14.1 million tons in 1975.668 The expansions of both total capacity and the average 
size of plants were also stimulated by European integration. In the case of Jersey 
Standard, for instance, the creation of the Common Market meant that concentrating 
refining at Rotterdam produced potential economies of scale by serving the Common 
Market from one large plant rather than from several smaller plants spread out across 
Western Europe.669  
 The effect of the port expansions was a concentration of production, storage 
and transhipment facilities that far exceeded domestic consumption in the 
Netherlands. The Rotterdam oil port thus increasingly acted as a hub in the European 
                                               
667 De Goey, Ruimte voor industrie, 218.  
668 Molle and Wever, Oil Refineries, 164-169. Own calculations.  
669 B.H. Wall, Growth in a Changing Environment. A History of Standard Oil (New Jersey), Exxon 
Corporation, 1950-1975 (New York 1988) 270-273. 
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distribution network of crude oil. It did this by not just performing a transit function 
for West Germany, but increasingly for other destinations as well. Moreover, 
particularly after the depth of the port entrance was increased between 1967 and 1969, 
new storage and transhipment facilities emerged: one in 1968 to service a new 36 inch 
Rotterdam-Rhine pipeline, and another in 1971 to pump crude oil to Antwerp.670 
The Rotterdam-Antwerp pipeline was constructed to feed the refineries of TOTAL – 
formerly CFP – and Jersey Standard in the Port of Antwerp, which could no longer 
accommodate the largest tankers. The Europoort expansion thus caused the scale of 
port operations to grow in terms of the draughts of entering ships and the available 
facilities for storing and handling incoming and outgoing flows of oil. This continued 
with the third expansion, namely Maasvlakte.671 These facilities brought about 
opportunities to become a regional transhipment hub with multiple international 
destinations. For instance, between 1967 and 1973, seaborne outgoing flows of crude 
oil grew from 1.3 million tons to 27 million tons.672 At the same time, the Rotterdam-
Antwerp pipeline increased its throughput from 6.8 million tons in 1971 to 18.5 
million tons in 1975, an annual growth rate of 28 per cent.673 By 1973, the Rotterdam 
port dominated Western Europe’s oil flows, as it still does today.674  
 In conclusion, this chapter revealed two key findings. Firstly, although the 
growth of the oil port reduced the transit share (the oil effect) of the port’s throughput, 
the German hinterland remained important for cargo outflows. Secondly, 
notwithstanding the efforts of the municipality and the Port Authority to industrialise 
and diversify the port’s operations, the oil and petrochemical industries became the 
dominant port sectors. Although the port was quite successful in adapting its 
infrastructure and facilities to meet the needs of the oil industry, the diversification of 
the port’s economy largely failed. A less lopsided industrialisation outcome could 
possibly have led to port historians coining the phrase the industrialisation effect rather 
than the oil effect, with the latter term essentially acknowledging the one-sided 
development of the port after 1945.  
 
  
                                               
670 De Goey, Ruimte voor industrie, 182. 
671 De Goey, Ruimte voor industrie, 230.  
672 Database Rotterdam-Antwerp: a century and a half of port competition 1880-2000, persistent identifier 
urn:nbn:nl:ui:13-n6w-g4s, 13 October 2009. 
673 Stichting Havenbelangen, Rotterdam-Europoort: statistisch overzicht, Rotterdam, 1972, 5. 
674 Of all the oil moving through ports in the Hamburg-Le Havre range in 2011, Rotterdam was 
responsible for no less than 50 per cent; its nearest rival, Le Havre, shifted just 12 per cent. (Source: 
Rotterdam Port Authority, ‘Port Statistics 2011’, 3). 
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Chapter 9 The composition of the hinterland, 1945-1975 
 
9.1 Introduction: beyond the Rhine-Ruhr hinterland? 
One of the least explored aspects of Rotterdam’s transport relations with the German 
hinterland is the question of how vital West Germany actually was for the city’s oil 
port. West Germany remained the most important destination for outgoing cargo 
flows from the port. This chapter aims to establish whether the country was also the 
most important destination for the Port of Rotterdam. Additionally, the chapter also 
questions how the transition from coal to oil affected the composition of the German 
hinterland. The first section aims to ascertain the relative importance of West 
Germany for Rotterdam’s oil port. It also questions how important Rotterdam was for 
West Germany, in particular the country’s growing demand for oil from the early 
1950s to the early 1970s. Did Rotterdam fuel the West German economic miracle? 
The second section looks specifically at the relative importance of the Rhine-Ruhr 
area, and compares the composition of the German hinterland for the Rotterdam port 
in general with the country’s hinterland for the oil port in particular.  
 
9.2 Fuelling the Wirtschaftswunder?  
Although the decline of coal in the Ruhr area greatly reduced the importance of West 
Germany for incoming cargo flows in the Port of Rotterdam, it did remain the single 
most important destination for cargo outflows. What is, however, unclear is the extent 
to which this also holds true for the Rotterdam oil port. With regard to crude oil, 
Rotterdam performed a clear function as a landing port for West German crude oil 
imports. Indeed, until 1967, West Germany received 93 per cent of all of the crude oil 
transhipped in Rotterdam for destinations outside the Netherlands (Figure 9-1). The 
expansion of tank storage capacity in Europoort after 1966 strengthened the seaborne 
transit of crude oil via Rotterdam, while the share of West German transit fell sharply 
to 56 per cent in 1971. After the construction of the Rotterdam-Antwerp pipeline, 
the West German share fell further to 39 per cent in 1975.  
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Figure 9-1. Crude oil flows to West Germany from Rotterdam, 1950-75675 
 
Source: CBS, Historie verkeer en vervoer van 1899, Goederenvervoer met pijpleidingen, 
http://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb/selection/?DM=SLNL&PA=37406&VW=T, 12.10.2011; CBS, 
Statistiek van de zeevaart, 1946-1975; Mineralölwirtschaftsverband, Daten zum Mineralölversorgung, 
Mineralölverbrauch, Mineralölausfuhr, http://mwv.de/index.php/daten/statistikeninfoportal, 
14.5.2009; RRP NV, Annual Reports, Rotterdam, 1960-1975. Statistisches Bundesamt, Die 
Binnenschiffahrt im Jahre, 1950-1957; Statistisches Bundesamt, Der Verkehr in der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland, Reihe 1, Binnenschiffahrt, 1958-1961; Statistisches Bundesamt, Fachserie H Verkehr, 
Reihe 1 Binnenschiffahrt, 1962-1975; Statistisches Bundesamt, Die Seeschiffahrt im Jahre, 1948-
1956; Statistisches Bundesamt, Verkehr. Reihe 2, Seeschiffahrt, 1957-1975; Database on cargo flows in 
the Port of Rotterdam, 1880-2000, persistent identifier urn:nbn:nl:ui:13-n6w-g4s, 13 October 2009. The 
full data are reported in Appendix B: Data Table 0-8. The West German oil supply from the 
Rotterdam oil port, 1950-75. 
 
As a transit port for crude oil, Rotterdam thus developed beyond being an outport for 
the German hinterland. Notwithstanding the declining share of crude oil transit flows 
to West Germany in the 1960s, the initial development of the Rotterdam port as a 
transit hub for crude was dedicated to supplying the Rhine-Ruhr refineries from 1960 
onwards. The Europoort expansion emerged as a way to adapt the port to demand 
from the Rhine-Ruhr hinterland for larger scale transhipment and transportation 
facilities. However, the sheer size of Europoort, and its ability to welcome the largest 
tankers of the day, created opportunities to establish the Rotterdam oil port as a 
                                               
675 The percentage in Figure 9-1 is derived from combining Dutch and German transport statistics. A 
number of problems arise from doing this, which is apparent from the percentages reported for the 
years 1955 to 1958. These figures are caused by a discrepancy between Dutch and German transport 
statistics. The German statistics reported a higher volume of crude oil shipments from Rotterdam to 
West Germany than the Dutch statistics for those years. The reasons for the discrepancy are discussed 
in Appendix B: Data Table 0-8. The West German oil supply from the Rotterdam oil port, 1950-75 
(in tons). 
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transhipment hub for crude oil and also led to the expansion of the Rotterdam-Rhine 
and Rotterdam-Antwerp pipelines. Indeed, through Europoort and Maasvlakte, 
Rotterdam became important for a wider region than just its Rhine-Ruhr hinterland. 
 In the case of oil product flows, the picture was entirely different. Figure 9-2 
presents the volumes of oil products shipped from Rotterdam to West Germany, as 
well as the country’s share of total oil product outflows from the Rotterdam port.  
 
Figure 9-2. Oil product flows to West Germany from Rotterdam, 1950-75 
 
Note: For the full data, see Appendix B: Data Table 0-8. The West German oil supply from the 
Rotterdam oil port, 1950-75. 
Source: CBS, Historie verkeer en vervoer van 1899, Goederenvervoer met pijpleidingen, 
http://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb/selection/?DM=SLNL&PA=37406&VW=T, 12.10.2011; CBS, 
Statistiek van de zeevaart, 1946-1975; Mineralölwirtschaftsverband, Daten zum Mineralölversorgung, 
Mineralölverbrauch, Mineralölausfuhr, http://mwv.de/index.php/daten/statistikeninfoportal, 
14.5.2009; RRP NV, Annual Reports, Rotterdam, 1960-1975. Statistisches Bundesamt, Die 
Binnenschiffahrt im Jahre, 1950-1957; Statistisches Bundesamt, Der Verkehr in der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland, Reihe 1, Binnenschiffahrt, 1958-1961; Statistisches Bundesamt, Fachserie H Verkehr, 
Reihe 1 Binnenschiffahrt, 1962-1975; Statistisches Bundesamt, Die Seeschiffahrt im Jahre, 1948-
1956; Statistisches Bundesamt, Verkehr. Reihe 2, Seeschiffahrt, 1957-1975; BP Archive, 21090 & 
21093, RMR Progress Reports, 1968-1971; Database on cargo flows in the Port of Rotterdam, 1880-2000, 
persistent identifier urn:nbn:nl:ui:13-n6w-g4s, 13 October 2009. 
 
The pattern of oil product flows from Rotterdam to West Germany corresponded 
with the development of the capacity of West German refiners, their geographical 
distribution and the output of these refineries in terms of types of oil product. In 1950, 
only 17 per cent of the oil products shipped from Rotterdam were destined for West 
Germany, but this share increased sharply in the early 1950s, rising to 31 per cent in 
1957 in response to the growing consumption of fuel oil in the country. The refinery 
expansions of the late 1950s in the Rhine-Ruhr area aimed to replace rising fuel oil 
imports with domestic production. As a consequence, West German oil product 
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imports stabilised between 1958 and 1961, and the German-destined share of the oil 
product flows from the Rotterdam port declined slightly to 27 per cent. There was 
then a sudden increase between 1961 and 1963, with growth to 34 per cent annually, 
as West German imports of oil products doubled. In the mid-1960s, West German 
oil imports stagnated in the face of a recession, further refinery expansions and due to 
government induced limits on fuel oil consumption in the country.676 When the West 
German economy recovered, refiners struggled to keep up with demand and 
increasingly needed to import oil products, the share of which rose from 20 per cent 
of total oil imports in 1968 to 29 per cent in 1975.677 In response, the share of 
German-destined oil products from Rotterdam increased again from 1967 onwards. 
In 1973, 50 per cent of all outgoing oil products from Rotterdam were destined for 
West Germany. This growth was partly caused by the 1968 connection of the 
Rotterdam-Rhine pipeline to the Royal Dutch Shell-BP oil product pipeline system, 
namely the Rhine-Main pipeline.  
 Figure 9-2 shows that the West German hinterland became more important 
for the Rotterdam port. Whether West German demand for oil products drove the 
expansion of the Rotterdam refining cluster is a difficult question to answer. Between 
1950 and 1955, refinery capacity in the port increased from 3 million to 12 million 
tons per annum.678  Given the rather low share of oil products destined for West 
Germany in those years, it is untenable to argue that West German demand drove 
refinery expansion in Rotterdam in the early 1950s. Indeed, until the second half of 
the 1950s, the West German economy still very much relied on coal, and therefore 
had little market potential for refineries establishing themselves in the Rotterdam port 
in the early part of the decade. However, the growing share of oil products to West 
Germany observed between 1952 and 1957 does suggest that the refineries in the port 
responded immediately when energy transition took off in the mid-1950s.  
 Before and shortly after World War II, West Germany’s oil consumption 
consisted primarily of motor fuels. The immediate post-war energy crisis was 
addressed by subsequently creating an oil import program and a refinery capacity 
expansion program in the late 1940s.679 The aim was to save on foreign currency by 
encouraging oil companies to refine crude oil in Germany instead of importing oil 
products. Furthermore, to stimulate the production of German crude oil in the 
process, a tax and tariff system was designed to further the aim of reducing imports of 
oil products. Up to 1959, these tariffs and taxes priced imported gasoline and diesel 
12 per cent higher than domestically refined alternatives. However, the initial tax and 
                                               
676 Horn, Die Energiepolitik, 252-254.  
677 Mineralölwirtschaftsverband, Daten zum Mineralölversorgung, 
http://mwv.de/index.php/daten/statistikeninfoportal, accessed on 14 May 2009 (own calculations). 
678 Molle and Wever, Oil Refineries, 164-169. Own calculations. 
679 Karlsch and Stokes, Faktor Öl, 248. 
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tariff law for the oil industry of 1953 was changed in 1955, because the protection of 
German refiners threatened to kill the independent traders and wholesalers and 
provided opportunities for these refiners to divide the market to the detriment of 
consumers. Some of the protective tariffs were therefore reduced again in 1955.680 To 
encourage competition in the heating fuel market following energy shortages in 
1955/1956, taxes on fuel oil were lifted in July 1956.681 At the time, there was an 
excess of crude oil on world markets. The increasing volumes of Middle Eastern crude, 
but also the promise of new reserves in Libya, flooded the European market with 
cheap crude oil. This was further compounded by declining tanker rates in the wake 
of the Suez Crisis. As the market for motor fuels in West Germany was already 
saturated, the heating fuel market provided an outlet for excess crude oil.682 
Consequently, fuel oil prices in West Germany plummeted by 30 per cent from a 
price peak of 210 DM per ton in 1956 to 147 DM per ton in 1960, which was lower 
than crude oil prices in West German ports and neighbouring countries.683  
 
Figure 9-3. Fuel oil imports and consumption in West Germany, 1950-59 
 
Source: Witte, Subventionen in der Mineralölwirtschaft, 142, 144. 
 
Figure 9-3 shows that between 1951 and 1959, West Germany relied heavily on fuel 
oil imports to meet rising demand, particularly between 1953 and 1956-57. In 
response to declining prices over the course of the 1950s, the demand for fuel oil rose 
rapidly after 1954. As West German refineries were not geared to the production of 
                                               
680 Witte, Subventionen in der Mineralölwirtschaft, 41.  
681 Ibid., 95.  
682 Plitzko, Bemerkungen, 57-58.  
683 Witte, Subventionen, 97; Plitzko, Bemerkungen, 58. 
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fuel oil, the share of imports soared from only 14 per cent in 1953 to 64 per cent in 
1956 and 1957. North Rhine Westphalia accounted for over 33 per cent of the total 
fuel oil consumption in West Germany, but the available refineries in that area were 
specifically dedicated to the production of motor fuels.684 The imports that covered 
rising demand were largely on account of independent traders and the sales and 
distribution subsidiaries of coal mining companies that moved into the fuel oil 
business to retain their clients. These parties imported mainly from countries with a 
cheap excess fuel oil supply, such as the Netherlands Antilles, Venezuela, the 
Netherlands and states in the Eastern bloc.685 The oil companies were surprised by the 
speed at which fuel oil demand grew, but immediately started investing in refining 
capacity dedicated to fuel oil production from 1955 onwards. However, it took several 
years for these expansions to materialise, and imports of fuel oil continued to rise until 
1958, when Esso AG’s new refinery near Cologne became operational. From then on, 
domestic refining capacity was more in tune with demand, although fuel oil imports 
kept rising into the 1960s.686  
 Between 1952 and 1957, the rise in the share of oil product flows to West 
Germany of the total oil product flows from Rotterdam observed in Figure 9-2, 
corresponded to the sudden spike in fuel oil consumption in West Germany. As the 
domestic production of fuel oil picked up again from 1957 onwards, oil product flows 
from Rotterdam stabilised. Moreover, in late 1959, a tax on light and heavy fuel oil 
was reinstated to limit the growing volume of imports. This tax was imposed under 
cover of the 1958 EEC exemption clause that expired in 1963, which allowed West 
Germany to uphold its protective framework of fiscal instruments for the energy 
market.687 Although the tax in itself did not limit fuel oil imports (after the decline in 
1959, they rose again in 1960 and 1961), it did have a limiting effect on exports from 
Rotterdam. Exactly why this was is unclear, but the growth of imported fuel oil in the 
early 1960s primarily came from Italy, the Soviet Union and other countries in the 
Eastern Bloc.688  Figure 9-2 shows that, between 1959 and 1961, exports from 
Rotterdam to West Germany did not grow, and only increased again in 1963 
following the removal of the fuel oil tax in April of that year.  
During the 1960s, the West German consumption pattern became 
increasingly skewed towards light fuel oil, with domestic refineries struggling to keep 
up throughout the decade. The inability of domestic refiners to cover growing 
                                               
684 Plitzko, Bemerkungen, 72. Union Kraftstoff, for instance, operated on a refining contract for 
Deutsche Shell and produced almost exclusively motor fuels (see Chapter 5).  
685 Witte, Subventionen, 96; Plitzko, Bemerkungen, 64.  
686 Karlsch and Stokes, Faktor Öl, 314.  
687 Witte, Subventionen, 104.  
688 M. Martiny and H-J. Schneider (Eds.), Deutsche Energiepolitik seit 1945. Vorrang für die Kohle: 
Dokumente und Materialien zur Energiepolitik der Industriegewerkschaft Bergbau und Energie (Köln 1981) 
209-210. 
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demand for light fuel oil was caused by the inherent inflexibility of the refineries that 
were constructed in North Rhine Westphalia in the late 1950s to meet the increasing 
demand for heavy fuel oil. The case of Deutsche Shell’s Rhineland refinery in 
Cologne (operational in 1960) is instructive. Whereas Royal Dutch Shell’s 
Rotterdam-Pernis refinery was a balancing refinery, which was a highly flexible 
facility designed to balance Royal Dutch’s market positions in Western Europe, 
Deutsche Shell’s Cologne-Godorf refinery was much less flexible. Deutsche Shell 
estimated that without a refinery in the Rhineland, it would have supply shortfalls on 
the West German market of 2.1 million tons of gas oil (light fuel oil) and 2.3 million 
tons of heavy fuel oil. To address these shortfalls, the Rhineland refinery was designed 
to process Kuwaiti crude oil to maximise fuel oil output, the demand for which was 
expected to grow particularly fast. Although the chosen refinery design did indeed 
adequately address the short-term need for heavy fuel oil, it did not have the flexibility 
to simultaneously supply the growing demand for light fuel oil. Indeed, Deutsche 
Shell projected that in 1965 it would still have a shortfall of 1.4 million tons of gas oil, 
even with the Rhineland refinery operating at full capacity.689 
 Figure 9-2 suggests that Rotterdam functioned as a supplier of the products 
that could not be provided adequately by the Rhine-Ruhr refineries. As the pattern of 
West German consumption shifted from being dominated by heavy to light fuel oil, 
flows from Rotterdam to West Germany changed composition accordingly (Figure 
9-4).  
 
Figure 9-4. Oil product exports from the Netherlands to West Germany, 
1950-1966 
 
Source: CBS, Maandstatistiek van de in-, uit- en doorvoer per goederensoort, Utrecht, 1950-1966. Own 
calculations. The data refer to exports from the Netherlands. From Dutch sea shipping statistics, it can 
                                               
689 SHA, MF/48, Budget Revision New Rhineland Refinery, 15 March 1957.  
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be gleaned that in the period 1960-1975 over 90 per cent of oil products shipped from the Netherlands 
originated in Rotterdam. (CBS, Statistiek van de Zeevaart, 1960-1975). The period 1950-1966 was 
chosen because the shift from heavy to light fuel oil took place then.  
 
In the mid-1950s, heavy fuel oil was marginally the most important oil product 
exported to West Germany from the Netherlands, save for gasoline. However, as the 
expanded refinery capacity in the Rhine-Ruhr hinterland took over, heavy fuel oil 
flows stabilised and fell off in the early 1960s, making way for lighter fuel oils and 
diesel (gas oil in this case comprises the range from light fuel oil to diesel), which 
became the majority of oil product flows from Rotterdam to West Germany. 
Rotterdam thus functioned as a supplier of those fractions that could not be properly 
covered by the limited flexibility of the refineries in the Rhine-Ruhr hinterland, as 
they were geared to produce heavier fractions.690 The pattern of lighter fuel oil exports 
from Rotterdam to West Germany is also corroborated by data on the landside 
outgoing flows of oil products from the port (Figure 9-5). 
 
Figure 9-5. Landside oil product outflows from Rotterdam, 1946-70.  
 
Source: Database on cargo flows in the Port of Rotterdam, 1880-2000, persistent identifier 
urn:nbn:nl:ui:13-n6w-g4s, accessed 7 March 2014. After 1970, a breakdown of oil products is not 
available in the database.  
 
Outflows of oil products were limited in the late 1940s. Then, when outflows started 
expanding in the early 1950s, heavy fuel became increasingly important, particularly 
between 1956 and 1960. Heavy fuel oil outflows then fell off after 1961, and gas oil 
made up the largest share of landside outgoing oil product flows. For Dutch Rhine 
                                               
690 Mulfinger, Auf dem Weg, 67. 
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tank ship owners, the gas oil imports into West Germany became a major part of 
their business. As the refineries in the Rhine-Ruhr area concentrated on gasoline and 
heavy fuel oil production, gas oil remained one of the few oil products that were 
shipped between Rotterdam and the West German hinterland. For most other oil 
products, inland tank ship owners were forced to look for cargoes in the so-called 
intra-German transport market.691  
 This section has revealed that the West German hinterland became 
increasingly important for the Rotterdam oil port. Although the hinterland provided 
few opportunities in the early 1950s, the West German economy’s transition from 
coal to oil after 1956 quickly turned the country into the principal destination for (re-) 
exports of oil products from the Port of Rotterdam. Not only did the transition to oil 
of the hinterland provide the impetus for large-scale port expansion (Europoort), but 
also provided a market for Rotterdam’s burgeoning refinery cluster. During the mid-
1950s, heavy fuel oil seemed to be the major growth product in the West German oil 
market, but in the following decade, light fuel oil for household heating, among other 
uses, became the main oil product in terms of West German oil consumption. 
Exports from the Netherlands to West Germany and landside outgoing oil product 
flows from Rotterdam to the country changed accordingly and became dominated by 
light fuel oil (gas oil). However, if West Germany was important for Rotterdam, was 
Rotterdam equally vital for West Germany? The foregoing seems to suggest so, but a 
closer look is required. For crude oil, Rotterdam commanded an enduring link with 
the West German hinterland through the Rotterdam-Rhine pipeline, which secured 
the port a stable share of West German crude oil imports.  
  
                                               
691 VOA, 1260/257, Notulen Raad van Beheer en Directie, Verslag vergadering RvB, 16 Februari 1961, 
2. 
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Figure 9-6. Rotterdam’s share of West German crude oil imports, 1950-75 
 
Note: For the full data, see Appendix B: Data Table 0-8. The West German oil supply from the 
Rotterdam oil port, 1950-75. 
Source: CBS, Historie verkeer en vervoer van 1899, Goederenvervoer met pijpleidingen, 
http://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb/selection/?DM=SLNL&PA=37406&VW=T, 12.10.2011; CBS, 
Statistiek van de zeevaart, Den Haag, 1946-1975; Mineralölwirtschaftsverband, Daten zum 
Mineralölversorgung, Mineralölverbrauch, Mineralölausfuhr, 
http://mwv.de/index.php/daten/statistikeninfoportal, 14.5.2009; RRP NV, Annual Reports, 
Rotterdam, 1960-1975. Statistisches Bundesamt, Die Binnenschiffahrt im Jahre, 1950-1957; 
Statistisches Bundesamt, Der Verkehr in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Reihe 1, Binnenschiffahrt, 
1958-1961; Statistisches Bundesamt, Fachserie H Verkehr, Reihe 1 Binnenschiffahrt, 1962-1975; 
Statistisches Bundesamt, Die Seeschiffahrt im Jahre, 1948-1956; Statistisches Bundesamt, Verkehr. 
Reihe 2, Seeschiffahrt, 1957-1975; Database on cargo flows in the Port of Rotterdam, 1880-2000, 
persistent identifier urn:nbn:nl:ui:13-n6w-g4s, 13 October 2009. 
 
Figure 9-6 portrays three distinct phases in Rotterdam’s share of West German crude 
oil imports: growth, decline and growth again. At first, because of its strong position 
in Rhine shipping, Rotterdam acquired a rising share of these imports, up to a figure 
of 33 per cent in 1957. However, crude oil imports into West Germany were 
relatively modest during this period, and when they began to rise in the face of 
refinery expansions in the Rhine-Ruhr area, the share of crude oil shipped via 
Rotterdam declined rapidly to 15 per cent in 1959. The decline was primarily caused 
by the Nord-West Oelleitung, which started pumping crude oil from Wilhelmshaven 
to the Rhine-Ruhr area in 1958. The construction of the Rotterdam-Rhine pipeline 
increased Rotterdam’s share slightly to 21 per cent in 1961, but this dropped again to 
19 per cent in 1965 as the Southern European, Central European and Trans-Alpine 
pipelines opened between 1963 and 1965. From the late 1960s onwards, growing 
amounts of crude oil were shipped to West Germany by sea, increasing the 
Rotterdam share of the country’s crude oil imports to 26 per cent in 1973. Rotterdam 
strengthened its position with consecutive port expansions in the 1960s, allowing the 
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capacity of the Rotterdam-Rhine pipeline to also be expanded in 1968, keeping pace 
with the growth in demand for crude oil in West Germany. This provided Rotterdam 
with a stable and enduring share of Western Germany’s crude oil imports.  
 A similar pattern can be found in the case of West German oil product 
imports. During the early 1950s, when these imports in the country were limited, 
Rotterdam commanded a high share of around 70 per cent (60 per cent if seaborne oil 
product flows from Rotterdam to West Germany are excluded; Figure 9-7). 
Rotterdam’s share gradually fell in the late 1950s and early 1960s, stabilising at 
around 50 per cent between 1963 and 1975. Most of the (re-)exports of oil products 
from Rotterdam were performed by landside transport (primarily inland shipping, via 
a pipeline from 1968 onwards, and rail). A steady percentage was also transported by 
sea. It is impossible to ascertain whether these shipments were actual (re-)exports 
from Rotterdam or transit flows as part of what is known as horseshoe-traffic, namely 
German-German transport between the Rhine basin and the German North Sea 
ports. These seaborne shipments made up around one fifth of oil product flows to 
West Germany throughout the period. One of the reasons for the decline of 
Rotterdam’s share in the early 1960s was the fact that refineries around Strasbourg 
started to export to Southwest Germany, while oil products also came from other 
origins.692 In the mid-1960s, West German oil imports plateaued, presumably due to 
both an economic down-cycle that lasted until 1968 and refinery expansions in the 
Rhine-Ruhr area and Bavaria and Württemberg. Thereafter which imports rose 
sharply again. Oil product flows from Rotterdam followed suit and grew at a similar 
pace. A crucial factor in Rotterdam maintaining its share of West German oil product 
imports was the pipeline system between the port and Ludwigshafen (the Rhine-
Main pipeline) that started operating in 1968. By 1971, this pipeline transported 47 
per cent of the landside oil product flows from Rotterdam to West Germany.693 
  
                                               
692 VOA, 1260/257, Notulen Raad van Beheer en Directie, Verslag vergadering RvB, 16 June 1961, 2. 
693 Statistisches Bundesamt, Verkehr, Reihe 8 Binnenschiffahrt, Stuttgart, 1950-1975; Statistisches 
Bundesamt, Die Seeschiffahrt im Jahre, Stuttgart, 1948-1956; Statistisches Bundesamt, Verkehr. 
Reihe 2, Seeschiffahrt, Stuttgart, 1957-1975; CBS, Historie verkeer en vervoer van 1899, 
Goederenvervoer met pijpleidingen, 
http://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb/selection/?DM=SLNL&PA=37406&VW=T, 12.10.2011; RRP NV, 
Annual Reports 1968-1975. Own calculations. 
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Figure 9-7. Rotterdam’s share of West German oil product imports, 1950-
75694 
 
Source: CBS, Historie verkeer en vervoer van 1899, Goederenvervoer met pijpleidingen, 
http://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb/selection/?DM=SLNL&PA=37406&VW=T, 12.10.2011; CBS, 
Statistiek van de zeevaart, Den Haag, 1946-1975; Mineralölwirtschaftsverband, Daten zum 
Mineralölversorgung, Mineralölverbrauch, Mineralölausfuhr, 
http://mwv.de/index.php/daten/statistikeninfoportal, 14.5.2009; RRP NV, Annual Reports, 
Rotterdam, 1960-1975. Statistisches Bundesamt, Die Binnenschiffahrt im Jahre, 1950-1957; 
Statistisches Bundesamt, Der Verkehr in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Reihe 1, Binnenschiffahrt, 
1958-1961; Statistisches Bundesamt, Fachserie H Verkehr, Reihe 1 Binnenschiffahrt, 1962-1975; 
Statistisches Bundesamt, Die Seeschiffahrt im Jahre, 1948-1956; Statistisches Bundesamt, Verkehr. 
Reihe 2, Seeschiffahrt, 1957-1975; Database on cargo flows in the Port of Rotterdam, 1880-2000, 
persistent identifier urn:nbn:nl:ui:13-n6w-g4s, 13 October 2009.  
                                               
694 The high shares of West German oil product imports originating from Rotterdam in the early 1950s 
do not seem credible. It could not be precisely established whether under-reporting in the import 
statistics or over-reporting in the German inland shipping statistics caused the seemingly anomalous 
values for 1952 in particular, and the high values throughout the 1950s in general. One possible 
explanation could be that the German trade statistics reported in Erdöl und Kohle do not include oil 
products received in German storage on foreign accounts, whereas the transport statistics do not 
differentiate between direct imports and imports in bonded storage. The amounts therefore differ and 
the percentage reported above is not entirely accurate; it is instead an indication of the share. A more 
precise method is not available, as trade statistics do not report the origin of imports at the level of 
individual ports. An additional problem with seaborne oil product shipments to Germany is that they 
could contain so-called horseshoe traffic between the Rhine area and German North Sea ports. Every 
year, several hundred thousand tons of oil products were shipped from West Germany to Rotterdam. 
Their final destination unknown; these flows were either exported to Rotterdam or elsewhere, or were 
destined for German North Sea ports as intermediates or balancing flows. For instance, inland tankers 
shipped a total of 600,000 tons of oil products to Rotterdam in 1961. Whether these were shipped to 
Germany cannot be established from the Seeschiffahrt statistics. Finally, the Dutch statistics mention 
that German customs overestimated inland shipping cargoes from Rotterdam (see Appendix B, Note 
on sources and definitions). For the full data, see Appendix B: Data Table 0-8. The West German oil 
supply from the Rotterdam oil port, 1950-75 (in tons). 
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West Germany thus developed into an important market for oil product exporters in 
Western Europe. As was demonstrated earlier, the country was the main destination 
for oil product flows from Rotterdam. The success of Rotterdam refiners in exporting 
to the Federal Republic lay in the flexibility of the large refineries of Royal Dutch 
Shell, Jersey Standard and BP in particular. Their ability to respond to the ‘lightning 
of the barrel’ (the demand for light oil products growing faster than that for heavy oil 
products) in the West German market provided them with a growing outlet for their 
production. Rotterdam was particularly successful in exporting so-called middle 
distillates, i.e. gas oil, but also lighter products such as naphtha for the petrochemical 
industry.695  
 
9.3 Expanding the hinterland 
The German hinterland remained the Port of Rotterdam’s primary hinterland. 
Moreover, it developed into the single most important oil product market for the 
Rotterdam refineries. These findings do not, however, clarify the effects of energy 
transition on the composition of the German hinterland of the Rotterdam oil port: 
did the composition change between 1950 and 1975 and, if so, how and why? On the 
one hand, it could be expected that the Rotterdam port would extend its hinterland 
beyond the Rhine-Ruhr area, as its oil cluster gained competitive advantages from 
scale and agglomeration economies in the expanding port. On the other hand, the 
expanding production of oil products in the Rhine-Ruhr hinterland, as well as further 
south along the Rhine, could have reduced the demand for oil products from 
Rotterdam. Moreover, throughout the period, exports from Italy, France and Belgium, 
to name just a few, also competed with oil flows from the Dutch port. This section 
takes a closer look at the destinations of oil flows from Rotterdam to the West 
German hinterland.696  
 As the transition from coal to oil took shape, German inland shipping 
statistics reported a steady rise in the volumes of oil products on West German inland 
                                               
695 WRR, Onder invloed van Duitsland. Een onderzoek naar de gevoeligheid en kwetsbaarheid in de 
betrekkingen tussen Nederland en de Bondsrepubliek (Den Haag 1982) 56-60. 
696 This section uses data from both Dutch and German cross-border inland shipping statistics. These 
data are supplemented with new data on crude oil and oil product flows by pipeline. The destinations 
of shipments are grouped by Verkehrsbezirke or traffic regions, which are regional groupings used by the 
West German statistical office to report transportation data. The Dutch statistics used similar regional 
groupings, but these were changed a number of times during the research period. The German traffic 
regions were changed once in 1969. However, the two systems of reporting data (before 1969 and 
after) are incomparable. The maps of the traffic regions both before and after 1969 can be found in 
Appendix D: West German traffic areas. This chapter looks only at inland shipping and pipeline data; 
rail and road haulage were of marginal importance and represented less than 3 per cent of the total 
cargo flows between port and hinterland.  
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waterways. In 1950, a mere 3 per cent of the total volume of cargo transhipped in 
inland ports consisted of oil products. By 1956, that percentage had doubled to 6 per 
cent, and doubled again to 12 per cent in 1961.697 Behind this rising share was an 
important and fundamental shift in the pattern of supply of the emerging demand for 
oil in West Germany (Table 9-1). In the first half of the 1950s, the growing demand 
for oil in West Germany was increasingly supplied from imports, which rose sharply 
between 1950 and 1957 (Figure 9-7). As imports grew, the share of oil products with 
foreign origins transhipped in West German inland ports increased from an already 
impressive 40 per cent in 1950 to 52 per cent in 1956 (Table 9-1). By 1961, however, 
this figure had declined again to 31 per cent. Rotterdam was by far the most 
important origin of those inflows, although its relative position fell during the 1950s 
from 86 per cent in 1950 to 73 per cent in 1961.  
 
Table 9-1. Oil products with foreign origins unloaded in West German 
inland ports, 1950-61 
1950 1956 1961 
Oil products with foreign origins as a percentage of 
the total oil products unloaded in West German inland 
ports 
40% 52% 31% 
Oil products from Rotterdam as a percentage of the 
total oil products unloaded in West German inland 
ports 
34% 40% 22% 
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, Verkehr, Reihe 8 Binnenschiffahrt, 1950-1961 
 
The rising, and then declining, importance of oil products from foreign destinations 
in West German inland waterway transport can be explained by the construction of 
inland refineries in the Rhine-Ruhr area in the late 1950s. From the early 1950s to 
1957-58, the share of oil products in West Germany’s oil imports started rising 
sharply, from less than 15 per cent to 41 per cent in 1957 (Figure 9-8).  
  
                                               
697 Statistisches Bundesamt, Verkehr, Reihe 8 Binnenschiffahrt, Stuttgart, 1950-1961. Own calculations. 
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Figure 9-8. West German oil product imports as a percentage of total oil 
imports, 1950-75 
 
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, Statistisches Jahrbuch 1950-69 (1950 to 1969); 
Mineralölwirtschaftsverband, Daten zum Mineralölversorgung, Mineralölverbrauch, Mineralölausfuhr, 
http://mwv.de/index.php/daten/statistikeninfoportal, 14 May 2009 (1970 to 1975). 
 
The refinery expansions of the late 1950s caused oil product imports to plateau, and 
the share of oil products in West Germany’s oil imports fell back again to 20 per cent. 
As a result, deliveries of oil products in the country’s inland ports increasingly 
originated from German refineries, while oil product flows from Rotterdam came to a 
halt and then declined between 1958 and 1961 (Figure 9-9). Then, between 1961 and 
1963, West German oil product imports started to rise sharply again. However, 
further refinery expansions in both the Rhine-Ruhr area and further south along the 
Rhine in around 1963 kept inland tank shipments from Rotterdam at a stable level 
until 1965. From the mid-1960s onwards, West German oil product imports started 
rising again, as they were required to complement the domestic output of West 
German refiners, which struggled to keep up with demand. As a consequence, the 
share of oil products in West Germany’s oil imports rose from 20 to 30 per cent.  
 Oil product flows from Rotterdam to West Germany started to rise again 
from 1965 (Figure 9-9). The bulk of this growth was attributable to exports via the 
Rhine-Main pipeline system between Rotterdam and the Main area, which became 
operational in late 1968. Between 1969 and 1973, the pipeline took over substantial 
shipments from inland tank shipping, increasing its share of landside shipments from 
Rotterdam to 45 per cent in 1973.  
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Figure 9-9. Oil products from Rotterdam to West Germany, 1950-75 
 
Note: the data consist of oil products (excluding crude oil) transported from Rotterdam to West 
Germany by inland shipping and, from 1969 onwards, also by the Rhine-Main pipeline (RMR). The 
volumes transported from Rotterdam by rail and road tank car are negligible, and are therefore 
excluded.  
Source: Inland shipping: Statistisches Bundesamt, Verkehr, Reihe 8 Binnenschiffahrt, 1950-1975; 
Rhine-Main pipeline: BP Archive, 21090 & 21093, RMR Progress Reports, 1968-1971. For the full 
data, see Appendix B: Data Table 0-10. The inland shipping of oil products between Rotterdam and 
West Germany, 1950-75 (in tons). 
 
Royal Dutch Shell and British Petroleum controlled the Rhine-Main pipeline, and its 
rapid rise to dominance in landside oil product flows from Rotterdam to West 
Germany demonstrated that the international oil companies at the time still 
dominated the West German oil market. The decision by Royal Dutch and BP to 
invest in the Rhine-Main pipeline had a substantial impact on the operations of the 
Rhine tank fleet. Indeed, during the late 1960s and early 1970s, the entire Rhine tank 
fleet experienced falling freight rates and declining profit margins.698 However, from 
the perspective of the Port of Rotterdam, the construction of the pipeline crafted a 
durable hinterland connection that gave the port permanent access to the Main area 
via the Rhine-Ruhr region. Moreover, the growth of demand in the Main area 
became increasingly important from the early-1960s onwards, particularly because it 
was less well served by local refineries than the Rhine-Ruhr region. Although 
Frankfurt boasted a refinery from 1963 onwards, it was the only one serving the local 
market. One of the key reasons why Royal Dutch and BP constructed the Rhine-
Main pipeline was the decision to expand their Rhine-Ruhr refineries and supply the 
                                               
698 Boele and Van de Laar, Geschiedenis Koninklijke Van Ommeren, 81.  
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Main area from there rather than constructing a refinery in the location.  
 The various shifts in the pattern of the oil product supply in the Rhine basin 
translated into several shifts in the composition of the West German hinterland of the 
Rotterdam oil port between 1950 and 1975 (Table 9-2). Rising imports in the 1950s 
caused a surge in oil product flows from Rotterdam to the Ruhr area, in particular to 
the inland port of Duisburg, which received the majority of these flows from 
Rotterdam to West Germany between 1950 and 1960 (43 per cent). In the 1950s, 
Duisburg was by far the most important inland oil port in West Germany. In 1956, it 
received 17 per cent of all of the oil products unloaded in the country’s inland ports. 
The second oil port was Mannheim, which received 11 per cent, followed by 
Frankfurt and Ludwigshafen, with 9 and 8 per cent shares respectively. By 1961, 
Frankfurt had become the largest West German inland oil port, with 13 per cent of 
the oil products unloaded in inland ports, followed by Duisburg with 11 per cent.699 
The drop in oil product flows from Rotterdam to West Germany that followed the 
construction of the Rhine-Ruhr refineries after 1959, particularly affected flows to the 
Ruhr and Cologne areas. Between 1960 and 1965, when oil product flows from 
Rotterdam to West Germany stagnated, the composition of the hinterland changed 
very little, save for a revival of the flows to the Cologne area, a steady growth in the 
flows to the Frankfurt area and a slight decline in the share of the Ruhr area. 
                                               
699 Statistisches Bundesamt, Verkehr, Reihe 8 Binnenschiffahrt, 1956, 1961. Own calculations. 
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This trend persisted from 1966 to 1975: oil flows to Frankfurt, Cologne and 
Düsseldorf grew stronger than those to the Ruhr region, the Manheim-Neckar area 
and other destinations in West Germany. By 1970, Frankfurt was the most important 
destination for oil product flows from Rotterdam. Another striking trend was the 
decline in the share of the Mannheim-Neckar area. Between 1950 and 1955, flows to 
this region equalled the share of the Ruhr area, although that of the former quickly 
fell from the early 1960s onwards, especially after the construction of the refineries in 
Karlsruhe that were connected to the Southern European pipelines.  
To compare the German hinterlands of the Rotterdam oil port and the port in 
general, a further clustering of the West German Rhine is required (Figure 9-10). 
 
Figure 9-10. Sections of the Rhine in West Germany: inland shipping 
statistics 
 
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, Die Binnenschiffahrt im Jahre, 1950-1957; Statistisches Bundesamt, 
Der Verkehr in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Reihe 1, Binnenschiffahrt, 1958-1961; Statistisches 
Bundesamt, Fachserie H Verkehr, Reihe 1 Binnenschiffahrt, 1962-1975. The Rhine sections include 
tributaries and connected canals.  
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Table 9-3 shows that the Lower Rhine area was the most important destination 
throughout the period, even increasing its share from 45 per cent in 1950-55 to 53 per 
cent in 1970-75. Although at the lower end of the aggregation in Table 9-2, 
Frankfurt received the largest share of oil product flows from Rotterdam, while that of 
the Upper Rhine region as a whole actually fell from 53 per cent in 1950-55 to 41 per 
cent in 1970-75. The declining share of Mannheim/Ludwigshafen cancelled out the 
growing share of Frankfurt in the 1960s. The Middle Rhine was of little importance, 
primarily because the oil and chemical clusters were located in the Rhine-Ruhr area 
and near Frankfurt and Ludwigshafen.  
In comparison to the total cargo flows by inland shipping from the Rotterdam 
port to West Germany, the hinterland of the oil port was much more extensive (Table 
9-4). Although the respective shares of the Lower Rhine and Upper Rhine regions 
showed the same trend as in Table 9-3, the former was far more important for the 
total cargo flows than for the oil product flows, increasing from 72 per cent in 1950-
55 to 79 per cent in 1970-75. Although cargo flows to the Upper Rhine doubled in 
absolute terms, its share of total cargo flows almost halved from 27 per cent in 1950-
55 to 14 per cent in 1970-75. Laspeyre reached a similar conclusion in 1969 when she 
found that 70 per cent of goods shipped from Rotterdam to West Germany by rail, 
road and inland navigation were destined for the western Ruhr area.700 
An oil product pipeline replaces barge and rail with a large central tank depot 
from which road tank cars cover the last mile to filling stations, industrial consumers 
and other local retailers. Although a pipeline delivered unrivalled transport cost 
reductions, the drawback was the necessity to construct one or two large tank depots 
or a system of branch pipelines with a number of smaller tank depots, adding 
substantially to the capital investment. A pipeline only made sense for the continuous 
transport of large volumes to a small number of central tank depots that were close to 
a major concentration of consumers.701 The Rhine-Main pipeline thus led to a 
restructuring of oil product distribution, and, as a result, oil product flows from 
Rotterdam became centred on three major transhipment points: Frankfurt, Cologne 
and Duisburg.   
                                               
700 Laspeyres, Rotterdam, 139.  
701 Heimerl, ‘Neue Raffineriestandorte und Produkten-Pipelines’, 535-536. 
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As the largest transhipment hub in West Germany, Duisburg remained an important 
destination. Deutsche Shell, for instance, maintained a large tank depot in the 
Duisburg port. Cologne and Frankfurt, on the other hand, were primarily important 
as urban agglomerations, as also was the fourth largest destination, Düsseldorf. Less 
visible from the data, but equally important in terms of economic impact, was the 
supply of naphtha to the steam crackers of Bayer (Leverkusen, in the Cologne area), 
Hoechst (Frankfurt) and, in particular, BASF (Ludwigshafen). A stable, long-term 
supply of naphtha was crucial for the operations of these large chemical complexes, 
which remain to this day the core of these companies (although in the case of 
Hoechst the firm itself fragmented in the 1990s after several divestments and 
restructurings).  
 The Rhine-Main pipeline system was originally designed as a logistical 
solution for supplying oil products to the Rhine-Main and Rhine-Neckar areas from 
refineries in the Rhine-Ruhr region. By 1971, however, the largest flow of oil 
products through the Rhine-Main pipeline was between Rotterdam and the Rhine-
Main area. The increasing importance of this area for the Rotterdam port was rooted 
in what has been called the oil-shed, which was an area across Western Germany 
where northern and southern oil pipeline systems did not reach. This relatively small 
band of just 125 kilometres comprised the area between Karlsruhe in the south and 
Frankfurt in the north and consisted of the German states of Hessen and the 
Rhineland Palatinate (Figure 9-11). These states also happened to be the two states 
with the least refinery capacity in the Federal Republic: Hessen had boasted one 
refinery since 1963, which was operated by Caltex and located southwest of Frankfurt; 
and the Rhineland Palatinate had disposed of two refineries since the mid-1960s, one 
in Speyer and another in Woerth. The Caltex refinery was supplied with crude oil 
from Rotterdam, while the Speyer and Woerth facilities were supplied from southern 
pipelines originating in Marseille and Trieste. Although the oil companies 
contemplated the idea of constructing an integrated trans-European pipeline system 
for crude oil in the late 1950s, in reality this did not materialise. The growing size of 
crude oil tankers dictated that pipelines from the North Sea enjoyed a cost advantage 
down to Frankfurt, while the southern pipelines maintained a cost advantage up to 
the Karlsruhe area.  
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Figure 9-11. Pipelines and refinery capacity in West Germany, 1970 
 
Note: The circles denote the capacity of the refineries. The black lines represent crude oil pipelines. 
The refineries in the Ruhr, Cologne and Karlsruhe areas were the largest in the Federal Republic. 
Source: W. Molle and E. Wever, Oil Refineries and Petrochemical Industries. Buoyant Past, 
Uncertain Future (Aldershot 1984) 164-169.  
 
As a result of the oil-shed, the Rhineland Palatinate and Hesse were relatively less 
well served by local refineries than the other states of the Federal Republic throughout 
the period. Table 9-5 shows the refinery capacity per capita in the states of the 
Federal Republic between 1950 and 1970. 
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Table 9-5. The refinery capacity in West German states, 1950-70 (in tons 
per capita) 
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 
Baden-Württemberg 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 2.1 
Bavaria 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 2.1 
Bremen 0.9 1.1 2.0 2.0 1.9 
Hamburg 1.1 2.7 4.3 5.0 7.0 
Hesse 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.8 
Lower Saxony 0.1 0.2 0.5 1.1 1.3 
North Rhine Westphalia 0.1 0.4 1.4 1.8 2.3 
Rhineland Palatinate 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.7 
Saarland 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.1 
Schleswig-Holstein 0.0 0.3 0.7 1.5 1.4 
Source: Refinery data: W. Molle and E. Wever, Oil Refineries, 164-169; population data: Jürgen 
Sensch, (1947-2005 [2007]) histat-Datenkompilation online: Bevölkerungsstand, 
Bevölkerungsbewegung, Haushalte und Familien in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1947 bis 1999. 
GESIS Köln, Deutschland ZA8200 Datenfile Version 2.0.0, 
http://www.gesis.org/histat/de/project/details/413B42498BD990E2258A7F58DDA682D6, 2 April 
2014. 
 
Although only Bremen and Hamburg had refinery capacity to speak of in 1950, by 
1965 and 1970 all German states had refineries serving the internal demand for oil. 
The least self-sufficient states by some distance were Hessen and the Rhineland 
Palatinate, leaving considerable demand for supplies from other states or foreign 
origins. The Rhine-Main pipeline was designed to service that demand, but as the 
West German refineries began to struggle to keep up (between 1965 and 1970, total 
refinery capacity was less than total consumption), supplies from the Rhine-Ruhr area 
were complemented by imports from Rotterdam.702 The position of Rotterdam in the 
Rhine-Main area was therefore strengthened by the existence of the oil-shed, which 
was in itself the result of the Rotterdam port gaining a competitive advantage over 
other ports in supplying the Frankfurt area with crude oil. As one of the largest urban 
agglomerations in the Rhine basin that was least served by local refineries, Frankfurt 
largely relied on other areas for its supply of oil products, and increasingly those with 
foreign origins (Figure 9-12). Before the refinery expansions in the Rhine-Ruhr area, 
the Ruhr refineries, comprising the former hydrogenation plants in Gelsenkirchen, 
supplied 70 per cent of Frankfurt’s oil product requirements. Additional supplies came 
from tank depots in Duisburg (not included in Figure 9-12) and Rotterdam.  
  
                                               
702 See Figure 9-12. 
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Figure 9-12. The supply of oil products to the Frankfurt area, 1957-71 
 
Note: The data on supplies are based on inland shipping data on delivered oil products (motor fuels 
and fuel oil) in the Frankfurt area (Frankfurt Wirtschaftsgebiet), supplemented with data from RMR 
deliveries (for the years 1969 and 1971). For the years 1969 and 1971, RMR transport was added to 
the flows from relevant traffic areas. Rail statistics were not included because rail shipments of oil 
products to Frankfurt were insignificant. This was because of the cost advantage of inland shipping 
over rail. Truck data were omitted because these typically involve intra-area transport (the last mile to 
the final customer).  
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, Verkehr, Reihe 8 Binnenschiffahrt, Stuttgart, 1957-1975; BP Archive, 
21090 & 21093, RMR Progress Reports, 1968-1971 (RMR data). The data are reported in Appendix 
B: Data Table 0-11. 
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By 1963, the supply pattern changed after refineries in Cologne and the Karlsruhe 
area started operating between 1959 and 1963. Of the West German refineries, 
Frankfurt received the majority of its oil products from the Cologne area, followed by 
flows from the Ruhr region and Karlsruhe. However, because the refinery expansions 
of the late 1950s and the 1960s were aimed at supplying burgeoning West German 
demand, increasing amounts of oil product supplies to Frankfurt were imported, 
jumping from 18 per cent in 1959 to 33 per cent in 1963, of which Rotterdam 
supplied two thirds. The only refinery in the Frankfurt area, which was located 
southwest of Frankfurt and operated by Caltex, became operational in late 1963, after 
which it supplied a rising, but relatively small, share of Frankfurt’s oil product 
requirements, illustrating the problem of local supplies.703 Notwithstanding the 
growth in supplies from the Caltex refinery and refineries in the Karlsruhe area, 
increasing volumes of oil products were obtained from Rotterdam over the course of 
the 1960s (Figure 9-13), leading to the opening of the Rhine-Main pipeline from the 
port in late 1968. Although the Rhine-Main pipeline also provided access to the 
Frankfurt area for the BP refinery in Dinslaken on the Lower Rhine and Royal Dutch 
Shell’s facility in Cologne-Godorf, it was particularly beneficial for the Rotterdam 
refineries of BP and Royal Dutch, as the West German refineries focussed on 
domestic demand. Rotterdam’s share of oil product supplies to Frankfurt jumped as a 
result, from 24 per cent in 1967 to 32 per cent in 1969 and 42 per cent in 1971, 
turning the port into the single most important supplier of oil products to the 
Frankfurt area.  
 The foregoing suggests that Royal Dutch Shell was a major player in the 
Rotterdam port in general and key in shaping the hinterland access infrastructure for 
the Rotterdam oil port in particular. Its image as a major player is further 
strengthened by its share of oil product flows from Rotterdam to West Germany 
(Figure 9-14). 
  
                                               
703 The Caltex refinery was supplied by an extension of the Rotterdam-Rhine pipeline, but struggled 
with high transportation costs and low profit margins from the start. The refinery closed down in the 
early 1980s after sluggish demand in the wake of the 1970s oil crises dealt the final blow to the refinery. 
Source: ‘Öl-Industrie – Gründlich verschätzt’, Der Spiegel, 23 August 1982, 56.  
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Figure 9-14. The volume of oil products shipped by Royal Dutch Shell as a 
percentage of the total oil product flow from Rotterdam to West Germany, 
1951-71 (5-year moving average) 
 
Source: Method of calculation: the Royal Dutch Shell transportation of oil products from Rotterdam to 
West Germany by its captive fleet of inland tank ships (VOA, 1260/86-89, Vervoersstatistieken 
Internationale 1947-1975) plus Royal Dutch Shell’s share of the RMR transport from Rotterdam to 
West Germany (BP Archive, 21090 & 21093, RMR Progress Reports, 1968-1971) divided by the total 
flow of oil products from Rotterdam to West Germany (derived from RMR data and Statistisches 
Bundesamt, Verkehr, Reihe 8 Binnenschiffahrt, Stuttgart, 1951-1971). Because no RMR data was 
available after 1971, the graph ends then.  
 
The total volume of oil products shipped from Rotterdam to West Germany on 
account of Royal Dutch Shell grew from 0.4 million tons in 1955 to 3.5 million tons 
in 1971.704 Although Royal Dutch’s share of the total oil product outflows to West 
Germany fell from around 90 per cent to around 25 per cent in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, Figure 9-14 clearly demonstrates that this company was, and remained, a 
major player in the Rotterdam oil port.705 Moreover, the manner in which Royal 
Dutch organised this sizable flow of oil products greatly affected the development of 
the hinterland infrastructure of the Rotterdam port. When, in 1968, the opportunity 
arose to connect Rotterdam to the Rhine-Main pipeline, Royal Dutch wasted little 
time and replaced its already ailing captive fleet on the Rhine with a pipeline.  
 
                                               
704 VOA, 1260/86-89, Vervoersstatistieken Internationale 1947-1975; BP Archive, 21090 & 21093, 
RMR Progress Reports, 1968-1971; Statistisches Bundesamt, Verkehr, Reihe 8 Binnenschiffahrt 
(Stuttgart 1955-1971). 
705 The declining share is of course explained by the arrival of other major refiners in the port during 
the 1960s: Esso in 1960,  
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9.4 Conclusion 
The Rotterdam oil port was highly internationalised as long ago as the early 1950s. 
This was due to Royal Dutch Shell’s balancing refinery in Rotterdam-Pernis, which 
imported crude oil and intermediate oil products and exported a large share of its 
production.706 The relationship between the Rotterdam oil port and the West German 
hinterland consisted of two functions, transit and production. Transit involved the 
transhipment of West German crude oil imports via Rotterdam. This function was 
already well developed at an early stage, with the vast majority of crude oil in transit 
destined for West Germany, although the volume was low in the early 1950s. The 
second major port expansion after World War II, Europoort, was directly related to 
the transit of West German crude oil imports. Europoort was originally intended to 
facilitate a crude oil pipeline to the Rhine-Ruhr area in the late 1950s by expanding 
the port out west in the search for deeper waters to accommodate larger crude oil 
tankers. Although the Europoort expansion created much more than just a 
transhipment facility, its success in adapting the port to the ever-increasing size of 
crude oil tankers in the 1960s put Rotterdam in a favourable position as a major crude 
oil transhipment hub for Northwest Europe. In the process, the importance of crude 
oil transit shipments to West Germany became relatively less important for 
Rotterdam’s oil port, as transit shipments to Antwerp by pipeline, and to other North 
Sea and Baltic Sea ports by maritime shipping, expanded in the course of the late 
1960s and early 1970s.  
 The productive function of the Rotterdam oil port was a different story. The 
importance of the West German hinterland for Rotterdam’s oil port was modest in 
the early 1950s. At the time, motor fuels dominated the West German oil market. 
Although consumption was steadily rising as immediate post-war problems were 
overcome, and despite the fact that the Allied occupation authorities, the Marshall 
Plan and the nascent Federal Republic helped to boost the country’s oil industry, 
Western Germany’s oil market was still relatively small. Consequently, oil product 
exports from Rotterdam to West Germany were a sizable, but modest, share of total 
oil product exports from the Dutch port. This changed dramatically after West 
Germany opened up to foreign fuel oil imports, which started pouring in at a growing 
rate, especially in the wake of the 1956 Suez Crisis. Rotterdam joined in with this 
frenzy and saw its share of exports to West Germany rise. The West German share 
did, however, decline somewhat, as refinery expansion in the Rhine-Ruhr area took 
over heavy fuel oil supplies in the region from the late 1950s and early 1960s onwards.  
Attempting to stem the competition between coal and heavy fuel oil, the West 
                                               
706 Between 1957 and 1963, the Pernis refinery exported on average 70 per cent of its production. The 
throughput data of the Rotterdam port suggest that this was also the case early in the 1950s. (Source: 
SHA, inv 976, file 114, Statistical data on Shell Nederland Raffinaderij NV, 1) 
  254 
German government imposed several limitations on the production and importation 
of the latter. However, the rising demand for light fuel oil proved less easy to contain, 
growing faster than for any other oil product in the 1960s. West German refiners 
struggled to keep up with demand and the country’s oil product imports continued to 
rise throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, particularly with respect to light fuel oil. 
The West German share of total Rotterdam oil product outflows rose accordingly, to 
50 per cent in 1973. The growing importance of the West German hinterland for the 
Rotterdam oil port thus followed the path of West Germany’s transition from coal to 
oil, and the respective changes in demand and supply were part of this. However, it is 
going too far to state that West German demand was driving the growth of 
Rotterdam’s oil port; the refineries in the port fed many other markets in Western 
Europe and often served specific purposes within their corporate groups. Nevertheless, 
on the whole, an increasing share of the port’s exports was destined for West 
Germany, which in the process became by far the most important market for exports 
from Rotterdam.  
 Conversely, Rotterdam was also important to West Germany. With two 
pipelines, the Port of Rotterdam had enduring access to the West German hinterland. 
These pipelines fixed some of the oil supply flows to West Germany, making the 
Rotterdam port vital for the West German economy. As a transhipment port for 
crude oil, Rotterdam carved out a share of 20 to 25 per cent of West German crude 
oil imports in the 1960s and early 1970s. It gained an even larger share of around 40 
to 50 per cent of West German oil product imports. Crucial was the Rhine-Main 
pipeline system that connected the Rotterdam oil port with the Rhine-Ruhr and 
Rhine-Main areas and Ludwigshafen from 1968 onwards. The Rhine-Main pipeline 
answered the need for imports of sizable volumes of oil products for the West 
German oil market, thereby expressing the importance of Rotterdam’s oil port for 
West Germany. 
 On the whole, the data presented in this chapter seem to indicate that West 
Germany was more important for Rotterdam than vice versa. Once the German 
energy transition took off in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Rotterdam share of 
West German oil imports declined. Although this share gradually increased again 
over the course of the 1960s, not least because of the pipeline infrastructure that was 
put in place, the importance of West Germany for Rotterdam’s oil exports was much 
greater. By the late 1960s, around half of all oil product exports from Rotterdam 
flowed to West Germany. There thus seems to be stronger evidence for the 
conclusion that German demand for oil fuelled the growth of the Port of Rotterdam 
than for the claim that the port fuelled the West German economic miracle. The 
Wirtschaftswunder was highly significant for the development of Rotterdam’s port, and 
the West German energy transition did accelerate port expansion in the late 1950s 
and 1960s, which first and foremost reconfirmed the historical importance of the 
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German hinterland for the Rotterdam port. The composition of that hinterland, 
however, differed greatly between that of the port in general and the oil port in 
particular. 
 Over the period under consideration, the dominance of the Lower Rhine area 
in terms of oil product flows from Rotterdam to West Germany rose, while the share 
of flows to the Upper Rhine area fell. However, the share of the Upper Rhine in 
terms of oil product flows was much higher than for total cargo flows from the 
Rotterdam port, which remained strongly concentrated on the Rhine-Ruhr area. The 
partial shift in the composition of Rotterdam’s West German hinterland was the 
result of the geographical evolution of the hinterland infrastructure. The interplay 
between the costs of transporting crude oil by maritime tankers and pipelines was 
such that the crude oil pipeline system serving West Germany was not fully integrated, 
instead remaining divided by an oil-shed, which was a 125 kilometre stretch between 
Frankfurt and Mannheim where the southern and northern pipeline systems did not 
reach. As they were at the end of both of these pipeline systems, the urban areas of 
Hesse and the Rhineland Palatinate disposed of relatively less refinery capacity than 
most other urban and industrial agglomerations in West Germany. Moreover, 
growing demand for petrochemical feedstock in the Rhine-Ruhr, Rhine-Main and 
Rhine-Neckar areas gave rise to increasing flows of naphtha. Large volumes of oil 
products were therefore shipped between those areas and additional supplies were 
sourced from Rotterdam. The Rhine-Main pipeline system transported those volumes 
and provided a fixed and enduring connection between Rotterdam and the Rhine-
Main region, making the Dutch port the largest supplier of oil products to the 
Frankfurt area by the late 1960s.    
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Chapter 10 Final conclusions 
This study has aimed to redress the limits of the local and national perspectives that 
have dominated the post-war historiography of both the Port of Rotterdam and the 
Ruhr area. Adopting a transnational perspective, the book has instead attempted to 
look at the connections between the respective histories, questioning how and why the 
transition from coal to oil affected the relationship between the Rotterdam port and 
the German hinterland. Three distinct areas of change were identified: the economic 
composition of the hinterland and its impact on the demand for transportation; the 
adaptability of the port and hinterland infrastructure in response to economic change 
in the hinterland; and the extent to which changes in transport demand and the 
infrastructure affected both the relationship of Rotterdam’s oil port to the German 
hinterland and the latter’s composition.  
 
10.1 The transition of the German hinterland 
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 questioned how and why the transition from coal to oil affected 
the demand for transport in the Rhine-Ruhr hinterland. This transition transformed 
the Rhine-Ruhr area fundamentally from the mid-1950s onwards. After the 1958 
coal crisis, the Ruhr coal industry suffered a prolonged decline and was unable to 
match the competition from oil. Simultaneously, the Rhine-Ruhr area became a 
major industrial and consumer market for oil, with the region subsequently 
developing into West Germany’s largest concentration of the oil and petrochemical 
industry.  
Explaining the transformation of the Rhine-Ruhr economy is more complex 
than describing how it transformed. The roots of the energy transition were firmly 
established during the Allied occupation of Germany between 1945 and 1949. The 
Rhine-Ruhr area had been a key industrial region for Hitler’s war economy, and many 
of its industries and plants had performed strategic tasks for the military. The Allies, 
in particular the Americans, sought to break the power of the area’s industries by 
dismantling and decartelising the coal, steel and chemical sectors. Although the 
Allied occupation authorities attempted to increase the production of the Ruhr coal 
industry, the Americans devised ways to increase the consumption of oil, both as a 
means to resolve the energy shortages that hampered German reconstruction after 
1947 and as a way to reduce Germany’s dependence on domestic coal. However, for 
that policy to succeed, the Allied authorities needed the very chemical and oil facilities 
that were listed for dismantling. Plants established during the 1930s became key 
components in the Allied energy policy after 1947, re-establishing them as essential 
producers of fuels, fertilisers and electricity, among other commodities. The Bizonal 
Refinery Plan and its subsequent adoption under the Marshall Plan laid the 
foundations for an expanded Western European oil industry fuelled by the Anglo-
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American controlled, and rapidly rising, oil production in the Middle East. 
Simultaneously, the coal policies of the Allied authorities hampered the 
reconstruction of the Ruhr coal industry and laid the foundations for its decline.  
The Allied refinery expansion program in West Germany and Western 
Europe coincided with two major shifts in the global oil industry. A US national 
policy change in 1946 dictated that the US would strive to be self-sufficient in oil, 
only allowing imports from the Western hemisphere. Simultaneously, American oil 
companies manoeuvred to gain a major stake in Middle Eastern oil fields, uncovering 
an enormous oil reserve, demand for which had to be created, and was found, in 
Western Europe. The necessary rehabilitation and expansion of refining and 
marketing capacities in Europe to absorb the expanding production in the Middle 
East was partially accomplished under the Bizonal Refinery and Marshall plans. As a 
consequence, West German refinery capacity expanded from little more than 3 
million tons at the end of World War II to 14.7 million tons in 1955. The Rhine-
Ruhr area represented 32 per cent of West Germany’s refinery capacity, up from 
around 10 per cent before the war. The Ruhr coal mining industry was less fortunate 
and faced reorganisation, which did little to help the outmoded production methods, 
chronic lack of investment and slow recovery of the industry. The situation was 
prolonged by the system of controlled low prices, which was enforced first by the 
Allied authorities, then by the federal government, and from 1953 to 1956 by the 
European Coal and Steel Community. 
The energy crisis of 1950-51 laid bare the vulnerability of the Ruhr coal 
mining industry when it proved unable to adapt to the market and keep up with 
economic growth. The federal government responded by unleashing market discipline 
through the reduction of import duties on US coal and fuel oil. When the Federal 
Minister of Economic Affairs Ludwig Erhard declared in the mid-1950s that “[t]he 
competition between energy sources that we pursue, will result in a more efficient 
energy supply in the long run”, he opened the West German economy up to an inflow 
of foreign oil and investment and triggered the take off of the transition from coal to 
oil.707 Overproduction, declining prices and falling transportation costs in the wake of 
the 1956 Suez Crisis coincided with an economic down-cycle and rising coal prices, 
creating a crisis of unexpected magnitude in the Ruhr coal mining industry in 1958. 
As oil companies, both international and domestic, started planning new refineries in 
the Rhine-Ruhr area to supply the growing demand for fuel oil, Ruhr coal stocks 
piled up and the coal industry descended into a prolonged crisis.  
Although the federal government attempted to stymie the displacement of 
                                               
707 Quoted in: M. Horn, Die Energiepolitik des Bundesregierung, 201. Original quote: “Die von uns 
geförderte Konkurrenz der Energieträger untereinander wird auf die Dauer zu einer besseren und 
wirtschaftlichen Energieversorgung führen.” 
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coal by oil after the 1958 coal crisis, the demand for the latter could no longer be 
contained. The ordoliberal writ posed that the state served to guide technological 
change along its path of development, but the 1956 liberalisation of fuel oil imports 
was not meant to compete with coal head on; coal was to remain the core of the 
German energy supply, with fuel oil (and in due course nuclear power) meeting 
marginal demand, thereby allowing for rapid economic growth based on cheap 
energy; such was the broad perception of the future German energy balance at the 
time. However, once industries and households started to enjoy the lower prices and 
the more convenient fuel oil, coal became threatened in its core markets, industry and 
domestic heating. Although initial measures to stem the onslaught of fuel oil were 
directed at heavy fuel oil (the Kohle-Öl Kartell of 1958-9, direct taxation of fuel oil 
from 1960 onwards), light fuel oil consumption grew much faster. After the 1957 
Treaty of Rome and the establishment of the EEC, which had the aim of reducing 
direct subsidies for industries and firms, the federal government attempted to restrict 
the growth of oil consumption by self-limitation and a system of licensing for new 
refineries and pipelines. These measures were, however, all to no avail, particularly in 
the case of light fuel oil. 
The implications of the transition on the demand for transport in the Rhine-
Ruhr area were considerable, as oil and petrochemical plants grew both in number 
and size from the early 1950s onwards. The presence of chemical complexes and the 
reactivated synthetic fuel and rubber plants in the region were important loci for 
growth and provided continuity in terms of geographical locations and the actors 
involved. This stability provided geographical pull locations to which new oil and 
petrochemical investments gravitated, developing a transport demand in the Rhine-
Ruhr hinterland. The case of Royal Dutch Shell in Germany clearly illustrated this 
point. Its German subsidiary, Deutsche Shell, profited from the reactivation of the 
former hydrogenation plant of Union Kraftstoff in Wesseling, which started refining 
for Deutsche Shell in 1948. Subsequent location decisions with respect to refinery 
expansions in West Germany favoured the Wesseling area from this point onwards. 
The byproducts from that refinery contract allowed the establishment in 1953 of 
Rheinische Olefinwerke, which was the first petrochemical plant in West Germany. 
As Olefinwerke expanded to meet rising demand for plastics in the late 1950s, 
Deutsche Shell decided in 1960 to build its new refinery next to the plant, instead of 
somewhere further south along the Rhine. Further expansion of Olefinwerke in the 
early 1960s also required the expansion of the Cologne-Godorf refinery in 1965, 
instead of the construction of a new refinery in the Frankfurt or Karlsruhe areas. 
Input-output relations between oil refineries and petrochemical plants fostered 
clustering, while the subsequent utilisation of economies of scale led to the 
concentrated growth of transport demand in the Rhine-Ruhr hinterland for both 
crude oil and oil products. As a consequence, a historical accident could have major 
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implications. The economies of scale and scope that characterise the oil and 
petrochemical industry were the drivers behind infrastructural and logistical scale 
shifts that transpired in Rotterdam’s oil port and its hinterland connections.  
 
10.2 Pipelines to the hinterland 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 questioned the extent to which the Port of Rotterdam was 
successful in adapting itself and the hinterland infrastructure to the energy transition 
in the hinterland, what the constraints on adaptation were and how these were 
overcome. The strong relationship between the Rotterdam port and the Rhine-Ruhr 
area did not seem to extend beyond the Rhine. The growing demand for oil in the 
hinterland required a new transport infrastructure: pipelines. Whereas the Rhine was 
geographically fixed and institutionally embedded in the supranational framework of 
the Central Commission for Navigation on the Rhine, the new pipeline infrastructure 
lacked any such regional embeddedness. Pipeline economics revealed that a number of 
ports could be used to supply crude oil to the Rhine-Ruhr area by pipe. In the mid-
1950s, pipeline plans emerged that featured the German North Sea port of 
Wilhelmshaven, Rotterdam and Marseille. Rotterdam had no decisive advantages 
over the other two ports, and the pipeline plans of the mid-1950s accentuated the 
risks of relying on a foreign hinterland. Whereas the federal German government was 
inclined to accommodate Rotterdam’s position in Rhine shipping, it felt no obligation 
whatsoever to accommodate the Dutch interest in establishing a pipeline connection 
between Rotterdam and the Rhine-Ruhr area. In other words, the consideration of 
different options for a pipeline system did not contain any decisive argument to opt 
for Rotterdam. Given this precarious position, Rotterdam had few options to advance 
its position or increase its chances of obtaining the pipeline connection.  
The Port of Rotterdam did, however, have two potential allies, the Dutch 
government and Royal Dutch Shell. Both supported the port, but their opportunities 
to foster real influence in pipeline planning diverged, as did their respective interests. 
The Dutch national government supported Rotterdam’s claim that the pipeline was in 
the national interest, but its ability to advance Rotterdam’s cause for a pipeline 
connection was limited. Dutch Foreign Office personnel gathered information in 
West Germany, discussed the pipeline plans with Royal Dutch Shell and frequently 
exchanged information with Rotterdam City Council and the Municipal Port 
Authority, but did little beyond that; it simply lacked the means and arguments to go 
further.  
Royal Dutch Shell also supported Rotterdam’s port and frequently expressed 
its preference for it to host a pipeline to the Rhine-Ruhr area. However, Royal Dutch 
was a multinational enterprise, and was constantly weighing its regional, national and 
transnational interests. Although the company repeatedly signalled its support for the 
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Port of Rotterdam, it was not inclined to invest in the city if alternatives proved to be 
more attractive. Efforts by Royal Dutch and British Petroleum to destabilise the 
German pipeline consortium by promoting Rotterdam were primarily aimed at foiling 
the German plan to the benefit of Royal Dutch’s trans-European pipeline proposal. 
Although discussions between the Dutch government and Royal Dutch revealed that 
the former was quite open to the Anglo-Dutch multinational, the company did not 
seem to have a preconceived goal of choosing Rotterdam out of a sense of national 
(Dutch) loyalty.  
The trans-European pipeline plan was equally threatening to the position of 
Rotterdam’s port, because it aimed to supply northwestern Europe, including the 
Rhine-Ruhr area and the Port of Rotterdam, with crude oil via the French 
Mediterranean Port of Marseille. However, the lack of legislative, fiscal and trade 
harmonisation between Western European countries, combined with general 
economic uncertainty at the time and discord over timing and tariffs within the 
consortium, ended the trans-European pipeline prematurely, to the benefit of 
Rotterdam. With less perceived friction between Western European national 
institutional frameworks, the trans-European pipeline project might have stood a 
greater chance of success. However, at the time, the Treaty of Rome had put forward 
a proposal that was yet to bear fruit. Other than in name, there was no Common 
Market in 1957.  
The European fragmentation was not reserved for its political structure; 
European enterprises were also highly fragmented, with the production units in most 
countries tailored to serving domestic demand. This was a consequence of the 
disjointed landscape of idiosyncratic national markets that developed out of the 
disintegration of the First Global Economy on the eve of World War I. One of the 
key aims of US foreign policy in Europe after World War II was to clear away the 
rubble of this economic disintegration after 1914 by bringing about European 
economic integration.708 Many multinationals in Europe inherited a corporate 
structure from the pre-war and war period in which national operating companies 
enjoyed a high degree of autonomy. For oil companies, forging a planning perspective 
at the European level might very well have suffered from the national perspective of 
their operating subsidiaries on the one hand, and the fragmented legal context on the 
other. Whereas most oil company operations were organised and operated at the 
national level, the pipeline was one of the few truly transnational projects undertaken 
by private firms at the time in Europe. Spearheaded by two multinationals, Royal 
Dutch Shell and British Petroleum, the trans-European pipeline project showed that 
European multinationals saw European fragmentation as much of a barrier to doing 
                                               
708 R. Geven, Transnational networks and the Common Market – business views on European integration, 
1950-1980 (Maastricht 2014) 260-261. 
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business as their American counterparts did.  
It was only when the trans-European pipeline project faltered that the option 
of a Rotterdam-Rhine pipeline become attractive to Royal Dutch. This was both an 
important boost of confidence and an opportunity for the Port of Rotterdam, because 
it not only obtained its prized pipeline, but was also encouraged by Royal Dutch to 
accelerate the Europoort expansion plan in 1957. This is not to say that the future of 
Rotterdam’s port hinged solely on the pipeline connection; Europoort hosted a 
number of other industries that would have contributed to paying the huge capital 
costs that the port authority incurred for its investment in the Europoort expansion, 
most importantly iron ore transhipment and the establishment of oil refineries and 
related industries. However, given that the port made most of its revenue from port 
dues – docking ships – not having a pipeline, or having a pipeline that supplied crude 
oil from Marseille, would have meant a substantial loss of income. The oil sector was 
therefore an important target industry for the port authority and the pipeline an 
important project. Indeed, it was experienced by the port authority as a litmus test for 
its stated objective to become a major oil port and the gateway to Europe. 
The long-term impact of Royal Dutch Shell’s decision to choose Rotterdam to 
serve the Rhine-Ruhr area was huge, leading to the construction of the Rotterdam-
Rhine pipeline and the strengthening of the case for the Europoort expansion. This in 
turn provided the opportunity to expand the Rotterdam-Rhine pipeline, which 
subsequently made the connection of this pipe to the Rhine-Main pipeline possible, 
tying Rotterdam into the supply network of refineries and petrochemical plants from 
the Lower Rhine to the Rhine-Main and Rhine-Neckar areas. The collection of 
separate regional pipelines that emerged from the efforts of the trans-European 
pipeline plan cemented the position of the Rotterdam oil port vis-à-vis the German 
hinterland over the long term. The division of the central European hinterland 
between a southern and a northern pipeline system solidified as super tankers gave 
Rotterdam a decisive cost advantage over Mediterranean ports up to Frankfurt. A 
fragmented Europe was therefore as much a threat to as an opportunity for the Dutch 
port.  
As an actor negotiating the various scales Royal Dutch Shell was crucial for 
the development of the Rotterdam oil port. The vested interests of Royal Dutch in 
Rotterdam, the Rhine and the Rhine-Ruhr region cemented relations between the 
company and the Port of Rotterdam. Royal Dutch managers inspired port authority 
planners to think big, and the latter often highlighted the importance of Jan Willem 
Ernste, the director of the Shell refinery at Pernis in this regard.709 Through the 
alliance between Royal Dutch and the Port Authority, Rotterdam was able to keep a 
                                               
709 W.F. Lichtenauer, 'Ernste, Jan Willem (1899-1971)', in: Biografisch Woordenboek van Nederland. 
http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/bwn1880-2000/lemmata/bwn2/ernste, 14 April 2014. 
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foot in the door during the years that the chances of becoming the oil port of the 
Rhine-Ruhr area, and even Western Europe, seemed slim. As a transnational actor 
operating in diverse institutional frameworks, Royal Dutch Shell was able to mitigate 
the risks involved in realising hinterland access infrastructure across a political border.  
A case study method runs the risk of bloating the role of the investigated 
company to the detriment of other firms that were not examined. Although Royal 
Dutch Shell was undoubtedly important for the Rotterdam oil port, it was not the 
only (oil) company active on a large scale in both port and hinterland; Jersey Standard, 
British Petroleum, Caltex and Gulf were the other major oil firms operating refineries, 
tank depots and transport modes in the Lower Rhine region. Even so, Royal Dutch 
boasted the longest presence in both the port and the hinterland. Moreover, 
Municipal Port Authority directors looked upon Royal Dutch as a leading company. 
The firm also played a key role in the planning, construction and ownership of the 
Rotterdam-Rhine and Rhine-Main pipelines.  
 
10.3 The German hinterland 
Finally, chapters 8 and 9 questioned how the transition of the hinterland and the 
adaptation of the transport infrastructure affected the composition of the hinterland 
of Rotterdam’s oil port. Firstly, the energy transition changed the composition of the 
cargo flow through the port and subsequently altered the flows between port and 
hinterland. Land-based inflows hardly grew at all throughout the period, while land-
based outflows grew rapidly as iron ore, crude oil and oil products flowed to the 
hinterland. In terms of destinations and origins, West Germany became of marginal 
importance for cargo inflows, while it remained by far the most important destination 
for cargo outflows throughout this time. Rotterdam thus became much less important 
for German exports than it had been in the pre-war period; German imports came to 
dominate the port-hinterland relationship in the post-war era. In particular, for the 
Rotterdam oil cluster, West Germany became the single most important market. The 
German economic miracle, and the transition from coal to oil that accompanied it, 
gave a strong impetus to the growth of the Rotterdam oil port, as testified by a 
growing share of oil product exports from Rotterdam flowing to the German 
hinterland from the mid-1950s until the early 1970s. Whether Rotterdam’s oil port 
fuelled the German economic miracle seems less clear. Competition from other ports 
for the supply of Germany’s demand for oil initially reduced Rotterdam’s share of 
West German imports in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The implementation of a 
pipeline infrastructure did, however, stabilise and even increase Rotterdam’s share 
somewhat over the course of the 1960s and early 1970s. The conclusion that 
Rotterdam responded to, rather than drove, the West German energy transition 
therefore seems to be warranted, which confirms the historical importance of the 
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West German hinterland for the Rotterdam port, even though the latter hoped that 
the post-war era would reduce this dependence.  
In that respect, the post-war evolution of the Port of Rotterdam and its 
hinterland relations seem to be embedded in a path-dependent development that 
started with the port’s initial growth in the late 19th century. As Rhine freight rates 
were falling relative to railway freights in the 1880s and 1890s, the Port of Rotterdam 
became the single largest bulk port in Europe, fuelled by the bulk imports and exports 
of Ruhr industry. As the port’s economy was heavily reliant on the transhipment of a 
few bulk commodities, it suffered greatly from disturbances to trade and transport 
relations with the German hinterland. Seeking to break the dependence on German 
transit flows, Rotterdam City Council pressed on with an industrialisation program in 
the 1930s. Dominated by bulk cargoes, the port’s management had developed a 
business philosophy based on tonnage maximisation, which also came to underpin the 
industrialisation of the port. The Port Authority carefully selected its industrial 
tenants on the basis of this principle; the scarce land in the port area should yield the 
highest possible volume of cargo. Employment was important too, but when the 
Dutch labour market became tight in the 1960s, tonnage maximisation remained the 
leading principle.  
 In terms of industries, the Port Authority focused in particular on the oil and 
petrochemical and steel sectors. Although the oil and petrochemical cluster could be 
considered a success, the port never succeeded in attracting blast furnaces and steel 
manufacturing plants. As a result, the oil industry came to dominate the port’s 
throughput. In 1970, two thirds of the total cargo flow consisted of crude oil and oil 
products. More than half of these flows were transhipped and exported to foreign 
destinations, primarily West Germany. Although the dominance of the German 
hinterland in generating Rotterdam throughput was arguably lower after World War 
II, the industrialisation effort did not diminish the problem of one or two 
commodities dominating port traffic. The very name of the largest post-war port 
expansion – Europoort – was an expression of the continuation of Rotterdam’s role as 
the raw material gateway to Europe, which was a function that it proudly proclaimed 
in the 1960s. Between 1945 and 1975, despite efforts to create a new path of 
development through industrialisation, the Rotterdam port had instead followed the 
well-trodden pre-war path of primaly providing transhipment services for bulk 
imports. Although the industrialisation effort had succeeded in creating an oil and 
petrochemical cluster, it was generally limited to feedstock and basic chemicals that 
were supplied to other countries with more developed and extensive downstream 
chemical industries, such as Belgium and West Germany. Despite the transition from 
coal to oil and the major impact this had on the European coal industries and the 
closely-related steel and chemical sectors, this did not radically change the function 
and position of Rotterdam as a bulk port dominated by a small number of 
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commodities and with close ties to the German hinterland.  
What did change historically was the composition of the West German 
hinterland. Indeed, although it did not change radically, over time the centre of 
gravity shifted from the Ruhr region to the Frankfurt and Cologne areas. The 
hinterland composition of the oil flows to West Germany had a wider geographical 
reach than the hinterland of other cargo flows to the country, which remained heavily 
dependent on the Ruhr area. This shift was caused by the pipeline infrastructure that 
developed between Rotterdam and the German hinterland. When the Rotterdam-
Rhine pipeline was connected to the Rhine-Main oil product pipeline between the 
Ruhr area and Ludwigshafen, the supply chain of oil products to and within West 
Germany changed substantially. A dense network of small tank depots was replaced 
by a smaller number of large regional tank depots served by the Rhine-Main pipeline. 
As the pipeline operated most efficiently with large batches over long distances, 
Rotterdam increasingly became the principal supplier of oil products to the Frankfurt 
area. Situated on the extremity of the northern European oil pipeline system, the 
Frankfurt region was undersupplied by local facilities, which was a gap filled by the 
export-oriented refineries of Rotterdam. Although the likelihood of Rotterdam 
becoming the oil port of the Rhine-Ruhr area seemed to be small in the mid-1950s, 
relations between the port and the Rhine-Ruhr area became increasingly stronger 
after the construction of Europoort and the Rotterdam-Rhine pipeline, even 
extending the port’s hinterland reach beyond the Rhine-Ruhr region.  
 
10.4 Discussion 
This study found that Rotterdam’s relationship to the German hinterland was 
vulnerable during the economic and technological transformations that accompanied 
the transition from coal to oil during the 1950s and 1960s. This period presented 
both continuities and discontinuities in the relationship between port and hinterland, 
as well as in their respective histories. Explaining the impact of the transition from 
coal to oil on this relationship involved a combination of economic geography and 
history. According to Allen Pred, the extent to which a port can benefit from a 
growth in the demand for transport depends on the types of industry in the hinterland, 
the ability of the port to adapt its own infrastructure, and the existence of a hinterland 
infrastructure that connects the port and hinterland. Economic geography plays an 
important role, according to Pred. However, Theo Notteboom and Jean-Paul 
Rodrigue propose a more actor-oriented view. While acknowledging the importance 
of geography, they identify different levels of hinterland consisting of different sets of 
relationships between actors, each entailing a varying degree of influence for port 
authorities. On the macro-economic level, i.e. the economic, political and 
technological context in which ports and hinterlands develop, a port has little to no 
  266 
influence; it is dependent on the direction and intensity of economic and 
technological change and the political choices affecting it in the hinterland, 
particularly if the hinterland is largely located in a foreign country.  
The transition from coal to oil in general, and the manner in which it affected 
the German Rhine industries in particular, provided Rotterdam with a fortuitous 
economic context to further its industrialisation policy, which was formulated before 
World War II. In terms of its enormous post-war growth, the Port of Rotterdam 
diverged from its pre-war transit function and transformed into an industrial port. As 
Western Europe’s largest concentration of oil refinery capacity, Rotterdam became a 
key supplier of oil products and basic petrochemicals in northwest Europe. 
Nonetheless, the opening up of the West German oil market in the mid-1950s gave 
an additional boost to port expansion. The clear break with history imposed on West 
Germany by its American occupiers after 1945, which continued under the 
economically liberal Adenauer cabinets, set the Rhine industry on a new course. The 
Rhine-Ruhr area developed into West Germany’s largest concentration of oil and 
petrochemical industries, and became an important destination for oil flows from 
Rotterdam, as well as a vital interconnection to other oil and chemical clusters along 
the German Rhine. The German hinterland thus once again became the most 
important destination for cargo outflows in Rotterdam, including oil. 
Notwithstanding the tempestuous growth of its industrial port, Rotterdam continued 
to be dominated by just a few types of bulk cargo. However, the decline of the 
German coal industry all but marginalised the port’s export function for the German 
hinterland, which was a clear break with the pre-war period. Consequently, the 
transition to oil fostered both continuity and discontinuity in both the Rotterdam port 
and the German hinterland. While the discontinuity of the port’s industrialisation has 
been stressed in its historiography, the continuity of the relationship between port and 
hinterland has generally been overlooked. Although the magnitude of the relationship 
was less articulate than in the pre-war period, simply because the large refinery cluster 
in the port diminished the share of pure transit in the port’s throughput, the German 
oil market did become hugely important for Rotterdam’s oil port. Nonetheless, this 
continuity was far from self-evident at the outset of the transition from coal to oil.   
As Allen Pred rightly argues, a port can only benefit from a growing demand 
for transport in the hinterland if infrastructural connections are in place. For 
infrastructural adaptation, a port typically interacts with actors at the national and 
regional level, such as national subsidiaries of multinational enterprises and regional 
and local governments, presumably giving a port authority more influence over 
decision-making. However, the pipeline connections developed in the 1950s were 
entirely new, and the level of planning involved differed widely, e.g. the German 
perspective of the Esso AG consortium and the transnational view adopted by Royal 
Dutch Shell in the trans-European pipeline plan. The outcome was highly uncertain 
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for the Port of Rotterdam and its means to interfere were limited.  
Location theories seem to suggest that ports with an existing competitive 
transport infrastructure are more likely to benefit than ports without such an 
infrastructure from growth through a self-reinforcing mechanism based on internal 
and external economies of scale and declining transport costs. The case of iron ore 
might confirm that proposition, but was based on Rhine shipping. In the case of oil, 
the capacity of Rhine shipping was inadequate, but once pipelines were considered, 
Rotterdam lost the powerful position it derived from the Rhine and Rhine shipping. 
New infrastructure thus presented a barrier to the feedback mechanism suggested by 
location theories by which ports benefit from growth. That barrier was political rather 
than economic or geographical, thus requiring an institutional rather than a pure 
economic explanation.  
Impeding Rotterdam’s position were nationally-oriented infrastructures and 
transport policies in West Germany. European integration had only just started, and 
while a supranational organisation already governed the European coal and steel 
industries, nuclear energy, and international Rhine shipping, in other areas 
(infrastructure, transportation, oil and gas) policy-making remained at the discretion 
of national governments. Although West Germany was politically one of the most 
liberal countries in Europe, its federal system of government compounded the 
primacy of German over transnational interests. As such, governments constrained 
rather than promoted the implementation of cross-border infrastructure. From the 
1960s onwards, the benefits of a transnational infrastructure became more generally 
accepted, although the case of the Rotterdam-Antwerp pipeline late in the decade 
showed how resilient national thinking in terms of questions of infrastructure and 
transportation remained.  
This preponderance of national thinking also corresponds to current 
theorising about the organisation of global supply chains and the role of port 
authorities therein. The various actors involved in shaping supply chains, their 
interrelations and the distribution of power among them are essential elements for 
understanding why port-hinterland relationships are sustained or not.710 Given the low 
degree of coordination within the EEC in the late 1950s and the 1960s, individual 
governments wielded considerable power over infrastructure development, to the 
detriment of the interests of the Port of Rotterdam in the case of West Germany. 
Firms, or at least multinational firms, had a more transnational perspective on 
European infrastructure development than national governments. As multinational oil 
companies were most influential in shaping the oil supply chains to and within 
                                               
710 S. Janssens, H. Meersman and E. Van de Voorde, ‘Port throughput and international trade: have 
port authorities any degrees of freedom left?’, in: R. Loyen et al (eds.), Struggling for Leadership: 
Antwerp-Rotterdam Port Competition between 1870-2000 (Berlin 2003) 91-114. 
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Western Europe, they presented an integrative force on pipeline infrastructure 
development in this part of the continent. Multinational oil companies, in particular 
Royal Dutch Shell, were therefore key allies for the Rotterdam port to develop a 
transnational pipeline infrastructure to access the hinterland in the 1950s and 1960s. 
The configuration of actors and their respective influence on shaping the supply chain 
determined to what extent Rotterdam could benefit from increasing demand for 
transportation in the hinterland.  
Earlier authors, such as De Goey, Brolsma and Posthuma, have alluded to the 
important role of Royal Dutch Shell in shaping the Port of Rotterdam after 1945. 
However, this study has demonstrated the conditionality of the relationship between 
Royal Dutch and the Rotterdam Municipal Port Authority. Whereas earlier authors 
have accentuated the importance of the relations with local Royal Dutch management 
in the port, this study has found that at a higher level of decision-making within the 
Shell group, the position of Rotterdam was weighed against other options. Indeed, 
although important to Royal Dutch Shell, Rotterdam was also just a node in the 
company’s European supply chain. The focus of the Port Authority on its relations 
with the local management of Royal Dutch Shell might also help to explain the failure 
of the former to anticipate demand for crude oil pipelines in the German hinterland. 
The Port Authority’s attention was directed at the port and the sea, not the hinterland, 
and it was with regard to the hinterland that the port needed Royal Dutch Shell the 
most. The episode of the trans-European pipeline plan illustrated that the interests of 
Royal Dutch and the Rotterdam Port Authority overlapped, but were not identical; 
the extent to which their interests aligned depended on the institutional context in 
Europe in the late 1950s. This context was not conducive to private, transnational 
infrastructure projects, which led Royal Dutch to opt for a regional rather than a 
trans-European solution.  
Once the infrastructure was in place, Royal Dutch Shell remained an 
important ally, because it was a key player in organising logistics in the Rhine basin. 
On this so-called logistical level, port authorities presumably have the most influence 
in attracting, for instance, cargo through pricing, facilities, hinterland connections and 
close contact with the local agents of firms and governments. This study has clearly 
shown that, once in place, the combination of deep-sea ports, industrial sites and 
pipeline connections to the hinterland provided Rotterdam’s oil port with a 
competitive advantage over other Western European oil ports. Although its share of 
the total oil flow through the Port of Rotterdam diminished over time, Royal Dutch 
continued to be very important, not least because it disposed of the largest captive 
inland tank fleet on the Rhine, and also extended and expanded the pipeline 
connections between the port and the German hinterland. Combined with the rather 
fortuitous growth of maritime oil tankers, the pipelines provided the Rotterdam oil 
port with a captive German hinterland that extended south along the Rhine to 
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Frankfurt am Main and Mannheim-Ludwigshafen. In itself, this presented a 
significant discontinuity, because the oil flows to West Germany were much less 
focused on the Rhine-Ruhr area than most other, more traditional, types of cargo 
such as iron ore. This was particularly attributable to the development of an oil cluster 
in the port. Rotterdam was no longer just the provider of transport and trade services 
to the German hinterland; between 1945 and 1975, it became one of West Germany’s 
principal suppliers of oil products. Accordingly, even though the close relationship 
between the Port of Rotterdam and the German hinterland continued through the 
transition to oil, it was of a different type, substance and direction.   
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Appendices 
Appendix A: The organisational structure of the Royal Dutch Shell group 
 
The Royal Dutch Shell Group (until 2005 Royal Dutch/Shell) is one of the largest oil 
companies in the world and has operations across the globe. Its company structure is 
complex, and decision-making takes place across many levels between the operating 
companies, the holding companies and the two parent companies, Koninklijke 
Nederlandse Petroleum Maatschappij (Royal Dutch, for short) and the Shell 
Transport and Trading Company (Figure 0-1). Until the late 1950s, when the firm’s 
structure was changed, Bataafsche Petroleum Maatschappij in The Hague and the 
Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Company in London were the group’s main international 
operating companies, which owned the shares in and controlled the vast array of 
national operating companies that operated around the globe. In general, Bataafsche 
focused on exploration, production and refining operations, while Anglo-Saxon 
concentrated on trading and marketing. The Shell Petroleum Company in London 
managed the group’s sales, while the group’s activities in Germany were managed by 
Deutsche Shell AG (formerly Rhenania-Ossag). Until 1948, Bataafsche held shares in 
Deutsche Shell, but transferred these to Anglo-Saxon that year to better protect the 
group’s assets in Allied occupied Germany.711  
  
                                               
711 Howarth and Jonker, Stuwmotor van de koolwaterstofrevolutie, 96-97. 
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Figure 0-1. The company structure of the Royal Dutch Shell Group, early 
1950s 
 
Source: J. Jonker and J. Luiten Van Zanden, Van nieuwkomer tot marktleider, 1890-1939. Geschiedenis 
van Koninklijke Shell, deel 1 (Amsterdam, 2007) 84, 90, 160; S. Howarth and J. Jonker, Stuwmotor van 
de koolwaterstofrevolutie, 1939-1973 Geschiedenis van Koninklijke Shell, deel 2 (Amsterdam, 2007) 96-97. 
 
In the late 1950s, the Shell group was reorganised to streamline the organisation, in 
particular the coordination between the group’s geographical and functional units. 
Figure 0-2 shows the group structure after the reorganisation. The group 
decentralised its decision-making by transferring responsibilities to the national 
operating companies, while also strengthening regional and functional reporting to 
the group’s Committee of Managing Directors. During the 1960s, the national 
operating companies thus became increasingly autonomous. Bataafsche, Anglo-Saxon 
and Shell Petroleum were transformed into holding companies, and their former 
advisory and controlling tasks were transferred to five service companies. These 
maintained the former division between exploration, production and midstream on the 
one hand, and marketing, sales and distribution on the other. Anglo-Saxon and Shell 
Petroleum were merged. The rise of petrochemicals in the 1950s and 1960s also led to 
the separation of the chemical business from the oil business. R&D services, 
meanwhile, were housed in a separate service company.  
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Figure 0-2. The company structure of Royal Dutch Shell, 1960s 
 
Source: S. Howarth and J. Jonker, Stuwmotor van de koolwaterstofrevolutie, 1939-1973 Geschiedenis van 
Koninklijke Shell, deel 2 (Amsterdam 2007) 145.  
 
The Shell group has been active in the Lower Rhine region almost since its inception. 
In 1902, when Royal Dutch and Shell were still separate companies, the former 
started to export crude gasoline from the Far East to Europe, which it refined in 
gasoline refineries in Rotterdam and Reisholz near Düsseldorf in Germany. 
Thereafter, Royal Dutch extended its operations by expanding its refinery in 
Rotterdam, enhancing its marketing, and deploying its own captive fleet of inland 
tank barges on the Rhine between Rotterdam and Germany. Since the early 20th 
century, Royal Dutch Shell has been operating in the Lower Rhine region in terms of 
all aspects of its downstream business and continues to do so today.  
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Appendix B: Data 
 
This appendix lists all the underlying data used in this study. Data tables that could be 
printed are included in this appendix. Some of the data comprise multiple tables or 
tables that were too large to print in the confinements of this book. These data are 
available on request and will be made available online at a later date.  
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Data Chapter 7 
 
Table 0-5. The Rhine-Main pipeline flow data, 1968-71 (in million tons) 
From  To 1968 1969 1970 1971 
Pe
rn
is
 
Dinslaken 0.00 0.02 0.10 0.16 
EC Dormagen 0.00 0.24 0.73 1.23 
Cologne-Godorf 0.30 1.38 1.58 1.60 
Flörsheim 0.08 0.55 0.73 0.63 
Ludwigshafen 0.02 0.38 0.57 0.45 
Köln-Niehl 0.02 0.11 0.61 0.54 
Gustavsburg 0.06 0.55 1.10 0.97 
Raunheim 0.00 0.05 0.47 0.72 
Koblenz 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
From Pernis 0.48 3.27 5.89 6.30 
D
in
sl
ak
en
 EC Dormagen 0.24 0.74 0.46 0.38 
Köln-Niehl 0.07 0.28 0.23 0.15 
Gustavsburg 0.15 0.42 0.25 0.36 
Flörsheim 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Ludwigshafen 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
From Dinslaken 0.47 1.46 0.94 0.90 
Co
lo
gn
e-
G
od
or
f Flörsheim 
0.19 0.60 0.83 0.81 
Ludwigshafen 0.16 0.55 0.71 0.73 
Oppau (BASF) 0.09 0.44 0.36 0.25 
Gustavsburg 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 
From Cologne-
Godorf 0.45 1.60 1.92 1.81 
Total  1.39   6.33   8.74   9.00  
Source: BPA, 21090 and 21093, RMR Progress Reports, 1968-1971.  
 
Table 0-6. The refinery capacity in Western Europe by region, 1950-75 (in 
million tons) 
Available on request 
 
Data Chapter 8 
 
Table 0-7. The Port of Rotterdam cargo flows, 1950-1975 (in tons) 
Available on request 
 
Data Chapter 9 
 
Table 0-8. The West German oil supply from the Rotterdam oil port, 
1950-75 (in tons) 
Available on request 
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Note on sources and definitions 
For the years 1955 to 1958, Figure 9-1 reports anomalous percentages, which are 
derived from a discrepancy between Dutch and German transport statistics. The data 
used for Figure 9-1 are taken from the database on cargo flows in the Port of 
Rotterdam (for the total volume of crude oil shipped from Rotterdam) and the 
German inland shipping statistics published by the Federal Statistics Office 
(Statistische Bundesamt). The data from the database on cargo flows in the Port of 
Rotterdam are originally derived from the Rotterdam Chamber of Commerce’s 
annual publication on Statistics of Trade, Industry and Transport (Statistiek van de 
Handel, Nijverheid en Transport), which are in turn based on the Monthly Statistics of 
Sea Shipping and Port Traffic (Maandstatistiek voor de zeevaart en het havenverkeer) 
published by the Dutch Central Statistics Office (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, 
CBS). Table 0-9 shows two possible causes of discrepancies when combining the 
Dutch and German sources. 
 
Table 0-9. Comparing Dutch and German transport statistics 
 CBS Statistische Bundesamt 
Source 
Dutch customs data. German customs data. 
According to the CBS, 
these data misrepresent 
the port of loading for 
inland shipping from the 
Netherlands.  
Definition of Rotterdam 
Municipal ports of 
Rotterdam, excluding 
other New Waterway 
ports such as Europoort 
and Vlaardingen, among 
others. 
All ports along the New 
Waterway, i.e. 
Rotterdam’s municipal 
ports, Europoort, 
Vlaardingen, Schiedam 
and other ports. 
Source: CBS, Maandstatistiek voor de zeevaart en het havenverkeer, 1961, 1965; CBS, Statistiek van 
de internationale binnenvaart, 1961; Kamer van Koophandel, Statistiek van de Handel, Nijverheid en 
Transport, 1963; Statistische Bundesamt, Verkehr, Reihe 8 Binnenschiffahrt, 1957-1975 
 
The first problem arises from the source of the statistics, which in the German case 
are said to misrepresent the Dutch port of loading for inland shipping flows from the 
Netherlands to Germany. This may inflate the volume of oil going from Rotterdam to 
Germany. The second problem derives from differences in the definition of 
Rotterdam. The CBS data in the particular tables used for the database on cargo flows 
in the Port of Rotterdam define Rotterdam as just the municipal ports, excluding all 
other ports on the New Waterway. The German inland shipping statistics – indeed all 
German transport statistics – use the traffic area the New Waterway (Verkehrsbezirk 
Nieuwe Waterweg) to denote shipments to and from Rotterdam. This involves a 
  282 
number of ports that are not included in the CBS data. Combined, these two 
problems can cause differences in the volumes transported between Rotterdam and 
West Germany, which can be particularly distorting in the case of smaller volumes.  
There is no obvious solution to problems that are derived from the 
combination of statistics compiled by separate entities in different countries. There 
are other Dutch sources on international inland shipping available, but other problems 
arise with these, such as the different classification of goods or the complete lack of a 
breakdown in terms of types of product. Moreover, a major limitation of the Dutch 
international inland shipping statistics is the lack of a coherent and stable definition of 
traffic areas in the German hinterland, which the German inland shipping statistics 
do provide.  
   
Table 0-10. The inland shipping of oil products between Rotterdam and 
West Germany, 1950-75 (in tons) 
Available on request 
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Appendix C: Basic petrochemicals 
 
Figure 0-3 presents a simplified diagram of the main groups of basic petrochemicals 
derived from crude oil by the cracking of petroleum fractions. Most of these can also 
be derived from natural gas. Naphtha, which is a liquid fraction derived from crude oil 
distillation, and cracking gases, which are a byproduct of the cracking of heavy oil 
fractions, were the most widely used sources of olefins and aromatics in Europe 
during the research period.712 In the US, natural gas was more important. Aromatics 
and olefins are, in terms of volume, the two most important groups of basic 
petrochemicals. Benzene is the most widely-used aromatic, and ethylene and 
propylene the most widely-used olefins.   
 
Figure 0-3. Basic petrochemicals from crude oil 
 
Source: W. Molle and E. Wever, Oil Refineries and Petrochemical Industries in Western Europe. Buoyant 
Past, Uncertain Future (Aldershot 1984) 17-19; Shell International Petroleum Company Ltd., The 
Petroleum Handbook (London 1966) 320-321. 
  
                                               
712 Molle and Wever, Oil Refineries, 19. 
Crude oil  
Aromatics 
Benzene 
Toluene 
Xylenes 
Paraffins 
Methane 
Ethane 
Propane 
Butanes 
Olefins 
Ethylene 
Propylene 
Butylenes 
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Appendix D: West German traffic areas 
The Statistische Bundesamt used a system of spatial groupings according to which 
transport statistics were reported. These were known as the so-called traffic areas 
(Verkehrsgebiete). Between 1950 and 1968, the definition of the areas remained 
unchanged, but in 1969 the areas were realigned to ensure that they corresponded 
better with the administrative borders within West Germany. Figure 0-4 presents the 
system in use until 1968, as well as its successor. Both maps clearly differ from each 
other.  
 
Figure 0-4. West German traffic areas 
1950-1968 
 
1969-1975 
 
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, Die Binnenschiffahrt im Jahre (Stuttgart 1950) (for the traffic regions 
used between 1950 and 1968); Statistisches Bundesamt, Verkehr, Reihe 8 Binnenschiffahrt (Stuttgart 
1969) (for the traffic regions used after 1969). The 1968 and 1969 traffic areas are incomparable, 
because existing areas were split up and partly subsumed in newly-created areas. Maps created by the 
author.  
 
Table 0-12 and Table 0-13 contain the names and numbers of the traffic areas.  
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Table 0-12. West German traffic areas, 1950-1968 
Number Name 
1 Lübeck 
2 Schleswig-Holsteinisches Ostseegebiet (ohne 1) 
3-4 Unterelbegebiet und schleswig-holsteinisches Nordseegebiet 
5 Hamburg 
6-7 Elbe und ihre Seitenwasserstrassen oderhalb von Hamburg und Lübeck 
8 Unterewesergebiet (ohne 9) 
9 Bremen 
10 Mittelweser zwischen Minden und Bremen (je ausschlieslich) und Aller 
11-13 Oberweser ab Minden (einsschlieslich) sowie Weser und Fulda 
14 Mittellandkanal zwischen Rühe und Peine (je einschlieslich) 
15 Mittellandkanal zwischen Peine und Minden (je ausschlieslich, ohne 16) 
16 Hannover 
17 Mittellandkanal zwischen Minden (ausschlieslich) und Bergeshövede (ausschlieslich) 
18 Emden 
19 Jade- und Huntegebiet sowie die ostfriesischen Inseln 
20 Dortmund-Emskanal und Ems unterhalb Bergeshövede (ohne 18) 
21 D-E kanal nördlich der Lippe bis Bergeshövede (einschlieslich) 
24 Rhein-Herne-Kanal, Ruhrkanal und D-E kanal südlich der Lippe (ohne 27 und 28) 
25 Wesel-Datteln-Kanal 
26 Datteln-Hamm-Kanal 
27 Dortmund 
28 Essen 
29 Niederrhein unterhalb des Ruhrgebietes 
30 Duisburg 
31 Rheinhäfen des Ruhrgebietes (ohne 30) 
32-33 Niederrhein um Düsseldorf (von Krefeld bis Monheim - je einschlieslich) 
34-37 Niederrhein um Köln (von oberhalb Monheim bis oberhalb Lülsdorf) 
38 Mittelrhein von Lülsdorf bis Koblenz (je ausschliesslich) 
39 Mittelrhein von unterhalb Koblenz bis unterhalb Bingen 
41 Lahn 
42-43 Mittelrhein um Mainz und Wiesbaden (von unterhalb Bingen bis unterhalb Mannheim) 
44 Ludwigshafen 
45 Mannheim (Wirtschaftsgebiet) 
46-47 Oberrhein um Karlsruhe 
48 Oberrhein um Kehl 
49 Oberrhein von oberhalb Kehl bis Weil (einschl.) 
50 Hochrhein und Bodensee 
52-54 Neckar 
55 Main in Hessen 
56 Frankfurt (Wirtschaftsgebiet) 
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58 Main um Aschaffenburg (von Kahl bis Klingenberg je einschl.) 
59 Main um Würzburg (von oberhalb Klingenberg bis oberhalb Würzburg) 
60 Main oberhalb Würzburg (ausschl.) 
61-62 Ludwigkanal in Mittel- und Oberfranken 
63-66 Donau nebst Zuflüssen und der Ludwigkanal südlich von Nürnberg and Fürth 
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, Die Binnenschiffahrt im Jahre (Stuttgart 1950) 
 
Table 0-13. West German traffic areas, 1969-1975 
Number Name 
011 Flensburg/Husum 
014 Heide 
015 Kiel 
018 Lübeck (Stadt) 
019 Itzehoe/Ratzeburg 
020 Hamburg (Stadt) 
031 Stade/Harburg 
032 Lüneburg/Uelzen 
033 Soltau 
034 Brake 
035 Verden/Nienburg 
041 Emden (Stadt) 
042 Wilhelmshaven 
043 Meppen 
044 Oldenburg 
045 Osnabrück 
051 Hannover 
052 Braunschweig 
053 Göttingen 
061 Bremen (Stadt) 
062 Bremerhaven (Stadt) 
071 Münster 
072 Moers 
081 Hamm 
082 Dinslaken 
083 Duisburg (Stadt) 
084 Essen 
085 Dortmund (Stadt) 
091 Hagen 
092 Düsseldorf 
093 Solingen 
094 Köln 
095 Bonn 
096 Aachen 
101 Bielefeld 
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104 Paderborn 
105 Arnsberg 
106 Siegen 
111 Kassel/Waldeck 
112 Hersfeld/Eschwege 
113 Giessen/Marburg 
121 Fulda 
122 Frankfurt 
123 Wiesbaden 
124 Darmstadt 
131 Trier 
132 Koblenz 
141 Mainz 
142 Kaiserslautern 
143 Ludwigshafen 
151 Mannheim 
152 Karlsruhe 
153 Heidelberg 
161 Freiburg 
162 Konstanz 
171 Heilbronn 
172 Stuttgart 
173 Ulm 
174 Tübingen 
175 Ravensburg 
181 Aschaffenburg 
182 Würzburg/Schweinfurt 
183 Bayreuth/Bamberg 
184 Nürnberg 
185 Ansbach 
191 Landshut 
192 Regensburg 
193 Passau/Straubing 
201 Ingolstadt 
202 Augsburg 
203 Kempten/Kaufbeuren 
204 München 
205 Garmisch-Partenkirchen 
206 Rosenheim 
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, Verkehr, Reihe 8 Binnenschiffahrt (Stuttgart 1969) 
 
To render the two systems of reporting comparable, the author devised new 
subgroups to be able to better compare the composition of the hinterland throughout 
the entire research period. Table 0-14 and Table 0-15 present the regrouped traffic 
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areas for the 1950-68 and 1969-75 periods, respectively.  
 
Table 0-14. The regrouped traffic areas, 1950-68 
Number Name 
24/26 27 28 30 Ruhr area 
32 33 Düsseldorf 
34/37 Köln 
38 39 40 41 Koblenz 
42 43 55 56 57 58/60 Frankfurt & Main area 
44 45 52/54 Mannheim & Neckar area 
46 47 48 51 Upper Rhine area 
14 15 16 17 18 20 21/23 North German canals 
(all other traffic areas) Other areas 
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, Die Binnenschiffahrt im Jahre (Stuttgart 1950) 
 
Table 0-15. The regrouped traffic areas, 1969-75 
Number Name 
72 81-85 Ruhr area 
92-93 Düsseldorf 
94-96 Köln 
113 131 132 Koblenz 
121 122 124 141 181 Frankfurt & Main area 
143 151 171-173 Mannheim & Neckar area 
142 152 161 162 174 175 Upper Rhine area 
41-43 45 51 53 91 101 104 105 111 112 North German canals 
(all other traffic areas) Other areas 
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, Verkehr, Reihe 8 Binnenschiffahrt (Stuttgart 1969) 
 
Although there are still a number of differences between the regrouped traffic areas 
before and after 1969, the boundaries between the major Rhine ports and the inland 
ports on the major tributaries and canals are fairly accurate. The Ruhr, Düsseldorf and 
Cologne areas are almost the same. The Koblenz area (or Middle Rhine) from Bonn 
to Mainz is slightly smaller after 1969, but still comprises the Mosel region and the 
ports of Koblenz and Mainz. The Frankfurt and Main area, the Mannheim and 
Neckar area and the rest of the Upper Rhine area are almost the same, as is the North 
German canal area, which comprises the Dortmund-Ems and Mittelland canals. 
Other traffic areas fall outside the river system of the Rhine, and its tributaries and 
canals and are therefore grouped together under the term ‘Other areas’.  
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Figure 0-5. The regrouped traffic areas, 1950-68 and 1969-75 
1950-1968 1969-1975 
  
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, Die Binnenschiffahrt im Jahre (Stuttgart 1950) (for the traffic regions 
used between 1950 and 1968); Statistisches Bundesamt, Verkehr, Reihe 8 Binnenschiffahrt (Stuttgart 
1969) (for the traffic regions used after 1969). The regrouping is defined by the author. 
 
A second clustering of the traffic areas was undertaken to examine the distribution of 
the cargo flows to the various parts of the Rhine, i.e. the Lower, Middle and Upper 
Rhine. The Lower Rhine consists of the Rhine from the Dutch border up to, but 
excluding, Bonn. The Middle Rhine stretches from just below Bonn to Bingen, just 
below Mainz. The Upper Rhine comprises the entire stretch between Bingen and the 
Swiss border. Figure 0-6 shows the boundaries of the sections of the Rhine based on 
the definition of the traffic areas both before and after 1969. For the purpose of the 
analysis, the various sections of the Rhine also include the tributaries and canals 
connected to the particular section. Although the boundaries are not identical 
between the two maps in Figure 0-6, the sections of the Rhine are accurately 
demarcated, rendering both maps comparable.   
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Figure 0-6. Sections of the Rhine, 1950-68 and 1969-75 
1950-1968 1969-1975 
  
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, Die Binnenschiffahrt im Jahre (Stuttgart 1950) (for the traffic regions 
used between 1950 and 1968); Statistisches Bundesamt, Verkehr, Reihe 8 Binnenschiffahrt (Stuttgart 
1969) (for the traffic regions used after 1969). The regrouping is defined by the author.  
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Appendix E: The composition of the German metropolitan regions 
 
The German metropolitan regions (Metropolregionen) emerged in the 1990s and were 
developed by German spatial planning institutes and government agencies in response 
to EU efforts to foster a regional perspective in European and national policy-
making.713 The Rhine-Ruhr metropolitan region stretches from Bonn in the south to 
Mönchengladbach in the west and Hamm in the north. However, the region has few 
historical roots, consisting of at least four economic areas with highly diverse 
historical experiences. The Ruhr area is probably the most well known. The use of the 
term Rhine-Ruhr to denote a historical region therefore seems to be a-historic, but is 
currently the most accurate label available to denote the area relevant to this study. 
The older and well-known regional unit of the Ruhr area is too restrictive for the 
research domain of the study, which necessitates the inclusion of large urban 
concentrations such as Cologne and Düsseldorf, as well as chemical centres such as 
Bayer’s headquarters in Leverkusen. Other metropolitan areas that have been 
identified since the 1990s are also relevant. Figure 0-7, Figure 0-8 and Figure 0-9 
show the geographical composition of the Rhine-Ruhr, Rhine-Main and Rhine-
Neckar regions consisting of Landkreise, a German administrative unit between the 
level of municipalities (Kreise) and states (Länder). 
 
                                               
713 H.H. Blotevogel, ‘The Rhine-Ruhr metropolitan region’, European Planning Studies 6 (1998) 395-
410, here: 395-396, 401; Federal Office for Building and Regional Planning (Bundesamt für Bauwesen 
und Raumordnung), Metropolitan areas in Europe (Bonn 2011) 7-24. 
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Figure 0-7. The Rhine-Ruhr metropolitan region with Landkreise and 
cities (of more than 50,000 inhabitants) 
 
Source: Map created by the author based on regional definitions provided in: Bundesamt für Bauwesen 
und Raumordnung (BBR) and Initiativkreis Europäische Metropolregionen in Deutschland (IKM), 
Regionales Monitoring 2008. Daten und Karten zu den Europäischen Metropolregionen in Deutschland 
(Bonn 2008) 7. http://www.deutsche-metropolregionen.org/fileadmin/ikm/IKM-
Veroeffentlichungen/IKM-Monitoring2008_lite.pdf, accessed 11 July 2014.  
 
	
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Figure 0-8. The Rhine-Main metropolitan region with Landkreise and 
cities (of more than 50,000 inhabitants) 
 
Source: Map created by the author based on regional definitions provided in: Bundesamt für Bauwesen 
und Raumordnung (BBR) and Initiativkreis Europäische Metropolregionen in Deutschland (IKM), 
Regionales Monitoring 2008. Daten und Karten zu den Europäischen Metropolregionen in 
Deutschland (Bonn 2008) 7. http://www.deutsche-metropolregionen.org/fileadmin/ikm/IKM-
Veroeffentlichungen/IKM-Monitoring2008_lite.pdf, accessed 11 July 2014. 
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Figure 0-9 The Rhine-Neckar metropolitan region with Landkreise and 
cities (of more than 50,000 inhabitants) 
 
Source: Map created by the author based on regional definitions provided in: Bundesamt für Bauwesen 
und Raumordnung (BBR) and Initiativkreis Europäische Metropolregionen in Deutschland (IKM), 
Regionales Monitoring 2008. Daten und Karten zu den Europäischen Metropolregionen in Deutschland 
(Bonn 2008) 7. http://www.deutsche-metropolregionen.org/fileadmin/ikm/IKM-
Veroeffentlichungen/IKM-Monitoring2008_lite.pdf, accessed 11 July 2014.  
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Primary sources 
 
Public archives 
Nationaal Archief, Den Haag (NL-HaNA) 
 2.05.113 Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (Code Archief) 
2.06.087 Ministerie van Economische Zaken (Centraal Archief)  
2.06.125 Ministerie van Economische Zaken (Directie Wetgeving en andere 
Juridische Aangelegenheden) 
 2.17.03 Ministerie van VROM (Centrale Sector) 
Stadsarchief Rotterdam (GAR) 
 Archief Havenbedrijf, Rotterdam (AHB) 
Bundesarchiv, Koblenz (BAK) 
 Z 8 Verwaltung für Wirtschaft des Vereinigten Wirtschaftsgebietes 
Z 14 Der Berater für den Marshallplan beim Vorsitzer des Verwaltungsrates 
des Vereinigten Wirtschaftsgebietes 
B 102 Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft 
B 136 Bundeskanzleramt 
B 146 Bundesministerium für den Marshallplan/Bundesministerium für 
wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit (bis 1957) 
 
Company archives 
Archief Koninklijke Van Ommeren NV, Rotterdam (VOA) 
British Petroleum Archive, Coventry (BPA) 
Historisches Konzernarchiv RWE, Essen (HK RWE) 
Shell Historical Archive, The Hague (SHA) 
 
Other primary sources 
46. Kabinettssitzung am 8. Dezember 1958 (Kabinettsprotokolle der Bundesregierung 
online), ‘[A.] Lage des Steinkohlenbergbaues’.  
Fischer-Tropsch Archiv (http://www.fischer-tropsch.org/) 
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Summary in Dutch 
Deze dissertatie onderzoekt de gevolgen van de transitie van kolen naar olie als 
belangrijkste energiebron voor de relatie tussen de Rotterdamse haven en het Duitse 
Rijn-Ruhrgebied. Tussen 1880 en 1914 ontpopte de Rotterdamse haven zich tot de 
grootste haven van Europa dankzij de im- en export van bulkgoederen van de kolen- 
en staal industrie in het Duitse Ruhrgebied. Met de Rijn beschikte Rotterdam over de 
goedkoopste transport modaliteit, binnenvaart, voor bulkgoederen. IJzererts, kolen, 
hout en graan waren de belangrijkste goederen die in Rotterdam werden overgeslagen. 
Na de Tweede Wereldoorlog kwam de kolenproductie moeizaam op gang, met name 
in Duitsland. Aanvankelijk was een gebrek aan mankracht en voedsel het voornaamste 
probleem maar toen de Duitse economie onstuimig begon te groeien vanaf het begin 
van de jaren 1950 bleef de kolenindustrie onderbemand. Er was volop werk en de 
mijnen waren geen aantrekkelijke werkomgeving. Omdat de lonen sterk stegen, steeg 
ook de prijs van kolen aanhoudend. Bovendien lukt het de kolenindustrie maar niet de 
productie te verhogen met het tempo van de groeiende vraag naar energie.  
Vanaf het einde van de oorlog poogden de geallieerde bezetters en na 1949 
ook de Duitse Bondsregering om de Duitse energiebalans aan te vullen met 
geïmporteerde energie. De Amerikaanse en Britse bezetters trachtten vanaf 1947 de 
olieraffinage capaciteit in hun bezettingszones te verhogen om energie en 
brandstoftekorten aan te vullen met geïmporteerde ruwe olie. De vondst van grote 
voorraden olie in het Midden-Oosten door Amerikaanse oliebedrijven opende een 
nieuwe energiebron voor West Europa. Het Marshall plan financierde de import van 
Midden-Oosten olie in Europa, alsmede de verdere uitbouw van de raffinage 
capaciteit. Duitsland bleef niet achter. Als energiebron had olie ten opzichte van 
kolen een belangrijk voordeel. De prijs had een dalende tendens, zeker na de Suez 
crisis van 1956. In een poging de kolenindustrie te dwingen tot prijsconcurrentie om 
de energiekosten voor de Duitse industrie te doen dalen, opende de Bondsregering in 
1956 de Duitse markt voor stookolie. Motorbrandstoffen concurreerden niet direct 
met kolen, stookolie daarentegen wel. Huishoudens, lichte industrie maar ook zware 
industrie konden vrij eenvoudig omschakelen van kolen op stookolie als de prijs dat 
aantrekkelijk maakte. Toen de stookolieprijzen en de maritieme transportkosten 
kelderden na het einde van de Suez crisis in 1957, stroomden grote hoeveelheden 
stookolie de Duitse markt op. Tegelijkertijd groeiden de onverkochte voorraden kolen 
bij de mijnen in het Ruhrgebied. Vanaf 1957-58, het begin van de kolencrisis, zette 
het verval van de Duitse kolenindustrie in en kwam deze nooit meer te boven. Olie, 
daarentegen, groeide onstuimig, met name in het Duitse Rijn-Ruhrgebied met haar 
grote concentratie industrie en stedelijke agglomeraties. De aan de Rijn gevestigde 
Duitse kolenchemie-industrie, waaronder de meest innovatieve bedrijven ter wereld, 
slaagde erin haar productie over te schakelen op olie. Daarmee herwon het haar 
vooroorlogse voorname positie in de wereld. Het betekende ook de basis voor een 
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enorme concentratie olie en petrochemische industrie in het Rijn-Ruhrgebied die zich 
tussen 1950 en 1975 ongebreideld ontwikkelde.  
De enorme groei en schaalvergroting van de olie-industrie na 1945 in West-
Europa had grote implicaties voor het Europese transportnetwerk van zeehavens, 
binnenhavens, spoorlijnen en wegen. Als gevolg van de groeiende vraag naar olie, 
werden nieuwe transport modaliteiten geïntroduceerd. Het vervoer per vrachtwagen 
steeg veel sneller dan het vervoer per binnenwater of spoor. Pijpleidingen werden 
aangelegd omdat het binnenwater en het spoor het groeiende vervoer van ruwe olie 
niet konden verwerken. Olietankers groeiden voortdurend in omvang, wat ingrijpende 
havenaanpassingen tot gevolg had om de grotere schepen te kunnen lossen. Om 
maximaal van de schaalvoordelen in het olietransport te kunnen profiteren werden 
havens ook aantrekkelijke locaties voor olieraffinaderijen. Ook Rotterdam profiteerde 
van de trend en groeide uit tot Europa’s grootste concentratie van raffinage capaciteit 
in de jaren 1960 en 1970. De industrialisatie van de Rotterdamse haven – 
gemeentelijk beleid ingezet na de vele crises die de Duitse transitohandel verstoorden 
tussen 1914 en 1945 – was daarmee succesvol. De drie grote havenuitbreidingen 
tussen 1945 en 1975 – Botlek, Europoort en Maasvlakte I – en de groei van de olie-
industrie zorgden ervoor dat Rotterdam zich al in 1963 de grootste haven van de 
wereld mocht noemen. Dit was echter geen vanzelfsprekendheid wat met name in de 
relatie tussen haven en achterland duidelijk werd.  
De groeiende vraag naar het vervoer van olie in het Duitse achterland stelde de 
Rotterdamse haven voor grote uitdagingen. In 1955, bereikte de haven het bericht dat 
een groep oliebedrijven, waaronder de Duitse dochterondernemingen van Standard 
Oil (het huidige ExxonMobil), Koninklijke/Shell en het Britse BP een ruwe 
oliepijpleiding wilden aanleggen naar hun nieuwe raffinaderijen in het Rijn-
Ruhrgebied. De groep bedrijven had twee havens op het oog: Rotterdam en het 
Noord-Duitse Wilhelmshaven. Esso AG, de Duitse dochter van Standard Oil, had 
haast bij de besluitvorming omdat diens raffinaderij al in 1959 in productie kwam. 
Een pijpleiding moest voordien aangelegd zijn. Esso wilde de grootste in de vaart 
zijnde tankers inzetten om de pijpleiding te bevoorraden. Het Rotterdamse 
Gemeentelijk Havenbedrijf schrok van de omvang van de plannen. Omdat de 
bestaande havenbekkens niet voldeden aan de eisen van de Esso begon het 
Havenbedrijf inderhaast met plannen voor nieuwe havenbekkens. Uitmondend in 
1957 in het uitbreidingsplan Europoort, Rotterdam’s grootste naoorlogse 
havenuitbreiding, gaf het Havenbedrijf er blijk van de tekens van de tijd begrepen te 
hebben. Wilde de haven een deel van de groeiende ruwe olie-import in West Europa 
verwerken dan moest het haar haven drastisch aanpassen. De diepwater bekkens van 
Europoort konden de steeds dieperstekende tankers ontvangen. Daarmee was echter 
het probleem van de pijpleiding niet opgelost, die was namelijk aan Wilhelmshaven 
toegewezen. De financiële hulp van de Duitse Bondsregering en de snellere 
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oplevering van de havenaanpassingen aldaar hadden Rotterdam afgetroefd. Het was 
duidelijk dat de groep onder leiding van Esso op Duitse sentimenten en belangen had 
ingespeeld. 
Het enige bedrijf dat zich onttrok aan de Wilhelmshaven pijpleiding en de 
Rotterdamse haven bleef steunen was Koninklijke/Shell. Rotterdam was de thuisbasis 
voor Shell’s grootste raffinaderij in Europa en sinds 1902 een belangrijke schakel in de 
Europese activiteiten van de Groep. Echter, de steun voor Rotterdam was niet 
onvoorwaardelijk. Het management in de hoofdkantoren van Shell in Den Haag en 
London waren van mening dat de potentiële schaalvoordelen van het vervoer van 
ruwe olie per tanker en pijpleiding niet konden worden gerealiseerd zolang 
pijpleidingen op nationaal niveau werden gepland. Shell nam daarom in 1956 het 
initiatief tot een onderneming die tot doel had een Trans-Europese pijpleiding te 
bestuderen. De onderneming, Sappeur, slaagde erin vrijwel alle grote en kleine 
Europese oliebedrijven met raffinaderijen op het continent aan tafel te krijgen. Het 
plan was om de totale Europese vraag naar ruwe olie uit het Midden-Oosten via 
Marseille te voldoen. Een pijpleiding zou Marseille via Straatsburg en Keulen met 
Rotterdam, Antwerpen, Wilhelmshaven en Hamburg verbinden. Voor Rotterdam 
betekende dit plan een tweede schok. Alhoewel Rotterdam zou beschikken over een 
pijpleiding tussen Rotterdam en het Rijn-Ruhrgebied, zou de pijpleiding in de 
verkeerde richting pompen. In plaats van ruwe olie uit binnenlopende tankers te 
verpompen naar Duitsland, zou de olie vanuit Duitsland naar de Rotterdamse 
raffinaderijen vloeien. Daarmee zou de haven jaarlijks miljoenen guldens aan 
inkomsten van lossende tankers derven, wat de exploitatie van de voorziene 
havenuitbreiding in het plan Europoort in gevaar zou kunnen brengen. Na twee jaar 
onderzoek en onderhandeling strandde het Trans-Europese pijpleiding plan echter. 
De grote verschillen in wetgeving tussen de verschillende landen die de pijpleiding 
zou doorkruisen, onzekerheid over de ontwikkeling en timing van de vraag naar ruwe 
olie en een periode van lage conjunctuur maakte consensus tussen de bedrijven 
onmogelijk. Het geplande Trans-Europese pijpleidingnetwerk viel uiteen – mede 
door het gebrek aan Europese integratie wat toen nog goeddeels opgang moest komen 
– in een aantal regionale pijpleidingen die enerzijds de Noordzee havens Rotterdam 
en Wilhelmshaven en anderzijds de Mediterrane havens Marseille, Genua en Triest 
verbonden met Duitsland. De noordelijke leidingen reikten tot Frankfurt, de 
zuidelijke leidingen tot Karlsruhe en Mannheim.  
In 1957 werd duidelijk dat Koninklijke/Shell de komst van een Trans-
Europese pijpleiding niet langer afwachtte en besloot om een pijpleiding tussen 
Rotterdam en Keulen aan te leggen. Zo kreeg Rotterdam toch nog haar vurig 
gewenste pijpleiding naar het Duitse achterland. Deze pijpleiding werd in 1968 
aangevuld met een grotere ruwe olieleiding en een olieproductenleiding die de 
Rotterdamse raffinaderijen verbond met de grote industriële en urbane centra langs de 
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Rijn: het Rijn-Ruhrgebied, het Rijn-Main gebied en het Rijn-Neckar gebied. 
Opnieuw was Koninklijke/Shell, middels de Duitse dochteronderneming van groot 
belang. Het besluit van Duitse Shell om in 1965 een olieproductenpijpleiding aan de 
leggen tussen Keulen, Frankfurt en Mannheim in plaats van het bouwen van een 
nieuwe raffinaderij in Frankfurt leidde tot de aanleg van de Rijn-Mijn pijpleiding. In 
1968 werd deze aangesloten op Rotterdam.  
De pijpleiding-episode maakte duidelijk dat Rotterdam niet de gedoodverfde 
kandidaat was om de belangrijkste oliehaven van het Duitse achterland te worden, 
niettegenstaande de grote importantie die de haven voor het Ruhrgebied had in het 
vooroorlogse tijdperk van kolen. Nationale belangen en de transnationale blik van 
multinationale ondernemingen bedreigden het tot stand komen van een 
pijpleidingverbinding tussen Rotterdam en het Rijn-Ruhrgebied. Geholpen door de 
Rotterdamse belangen van Shell en het falen van het Trans-Europese project kon 
Rotterdam zich alsnog vestigen tot de belangrijkste oliehaven van het Rijn-
Ruhrgebied. Voor ruwe olie moest het die plek delen met Wilhelmshaven maar de 
omvangrijke capaciteit van de Rotterdamse raffinaderijen en de expansie van de 
pijpleidingverbindingen met Duitsland in 1968 leidden ertoe dat Duitsland 
Rotterdam’s grootste oliemarkt werd, terwijl Rotterdam zich een aanzienlijk aandeel 
in de Duitse olie-import verwierf. Mede door de aanleg van pijpleidingen ontwikkelde 
de Rotterdamse oliehaven een groot en vrijwel onbedreigd achterland in het Duitse 
Rijngebied. In combinatie met de diepe havenbekkens van Europoort en Maasvlakte I 
beschikte Rotterdam over een combinatie van havenfaciliteiten en 
achterlandverbindingen die het tot op de dag de grootste oliehaven van Europa maken.  
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